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* fix(batches): count non-chat tokens and validate every model in batch file Two security control bypasses on POST /v1/batches: 1. `_get_batch_job_input_file_usage` only summed tokens for `body.messages` (chat completions). Embedding (`input`) and text completion (`prompt`) batches reported zero, letting massive non-chat workloads slip past TPM rate limits. Extend the counter to handle string and list shapes for both fields. 2. The batch input file was forwarded to the upstream provider without inspecting the models named inside the JSONL — only the outer `model` query parameter was checked against the caller's allowlist. A caller restricted to gpt-3.5 could submit a batch targeting gpt-4o and the upstream would execute it under the proxy's shared API key. Add `_get_models_from_batch_input_file_content` (returns the distinct `body.model` values) and call it from `_enforce_batch_file_model_access` in the pre-call hook, which runs each model through `can_key_call_model` so the same allowlist semantics (wildcards, access groups, all-proxy-models, team aliases) the proxy enforces on `/chat/completions` apply here too. Any unauthorized model raises a 403 before the file is forwarded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(batches): count pre-tokenized prompt/input shapes, classify 403 logs Two follow-ups from the Greptile review on the batch validation PR: 1. P1 TPM bypass via integer token arrays. The OpenAI batch schema accepts ``prompt`` and ``input`` as ``list[int]`` (a single pre-tokenized prompt) or ``list[list[int]]`` (multiple) in addition to the string and ``list[str]`` shapes. Pre-fix only the string shapes were counted, so a caller could submit a batch with hundreds of millions of pre-tokenized tokens and the rate limiter would record zero. Extract the per-field logic into ``_count_prompt_or_input_tokens`` and count each int as one token. 2. P2 access-denial logs were indistinguishable from I/O failures. ``count_input_file_usage`` caught every exception under a generic "Error counting input file usage" message, so an intentional 403 from ``_enforce_batch_file_model_access`` looked the same in the logs as a missing file or a Prisma timeout. Catch ``HTTPException`` separately and log 403s at WARNING level with a security-relevant message before re-raising. Tests cover the new shapes: single ``list[int]``, ``list[list[int]]`` (the worst-case bypass vector), and embeddings ``input`` with pre-tokenized arrays. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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| .. | ||
| test_async_post_call_streaming_iterator_hook.py | ||
| test_batch_file_validation.py | ||
| test_dynamic_rate_limiter_v3.py | ||
| test_image_generation_guardrails.py | ||
| test_key_management_event_hooks.py | ||
| test_max_budget_limiter.py | ||
| test_max_budget_per_session_limiter.py | ||
| test_max_iterations_limiter.py | ||
| test_parallel_request_limiter_v3.py | ||
| test_post_call_failure_hook_integration.py | ||
| test_post_call_response_headers_hook.py | ||
| test_post_call_streaming_hook_integration.py | ||
| test_post_call_success_hook_integration.py | ||
| test_prompt_injection_detection.py | ||
| test_proxy_track_cost_callback.py | ||
| test_rate_limiter_toctou.py | ||
| test_send_invite_email.py | ||