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* fix(mcp): honor an explicit null on toolset update, cover MCP lifecycle e2e PUT /v1/mcp/toolset dumped its payload with exclude_none, so a field sent as null looked exactly like one the caller left out and the stored value survived. An admin could not clear a toolset's description: the save reported success and the old text came straight back. It now dumps with exclude_unset, so absent keeps and null clears, which is what PUT /v1/mcp/server already did. A null tools list clears the selection to empty, and a null toolset_name is ignored because a toolset always has a name. Adds create, read, partial-update, clear and delete e2e coverage for MCP servers and toolsets, with every read-back polled on every replica so an edit that lands on one replica and not another fails the test, plus an enforcement test proving a key granted a toolset lists exactly that toolset's tools against the real Datadog upstream. * fix(e2e): refuse a read-back that no replica serves A read-back over an empty replica mapping satisfied every predicate and returned as if it had converged, so it would have asserted nothing and passed. No wiring can produce that today, since the replica list always falls back to at least one URL, but a helper whose whole job is proving a write reached every replica should not have a shape that passes vacuously. * fix(mcp): keep a null tools list a no-op on toolset update Treating a null tools list as a clear meant an existing client that sends tools=null during a partial update, meaning "leave the selection alone", silently lost every tool the toolset grants. That is a permission surface, so the quiet version of it is the worst version. A toolset always has a tool list, the same way it always has a name, so a null on either is now a no-op. Emptying the selection is an explicit [], which cannot be confused with a field the caller left out, and which is what the dashboard already sends. * fix(e2e): keep MCP admin routes on the data plane /v1/mcp/* is a lazily mounted feature, so a gateway registers it on the first matching request, which happens after the startup route trim that drops management endpoints. Routing it to the control plane therefore sent every MCP call to the one backend process: the new lifecycle read-backs proved a single process rather than every replica, and mcp_client's await_registered barrier waited on a registry that does not serve the tools/list call it guards, so the existing MCP suites polled a gateway that had not synced yet until poll_timeout Verified against a two-gateway split stack (backend on 4001, gateways on 4010 and 4011, one postgres): both gateways answer /v1/mcp/server and /v1/mcp/toolset, and each served 6 server reads and 7 toolset reads over the run * fix(e2e): grant the toolset by the tool's own name, not the wire name tools/list serves a tool as <prefix><tool_name>, but a toolset grants by the tool's own name: resolve_toolset_permissions reads toolset.tools[].tool_name straight through, and the prefix is added on the way out. The test built the toolset from the names tools/list reported, so the grant matched nothing, the scoped key listed no tools, and await_tools ran out its whole poll_timeout before failing Measure the prefix off search_datadog_logs, whose own name is known, rather than guessing it from the alias, since the proxy can be configured to prefix with a short server id instead. The expectation compared against tools/list stays in wire names; only what the toolset stores crosses back * test(mcp): build immutable lifecycle updates and replica results * test: validate opaque stream IDs and hide log-reader credentials * test: isolate auto-router scenarios and clean partial setup * test: honor Datadog search rate-limit reset headers * test: share the Datadog read-back deadline across retries * test: preserve captured MCP toolset update fields
129 lines
4 KiB
YAML
129 lines
4 KiB
YAML
# MCP module. Grounded in litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/. See tests/e2e/CLAUDE.md for the grammar.
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- id: mcp.list_tools.api_key.succeeds
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module: mcp
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tier: P0
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operation: list_tools
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auth_family: api_key
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assertions: [succeeds]
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source: "server.py:637"
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rationale: Core operation; most common auth path; high usage
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- id: mcp.list_tools.api_key.access_group_scoped
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module: mcp
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tier: P1
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operation: list_tools
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auth_family: api_key
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assertions: [access_group_scoped]
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source: "test_mcp_access_group_e2e.py"
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rationale: "A key granted an MCP access group sees the tagged server's tools; a key with a different group does not. Access-group-scoped tool selection at key creation"
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- id: mcp.list_tools.api_key.denied_without_permission
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module: mcp
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tier: P0
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operation: list_tools
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auth_family: api_key
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assertions: [denied_without_permission]
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source: "mcp_server_manager.py:1409"
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rationale: Permission guard is high blast-radius; multi-tenant safety
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- id: mcp.call_tool.api_key.succeeds
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module: mcp
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tier: P0
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operation: call_tool
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auth_family: api_key
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assertions: [succeeds]
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source: "server.py:849"
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rationale: Primary operation; customer-critical; high usage
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- id: mcp.call_tool.api_key.denied_without_permission
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module: mcp
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tier: P0
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operation: call_tool
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auth_family: api_key
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assertions: [denied_without_permission]
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source: "rest_endpoints.py:305-386"
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rationale: Tool-level permission guard; multi-tenant safety
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- id: mcp.list_tools.bearer.succeeds
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module: mcp
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tier: P1
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operation: list_tools
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auth_family: bearer
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assertions: [succeeds]
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source: "server.py:662"
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rationale: OAuth/bearer token flow; upstream delegation
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- id: mcp.call_tool.bearer.succeeds
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module: mcp
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tier: P1
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operation: call_tool
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auth_family: bearer
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assertions: [succeeds]
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source: "server.py:886"
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rationale: Bearer token forwarding for tool invocation
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- id: mcp.list_tools.oauth.succeeds
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module: mcp
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tier: P1
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operation: list_tools
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auth_family: oauth
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assertions: [succeeds]
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source: "rest_endpoints.py:138-188"
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rationale: Interactive OAuth2 flow; live token management
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- id: mcp.call_tool.oauth.succeeds
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module: mcp
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tier: P1
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operation: call_tool
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auth_family: oauth
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assertions: [succeeds]
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source: "db.py user_oauth_credential lookup"
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rationale: OAuth2 token passthrough; per-user credential storage
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- id: mcp.list_tools.none.succeeds
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module: mcp
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tier: P1
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operation: list_tools
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auth_family: none
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assertions: [succeeds]
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source: "mcp_server_manager.py:1485-1492"
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rationale: Public/anonymous servers; delegate_auth_to_upstream
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- id: mcp.call_tool.none.succeeds
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module: mcp
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tier: P1
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operation: call_tool
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auth_family: none
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assertions: [succeeds]
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source: "rest_endpoints.py:305-334"
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rationale: No upstream auth required; demo servers
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- id: mcp.get_prompt.api_key.succeeds
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module: mcp
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tier: P1
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operation: get_prompt
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auth_family: api_key
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assertions: [succeeds]
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source: "server.py:1042"
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rationale: Prompt op; same auth stack as tools
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- id: mcp.read_resource.api_key.succeeds
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module: mcp
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tier: P1
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operation: read_resource
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auth_family: api_key
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assertions: [succeeds]
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source: "server.py:1177"
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rationale: Resource op; same permission model as tools
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- id: mcp.list_prompts.api_key.succeeds
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module: mcp
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tier: P2
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operation: list_prompts
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auth_family: api_key
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assertions: [succeeds]
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source: "server.py:993"
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rationale: Smoke-level; same auth stack as list_tools
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- id: mcp.list_resources.api_key.succeeds
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module: mcp
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tier: P2
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operation: list_resources
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auth_family: api_key
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assertions: [succeeds]
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source: "server.py:1089"
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rationale: Smoke; rarely used; same auth model as tools
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- id: mcp.list_tools.api_key.toolset_scoped
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module: mcp
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tier: P0
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operation: list_tools
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auth_family: api_key
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assertions: [toolset_scoped]
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source: "user_api_key_auth_mcp.py:2137"
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rationale: "A key granted a toolset lists exactly the toolset's tools: the rest of the server's catalog stays hidden and every stored name resolves"
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