litellm/tests/code_coverage_tests/recursive_detector.py
Yassin Kortam 8e65265bb4
fix(agents): redact secret litellm_params fields from all /v1/agents responses (#39389)
* fix(agents): redact secret litellm_params fields from all /v1/agents responses

Secret-bearing litellm_params fields (aws_secret_access_key, api_key, and
similar) are now write-only: list, get, create, update, and patch
responses always replace them with a fixed marker, regardless of caller
role. Editing an agent no longer requires resending a real credential --
an update that omits a sensitive field, or echoes the marker back,
preserves the stored value; a real value still rotates it.

* fix(agents): redact secrets nested inside dicts/lists in litellm_params too

Greptile found that a secret nested one level down under a
non-sensitively-named key, or inside a list of per-provider configs, was
neither redacted on read nor restored symmetrically on write (the marker
string could get persisted as the real value). Recurse into lists on the
read side, and mirror that recursion on the write side so restoration
isn't limited to top-level keys. Also fixes a regression the redact
rewrite introduced (a plain string leaf like a model name was being
misinterpreted as a JSON blob and redacted), and suppresses 3 new
test-quality-gate findings on an established repo-wide mocking pattern
this PR's new tests also use.

* fix(agents): guard list-position credential restore against misassignment

Two more real gaps Greptile/veria found in the recursive redact/restore
mechanism, verified directly against the exact reported shape
(litellm_params.model_list, each entry carrying its own nested
litellm_params.api_key/aws_secret_access_key) before fixing:

- Positional restoration inside a list could attach one entry's stored
  credential to a different entry if the list were reordered or resized
  between GET and PUT/PATCH. Restoration by index now only fires when the
  incoming and existing entries match on every non-secret field; otherwise
  the caller's own value is used (never a guessed cross-entry secret).
- A subtree collapsed to the flat REDACTED_BY_LITELM marker by the
  read-side recursion depth cap couldn't be recovered on write (the marker
  string itself would get persisted). Restore now recognizes that shape and
  recovers the whole existing subtree.

Both covered by regression tests mirroring the exact model_list shape
reported, mutation-verified.

* fix(agents): simplify list-entry credential restore to positional matching

The content-match guard from the previous commit fixed one Greptile
finding (cross-entry misassignment on reorder) but introduced a worse one:
it also rejected restoration whenever an entry's own non-secret fields
changed, which is the common case (rename a model_list entry while
leaving its own secret masked) -- silently dropping the stored credential
on an ordinary edit.

There is no stable per-element identity in a plain dict[str, object]
schema, so no rule can satisfy both 'restore whenever the entry itself
only had its secret masked' and 'never restore across a reorder' at once.
Positional correspondence is what every other part of this restore (and
the endpoints' full-replace-on-PUT semantics) already assumes, so drop
the content-match gate and rely on it here too: this fixes the common
case correctly and accepts cross-entry misassignment on a simultaneous
reorder-plus-masked-echo as a known, narrow, documented limitation (not a
leak between different agents or tenants, since it only reshuffles one
agent's own stored values). Tests updated to pin the accepted trade-off
explicitly rather than asserting it away, and to cover the previously
broken ordinary-edit case.
2026-09-02 14:28:44 -07:00

152 lines
8.1 KiB
Python

import ast
import os
IGNORE_FUNCTIONS = [
"_format_type",
"_remove_additional_properties",
"_remove_strict_from_schema",
"filter_schema_fields",
"text_completion",
"_check_for_os_environ_vars",
"clean_message",
"unpack_defs",
"convert_anyof_null_to_nullable", # has a set max depth
"add_object_type",
"strip_field",
"_transform_prompt",
"mask_dict",
"_serialize", # we now set a max depth for this
"_sanitize_request_body_for_spend_logs_payload", # testing added for circular reference
"_sanitize_value", # testing added for circular reference
"set_schema_property_ordering", # testing added for infinite recursion
"process_items", # testing added for infinite recursion + max depth set.
"_can_object_call_model", # max depth set.
"encode_unserializable_types", # max depth set.
"filter_value_from_dict", # max depth set.
"normalize_json_schema_types", # max depth set.
"_extract_fields_recursive", # max depth set.
"_remove_json_schema_refs", # max depth set.,
"_convert_schema_types", # max depth set.,
"_fix_enum_empty_strings", # max depth set.,
"get_access_token", # max depth set.,
"_redact_base64", # max depth set.
"_contains_vision_content", # max depth set.
"_read_all_bytes", # max depth set.
"_fix_enum_types", # max depth set.
"_collect_argument_paths", # max depth set.
"_split_text", # max depth set.
"_mask_sequence", # max depth set.
"_walk_payload", # max depth set (DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH_SENSITIVE_DATA_MASKER).
"_delete_nested_value_custom", # max depth set (bounded by number of path segments).
"filter_exceptions_from_params", # max depth set (default 20) to prevent infinite recursion.
"__getattr__", # lazy loading pattern in litellm/__init__.py with proper caching to prevent infinite recursion.
"_validate_inheritance_chain", # max depth set (default 100) to prevent infinite recursion in policy inheritance validation.
"_basic_json_schema_validate", # max depth set.
"extract_text_from_a2a_message", # max depth set (default 10) to prevent infinite recursion in A2A message parsing.
"_convert_to_json_serializable_dict", # max depth set (default 20) and circular reference protection to prevent infinite recursion.
"dict", # max depth set. _LiteLLMParamsDictView.dict() calls builtin dict(), not itself.
"_read_image_bytes", # max depth set.
"_get_masked_values", # max depth set (default 20) to prevent infinite recursion while masking nested sensitive config dicts.
"_redact_sensitive_litellm_params", # max depth set (default 10).
"_redact_secret_values_in_obj", # max depth set (default 10, _REDACT_SECRET_MAX_DEPTH); fails closed by returning "REDACTED" at the cap.
"_resolve", # OCI: $ref resolver bounded by `resolving_stack` cycle guard.
"resolve_oci_schema_anyof", # OCI: bounded by JSON-schema tree depth (no cycles possible in well-formed input).
"sanitize_oci_schema", # OCI: bounded by JSON-schema tree depth.
"_freeze_for_dedupe", # OTEL: max depth set (default 16, _FREEZE_MAX_DEPTH); fails closed by returning repr(value) at the cap.
"apply_json_merge_patch", # max depth set (_MAX_MERGE_DEPTH=64); fails closed by raising ValueError at the cap.
"_filter_argument_value", # max depth set (DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH); fails closed by blocking the tool call at the cap.
"_redact_scanned_content", # max depth set (DEFAULT_MAX_RECURSE_DEPTH); fails closed by returning "[REDACTED]" at the cap.
"_iter_fallback_targets", # max depth set (2 * ROUTER_MAX_FALLBACKS); fails closed by raising ValueError at the cap.
"_mergeable_branch", # max depth set (_MAX_SCHEMA_FLATTEN_DEPTH=32) plus a seen_refs cycle guard; passes the schema through untouched at the cap.
"json_string_leaves", # max depth set (MAX_STRUCTURED_CONTENT_SCAN_DEPTH); fails closed by raising at the cap so nothing goes unscanned.
"with_json_string_leaves", # transitively bounded: only runs on a tree json_string_leaves already walked under the cap.
"json_unrewritable_labels", # max depth set (MAX_STRUCTURED_CONTENT_SCAN_DEPTH); returns the None sentinel at the cap so the caller blocks.
"_flatten_form_field", # bounded by the nesting depth of the already-parsed request body (a finite JSON tree, no cycles possible).
"_flatten_form_data_field", # bounded by the nesting depth of the already-parsed request body (a finite JSON tree, no cycles possible).
"_json_safe", # max depth set (_MAX_DEPTH) plus a seen-ids cycle guard for self-referential input.
"_redact_agent_params_tree", # max depth set (default 10), same shape as _redact_sensitive_litellm_params.
"_restore_redacted_nested_value", # max depth set (default 10), mirrors _redact_agent_params_tree on the write side.
]
class RecursiveFunctionFinder(ast.NodeVisitor):
def __init__(self):
self.recursive_functions = []
self.ignored_recursive_functions = []
def visit_FunctionDef(self, node):
# Check if the function calls itself
if any(self._is_recursive_call(node, call) for call in ast.walk(node)):
if node.name in IGNORE_FUNCTIONS:
self.ignored_recursive_functions.append(node.name)
else:
self.recursive_functions.append(node.name)
self.generic_visit(node)
def _is_recursive_call(self, func_node, call_node):
# Check if the call node is a function call
if not isinstance(call_node, ast.Call):
return False
# Case 1: Direct function call (e.g., my_func())
if isinstance(call_node.func, ast.Name) and call_node.func.id == func_node.name:
return True
# Case 2: Method call with self (e.g., self.my_func())
if isinstance(call_node.func, ast.Attribute) and isinstance(
call_node.func.value, ast.Name
):
return (
call_node.func.value.id == "self"
and call_node.func.attr == func_node.name
)
return False
def find_recursive_functions_in_file(file_path):
with open(file_path, "r") as file:
tree = ast.parse(file.read(), filename=file_path)
finder = RecursiveFunctionFinder()
finder.visit(tree)
return finder.recursive_functions, finder.ignored_recursive_functions
def find_recursive_functions_in_directory(directory):
recursive_functions = {}
ignored_recursive_functions = {}
for root, _, files in os.walk(directory):
for file in files:
print("file: ", file)
if file.endswith(".py"):
file_path = os.path.join(root, file)
functions, ignored = find_recursive_functions_in_file(file_path)
if functions:
recursive_functions[file_path] = functions
if ignored:
ignored_recursive_functions[file_path] = ignored
return recursive_functions, ignored_recursive_functions
if __name__ == "__main__":
# Example usage
# raise exception if any recursive functions are found, except for the ignored ones
# this is used in the CI/CD pipeline to prevent recursive functions from being merged
directory_path = "./litellm"
recursive_functions, ignored_recursive_functions = (
find_recursive_functions_in_directory(directory_path)
)
print("UNIGNORED RECURSIVE FUNCTIONS: ", recursive_functions)
print("IGNORED RECURSIVE FUNCTIONS: ", ignored_recursive_functions)
if len(recursive_functions) > 0:
# raise exception if any recursive functions are found
for file, functions in recursive_functions.items():
print(
f"🚨 Unignored recursive functions found in {file}: {functions}. THIS IS REALLY BAD, it has caused CPU Usage spikes in the past. Only keep this if it's ABSOLUTELY necessary."
)
file, functions = list(recursive_functions.items())[0]
raise Exception(
f"🚨 Unignored recursive functions found include {file}: {functions}. THIS IS REALLY BAD, it has caused CPU Usage spikes in the past. Only keep this if it's ABSOLUTELY necessary."
)