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2edb7507c6
* fix: validate proxy request body and nested fields
Ensure caller-supplied request fields cannot override server-side deployment
configuration, and apply request-body validation consistently to nested
structures. Adjusts router kwarg handling and client-side credential handling
for base-url overrides
* test: cover router strip ordering and advisor clientside credential gate
* fix: clear deployment credentials on client base-url override
When a request overrides api_base/base_url, recompute the deployment's
litellm_params (clearing the deployment's own api_key) and drop the cached
client built for the original endpoint, so the deployment credential is not
reused for the client-supplied endpoint. Adds regression tests that assert the
credentials actually forwarded to litellm.completion/acompletion.
* fix(proxy): require api_key alongside api_base override
A request that overrides api_base/base_url but supplies no api_key still
left the proxy carrying a server credential: once the override clears the
banned-param opt-in, the provider re-resolves a key from the environment
(api_key or get_secret("OPENAI_API_KEY") and ~30 sibling chains in
main.py) and forwards it to the caller-controlled URL. Popping the
deployment api_key only changed which server key leaked.
Gate is_request_body_safe so a permitted api_base/base_url override must
also carry a non-empty caller api_key; reject otherwise. The env
resolution in main.py is left as the provider boundary.
* fix(proxy): extend request-body banlist with five additional credential and session targeting fields
Yuneng's review found five deployment-owned request-body params still missing
from the denylist and the router strip set. Each lets a caller reach the
operator's provider credentials or retarget the outbound request:
aws_profile_name selects a local AWS profile, oci_compartment_id and oci_region
retarget the OCI request, litellm_credential_name selects any server-loaded
credential by name with no ownership check, and runtimeSessionId resumes a
Bedrock AgentCore runtime session (AWS does not enforce session-to-user
mapping, so this is a cross-tenant session-resume vector).
Add all five to _BANNED_REQUEST_BODY_PARAMS in auth_utils.py and to
_DEPLOYMENT_OWNED_CREDENTIAL_KWARGS in router.py. Deployment litellm_params and
SDK direct calls are unaffected: the banlist gates the request body only, and
the router strip drops caller kwargs, never deployment["litellm_params"].
* test: rename arbitrary canary values in security tests to neutral placeholders
* fix(proxy): apply api_key co-presence to nested base override and warn on Router credential strip
P1-A: is_request_body_safe descended into _NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS
(litellm_embedding_config, extra_body) for the banned-param check but not for
the api_key co-presence check, so a base override smuggled into one of those
nested dicts cleared the client-side-credentials opt-in without a paired
api_key and let the provider re-resolve a server credential from the
environment. Run _check_base_override_has_api_key on each nested config dict
too, so the requirement applies wherever a base override is permitted.
P1-B: the deployment-owned credential strip in the Router runs unconditionally
on every _completion/_acompletion, which is security-correct but silently
drops per-call api_version/vertex_project/etc. for SDK Router callers. Emit a
single warning (key names only, never values) when the strip removes a
non-empty value, so the backwards-incompatible behavior is visible without
gating the strip on a context flag that does not exist.
* fix(proxy): apply api_key co-presence to tool-entry base override
is_request_body_safe scans three surfaces (root, _NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS, and
tools[]); the previous commit extended the api_key co-presence rule to root
and nested config dicts but not to tool entries. With
allow_client_side_credentials enabled, a tool entry carrying api_base/base_url
and no paired api_key cleared the gate, letting a provider interceptor fall
back to a server-side credential for a caller-controlled URL. Add the same
_check_base_override_has_api_key call to each tool dict and its nested function
dict, mirroring the symmetry already applied to the nested config keys. The
rule is unchanged: api_key must live in the same dict as the base override it
accompanies.
* test(proxy/auth): require paired api_key under extra_body opt-in
* fix(router): gate deployment-owned kwarg strip on litellm.proxy_is_running
* fix(advisor): narrow proxy-import guard to ImportError-family
* fix(router): gate api_key clear on base override behind litellm.proxy_is_running
* test(proxy/auth): scope proxy_is_running flag to dynamic-params class with autouse fixture
* style: use built-in generics in PR-added type annotations
* revert: drop proxy_is_running flag and router-level credential strip; rely on proxy gate
* revert: scope PR to LIT-3828 + LIT-3834 only; drop LIT-3830/LIT-3833 changes
* style: black-format advisor orchestration test
(cherry picked from commit
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|---|---|---|
| .. | ||
| _experimental/mcp_server | ||
| a2a | ||
| agent_endpoints | ||
| anthropic_endpoints | ||
| auth | ||
| client | ||
| common_utils | ||
| db | ||
| discovery_endpoints | ||
| experimental/mcp_server | ||
| google_endpoints | ||
| guardrails | ||
| health_endpoints | ||
| hooks | ||
| image_endpoints | ||
| management_endpoints | ||
| management_helpers | ||
| memory | ||
| middleware | ||
| openai_files_endpoint | ||
| pass_through_endpoints | ||
| policy_engine | ||
| prompts | ||
| proxy_server | ||
| public_endpoints | ||
| rag_endpoints | ||
| realtime_endpoints | ||
| response_api_endpoints | ||
| shutdown | ||
| spend_tracking | ||
| test_configs | ||
| types_utils | ||
| ui_crud_endpoints | ||
| utils | ||
| vector_store_endpoints | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| conftest.py | ||
| test_aiohttp_cleanup_closed.py | ||
| test_aiohttp_session_recovery.py | ||
| test_api_key_masking_in_errors.py | ||
| test_audio_speech_prometheus_hooks.py | ||
| test_batch_expiry.py | ||
| test_batch_metadata_none_fix.py | ||
| test_batch_retrieve_bedrock.py | ||
| test_budget_reservation.py | ||
| test_caching_routes.py | ||
| test_chat_completion_metadata.py | ||
| test_common_request_processing.py | ||
| test_component_allowlists.py | ||
| test_cors_config.py | ||
| test_custom_proxy.py | ||
| test_dynamic_mcp_route.py | ||
| test_empty_model_list.py | ||
| test_enforce_user_param.py | ||
| test_fallback_management_endpoints.py | ||
| test_fastapi_offline_routes.py | ||
| test_filter_models_by_team_access_group.py | ||
| test_health_check_functions.py | ||
| test_health_check_max_tokens.py | ||
| test_langfuse_passthrough_security.py | ||
| test_lazy_openapi_snapshot.py | ||
| test_litellm_pre_call_utils.py | ||
| test_max_budget_env_var.py | ||
| test_mcp_asgi_response.py | ||
| test_model_dump_with_preserved_fields.py | ||
| test_model_id_header_propagation.py | ||
| test_model_info_default_limits.py | ||
| test_model_level_guardrails.py | ||
| test_model_list_healthy_only.py | ||
| test_openapi_schema_validation.py | ||
| test_pricing_field_strip.py | ||
| test_prometheus_cleanup.py | ||
| test_provider_url_destination_guard.py | ||
| test_proxy_cli.py | ||
| test_proxy_logging_hook_detection.py | ||
| test_proxy_server.py | ||
| test_proxy_types.py | ||
| test_proxy_utils.py | ||
| test_pyroscope.py | ||
| test_redis_auth_cache_flag.py | ||
| test_response_model_sanitization.py | ||
| test_route_a2a_models.py | ||
| test_route_llm_request.py | ||
| test_sensitive_route_auth.py | ||
| test_shared_health_check.py | ||
| test_spend_log_cleanup.py | ||
| test_swagger_chat_completions.py | ||
| test_team_member_update.py | ||
| test_team_org_move.py | ||
| test_tools_allowlist_enforcement.py | ||
| test_update_llm_router_resilience.py | ||