mirror of
https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm.git
synced 2026-09-27 01:22:18 +00:00
Second CI run failed: ``/key/generate`` with explicit ``user_id`` returned 403 "User can only create keys for themselves. Got user_id=X, Your ID=None" in every test that called ``_create_scratch_key`` with a per-actor user_id. The bare master key's auth path was producing ``user_id=None`` in the fresh CI Postgres, which doesn't trigger the PROXY_ADMIN bypass in ``_user_can_only_create_keys_for_themselves`` reliably. Locally the same master key path worked, masking the issue. Fix: every ``_create_scratch_key`` helper now takes a seeder cleartext and the test bodies pass ``world.keys[Actor.PROXY_ADMIN].cleartext``. That actor was seeded with ``user_role=PROXY_ADMIN`` AND a concrete ``user_id``, so the bypass fires deterministically in both environments. No behavior shift in the matrices themselves — all 128 scenarios still pass locally; only the setup helper's auth identity changed. The bare-master smoke (test_smoke + test_scratch_teardown) is intentionally left on the master key path: those tests don't pass ``user_id`` in the body so they don't hit the user_id-mismatch gate.
177 lines
6.9 KiB
Python
177 lines
6.9 KiB
Python
"""Slice 10 — actor × target authz matrix for ``POST /key/update``.
|
||
|
||
Each scenario:
|
||
1. The master key seeds a fresh scratch key with a specific (user_id,
|
||
team_id, organization_id) scope on it.
|
||
2. The actor under test calls ``POST /key/update`` to flip its ``models``
|
||
field to a known marker list.
|
||
3. The test asserts the status code and (when 200) that the mutation
|
||
actually landed in the DB.
|
||
|
||
Three target shapes:
|
||
* **self**: target is scoped to the actor's own user (the actor's "own" key).
|
||
* **owner_target**: scoped to OWNER in org_a / team_alpha — the same-team /
|
||
same-org / different-user target.
|
||
* **cross_org_target**: scoped to CROSS_ORG_USER in org_b / team_beta — the
|
||
cross-org target.
|
||
|
||
Status codes are pinned against observed handler behavior.
|
||
"""
|
||
|
||
from typing import Any, Dict, List
|
||
|
||
import pytest
|
||
|
||
from .actors import TEAM_ALPHA, TEAM_BETA, Actor
|
||
|
||
pytestmark = pytest.mark.asyncio(loop_scope="session")
|
||
|
||
|
||
# (id, actor, target_shape, expected_status)
|
||
#
|
||
# Pinned against current /key/update gating:
|
||
#
|
||
# * PROXY_ADMIN bypasses every check (200).
|
||
# * ORG_ADMIN is blocked by an early role gate, regardless of target
|
||
# scope, with a 401 "Only proxy admin..." auth_error.
|
||
# * Every other (INTERNAL_USER-rolesed) actor hits one of:
|
||
# - 403 "User can only create keys for themselves" when the target key's
|
||
# user_id is not theirs;
|
||
# - 403 "Only proxy admins, team admins, or org admins can call /key/update"
|
||
# when they own the target but lack team-admin status on the target
|
||
# key's team (or the key has no team);
|
||
# - 401 "Team member does not have permissions" when they own the target
|
||
# in a team they're a member of without admin role.
|
||
_SCENARIOS = [
|
||
# ─── target = self-owned key (no team_id on the key) ──────────────────
|
||
("self/proxy_admin", Actor.PROXY_ADMIN, "self", 200),
|
||
("self/org_admin", Actor.ORG_ADMIN, "self", 401),
|
||
("self/team_admin", Actor.TEAM_ADMIN, "self", 403),
|
||
("self/internal_user", Actor.INTERNAL_USER, "self", 403),
|
||
("self/owner", Actor.OWNER, "self", 403),
|
||
("self/unrelated_same_org", Actor.UNRELATED_SAME_ORG, "self", 403),
|
||
("self/cross_org_user", Actor.CROSS_ORG_USER, "self", 403),
|
||
("self/service_account", Actor.SERVICE_ACCOUNT, "self", 403),
|
||
# ─── target = OWNER-scoped key in org_a / team_alpha ──────────────────
|
||
("owner_target/proxy_admin", Actor.PROXY_ADMIN, "owner", 200),
|
||
("owner_target/org_admin", Actor.ORG_ADMIN, "owner", 401),
|
||
# team_admin gets 403 "user can only create keys for themselves" — the
|
||
# user_id-mismatch check fires BEFORE the team-admin check.
|
||
("owner_target/team_admin", Actor.TEAM_ADMIN, "owner", 403),
|
||
("owner_target/internal_user", Actor.INTERNAL_USER, "owner", 403),
|
||
("owner_target/unrelated_same_org", Actor.UNRELATED_SAME_ORG, "owner", 403),
|
||
("owner_target/cross_org_user", Actor.CROSS_ORG_USER, "owner", 403),
|
||
("owner_target/service_account", Actor.SERVICE_ACCOUNT, "owner", 403),
|
||
# ─── target = CROSS_ORG_USER-scoped key in org_b / team_beta ──────────
|
||
("cross_org_target/proxy_admin", Actor.PROXY_ADMIN, "cross_org", 200),
|
||
("cross_org_target/org_admin", Actor.ORG_ADMIN, "cross_org", 401),
|
||
("cross_org_target/team_admin", Actor.TEAM_ADMIN, "cross_org", 403),
|
||
("cross_org_target/owner", Actor.OWNER, "cross_org", 403),
|
||
# cross_org_user owns the target (user_id matches) and is in team_beta as
|
||
# a non-admin → team_member_permission_error 401.
|
||
("cross_org_target/cross_org_user", Actor.CROSS_ORG_USER, "cross_org", 401),
|
||
("cross_org_target/service_account", Actor.SERVICE_ACCOUNT, "cross_org", 403),
|
||
]
|
||
|
||
MARKER_MODEL = "behavior-pin-update-marker-model"
|
||
|
||
|
||
async def _create_scratch_key(
|
||
proxy_client,
|
||
seeder_cleartext: str,
|
||
scratch_prefix: str,
|
||
*,
|
||
user_id: str,
|
||
team_id: str = None,
|
||
organization_id: str = None,
|
||
) -> str:
|
||
"""Seed a fresh key tagged with scratch_prefix using the proxy_admin actor.
|
||
|
||
Using the seeded PROXY_ADMIN actor (not the bare master key) makes the
|
||
setup call's auth path deterministic: user_role=PROXY_ADMIN + a concrete
|
||
user_id, which reliably triggers
|
||
``_user_can_only_create_keys_for_themselves``'s admin bypass.
|
||
"""
|
||
body: Dict[str, Any] = {"key_alias": scratch_prefix, "user_id": user_id}
|
||
if team_id is not None:
|
||
body["team_id"] = team_id
|
||
if organization_id is not None:
|
||
body["organization_id"] = organization_id
|
||
resp = await proxy_client.post(
|
||
"/key/generate",
|
||
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {seeder_cleartext}"},
|
||
json=body,
|
||
)
|
||
assert resp.status_code == 200, f"setup: seeder /key/generate failed: {resp.text}"
|
||
return resp.json()["key"]
|
||
|
||
|
||
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
||
"actor,target_shape,expected_status",
|
||
[(a, t, s) for (_id, a, t, s) in _SCENARIOS],
|
||
ids=[s[0] for s in _SCENARIOS],
|
||
)
|
||
async def test_key_update_authz_matrix(
|
||
actor: Actor,
|
||
target_shape: str,
|
||
expected_status: int,
|
||
proxy_client,
|
||
prisma,
|
||
scratch,
|
||
world,
|
||
):
|
||
caller = world.keys[actor]
|
||
|
||
seeder = world.keys[Actor.PROXY_ADMIN].cleartext
|
||
if target_shape == "self":
|
||
target_cleartext = await _create_scratch_key(
|
||
proxy_client, seeder, scratch.prefix, user_id=caller.user_id
|
||
)
|
||
elif target_shape == "owner":
|
||
target_cleartext = await _create_scratch_key(
|
||
proxy_client,
|
||
seeder,
|
||
scratch.prefix,
|
||
user_id=world.keys[Actor.OWNER].user_id,
|
||
team_id=TEAM_ALPHA,
|
||
)
|
||
elif target_shape == "cross_org":
|
||
target_cleartext = await _create_scratch_key(
|
||
proxy_client,
|
||
seeder,
|
||
scratch.prefix,
|
||
user_id=world.keys[Actor.CROSS_ORG_USER].user_id,
|
||
team_id=TEAM_BETA,
|
||
)
|
||
else:
|
||
pytest.fail(f"unknown target_shape={target_shape}")
|
||
|
||
from litellm.proxy.utils import hash_token
|
||
|
||
target_hashed = hash_token(target_cleartext)
|
||
|
||
resp = await proxy_client.post(
|
||
"/key/update",
|
||
headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {caller.cleartext}"},
|
||
json={"key": target_cleartext, "models": [MARKER_MODEL]},
|
||
)
|
||
assert resp.status_code == expected_status, (
|
||
f"{actor.value} POST /key/update {target_shape} → {resp.status_code} "
|
||
f"(expected {expected_status}). body={resp.text}"
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
row = await prisma.db.litellm_verificationtoken.find_unique(
|
||
where={"token": target_hashed}
|
||
)
|
||
assert row is not None, "scratch key vanished mid-test"
|
||
|
||
if expected_status == 200:
|
||
assert row.models == [MARKER_MODEL], (
|
||
f"{actor.value}: handler returned 200 but row.models did not flip — "
|
||
f"got {row.models!r}"
|
||
)
|
||
else:
|
||
assert row.models != [MARKER_MODEL], (
|
||
f"{actor.value}: handler returned {expected_status} but row.models was "
|
||
f"mutated to {row.models!r}"
|
||
)
|