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* feat(proxy): limit repeated failed Admin UI sign-in attempts The Admin UI sign-in endpoints accept an unbounded number of password attempts. All three call authenticate_user, and none of them keeps any record of how many times a given caller has already been refused, so a misbehaving or misconfigured client can retry indefinitely at full speed. A LoginThrottle is now a required argument to authenticate_user, so the accounting lives at the one function all three endpoints share and a fourth endpoint cannot be added without deciding what to pass. Failures are counted per username and source address over a fixed window and further attempts are refused with 429 and a Retry-After header. The check runs before the database lookup and before the password comparison, so a refused caller does no further work. Only genuine credential rejections count. Configuration errors do not, a refused attempt does not extend the window, and a successful sign-in clears the bucket. The username is case folded because the user lookup is case insensitive, so casing cannot multiply the allowance. Both credential rejections now return one identical message. SSO is unaffected; it never calls this function. max_failed_login_attempts (10) and failed_login_window_seconds (900) are read from config.yaml, with LITELLM_DISABLE_LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT to turn the accounting off. They are deliberately not database backed, so editing YAML always wins and an operator refused by a bad value can recover. * test(proxy): clear failed-login TTLs when resetting the throttle between tests * feat(proxy): harden Admin UI login throttling * docs(proxy): clarify login throttle configuration * fix(proxy): keep the login throttle inside the type budget and fail safe on secret errors * fix(proxy): warn about per-worker sign-in counters without a module global * fix: honor environment login throttle settings * fix: satisfy login setting type checks * refactor(proxy): keep authenticate_user within the C901 budget after merge Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): write failed-login counters and their expiry in one Redis call Use RedisCache.async_increment_with_floor (a single Lua INCRBY + EXPIRE) for the shared login counters instead of the two-step INCRBYFLOAT then EXPIRE, so a counter can never be committed to Redis without its expiry. The repair in _remaining_window now only covers expiries stripped out of band (PERSIST, a restore) and uses the same atomic call Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): resolve the login rate limit kill switch once per process Reading LITELLM_DISABLE_LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT through get_secret_bool on every unauthenticated sign-in attempt meant a hosted secret manager in read mode was queried once per password guess, before any counter was checked Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): count failed sign-ins in Redis alone while it answers Every worker spends one shared budget and a successful sign-in clears it for all of them. This worker's own counter is only consulted while Redis raises, so an outage degrades to per-worker accounting instead of switching the control off Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): keep counting the failed sign-ins Redis missed once it answers again A guess is recorded in exactly one place, Redis or this worker's own store when Redis refused it, so the count is the sum of the two. Redis is read through async_batch_get_counts, which raises on failure, instead of async_get_cache, which swallows it into None and read as an empty counter Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(proxy): read the shared sign-in counter through a tuple of keys Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(caching): spell out the key collections batch_get_counts accepts Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): warn about per-worker login counters even without general_settings Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * chore(ui): regenerate schema.d.ts after merging main Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(proxy): inject settings and Redis cache into LoginThrottle.from_request Removes the runtime import of proxy_server from login_throttle so the throttle module no longer participates in the import cycle CodeQL flagged (py/cyclic-import). Callers pass general_settings and redis_usage_cache explicitly; behavior is unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): drop the section banner comment from the login tests Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(proxy): assert separate login counter stores in the spray regression test instead of a comment Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(proxy): throttle failed Admin UI sign-ins per source and source/username Replace the username-global lockout with counters keyed by source address and by source/username pair. Each has a fixed counting window (60s) and a separate block TTL (300s). Blocks are soft: a correct password still signs in, wrong passwords from a blocked key take one of 5 held slots per worker and are held 30s before a 429. Once a pair is blocked its failures stop counting against the source. The source scope runs only when trusted_proxy_ranges is set, IPv6 is grouped by /64, and per-source limits accept IP and CIDR overrides with longest-prefix matching. Redis is authoritative through one Lua script per failure, with bounded per-worker fallback when Redis raises. Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): explain the internal patches in the login throttle tests Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): key held sign-in attempts on the source while the source is blocked An active source block now takes precedence over a pair block, so every blocked username behind one blocked source shares the source's five held slots instead of getting five each Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): apply source overrides to IPv4-mapped IPv6 sign-in sources Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): catch only Redis failures when falling back to local login counters Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): type the login throttle's local store and pass frozen Redis script arguments Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): keep the sign-in hold pool from refusing a correct password The held-attempt cap ran before the password check, so five parked wrong guesses from a blocked source turned the soft block into a lockout for the real user. The slot is now taken only after a wrong password, and the pool-full refusal carries the block's remaining time as Retry-After Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): stub DATABASE_URL in the hold-pool regression test so it passes off the dev box Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * chore(proxy): drop a comment that restated the NUM_WORKERS assignment Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): match IPv4-mapped IPv6 peers against IPv4 trusted proxy ranges Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): keep mapped-notation trusted proxy ranges matching mapped peers Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(proxy): hard-block throttled Admin UI sign-ins with no credential bypass A blocked source, or source and username pair, is now refused with 429 before the database lookup and password check, in place of the soft block that held wrong guesses for 30 seconds and let a correct password through. The env admin credentials and the master key typed into the login form are refused like any other credential while blocked; recovery is the master key as an API bearer token, which never goes through the sign-in path trusted_proxy_ranges: [] now means clients connect directly, so the peer address is the source and the per-source limit stays on. Only an unset or malformed value leaves the topology unknown, warns at startup and turns the per-source limit off Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(proxy): move login throttle sentinels into constants Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(proxy): derive the per-username sign-in allowance from the address limit The per-address-and-username allowance is now half the effective address allowance, rounded up, instead of a separate max_failed_login_attempts_per_user setting. A per-address override therefore raises or effectively removes both limits for that address, and no second override table is needed Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(proxy): raise the sign-in block explicitly and type the empty settings mapping Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(proxy): round the per-username sign-in allowance down and exempt an address with an override of 0 Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): import LoginThrottle under TYPE_CHECKING for the throttle helper annotation Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): break ties between equivalent login limit overrides deterministically Two spellings of one network share a prefix length, so the exemption wins the tie, then the higher limit, regardless of mapping order Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): treat a malformed trusted_proxy_ranges entry as an undeclared topology A list with an entry that is not an address or CIDR range no longer switches the per-source Admin UI sign-in limit on against the direct peer address, so a typo cannot make a shared ingress address the bucket for every user behind it Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): reject blank trusted_proxy_ranges entries before they are dropped Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Yucheng Zhu <yucheng@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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| .. | ||
| _experimental/mcp_server | ||
| a2a | ||
| agent_endpoints | ||
| analytics_endpoints | ||
| anthropic_endpoints | ||
| auth | ||
| batches_endpoints | ||
| client | ||
| common_utils | ||
| config_resolvers | ||
| container_endpoints | ||
| credential_endpoints | ||
| db | ||
| discovery_endpoints | ||
| enterprise_billing | ||
| experimental/mcp_server | ||
| fine_tuning_endpoints | ||
| google_endpoints | ||
| guardrails | ||
| health_endpoints | ||
| hooks | ||
| image_endpoints | ||
| list_api | ||
| logging_endpoints | ||
| management_endpoints | ||
| management_helpers | ||
| memory | ||
| middleware | ||
| ocr_endpoints | ||
| openai_files_endpoint | ||
| pass_through_endpoints | ||
| policy_engine | ||
| prompts | ||
| proxy_server | ||
| public_endpoints | ||
| rag_endpoints | ||
| realtime_endpoints | ||
| rerank_endpoints | ||
| response_api_endpoints | ||
| shutdown | ||
| spend_tracking | ||
| test_configs | ||
| types_utils | ||
| ui_crud_endpoints | ||
| utils | ||
| vector_store_endpoints | ||
| vector_store_files_endpoints | ||
| video_endpoints | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| conftest.py | ||
| test__types.py | ||
| test_aiohttp_cleanup_closed.py | ||
| test_aiohttp_session_recovery.py | ||
| test_api_key_masking_in_errors.py | ||
| test_audio_speech_prometheus_hooks.py | ||
| test_batch_expiry.py | ||
| test_batch_metadata_none_fix.py | ||
| test_batch_retrieve_bedrock.py | ||
| test_batch_x_litellm_model_encoding.py | ||
| test_blocked_response_usage.py | ||
| test_budget_reservation.py | ||
| test_caching_routes.py | ||
| test_chat_completion_metadata.py | ||
| test_claude_code_marketplace.py | ||
| test_collector.py | ||
| test_common_request_processing.py | ||
| test_component_allowlists.py | ||
| test_conftest.py | ||
| test_cors_config.py | ||
| test_custom_proxy.py | ||
| test_dynamic_mcp_route.py | ||
| test_empty_model_list.py | ||
| test_enforce_user_param.py | ||
| test_fallback_management_endpoints.py | ||
| test_fastapi_offline_routes.py | ||
| test_filter_models_by_team_access_group.py | ||
| test_health_check_functions.py | ||
| test_health_check_max_tokens.py | ||
| test_init_litellm_callbacks.py | ||
| test_langfuse_passthrough_security.py | ||
| test_lazy_openapi_snapshot.py | ||
| test_litellm_pre_call_utils.py | ||
| test_max_budget_env_var.py | ||
| test_mcp_asgi_response.py | ||
| test_model_based_routing_files_batches.py | ||
| test_model_deprecations_endpoint.py | ||
| test_model_dump_with_preserved_fields.py | ||
| test_model_id_header_propagation.py | ||
| test_model_info_default_limits.py | ||
| test_model_level_guardrails.py | ||
| test_model_list_healthy_only.py | ||
| test_modify_response_streaming_passthrough.py | ||
| test_openai_ws_passthrough_routes.py | ||
| test_openapi_schema_validation.py | ||
| test_plugin_routes.py | ||
| test_pointfive_dashboard_config.py | ||
| test_pointfive_ui_callback.py | ||
| test_pricing_field_strip.py | ||
| test_prisma_engine_watchdog.py | ||
| test_prisma_migration.py | ||
| test_prometheus_cleanup.py | ||
| test_prometheus_metrics_server.py | ||
| test_provider_url_destination_guard.py | ||
| test_proxy_cli.py | ||
| test_proxy_logging_hook_detection.py | ||
| test_proxy_server.py | ||
| test_proxy_types.py | ||
| test_proxy_utils.py | ||
| test_pyroscope.py | ||
| test_read_model_list.py | ||
| test_redis_auth_cache_flag.py | ||
| test_response_model_sanitization.py | ||
| test_route_a2a_models.py | ||
| test_route_llm_request.py | ||
| test_route_priority.py | ||
| test_sensitive_route_auth.py | ||
| test_shared_health_check.py | ||
| test_spend_log_cleanup.py | ||
| test_swagger_chat_completions.py | ||
| test_team_member_update.py | ||
| test_team_org_move.py | ||
| test_tools_allowlist_enforcement.py | ||
| test_update_llm_router_resilience.py | ||