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https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm.git
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36aec560db
* feat: add silent CLI token refresh for apiKeyHelper support
lite auth print-token prints a valid proxy credential for use as Claude
Code's apiKeyHelper, transparently refreshing it first if the cached JWT
is stale. This unblocks MDM-managed apiKeyHelper deployments (managed
via `lite auth print-token`) that need silent mid-session credential
rotation without restarting the client.
Refresh capability is backed by a virtual key minted with an empty model
list and cli_refresh metadata, kept strictly separate from the actual
(short-lived, real-model-scoped) call credential -- so a leak of the
credential that flows through every LLM request and subprocess env var
can't also self-renew. The refresh flow is single-use: /sso/cli/refresh
mints a fresh JWT + refresh token pair and blocks the presented refresh
token immediately, so a replay can't mint a second pair from it.
Server: /sso/cli/refresh (rotate) and /sso/cli/logout (revoke) endpoints.
lite login now also stores a refresh token; lite logout revokes it
server-side instead of only clearing the local file.
* fix: allow non-admin users to hit CLI refresh routes; resolve apiKeyHelper base_url from token.json
Found via a live end-to-end test against a real proxy + real Claude Code
session: /sso/cli/refresh and /sso/cli/logout were unreachable for any
non-proxy-admin caller, since Depends(user_api_key_auth) pulls in a
route-RBAC gate that 403s any route not on an explicit allowlist. That
made the feature unusable for actual end users, who authenticate as
internal_user. Add both routes to internal_user_routes; the handlers
already do their own fine-grained check (metadata.cli_refresh) same as
/key/block does today.
Also: `lite auth print-token` required an explicit --base-url/
LITELLM_PROXY_URL matching the stored token's origin, defaulting to
localhost:4000 otherwise. But apiKeyHelper is configured bare (no
flags), so this always mismatched a real deployment. Track whether
--base-url was explicitly passed (via click's ParameterSource) and, if
not, resolve the server from token.json directly instead of the CLI
default.
* test: mock refresh-token minting in test_cli_poll_key_tolerates_missing_user_row
Landed on litellm_internal_staging after this branch's refresh-key minting
change; needs the same mock as the other cli_poll_key tests since minting
now runs unconditionally whenever a JWT is generated.
* fix(ci): update test_cli_auth.py for refresh_token contract, regenerate schema.d.ts
_poll_for_authentication now always includes "refresh_token" in its
returned dict, and _handle_team_selection_during_polling returns a dict
instead of a bare JWT string -- test_cli_auth.py predates this branch's
refresh-token work and still asserted the old shapes.
schema.d.ts regenerated via `npm run gen:api` to pick up the new
/sso/cli/refresh and /sso/cli/logout routes (plus unrelated drift from
other PRs merged since it was last generated).
* fix(ci): apply CI's own schema.d.ts diff (enterprise routes I can't generate locally)
Local `npm run gen:api` only sees OSS routes -- this machine's
litellm_enterprise editable install points at a now-deleted temp
directory, so it silently drops enterprise-only routes from the spec.
Applied the exact diff CI's own generation produced instead of
re-running the generator locally.
* fix: close refresh-token race, fail closed on DB down, fix logout base_url
Addresses Greptile review findings on the CLI refresh-token PR:
- cli_refresh_token minted a new JWT + refresh token BEFORE blocking the
presented one. Two concurrent requests bearing the same refresh token
could both pass auth and both mint fresh pairs, yielding four live
credentials from one consumed token. Now the presented token is
consumed atomically first via update_many (only succeeding if it flips
blocked from False/None to True); the loser gets count=0 and is
rejected before anything is minted.
- When prisma_client is None, refresh silently returned a new JWT
without ever being able to mark the presented token consumed, leaving
it valid indefinitely. Now fails closed with a 500 instead.
- `lite logout` sent its revocation POST to ctx.obj["base_url"], which
defaults to localhost:4000 when --base-url isn't passed -- the same
bug print_token had before the base_url_explicit fix, just missed
here. Now resolves the same way: trust the stored token's origin
unless the caller explicitly overrode --base-url.
* fix(ci): satisfy ruff format and narrow token_data type in logout
* fix(security): never trust refresh-token metadata for authorization
Addresses a real privilege-escalation path Veria flagged: cli_refresh_token
read team_id, team_alias, and max_budget straight off the presented
token's own metadata and used them to authorize the new JWT. Since any
authenticated user can self-mint a virtual key with arbitrary metadata
via the ordinary /key/generate endpoint, a self-forged key with
{"cli_refresh": true, "team_id": "<any-team>", "max_budget": 999999999}
would sail through _require_cli_refresh_token's only check
(metadata.cli_refresh == True) and get a JWT scoped to a team the
caller never belonged to, with a budget it never had -- full
cross-team / budget bypass, and a removed team member could keep
refreshing team-scoped sessions indefinitely.
Metadata's team_id is now treated as an untrusted UX hint only: honored
solely if the CALLER (identified by the authenticated key's own
user_id, not client input) is a current member per a fresh
get_user_object lookup. team_alias and max_budget are never read back
from metadata at all -- team_alias comes from a live get_team_object
lookup and max_budget is recomputed with the exact same capping logic
the initial SSO login poll uses. _mint_cli_refresh_token no longer
accepts or stores team_alias/max_budget, only the team_id hint.
Added regression tests proving: a forged/stale team_id is dropped
(falls back to no team, not silently honored), and a forged max_budget
in metadata never reaches the issued JWT.
* fix(ci): catch HTTPException specifically instead of bare Exception (BLE001)
* fix: un-consume refresh token if minting the replacement fails
Greptile flagged a real reliability gap: cli_refresh_token blocks the
presented token atomically, then does several more DB calls before
returning a replacement (user lookup, team lookup, JWT mint, new
refresh-key mint). Since this endpoint exists specifically for fully
unattended apiKeyHelper operation, a single transient failure in that
window (DB hiccup, etc.) permanently stranded the user: their old
token was already dead and no new one was issued, with no recovery
path short of a full interactive browser re-login.
Wrap that window in try/except; on any failure, best-effort revert the
consumed token back to usable (blocked=False) before re-raising, so a
retry can succeed. Standard compensating-action pattern since
generate_key_helper_fn doesn't take an injectable transaction, so
wrapping the whole thing in a real DB transaction isn't practical here.
* fix(security): refresh key had unrestricted model access, not none
Critical bug: _mint_cli_refresh_token used models=[] intending "no LLM
access", but that's backwards in this codebase. Per
_check_model_access_helper: `len(filtered_models) == 0 and len(models)
== 0` -> all_model_access = True. An empty models list on a key with no
team_id means UNRESTRICTED access to every model, not zero access. The
CLI refresh token -- meant to be usable for nothing but silently
exchanging itself for a new JWT -- was actually a fully unrestricted
API key for its entire 90-day lifetime, completely undermining the
whole point of keeping it separate from the short-lived call
credential.
Fixed with two independent layers: allowed_routes hard-restricts the
key to exactly /sso/cli/refresh and /sso/cli/logout (the real enforced
boundary, checked in the shared user_api_key_auth dependency for every
route); models is set to an unmatchable sentinel string as
defense-in-depth in case any code path only consults the models field.
Added an end-to-end regression test that exercises the actual
model-access-control function against a key shaped like the minted
refresh token, rather than only asserting on what arguments were passed
to the key-generation call -- the latter kind of test is exactly what
let the original bug ship, since asserting `models == []` is equally
consistent with "no access" and "unrestricted access" without checking
what the access-control code actually does with that shape.
Also: the compensating-rollback added for reliability un-blocked a
consumed refresh token even when the underlying user no longer exists.
That's a permanent, intentional rejection, not a transient failure --
un-blocking it would let a stale refresh token become valid again for a
different account if the user_id is ever reused/re-registered. Moved
the user-existence check outside the rollback-on-failure block so it
stays permanently blocked.
* refactor: rotate CLI refresh tokens via regenerate_key_fn instead of hand-rolled consume/rollback
The refresh token is already a plain litellm virtual key, so rotation can
delegate to the same atomic DB update /key/regenerate uses instead of a
bespoke update_many + compensating-rollback dance. This makes silent CLI
refresh an Enterprise feature, same as regular key regeneration.
* refactor: replace CLI stateless JWT + refresh-key pair with one self-rotating virtual key
The CLI previously minted two credentials on login: a stateless self-signed
JWT for LLM calls, and a separate DB-backed refresh-only key (scoped away
from ever calling an LLM) just to authorize minting a new JWT. Collapse
this into a single real virtual key, used directly as the LLM bearer token
and re-presented to /sso/cli/refresh to rotate its own secret in place.
This also means the CLI session key now shows up in the Admin UI's Keys
page and can be revoked/regenerated like any other key, rather than being
an invisible, unmanageable stateless token.
* refactor: drop silent CLI refresh, key just expires and requires re-login
/sso/cli/refresh only ever benefited Enterprise deployments (regenerate_key_fn's
gate), while everyone else already fell through to "re-run lite login" on
failure. Cut the endpoint, the rotation logic, and the client-side refresh
path entirely; print-token now just prints the cached key until it hits its
LITELLM_CLI_JWT_EXPIRATION_HOURS duration, then fails fast telling the user
to log in again. Session key itself is unaffected: still a real, revocable
virtual key visible in the Keys UI, `lite logout` still revokes it directly.
* fix(ci): regenerate schema.d.ts after removing /sso/cli/refresh route
* revert: go back to stateless JWT, keep only lite auth print-token
The virtual-key redesign (revocable, Keys-UI-visible credential) wasn't
needed just to support print-token, and cost real server-side surface
(a mint path, a logout-revoke endpoint, migrated tests/docs) for a property
this repo doesn't need yet. Reverting cli_poll_key/_types.py/schema.d.ts
back to the original stateless-JWT design; the only durable addition from
this whole effort is `lite auth print-token` (reads the cached credential,
prints it while fresh, fails with a clear message once it's past
LITELLM_CLI_JWT_EXPIRATION_HOURS) plus the base_url_explicit plumbing it
needs. `lite logout` goes back to clearing the local file only, since a
stateless JWT can't be revoked server-side.
* refactor: move CLI token freshness check to cli_token_utils, drop unnecessary renames
Addresses review: the freshness check is a pure token-shape/timestamp
util, not command logic, so it belongs alongside the other SDK-level
CLI token helpers (load_cli_token, get_litellm_gateway_api_key) rather
than in commands/auth.py. Also reverted a few incidental jwt_token/
session_key variable and string renames that weren't load-bearing.
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|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| a2a_protocol | ||
| anthropic_interface/exceptions | ||
| batches | ||
| caching | ||
| completion_extras | ||
| containers | ||
| enterprise | ||
| expected_fine_tuning_api | ||
| expected_responses_api_request | ||
| experimental_mcp_client | ||
| google_genai | ||
| images | ||
| integrations | ||
| interactions | ||
| litellm_core_utils | ||
| llms | ||
| models | ||
| ocr | ||
| passthrough | ||
| proxy | ||
| realtime_api | ||
| repositories | ||
| rerank_api | ||
| responses | ||
| router_strategy | ||
| router_utils | ||
| sandbox | ||
| secret_managers | ||
| test_router | ||
| types | ||
| vector_stores | ||
| videos | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| conftest.py | ||
| log.txt | ||
| readme.md | ||
| test__types.py | ||
| test_a2a_registry_lookup.py | ||
| test_acompletion_session_reuse_e2e.py | ||
| test_add_deployment_no_master_key.py | ||
| test_aembedding_session_reuse_e2e.py | ||
| test_anthropic_beta_headers_filtering.py | ||
| test_anthropic_skills_transformation.py | ||
| test_anthropic_sonnet_1hr_cache_pricing.py | ||
| test_azure_ad_token_credential_resolution.py | ||
| test_azure_video_router.py | ||
| test_batch_completion_models_all_responses.py | ||
| test_bedrock_anthropic_1hr_cache_pricing.py | ||
| test_bedrock_usgov_haiku_1hr_cache.py | ||
| test_bedrock_usgov_pricing.py | ||
| test_budget_ratchet_check.py | ||
| test_chat_ui_responses_session.py | ||
| test_check_licenses.py | ||
| test_check_type_discipline.py | ||
| test_circleci_path_filter.py | ||
| test_claude_fable_5_config.py | ||
| test_claude_haiku_4_5_config.py | ||
| test_claude_opus_4_6_config.py | ||
| test_claude_opus_4_8_config.py | ||
| test_claude_sonnet_4_6_config.py | ||
| test_claude_sonnet_5_config.py | ||
| test_cloudflare_workers_ai_model_metadata.py | ||
| test_command_r7b_pricing.py | ||
| test_completion_timeout_resolution.py | ||
| test_compression.py | ||
| test_constants.py | ||
| test_container_router.py | ||
| test_cost_calculation_log_level.py | ||
| test_cost_calculator.py | ||
| test_count_tokens_public_api.py | ||
| test_dashscope_image_generation.py | ||
| test_deepseek_model_metadata.py | ||
| test_dockerfile_non_root.py | ||
| test_eager_tiktoken_load.py | ||
| test_exception_exports.py | ||
| test_exception_header_preservation.py | ||
| test_exception_mapping_request_attribute.py | ||
| test_filter_out_litellm_params.py | ||
| test_get_blog_posts.py | ||
| test_git_hooks.py | ||
| test_github_close_low_quality_prs.py | ||
| test_github_review_gate.py | ||
| test_github_triage_with_llm.py | ||
| test_github_triage_workflows.py | ||
| test_gpt_5_5_model_metadata.py | ||
| test_gpt_5_6_model_metadata.py | ||
| test_gpt_image_cost_calculator.py | ||
| test_groq_streaming_encoding.py | ||
| test_guardrail_exception_status_codes.py | ||
| test_lazy_imports.py | ||
| test_litellm_params_reserved_keys.py | ||
| test_logging.py | ||
| test_lowest_latency_zero_tokens.py | ||
| test_main.py | ||
| test_main_module_header.py | ||
| test_mistral_medium_3_5_model_metadata.py | ||
| test_model_block_unblock.py | ||
| test_model_cost_aliases.py | ||
| test_model_param_helper.py | ||
| test_model_response_normalization.py | ||
| test_muse_spark_1_1_model_metadata.py | ||
| test_nested_drop_params.py | ||
| test_openai_embedding_encoding_format_default.py | ||
| test_prisma_generate_if_needed.py | ||
| test_project_alias_tracking.py | ||
| test_project_tags_pydantic.py | ||
| test_rag_openai_ingestion.py | ||
| test_rate_limit_error_unification.py | ||
| test_redact_string_in_error_paths.py | ||
| test_redis.py | ||
| test_register_model_custom_pricing.py | ||
| test_register_model_zero_cost_persistence.py | ||
| test_responses_api_bridge_non_stream.py | ||
| test_responses_id_security.py | ||
| test_responses_streaming_container_ownership.py | ||
| test_retrieve_batch_bedrock_dispatch.py | ||
| test_router.py | ||
| test_router_block_helpers.py | ||
| test_router_exception_redaction.py | ||
| test_router_google_genai.py | ||
| test_router_model_cost_isolation.py | ||
| test_router_order_fallback.py | ||
| test_router_per_deployment_num_retries.py | ||
| test_router_redis_init.py | ||
| test_router_retry_non_retryable_errors.py | ||
| test_router_retry_policy_update.py | ||
| test_router_silent_experiment.py | ||
| test_router_streaming_fallback_metadata.py | ||
| test_router_weighted_failover.py | ||
| test_ruff_strict_gate.py | ||
| test_secret_redaction.py | ||
| test_service_logger.py | ||
| test_setup_wizard.py | ||
| test_shared_session_integration.py | ||
| test_ssl_verify_unit.py | ||
| test_stream_chunk_builder_annotations.py | ||
| test_streaming_connection_cleanup.py | ||
| test_system_message_format_bug.py | ||
| test_thinking_enabled.py | ||
| test_triage_rollout_heads_up.py | ||
| test_type_check_gate.py | ||
| test_type_discipline_gate.py | ||
| test_utils.py | ||
| test_utils_module_docstring.py | ||
| test_uuid_helper.py | ||
| test_vcr_safe_body_matcher.py | ||
| test_video_generation.py | ||
| test_xai_grok_4_3_model_metadata.py | ||
| test_xai_responses_auto_routing.py | ||
Testing for litellm/
This directory 1:1 maps the the litellm/ directory, and can only contain mocked tests.
The point of this is to:
- Increase test coverage of
litellm/ - Make it easy for contributors to add tests for the
litellm/package and easily run tests without needing LLM API keys.
File name conventions
litellm/proxy/test_caching_routes.pymaps tolitellm/proxy/caching_routes.pytest_<filename>.pymaps tolitellm/<filename>.py