litellm/litellm/proxy/auth/handle_jwt.py
Mateo Wang 0855fa02b2
feat(jwt): fall back to DB team memberships when JWT has no team claims (#31356)
* feat(jwt): fall back to DB team memberships when JWT has no team claims

* style(jwt): use PEP 585/604 annotations in DB team fallback to clear strict gate

* fix(jwt): preserve DB teams on no-claim sync, model-gate DB fallback, stop team-id leak

When fallback_to_db_teams is enabled and a JWT carries no team claims,
sync_user_role_and_teams previously computed teams_to_remove as every existing
DB membership and wiped the user out of all their teams on each request, which
also left the DB fallback nothing to resolve. Skip team removal in that case so
memberships survive and the fallback can attribute usage.

Apply the same per-team model-access check the claim-based path enforces when
selecting a DB fallback team, so a team's models restriction is no longer
bypassed; a team that cannot serve the requested model is skipped in favor of
one that can.

Drop the user's team-id list from the x-litellm-team-id membership 403 detail so
a valid-JWT caller can no longer enumerate team IDs.

* fix(jwt): load team membership on DB fallback; scope header check to provisional teams

The DB-team fallback resolved a team but never loaded its team membership
row, so per-team membership budget limits were silently skipped on that
path. _resolve_db_team_fallback now fetches the resolved team's membership
when a user_id is known and returns it, matching the claim-based path so
downstream LiteLLM_TeamMembership budget enforcement works there too.

The provisional x-litellm-team-id validation also fired on any non-None
team_id, including an RBAC role-derived one, which 403'd RBAC team flows
when the asserted team was not also a DB membership. It now runs only when
team_id actually came from the header (team_id == header_team_id).

* fix(jwt): surface DB-fallback membership lookup failures at warning level

A transient get_team_membership failure on the DB team fallback path is
recoverable: the team is still resolved and the request proceeds, just
without per-team membership budget enforcement for that request. Logging
that at debug hid a silent budget-enforcement gap from operators, so it now
logs at warning and states that enforcement was skipped. Behavior is
otherwise unchanged: the resolved team is returned with a None membership
rather than failing the request, covered by
test_resolve_db_team_fallback_survives_membership_lookup_error.

* fix(jwt-auth): tighten db-team fallback gating and passthrough enforcement

Resolves four issues in the fallback_to_db_teams path:

- _resolve_db_team_fallback now surfaces a model-access denial when memberships
  exist but none can access the requested model, instead of always returning
  the no-membership message
- auth_builder gates the fallback on real JWT team claims via
  get_all_jwt_team_ids so a configured team_id_default does not silently route
  claimless tokens to the default team
- A team selected only via _resolve_db_team_fallback is re-validated against
  the team's allowed_passthrough_routes; the earlier gate ran while team_id
  was still None
- sync_user_role_and_teams considers both plural and singular team claim
  shapes when reconciling DB memberships so singular-only tokens
  (Okta/Auth0 defaults) no longer leave stale teams behind

* fix(jwt): don't upsert a provisional x-litellm-team-id before membership check

When fallback_to_db_teams is on and the JWT carries no team claims, an
x-litellm-team-id header is accepted provisionally and only validated against
the user's DB memberships later in auth_builder. With team_id_upsert also
enabled, get_team_object ran the upsert on that unvalidated header team first,
so an attacker-supplied header could create an orphaned team row before the
403 membership check. Suppress the upsert whenever the team is provisional
(db_team_fallback), since a genuine membership team already exists and an
invalid one must not be created. Regression:
test_auth_builder_provisional_header_team_is_not_upserted.

* fix(jwt): pin RBAC-asserted team against db-team-fallback header override

When a JWT carries an RBAC team role but no group claims, auth_builder already
sets team_id from the RBAC object_id. db_team_fallback still evaluated true
there, so the provisional x-litellm-team-id path accepted a header team and
silently overrode the RBAC-asserted team with any team the caller belonged to.
Gate db_team_fallback on team_id being unset, and drive the header's provisional
acceptance off db_team_fallback rather than the raw flag, so an RBAC token plus
a non-claim header team is rejected with 403 instead of substituting the team.
Regression: test_auth_builder_header_cannot_override_rbac_team_under_db_fallback.

* fix(jwt): scope dual-claim membership sync to fallback_to_db_teams

The membership sync read both plural and singular JWT team claims via
get_all_jwt_team_ids unconditionally, which silently changed reconciliation
for every deployment using sync_user_role_and_teams, not just those opting
into fallback_to_db_teams: a singular-only IdP token that previously stripped
all DB teams would now be recognized. Gate the dual-claim read on
fallback_to_db_teams so flag-off deployments keep the upstream plural-only
behavior, honoring the PR's contract that existing deployments are unchanged.
Regression: test_sync_user_role_and_teams_singular_claim_only_recognized_under_flag.

* fix(jwt): drop user team IDs from db-fallback model-access 403 detail

The model-access-denied 403 in _resolve_db_team_fallback echoed the user's
full DB team-id list in its detail. It is only the caller's own memberships,
but it is inconsistent with the membership-validation 403 in the same feature
that was deliberately scrubbed of team IDs. Replace the enumerated list with a
generic "no team you are a member of has access" message. Regression extends
test_resolve_db_team_fallback_distinguishes_no_membership_vs_model_denied to
assert the team id is absent from the detail.

* fix(jwt): keep db-team fallback off for alias-only tokens

* test(jwt): cover alias-only token skipping db-team fallback

The autofix in ed21199 added a get_team_alias clause to the db_team_fallback
gate so an alias-only JWT (team_alias_jwt_field set, no team-id claims)
resolves its alias via find_and_validate_specific_team_id instead of being
mis-attributed to the user's first DB team, but it shipped without a
regression test. This drives auth_builder with an alias-only token whose
alias resolves to a different team than the user's DB membership and asserts
the result is the alias-resolved team; reverting the get_team_alias clause
flips the result to the DB-membership team, so the test fails without the fix

* fix(jwt): prefer alias resolution over team_id_default

When the JWT only carries an alias claim and the operator configures
team_id_default, JWTHandler.get_team_id silently substitutes the
default into find_and_validate_specific_team_id. That made the helper
return the default team without ever attempting alias resolution, so
spend and access attached to the default team even though the token
identified a different team via its alias. Use get_all_jwt_team_ids
(which ignores team_id_default) to detect when the resolved team_id is
only the default and clear it so alias resolution runs first; the
default remains the fallback when no alias claim is present.

* fix(jwt): enforce team_allowed_routes in db-team fallback resolution

The claim-based path runs allowed_routes_check when selecting a team, but
_resolve_db_team_fallback selected a team purely on model access, so a
DB-resolved team could reach routes excluded by team_allowed_routes with no
downstream backstop. This mirrors the claim path's route gate in the fallback,
exempting auth-enforced passthrough routes that are gated separately by
allowed_passthrough_routes at the call site

* fix(jwt): enforce team_allowed_routes on header-team db fallback path

The auto-pick DB-team fallback already gates against team_allowed_routes, but a claimless JWT presenting x-litellm-team-id under fallback_to_db_teams set team_id directly from the header and only re-validated DB membership afterwards, skipping the route gate. A caller could reach management/info routes that the JWT config narrowed for team-role callers by supplying the header even though the auto-pick path on the same route returns no team.

* refactor(jwt): narrow db-team fallback except clauses to actual failure types

* fix(jwt): collapse provisional header team lookup failure into membership denial

A caller holding a valid claimless JWT under fallback_to_db_teams could
distinguish nonexistent teams (404 from get_team_object) from existing
teams they do not belong to (membership 403) by varying x-litellm-team-id,
giving an authenticated team-id existence oracle. The provisional header
path now rewrites the lookup failure into the exact 403 the membership
check raises, while claim-backed header teams keep the upstream 404.

Also drop the unreachable falsy-team guard in _resolve_db_team_fallback
(get_team_object returns a team or raises, never None) and stop codecov
carryforward for three dead flags whose stale sessions were measured
against old file revisions and sank patch coverage with phantom
executable lines

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-07-06 17:17:10 -07:00

2314 lines
91 KiB
Python

"""
Supports using JWT's for authenticating into the proxy.
Currently only supports admin.
JWT token must have 'litellm_proxy_admin' in scope.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import fnmatch
import hashlib
import os
import re
from typing import Any, List, Literal, NoReturn, Optional, Set, Tuple, Union, cast
import jwt
from cryptography import x509
from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
from fastapi import HTTPException, status
from jwt.api_jwk import PyJWK
from litellm._logging import verbose_proxy_logger
from litellm.litellm_core_utils.dot_notation_indexing import get_nested_value
from litellm.llms.custom_httpx.httpx_handler import HTTPHandler
from litellm.proxy._types import (
RBAC_ROLES,
JWKKeyValue,
JWTAuthBuilderResult,
JWTIssuerConfig,
JWTKeyItem,
LiteLLM_EndUserTable,
LiteLLM_JWTAuth,
LiteLLM_OrganizationTable,
LiteLLM_TeamMembership,
LiteLLM_TeamTable,
LiteLLM_UserTable,
LitellmUserRoles,
Member,
ProxyErrorTypes,
ProxyException,
ScopeMapping,
Span,
TeamMemberAddRequest,
UserAPIKeyAuth,
)
from litellm.proxy.auth.auth_checks import can_team_access_model
from litellm.proxy.auth.route_checks import RouteChecks
from litellm.proxy.common_utils.user_api_key_cache import (
UserApiKeyCache,
get_management_object_ttl,
)
from litellm.proxy.utils import PrismaClient, ProxyLogging
from litellm.repositories.user_repository import UserRepository
from .auth_checks import (
_allowed_routes_check,
allowed_routes_check,
get_actual_routes,
get_end_user_object,
get_org_object,
get_org_object_by_alias,
get_role_based_models,
get_role_based_routes,
get_team_membership,
get_team_object,
get_team_object_by_alias,
get_user_object,
)
class NoMatchingJWTPublicKeyError(Exception):
"""Raised when a JWKS endpoint returns no key matching the requested ``kid``."""
class JWTHandler:
"""
- treat the sub id passed in as the user id
- return an error if id making request doesn't exist in proxy user table
- track spend against the user id
- if role="litellm_proxy_user" -> allow making calls + info. Can not edit budgets
"""
prisma_client: Optional[PrismaClient]
user_api_key_cache: UserApiKeyCache
# Supported algos: https://pyjwt.readthedocs.io/en/stable/algorithms.html
# "Warning: Make sure not to mix symmetric and asymmetric algorithms that interpret
# the key in different ways (e.g. HS* and RS*)."
SUPPORTED_JWT_ALGORITHMS = [
"RS256",
"RS384",
"RS512",
"PS256",
"PS384",
"PS512",
"ES256",
"ES384",
"ES512",
"EdDSA",
]
LITELLM_JWT_ISSUER_CLAIM = "_litellm_jwt_issuer"
LITELLM_USER_ID_CLAIM = "_litellm_user_id"
LITELLM_USER_EMAIL_CLAIM = "_litellm_user_email"
LITELLM_TEAM_ID_CLAIM = "_litellm_team_id"
LITELLM_TEAM_IDS_CLAIM = "_litellm_team_ids"
LITELLM_ORG_ID_CLAIM = "_litellm_org_id"
LITELLM_END_USER_ID_CLAIM = "_litellm_end_user_id"
LITELLM_INTERNAL_CLAIMS = (
LITELLM_JWT_ISSUER_CLAIM,
LITELLM_USER_ID_CLAIM,
LITELLM_USER_EMAIL_CLAIM,
LITELLM_TEAM_ID_CLAIM,
LITELLM_TEAM_IDS_CLAIM,
LITELLM_ORG_ID_CLAIM,
LITELLM_END_USER_ID_CLAIM,
)
def __init__(
self,
) -> None:
self.http_handler = HTTPHandler()
self.leeway = 0
def update_environment(
self,
prisma_client: Optional[PrismaClient],
user_api_key_cache: UserApiKeyCache,
litellm_jwtauth: LiteLLM_JWTAuth,
leeway: int = 0,
) -> None:
self.prisma_client = prisma_client
self.user_api_key_cache = user_api_key_cache
self.litellm_jwtauth = litellm_jwtauth
self.leeway = leeway
@staticmethod
def is_jwt(token: Optional[str]) -> bool:
if token is None:
return False
parts = token.split(".")
return len(parts) == 3
@staticmethod
def get_unverified_claims(token: str) -> Optional[dict]:
"""
Decode JWT claims without signature verification.
Used for routing decisions before selecting validation path.
"""
if not JWTHandler.is_jwt(token):
return None
try:
claims = jwt.decode(
token,
options={"verify_signature": False, "verify_aud": False},
algorithms=JWTHandler.SUPPORTED_JWT_ALGORITHMS,
)
if isinstance(claims, dict):
return claims
return None
except Exception as e:
verbose_proxy_logger.debug("Failed to decode unverified JWT claims for routing: %s", e)
return None
def _rbac_role_from_role_mapping(self, token: dict) -> Optional[RBAC_ROLES]:
"""
Returns the RBAC role the token 'belongs' to based on role mappings.
Args:
token (dict): The JWT token containing role information
Returns:
Optional[RBAC_ROLES]: The mapped internal RBAC role if a mapping exists,
None otherwise
Note:
The function handles both single string roles and lists of roles from the JWT.
If multiple mappings match the JWT roles, the first matching mapping is returned.
"""
if self.litellm_jwtauth.role_mappings is None:
return None
jwt_role = self.get_jwt_role(token=token, default_value=None)
if not jwt_role:
return None
jwt_role_set = set(jwt_role)
for role_mapping in self.litellm_jwtauth.role_mappings:
# Check if the mapping role matches any of the JWT roles
if role_mapping.role in jwt_role_set:
return role_mapping.internal_role
return None
def get_rbac_role(self, token: dict) -> Optional[RBAC_ROLES]:
"""
Returns the RBAC role the token 'belongs' to.
RBAC roles allowed to make requests:
- PROXY_ADMIN: can make requests to all routes
- TEAM: can make requests to routes associated with a team
- INTERNAL_USER: can make requests to routes associated with a user
Resolves: https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/6793
Returns:
- PROXY_ADMIN: if token is admin
- TEAM: if token is associated with a team
- INTERNAL_USER: if token is associated with a user
- None: if token is not associated with a team or user
"""
scopes = self.get_scopes(token=token)
is_admin = self.is_admin(scopes=scopes)
user_roles = self.get_user_roles(token=token, default_value=None)
if is_admin:
return LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN
elif self.get_team_id(token=token, default_value=None) is not None:
return LitellmUserRoles.TEAM
elif self.get_user_id(token=token, default_value=None) is not None:
return LitellmUserRoles.INTERNAL_USER
elif user_roles is not None and self.is_allowed_user_role(user_roles=user_roles):
return LitellmUserRoles.INTERNAL_USER
elif rbac_role := self._rbac_role_from_role_mapping(token=token):
return rbac_role
return None
def is_admin(self, scopes: list) -> bool:
if self.litellm_jwtauth.admin_jwt_scope in scopes:
return True
return False
def _is_trusted_issuer_normalized_token(self, token: dict) -> bool:
issuer = token.get(self.LITELLM_JWT_ISSUER_CLAIM)
if not isinstance(issuer, str) or not issuer:
return False
litellm_jwtauth = getattr(self, "litellm_jwtauth", None)
issuer_configs = getattr(litellm_jwtauth, "issuers", None) or []
return any(issuer_config.issuer == issuer for issuer_config in issuer_configs)
def _has_trusted_issuer_normalized_claim(self, token: dict, claim: str) -> bool:
return self._is_trusted_issuer_normalized_token(token=token) and claim in token
def get_team_ids_from_jwt(self, token: dict) -> List[str]:
if self._has_trusted_issuer_normalized_claim(token=token, claim=self.LITELLM_TEAM_IDS_CLAIM):
issuer_team_ids = token.get(self.LITELLM_TEAM_IDS_CLAIM)
if isinstance(issuer_team_ids, list):
return issuer_team_ids
if isinstance(issuer_team_ids, str):
return [issuer_team_ids]
# Issuer-scoped claim exists but has an unexpected type
# (e.g. int/dict from an unusual upstream mapping). Don't silently
# fall through to the global ``team_ids_jwt_field`` path — that
# would read a semantically unrelated claim on the same token.
return []
if self.litellm_jwtauth.team_ids_jwt_field is not None:
team_ids: Optional[List[str]] = get_nested_value(
data=token,
key_path=self.litellm_jwtauth.team_ids_jwt_field,
default=[],
)
return team_ids or []
return []
def get_all_jwt_team_ids(self, token: dict) -> List[str]:
"""
Return team IDs from both the plural ``team_ids_jwt_field`` and the
singular ``team_id_jwt_field`` claim (string or list of strings), as a
deduplicated list preserving plural-first order.
Membership-reconciliation paths (SSO callback, JWT-bearer sync) need
to consider both claim shapes. Reading only the plural field — as
callers historically did — silently dropped users whose IdP populates
the singular field, which is what Okta and Auth0 default to when a
user has a single primary team.
This intentionally does NOT consult ``team_id_default``: that fallback
is a property of how the JWT-bearer auth flow resolves a single
request-bound team, not of the token's claims. Callers that want the
default-team behavior should still go through ``get_team_id``.
"""
team_ids: List[str] = list(self.get_team_ids_from_jwt(token))
singular: Any = None
if self._has_trusted_issuer_normalized_claim(token=token, claim=self.LITELLM_TEAM_ID_CLAIM):
singular = token.get(self.LITELLM_TEAM_ID_CLAIM)
elif self.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_jwt_field is not None:
singular = get_nested_value(
data=token,
key_path=self.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_jwt_field,
default=None,
)
if singular is not None:
if isinstance(singular, list):
for item in singular:
if item is None:
continue
sid = str(item)
if sid and sid not in team_ids:
team_ids.append(sid)
elif singular and str(singular) not in team_ids:
team_ids.append(str(singular))
return team_ids
def get_end_user_id(self, token: dict, default_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
if self._has_trusted_issuer_normalized_claim(token=token, claim=self.LITELLM_END_USER_ID_CLAIM):
return token.get(self.LITELLM_END_USER_ID_CLAIM)
try:
if self.litellm_jwtauth.end_user_id_jwt_field is not None:
user_id = get_nested_value(
data=token,
key_path=self.litellm_jwtauth.end_user_id_jwt_field,
default=default_value,
)
else:
user_id = None
except KeyError:
user_id = default_value
return user_id
def is_required_team_id(self) -> bool:
"""
Returns:
- True: if 'team_id_jwt_field' or 'team_alias_jwt_field' is set
- False: if neither is set
"""
if self.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_jwt_field is None and self.litellm_jwtauth.team_alias_jwt_field is None:
return False
return True
def is_enforced_email_domain(self) -> bool:
"""
Returns:
- True: if 'user_allowed_email_domain' is set
- False: if 'user_allowed_email_domain' is None
"""
if self.litellm_jwtauth.user_allowed_email_domain is not None and isinstance(
self.litellm_jwtauth.user_allowed_email_domain, str
):
return True
return False
def get_team_id(self, token: dict, default_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
if self._has_trusted_issuer_normalized_claim(token=token, claim=self.LITELLM_TEAM_ID_CLAIM):
team_id = token.get(self.LITELLM_TEAM_ID_CLAIM)
if isinstance(team_id, list):
return team_id[0] if team_id else default_value
return team_id
try:
if self.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_jwt_field is not None:
# Use a sentinel value to detect if the path actually exists
sentinel = object()
team_id = get_nested_value(
data=token,
key_path=self.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_jwt_field,
default=sentinel,
)
if team_id is sentinel:
# Path doesn't exist, use team_id_default if available
if self.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_default is not None:
return self.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_default
else:
return default_value
# AAD and other IdPs often send roles/groups as a list of strings.
# team_id_jwt_field is singular, so take the first element when a list
# is returned. This avoids "unhashable type: 'list'" errors downstream.
if isinstance(team_id, list):
if not team_id:
return default_value
verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
f"JWT Auth: team_id_jwt_field '{self.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_jwt_field}' "
f"returned a list {team_id}; using first element '{team_id[0]}' automatically."
)
team_id = team_id[0]
return team_id # type: ignore[return-value]
elif self.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_default is not None:
team_id = self.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_default
else:
team_id = None
except KeyError:
team_id = default_value
return team_id
def get_team_alias(self, token: dict, default_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
"""
Extract team name/alias from JWT token using the configured team_alias_jwt_field.
Args:
token: The decoded JWT token dictionary
default_value: Default value to return if field not found
Returns:
The team alias from the token, or default_value if not found
"""
try:
if self.litellm_jwtauth.team_alias_jwt_field is not None:
team_alias = get_nested_value(
data=token,
key_path=self.litellm_jwtauth.team_alias_jwt_field,
default=default_value,
)
return team_alias
else:
team_alias = None
except KeyError:
team_alias = default_value
return team_alias
def is_upsert_user_id(self, valid_user_email: Optional[bool] = None) -> bool:
"""
Returns:
- True: if 'user_id_upsert' is set AND valid_user_email is not False
- False: if not
"""
if valid_user_email is False:
return False
return self.litellm_jwtauth.user_id_upsert
def get_user_id(self, token: dict, default_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
if self._has_trusted_issuer_normalized_claim(token=token, claim=self.LITELLM_USER_ID_CLAIM):
return token.get(self.LITELLM_USER_ID_CLAIM)
try:
if self.litellm_jwtauth.user_id_jwt_field is not None:
user_id = get_nested_value(
data=token,
key_path=self.litellm_jwtauth.user_id_jwt_field,
default=default_value,
)
else:
user_id = default_value
except KeyError:
user_id = default_value
return user_id
def get_user_roles(self, token: dict, default_value: Optional[List[str]]) -> Optional[List[str]]:
"""
Returns the user role from the token.
Set via 'user_roles_jwt_field' in the config.
"""
try:
if self.litellm_jwtauth.user_roles_jwt_field is not None:
user_roles = get_nested_value(
data=token,
key_path=self.litellm_jwtauth.user_roles_jwt_field,
default=default_value,
)
else:
user_roles = default_value
except KeyError:
user_roles = default_value
return user_roles
def map_jwt_role_to_litellm_role(self, token: dict) -> Optional[LitellmUserRoles]:
"""Map roles from JWT to LiteLLM user roles"""
if not self.litellm_jwtauth.jwt_litellm_role_map:
return None
jwt_roles = self.get_jwt_role(token=token, default_value=[])
if not jwt_roles:
return None
for mapping in self.litellm_jwtauth.jwt_litellm_role_map:
for role in jwt_roles:
if fnmatch.fnmatch(role, mapping.jwt_role):
return mapping.litellm_role
return None
def get_jwt_role(self, token: dict, default_value: Optional[List[str]]) -> Optional[List[str]]:
"""
Generic implementation of `get_user_roles` that can be used for both user and team roles.
Returns the jwt role from the token.
Set via 'roles_jwt_field' in the config.
"""
try:
if self.litellm_jwtauth.roles_jwt_field is not None:
user_roles = get_nested_value(
data=token,
key_path=self.litellm_jwtauth.roles_jwt_field,
default=default_value,
)
else:
user_roles = default_value
except KeyError:
user_roles = default_value
return user_roles
def is_allowed_user_role(self, user_roles: Optional[List[str]]) -> bool:
"""
Returns the user role from the token.
Set via 'user_allowed_roles' in the config.
"""
if (
user_roles is not None
and self.litellm_jwtauth.user_allowed_roles is not None
and any(role in self.litellm_jwtauth.user_allowed_roles for role in user_roles)
):
return True
return False
def get_user_email(self, token: dict, default_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
if self._has_trusted_issuer_normalized_claim(token=token, claim=self.LITELLM_USER_EMAIL_CLAIM):
return token.get(self.LITELLM_USER_EMAIL_CLAIM)
try:
if self.litellm_jwtauth.user_email_jwt_field is not None:
user_email = get_nested_value(
data=token,
key_path=self.litellm_jwtauth.user_email_jwt_field,
default=default_value,
)
else:
user_email = None
except KeyError:
user_email = default_value
return user_email
def get_object_id(self, token: dict, default_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
try:
if self.litellm_jwtauth.object_id_jwt_field is not None:
object_id = get_nested_value(
data=token,
key_path=self.litellm_jwtauth.object_id_jwt_field,
default=default_value,
)
else:
object_id = default_value
except KeyError:
object_id = default_value
return object_id
def get_org_id(self, token: dict, default_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
if self._has_trusted_issuer_normalized_claim(token=token, claim=self.LITELLM_ORG_ID_CLAIM):
return token.get(self.LITELLM_ORG_ID_CLAIM)
try:
if self.litellm_jwtauth.org_id_jwt_field is not None:
org_id = get_nested_value(
data=token,
key_path=self.litellm_jwtauth.org_id_jwt_field,
default=default_value,
)
else:
org_id = None
except KeyError:
org_id = default_value
return org_id
def get_org_alias(self, token: dict, default_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]:
"""
Extract organization name/alias from JWT token using the configured org_alias_jwt_field.
Args:
token: The decoded JWT token dictionary
default_value: Default value to return if field not found
Returns:
The organization alias from the token, or default_value if not found
"""
try:
if self.litellm_jwtauth.org_alias_jwt_field is not None:
org_alias = get_nested_value(
data=token,
key_path=self.litellm_jwtauth.org_alias_jwt_field,
default=default_value,
)
return org_alias
else:
org_alias = None
except KeyError:
org_alias = default_value
return org_alias
def get_scopes(self, token: dict) -> List[str]:
try:
if isinstance(token["scope"], str):
# Assuming the scopes are stored in 'scope' claim and are space-separated
scopes = token["scope"].split()
elif isinstance(token["scope"], list):
scopes = token["scope"]
else:
raise Exception(f"Unmapped scope type - {type(token['scope'])}. Supported types - list, str.")
except KeyError:
scopes = []
return scopes
async def _resolve_jwks_url(self, url: str) -> str:
"""
If url points to an OIDC discovery document (*.well-known/openid-configuration),
fetch it and return the jwks_uri contained within. Otherwise return url unchanged.
This lets JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_URL be set to a well-known discovery endpoint instead of
requiring operators to manually find the JWKS URL.
"""
if ".well-known/openid-configuration" not in url:
return url
cache_key = f"litellm_oidc_discovery_{url}"
cached_jwks_uri = await self.user_api_key_cache.async_get_cache(cache_key)
if cached_jwks_uri is not None:
return cached_jwks_uri
verbose_proxy_logger.debug(f"JWT Auth: Fetching OIDC discovery document from {url}")
response = await self.http_handler.get(url)
if response.status_code != 200:
raise Exception(
f"JWT Auth: OIDC discovery endpoint {url} returned status {response.status_code}: {response.text}"
)
try:
discovery = response.json()
except Exception as e:
raise Exception(f"JWT Auth: Failed to parse OIDC discovery document at {url}: {e}")
jwks_uri = discovery.get("jwks_uri")
if not jwks_uri:
raise Exception(f"JWT Auth: OIDC discovery document at {url} does not contain a 'jwks_uri' field.")
verbose_proxy_logger.debug(f"JWT Auth: Resolved OIDC discovery {url} -> jwks_uri={jwks_uri}")
await self.user_api_key_cache.async_set_cache(
key=cache_key,
value=jwks_uri,
ttl=self._get_public_key_cache_ttl(),
)
return jwks_uri
def _get_public_key_cache_ttl(self) -> float:
litellm_jwtauth = getattr(self, "litellm_jwtauth", None)
if litellm_jwtauth is None:
return 600
return litellm_jwtauth.public_key_ttl
async def _get_public_key_from_jwks_url(self, jwks_url: str, kid: Optional[str]) -> dict:
resolved_jwks_url = await self._resolve_jwks_url(jwks_url)
cache_key = f"litellm_jwt_auth_keys_{resolved_jwks_url}"
cached_keys = await self.user_api_key_cache.async_get_cache(cache_key)
if cached_keys is None:
response = await self.http_handler.get(resolved_jwks_url)
try:
response_json = response.json()
except Exception as e:
verbose_proxy_logger.error(f"Error parsing response: {e}. Original Response: {response.text}")
raise Exception(f"Error parsing response: {e}. Check server logs for original response.")
if "keys" in response_json:
keys: JWKKeyValue = response_json["keys"]
else:
keys = response_json
await self.user_api_key_cache.async_set_cache(
key=cache_key,
value=keys,
ttl=self._get_public_key_cache_ttl(),
)
else:
keys = cached_keys
public_key = self.parse_keys(keys=keys, kid=kid)
if public_key is not None:
return cast(dict, public_key)
raise NoMatchingJWTPublicKeyError(f"No matching public key found. keys={resolved_jwks_url}, kid={kid}")
async def get_public_key(self, kid: Optional[str]) -> dict:
keys_url = os.getenv("JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_URL")
if keys_url is None:
raise Exception("Missing JWT Public Key URL from environment.")
keys_url_list = [url.strip() for url in keys_url.split(",") if url.strip()]
for key_url in keys_url_list:
try:
return await self._get_public_key_from_jwks_url(jwks_url=key_url, kid=kid)
except NoMatchingJWTPublicKeyError as e:
verbose_proxy_logger.debug("JWT Auth: No matching public key found at %s: %s", key_url, e)
raise NoMatchingJWTPublicKeyError(f"No matching public key found. keys={keys_url_list}, kid={kid}")
def parse_keys(self, keys: JWKKeyValue, kid: Optional[str]) -> Optional[JWTKeyItem]:
public_key: Optional[JWTKeyItem] = None
if len(keys) == 1:
if isinstance(keys, dict) and (keys.get("kid", None) == kid or kid is None):
public_key = keys
elif isinstance(keys, list) and (keys[0].get("kid", None) == kid or kid is None):
public_key = keys[0]
elif len(keys) > 1:
for key in keys:
if isinstance(key, dict):
key_kid = key.get("kid", None)
else:
key_kid = None
if kid is not None and isinstance(key, dict) and key_kid is not None and key_kid == kid:
public_key = key
return public_key
def is_allowed_domain(self, user_email: str) -> bool:
if self.litellm_jwtauth.user_allowed_email_domain is None:
return True
email_domain = user_email.split("@")[-1] # Extract domain from email
if email_domain == self.litellm_jwtauth.user_allowed_email_domain:
return True
else:
return False
async def get_oidc_userinfo(self, token: str) -> dict:
"""
Fetch user information from OIDC UserInfo endpoint.
This follows the OpenID Connect protocol where an access token
is sent to the identity provider's UserInfo endpoint to retrieve
user identity information.
Args:
token: The access token to use for authentication
Returns:
dict: User information from the UserInfo endpoint
Raises:
Exception: If UserInfo endpoint is not configured or request fails
"""
if not self.litellm_jwtauth.oidc_userinfo_endpoint:
raise Exception("OIDC UserInfo endpoint not configured. Set 'oidc_userinfo_endpoint' in JWT auth config.")
# Check cache first
cache_key = f"oidc_userinfo_{hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()}"
cached_userinfo = await self.user_api_key_cache.async_get_cache(cache_key)
if cached_userinfo is not None:
verbose_proxy_logger.debug("Returning cached OIDC UserInfo")
return cached_userinfo
verbose_proxy_logger.debug(f"Calling OIDC UserInfo endpoint: {self.litellm_jwtauth.oidc_userinfo_endpoint}")
try:
# Call the UserInfo endpoint with the access token
response = await self.http_handler.get(
url=self.litellm_jwtauth.oidc_userinfo_endpoint,
headers={
"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
"Accept": "application/json",
},
)
if response.status_code != 200:
raise Exception(f"OIDC UserInfo endpoint returned status {response.status_code}: {response.text}")
userinfo = response.json()
verbose_proxy_logger.debug(f"Received OIDC UserInfo: {userinfo}")
# Cache the userinfo response
await self.user_api_key_cache.async_set_cache(
key=cache_key,
value=userinfo,
ttl=self.litellm_jwtauth.oidc_userinfo_cache_ttl,
)
return userinfo
except Exception as e:
verbose_proxy_logger.error(f"Error fetching OIDC UserInfo: {str(e)}")
raise Exception(f"Failed to fetch OIDC UserInfo: {str(e)}")
_unscoped_jwt_warning_emitted = False
@classmethod
def _build_decode_kwargs(cls) -> dict:
"""Build the audience/issuer/options kwargs for ``jwt.decode``.
Setting ``JWT_AUDIENCE`` (and optionally ``JWT_ISSUER``) turns on the
corresponding PyJWT verifications, blocking cross-tenant tokens
minted by other applications that share the same IdP signing keys.
When both are unset PyJWT only checks the signature and expiry, which
is preserved for backward compatibility but logged once as a warning.
The warning fires even in mixed deployments that also configure
``LiteLLM_JWTAuth.issuers``: tokens whose ``iss`` does not match any
configured issuer fall through to this global path, and if env-var
scoping is absent that fallback is itself unscoped.
"""
audience = os.getenv("JWT_AUDIENCE")
issuer = os.getenv("JWT_ISSUER")
if audience is None and issuer is None and not cls._unscoped_jwt_warning_emitted:
verbose_proxy_logger.warning(
"JWT auth is enabled but neither JWT_AUDIENCE nor JWT_ISSUER "
"is configured. Tokens minted by any application that shares "
"the same IdP signing keys will be accepted. Set JWT_AUDIENCE "
"(and ideally JWT_ISSUER) to scope this proxy."
)
cls._unscoped_jwt_warning_emitted = True
options: dict = {}
if audience is None:
options["verify_aud"] = False
if issuer is None:
options["verify_iss"] = False
return {
"audience": audience,
"issuer": issuer,
"options": options or None,
}
def _get_configured_issuer(self, token: str) -> Optional[JWTIssuerConfig]:
litellm_jwtauth = getattr(self, "litellm_jwtauth", None)
if litellm_jwtauth is None:
return None
issuer_configs = litellm_jwtauth.issuers
if not issuer_configs:
return None
claims = self.get_unverified_claims(token=token)
if claims is None:
return None
issuer = claims.get("iss")
if not isinstance(issuer, str) or not issuer:
return None
for issuer_config in issuer_configs:
if issuer_config.issuer == issuer:
return issuer_config
return None
def _get_jwks_url_for_issuer(self, issuer_config: JWTIssuerConfig) -> str:
if issuer_config.jwks_url:
return issuer_config.jwks_url
# _resolve_jwks_url fetches this OIDC discovery document and follows
# its jwks_uri, matching JWTIssuerConfig.jwks_url's documented fallback.
return f"{issuer_config.issuer.rstrip('/')}/.well-known/openid-configuration"
def _get_claim_value_for_issuer_mapping(self, token: dict, claim_field: str) -> Any:
"""Resolve a mapped claim from ``token``.
Returns ``None`` when the field is absent or empty so that mapped claims
behave like the global ``litellm_jwtauth`` path — present claims override
the normalised value, missing ones simply leave it ``None``.
"""
sentinel = object()
claim_value = get_nested_value(
data=token,
key_path=claim_field,
default=sentinel,
)
if claim_value is sentinel or claim_value is None or claim_value == "":
return None
return claim_value
def _apply_issuer_claim_mappings(self, token: dict, issuer_config: JWTIssuerConfig) -> dict:
normalized: dict = {k: v for k, v in token.items() if k not in self.LITELLM_INTERNAL_CLAIMS}
normalized[self.LITELLM_JWT_ISSUER_CLAIM] = issuer_config.issuer
claim_mappings = [
(issuer_config.user_id_jwt_field, self.LITELLM_USER_ID_CLAIM),
(issuer_config.user_email_jwt_field, self.LITELLM_USER_EMAIL_CLAIM),
(issuer_config.team_id_jwt_field, self.LITELLM_TEAM_ID_CLAIM),
(issuer_config.team_ids_jwt_field, self.LITELLM_TEAM_IDS_CLAIM),
(issuer_config.org_id_jwt_field, self.LITELLM_ORG_ID_CLAIM),
(issuer_config.end_user_id_jwt_field, self.LITELLM_END_USER_ID_CLAIM),
]
for source_claim, normalized_claim in claim_mappings:
if source_claim is None:
continue
claim_value = self._get_claim_value_for_issuer_mapping(
token=token,
claim_field=source_claim,
)
if claim_value is not None:
normalized[normalized_claim] = claim_value
return normalized
def _get_jwk_from_public_key(self, public_key: dict) -> dict:
jwk = {}
for key in ["kty", "kid", "n", "e", "x", "y", "crv"]:
if key in public_key:
jwk[key] = public_key[key]
return jwk
def _get_decode_options(
self,
audience: Optional[Union[str, List[str]]],
issuer: Optional[str] = None,
disable_audience_validation: bool = False,
) -> Optional[dict]:
# Disabling audience verification must be an explicit choice — never
# an implicit consequence of ``audience`` being None. Otherwise a
# caller that accidentally constructs a config with ``audience=None``
# (bypassing the model validator) would silently lose audience
# validation. Require callers to opt in via
# ``disable_audience_validation=True``.
if audience is None and not disable_audience_validation:
raise ValueError("audience must be provided unless disable_audience_validation=True")
options: dict = {}
if audience is None:
options["verify_aud"] = False
if issuer is None:
options["verify_iss"] = False
return options or None
def _decode_jwt_with_public_key(
self,
token: str,
public_key: Union[dict, str],
audience: Optional[Union[str, List[str]]],
issuer: Optional[str] = None,
options: Optional[dict] = None,
disable_audience_validation: bool = False,
) -> dict:
decode_options = (
options
if options is not None
else self._get_decode_options(
audience=audience,
issuer=issuer,
disable_audience_validation=disable_audience_validation,
)
)
if isinstance(public_key, dict):
public_key_obj = PyJWK.from_dict(self._get_jwk_from_public_key(public_key=public_key)).key
return jwt.decode(
token,
public_key_obj, # type: ignore
algorithms=self.SUPPORTED_JWT_ALGORITHMS,
options=decode_options, # type: ignore[arg-type]
audience=audience,
issuer=issuer,
leeway=self.leeway,
)
cert = x509.load_pem_x509_certificate(public_key.encode(), default_backend())
key = cert.public_key().public_bytes(
serialization.Encoding.PEM,
serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
)
return jwt.decode(
token,
key,
algorithms=self.SUPPORTED_JWT_ALGORITHMS,
audience=audience,
issuer=issuer,
options=decode_options, # type: ignore[arg-type]
leeway=self.leeway,
)
async def _auth_jwt_with_issuer(self, token: str, issuer_config: JWTIssuerConfig, kid: Optional[str]) -> dict:
public_key = await self._get_public_key_from_jwks_url(
jwks_url=self._get_jwks_url_for_issuer(issuer_config=issuer_config),
kid=kid,
)
try:
payload = self._decode_jwt_with_public_key(
token=token,
public_key=public_key,
audience=issuer_config.audience,
issuer=issuer_config.issuer,
disable_audience_validation=issuer_config.disable_audience_validation,
)
except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
raise ProxyException(
message="Token Expired",
type=ProxyErrorTypes.expired_key,
param=None,
code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
)
except Exception as e:
raise Exception(f"Validation fails: {str(e)}")
return self._apply_issuer_claim_mappings(
token=payload,
issuer_config=issuer_config,
)
async def auth_jwt(self, token: str) -> dict:
header = jwt.get_unverified_header(token)
verbose_proxy_logger.debug("header: %s", header)
kid = header.get("kid", None)
issuer_config = self._get_configured_issuer(token=token)
if issuer_config is not None:
return await self._auth_jwt_with_issuer(
token=token,
issuer_config=issuer_config,
kid=kid,
)
decode_kwargs = self._build_decode_kwargs()
public_key = await self.get_public_key(kid=kid)
if public_key is not None:
try:
payload = self._decode_jwt_with_public_key(
token=token,
public_key=public_key,
audience=decode_kwargs["audience"],
issuer=decode_kwargs["issuer"],
options=decode_kwargs["options"],
)
return {k: v for k, v in payload.items() if k not in self.LITELLM_INTERNAL_CLAIMS}
except jwt.ExpiredSignatureError:
raise ProxyException(
message="Token Expired",
type=ProxyErrorTypes.expired_key,
param=None,
code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
)
except Exception as e:
raise Exception(f"Validation fails: {str(e)}")
raise Exception("Invalid JWT Submitted")
async def close(self):
await self.http_handler.close()
class JWTAuthManager:
"""Manages JWT authentication and authorization operations"""
@staticmethod
def can_rbac_role_call_route(
rbac_role: RBAC_ROLES,
general_settings: dict,
route: str,
) -> Literal[True]:
"""
Checks if user is allowed to access the route, based on their role.
"""
role_based_routes = get_role_based_routes(rbac_role=rbac_role, general_settings=general_settings)
if role_based_routes is None or route is None:
return True
is_allowed = _allowed_routes_check(
user_route=route,
allowed_routes=role_based_routes,
)
if not is_allowed:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail=f"Role={rbac_role} not allowed to call route={route}. Allowed routes={role_based_routes}",
)
return True
@staticmethod
def can_rbac_role_call_model(
rbac_role: RBAC_ROLES,
general_settings: dict,
model: Optional[str],
) -> Literal[True]:
"""
Checks if user is allowed to access the model, based on their role.
"""
role_based_models = get_role_based_models(rbac_role=rbac_role, general_settings=general_settings)
if role_based_models is None or model is None:
return True
if model not in role_based_models:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail=f"Role={rbac_role} not allowed to call model={model}. Allowed models={role_based_models}",
)
return True
@staticmethod
def check_scope_based_access(
scope_mappings: List[ScopeMapping],
scopes: List[str],
request_data: dict,
general_settings: dict,
) -> None:
"""
Check if scope allows access to the requested model
"""
if not scope_mappings:
return None
allowed_models = []
for sm in scope_mappings:
if sm.scope in scopes and sm.models:
allowed_models.extend(sm.models)
requested_model = request_data.get("model")
if not requested_model:
return None
if requested_model not in allowed_models:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail={"error": "model={} not allowed. Allowed_models={}".format(requested_model, allowed_models)},
)
return None
@staticmethod
async def check_rbac_role(
jwt_handler: JWTHandler,
jwt_valid_token: dict,
general_settings: dict,
request_data: dict,
route: str,
rbac_role: Optional[RBAC_ROLES],
) -> None:
"""Validate RBAC role and model access permissions"""
if jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.enforce_rbac is True:
if rbac_role is None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Unmatched token passed in. enforce_rbac is set to True. Token must belong to a proxy admin, team, or user.",
)
JWTAuthManager.can_rbac_role_call_model(
rbac_role=rbac_role,
general_settings=general_settings,
model=request_data.get("model"),
)
JWTAuthManager.can_rbac_role_call_route(
rbac_role=rbac_role,
general_settings=general_settings,
route=route,
)
@staticmethod
async def check_admin_access(
jwt_handler: JWTHandler,
scopes: list,
route: str,
user_id: Optional[str],
org_id: Optional[str],
api_key: str,
jwt_valid_token: Optional[dict] = None,
) -> Optional[JWTAuthBuilderResult]:
"""Check admin status and route access permissions"""
if not jwt_handler.is_admin(scopes=scopes):
return None
is_allowed = allowed_routes_check(
user_role=LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN,
user_route=route,
litellm_proxy_roles=jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth,
)
if not is_allowed:
allowed_routes: List[Any] = jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.admin_allowed_routes
actual_routes = get_actual_routes(allowed_routes=allowed_routes)
raise Exception(f"Admin not allowed to access this route. Route={route}, Allowed Routes={actual_routes}")
return JWTAuthBuilderResult(
is_proxy_admin=True,
team_object=None,
user_object=None,
end_user_object=None,
org_object=None,
token=api_key,
team_id=None,
user_id=user_id,
end_user_id=None,
org_id=org_id,
team_membership=None,
jwt_claims=jwt_valid_token or {},
)
@staticmethod
async def find_and_validate_specific_team_id(
jwt_handler: JWTHandler,
jwt_valid_token: dict,
prisma_client: Optional[PrismaClient],
user_api_key_cache: UserApiKeyCache,
parent_otel_span: Optional[Span],
proxy_logging_obj: ProxyLogging,
) -> Tuple[Optional[str], Optional[LiteLLM_TeamTable]]:
"""Find and validate specific team ID from team_id_jwt_field or team_alias_jwt_field"""
individual_team_id = jwt_handler.get_team_id(token=jwt_valid_token, default_value=None)
team_alias = jwt_handler.get_team_alias(token=jwt_valid_token, default_value=None)
# `get_team_id` silently substitutes `team_id_default` for a missing
# JWT team_id claim. When the token actually carries an alias claim,
# that substitution would mask the alias-resolved team, so prefer
# alias resolution. `get_all_jwt_team_ids` ignores `team_id_default`;
# an empty result means no real JWT team_id claim is present.
if (
team_alias
and individual_team_id is not None
and not jwt_handler.get_all_jwt_team_ids(token=jwt_valid_token)
):
individual_team_id = None
team_object: Optional[LiteLLM_TeamTable] = None
if individual_team_id:
try:
team_object = await get_team_object(
team_id=individual_team_id,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
team_id_upsert=jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_upsert,
)
return individual_team_id, team_object
except HTTPException as e:
if e.status_code != 404 or not jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.team_claim_fallback:
raise
# Claim doesn't map to a known team — defer to fallback.
verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
"JWT team_id claim '%s' did not resolve to a team: %s",
individual_team_id,
e.detail,
)
return None, None
if team_alias:
verbose_proxy_logger.info(f"JWT Auth: Resolving team by alias: '{team_alias}'")
team_object = await get_team_object_by_alias(
team_alias=team_alias,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
)
if team_object:
individual_team_id = team_object.team_id
verbose_proxy_logger.info(
f"JWT Auth: Resolved team_alias='{team_alias}' to team_id='{individual_team_id}'"
)
return individual_team_id, team_object
# Check if team is required but not found
if jwt_handler.is_required_team_id() is True:
team_id_field = jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_jwt_field
team_alias_field = jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.team_alias_jwt_field
hint = ""
if team_id_field:
# "roles.0" — dot-notation numeric indexing is not supported
if "." in team_id_field:
parts = team_id_field.rsplit(".", 1)
if parts[-1].isdigit():
base_field = parts[0]
hint = (
f" Hint: dot-notation array indexing (e.g. '{team_id_field}') is not "
f"supported. Use '{base_field}' instead — LiteLLM automatically "
f"uses the first element when the field value is a list."
)
# "roles[0]" — bracket-notation indexing is also not supported in get_nested_value
elif "[" in team_id_field and team_id_field.endswith("]"):
m = re.match(r"^(\w+)\[(\d+)\]$", team_id_field)
if m:
base_field = m.group(1)
hint = (
f" Hint: array indexing (e.g. '{team_id_field}') is not supported "
f"in team_id_jwt_field. Use '{base_field}' instead — LiteLLM "
f"automatically uses the first element when the field value is a list."
)
raise Exception(
f"No team found in token. Checked team_id field '{team_id_field}' and team_alias field '{team_alias_field}'.{hint}"
)
return individual_team_id, team_object
@staticmethod
def get_all_team_ids(jwt_handler: JWTHandler, jwt_valid_token: dict) -> Set[str]:
"""Get combined team IDs from groups and individual team_id"""
team_ids_from_groups = jwt_handler.get_team_ids_from_jwt(token=jwt_valid_token)
all_team_ids = set(team_ids_from_groups)
return all_team_ids
@staticmethod
def _team_has_passthrough_route_access(
team_object: Optional[LiteLLM_TeamTable],
route: str,
request_method: Optional[str] = None,
) -> bool:
normalized_request_method = request_method.upper() if isinstance(request_method, str) else None
if not RouteChecks.is_auth_enforced_pass_through_route(
route=route,
method=normalized_request_method,
):
return True
# JWT team selection is team-scoped; key metadata is not available here,
# so passthrough access is granted only by the selected team's metadata.
return RouteChecks.check_passthrough_route_access(
route=route,
user_api_key_dict=UserAPIKeyAuth(team_metadata=(team_object.metadata or {}) if team_object else {}),
)
@staticmethod
def _raise_team_passthrough_route_denial(route: str) -> None:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail=(
f"Team not allowed to access passthrough route {route}. "
"Configure `allowed_passthrough_routes` on the team."
),
)
@staticmethod
async def find_team_with_model_access(
team_ids: Set[str],
requested_model: Optional[str],
route: str,
jwt_handler: JWTHandler,
prisma_client: Optional[PrismaClient],
user_api_key_cache: UserApiKeyCache,
parent_otel_span: Optional[Span],
proxy_logging_obj: ProxyLogging,
request_method: Optional[str] = None,
) -> Tuple[Optional[str], Optional[LiteLLM_TeamTable]]:
"""Find first team with access to the requested model"""
from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import llm_router
denied_auth_enforced_pass_through_route = False
if not team_ids:
if (
jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.enforce_team_based_model_access
and not jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.fallback_to_db_teams
):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="No teams found in token. `enforce_team_based_model_access` is set to True. Token must belong to a team.",
)
return None, None
any_claim_team_resolved = False
for team_id in team_ids:
try:
team_object = await get_team_object(
team_id=team_id,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
)
if team_object is not None:
any_claim_team_resolved = True
if team_object and team_object.models is not None:
team_models = team_object.models
if isinstance(team_models, list) and (
not requested_model
or await can_team_access_model(
model=requested_model,
team_object=team_object,
llm_router=llm_router,
team_model_aliases=None,
)
):
is_allowed = allowed_routes_check(
user_role=LitellmUserRoles.TEAM,
user_route=route,
litellm_proxy_roles=jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth,
)
if is_allowed and not JWTAuthManager._team_has_passthrough_route_access(
team_object=team_object,
route=route,
request_method=request_method,
):
is_allowed = False
denied_auth_enforced_pass_through_route = True
verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
f"JWT team route check: team_id={team_id}, route={route}, is_allowed={is_allowed}"
)
if is_allowed:
return team_id, team_object
except Exception:
continue
if denied_auth_enforced_pass_through_route:
JWTAuthManager._raise_team_passthrough_route_denial(route=route)
if requested_model and (any_claim_team_resolved or not jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.team_claim_fallback):
# Claim resolved but no model access, or fallback disabled — deny.
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail=f"No team has access to the requested model: {requested_model}. Checked teams={team_ids}. Check `/models` to see all available models.",
)
# No claim team resolved and fallback enabled — defer to fallback.
return None, None
@staticmethod
async def get_user_info(
jwt_handler: JWTHandler,
jwt_valid_token: dict,
) -> Tuple[Optional[str], Optional[str], Optional[bool]]:
"""Get user email and validation status"""
user_email = jwt_handler.get_user_email(token=jwt_valid_token, default_value=None)
valid_user_email = None
if jwt_handler.is_enforced_email_domain():
valid_user_email = False if user_email is None else jwt_handler.is_allowed_domain(user_email=user_email)
user_id = jwt_handler.get_user_id(token=jwt_valid_token, default_value=user_email)
return user_id, user_email, valid_user_email
@staticmethod
def _canonical_user_id_from_db(
user_id: Optional[str],
user_object: Optional[LiteLLM_UserTable],
) -> Optional[str]:
"""Id used for spend / team-membership attribution.
JWT claim (often email) is only a lookup key. If fuzzy match in
``get_user_object`` resolved a legacy row with a different ``user_id``,
use that row's id; otherwise keep the claim. GH #26789.
"""
if user_object is not None and user_object.user_id:
return user_object.user_id
return user_id
@staticmethod
async def get_objects(
user_id: Optional[str],
user_email: Optional[str],
org_id: Optional[str],
end_user_id: Optional[str],
team_id: Optional[str],
valid_user_email: Optional[bool],
jwt_handler: JWTHandler,
prisma_client: Optional[PrismaClient],
user_api_key_cache: UserApiKeyCache,
parent_otel_span: Optional[Span],
proxy_logging_obj: ProxyLogging,
route: str,
org_alias: Optional[str] = None,
) -> Tuple[
Optional[LiteLLM_UserTable],
Optional[LiteLLM_OrganizationTable],
Optional[LiteLLM_EndUserTable],
Optional[LiteLLM_TeamMembership],
Optional[str],
]:
"""Get user, org, end-user, and team-membership objects.
Returns ``(..., effective_user_id)``: JWT claim unless fuzzy lookup
matched a legacy row (GH #26789).
"""
# Get org object - first try by ID, then by alias
org_object: Optional[LiteLLM_OrganizationTable] = None
if org_id:
org_object = (
await get_org_object(
org_id=org_id,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
)
if org_id
else None
)
elif org_alias:
verbose_proxy_logger.info(f"JWT Auth: Resolving org by alias: '{org_alias}'")
org_object = await get_org_object_by_alias(
org_alias=org_alias,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
)
if org_object:
verbose_proxy_logger.info(
f"JWT Auth: Resolved org_alias='{org_alias}' to org_id='{org_object.organization_id}'"
)
# Check if email domain is allowed before attempting to get/create user
if valid_user_email is False:
raise ProxyException(
message=f"Email domain not allowed. User email: {user_email}. Allowed domain: {jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.user_allowed_email_domain}",
type=ProxyErrorTypes.auth_error,
param="user_email",
code=403,
)
user_object: Optional[LiteLLM_UserTable] = None
if user_id:
user_object = (
await get_user_object(
user_id=user_id,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
user_id_upsert=jwt_handler.is_upsert_user_id(valid_user_email=valid_user_email),
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
user_email=user_email,
sso_user_id=user_id,
)
if user_id
else None
)
end_user_object: Optional[LiteLLM_EndUserTable] = None
if end_user_id:
end_user_object = (
await get_end_user_object(
end_user_id=end_user_id,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
route=route,
)
if end_user_id
else None
)
# Rebind to resolved DB user_id for team_membership + auth_builder (GH #26789).
effective_user_id = JWTAuthManager._canonical_user_id_from_db(user_id=user_id, user_object=user_object)
if effective_user_id != user_id:
verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
"JWT Auth: rebinding user_id %r -> DB user_id %r (email/sso match)",
user_id,
effective_user_id,
)
user_id = effective_user_id
team_membership_object: Optional[LiteLLM_TeamMembership] = None
if user_id and team_id:
team_membership_object = (
await get_team_membership(
user_id=user_id,
team_id=team_id,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
)
if user_id and team_id
else None
)
return (
user_object,
org_object,
end_user_object,
team_membership_object,
user_id,
)
@staticmethod
def validate_object_id(
user_id: Optional[str],
team_id: Optional[str],
enforce_rbac: bool,
is_proxy_admin: bool,
) -> Literal[True]:
"""If enforce_rbac is true, validate that a valid rbac id is returned for spend tracking"""
if enforce_rbac and not is_proxy_admin and not user_id and not team_id:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="No user or team id found in token. enforce_rbac is set to True. Token must belong to a proxy admin, team, or user.",
)
return True
@staticmethod
def get_team_id_from_header(
request_headers: Optional[dict],
allowed_team_ids: Set[str],
fallback_to_db_teams: bool = False,
) -> Optional[str]:
"""
Extract team_id from x-litellm-team-id header if present.
Validates that the team is in the user's allowed teams from JWT.
Args:
request_headers: Dictionary of request headers
allowed_team_ids: Set of team IDs the user is allowed to access (from JWT)
fallback_to_db_teams: When True and the JWT carries no team claims
(allowed_team_ids is empty), the header value is returned
provisionally and validated against DB memberships later in
auth_builder instead of being rejected here.
Returns:
The team_id from header if valid, None otherwise
Raises:
HTTPException: If team_id is provided but not in allowed_team_ids
"""
if not request_headers:
return None
# Normalize headers to lowercase for case-insensitive lookup
normalized_headers = {k.lower(): v for k, v in request_headers.items()}
header_team_id = normalized_headers.get("x-litellm-team-id")
if not header_team_id:
return None
defer_to_db_membership = fallback_to_db_teams and not allowed_team_ids
if not defer_to_db_membership and header_team_id not in allowed_team_ids:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail=f"Team '{header_team_id}' from x-litellm-team-id header is not in your JWT's allowed teams. Allowed teams: {list(allowed_team_ids)}",
)
verbose_proxy_logger.debug(f"Using team_id from x-litellm-team-id header: {header_team_id}")
return header_team_id
@staticmethod
async def map_user_to_teams(
user_object: Optional[LiteLLM_UserTable],
team_object: Optional[LiteLLM_TeamTable],
):
"""
Map user to teams.
- If user is not in team, add them to the team
- If user is in team, do nothing
"""
from litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.team_endpoints import team_member_add
if not user_object:
return None
if not team_object:
return None
# check if user is in team
for member in team_object.members_with_roles:
if member.user_id and member.user_id == user_object.user_id:
return None
data = TeamMemberAddRequest(
member=Member(
user_id=user_object.user_id,
role="user", # [TODO]: allow controlling role within team based on jwt token
),
team_id=team_object.team_id,
)
# add user to team - make this non-blocking to avoid authentication failures
try:
await team_member_add(
data=data,
user_api_key_dict=UserAPIKeyAuth(
user_role=LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN
), # [TODO]: expose an internal service role, for better tracking
)
verbose_proxy_logger.debug(f"Successfully added user {user_object.user_id} to team {team_object.team_id}")
except ProxyException as e:
if e.type == ProxyErrorTypes.team_member_already_in_team:
verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
f"User {user_object.user_id} is already a member of team {team_object.team_id}"
)
return None
else:
raise e
return None
@staticmethod
async def sync_user_role_and_teams(
jwt_handler: JWTHandler,
jwt_valid_token: dict,
user_object: Optional[LiteLLM_UserTable],
prisma_client: Optional[PrismaClient],
user_api_key_cache: Optional[UserApiKeyCache] = None,
) -> None:
"""
Sync user role and team memberships with JWT claims
The goal of this method is to ensure:
1. The user role on LiteLLM DB is in sync with the IDP provider role
2. The user is a member of the teams specified in the JWT token
This method is only called if sync_user_role_and_teams is set to True in the JWT config.
"""
if not jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.sync_user_role_and_teams:
return None
if user_object is None or prisma_client is None:
return None
# Update user role
new_role = jwt_handler.map_jwt_role_to_litellm_role(jwt_valid_token)
if new_role and user_object.user_role != new_role.value:
await UserRepository(prisma_client).table.update(
where={"user_id": user_object.user_id},
data={"user_role": new_role.value},
)
user_object.user_role = new_role.value
if user_api_key_cache is not None:
await user_api_key_cache.async_set_cache(
key=user_object.user_id,
value=user_object,
model_type=LiteLLM_UserTable,
ttl=get_management_object_ttl(user_api_key_cache),
)
# Sync team memberships. With fallback_to_db_teams on, read both plural and
# singular claim shapes so a singular-only IdP token (e.g. Okta/Auth0) is
# not mistaken for claimless and left with stale DB memberships the fallback
# could later attribute. With the flag off, keep the upstream plural-only
# reconciliation so existing deployments are unchanged.
jwt_team_ids = set(
jwt_handler.get_all_jwt_team_ids(jwt_valid_token)
if jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.fallback_to_db_teams
else jwt_handler.get_team_ids_from_jwt(jwt_valid_token)
)
existing_teams = set(user_object.teams or [])
teams_to_add = jwt_team_ids - existing_teams
preserve_db_teams_without_claims = jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.fallback_to_db_teams and not jwt_team_ids
teams_to_remove = set() if preserve_db_teams_without_claims else existing_teams - jwt_team_ids
if teams_to_add or teams_to_remove:
from litellm.proxy.management_endpoints.scim.scim_v2 import (
patch_team_membership,
)
await patch_team_membership(
user_id=user_object.user_id,
teams_ids_to_add_user_to=list(teams_to_add),
teams_ids_to_remove_user_from=list(teams_to_remove),
)
user_object.teams = list(jwt_team_ids)
if user_api_key_cache is not None:
await user_api_key_cache.async_set_cache(
key=user_object.user_id,
value=user_object,
model_type=LiteLLM_UserTable,
ttl=get_management_object_ttl(user_api_key_cache),
)
return None
@staticmethod
async def _attach_team_from_header_for_admin(
admin_result: JWTAuthBuilderResult,
route: str,
request_headers: Optional[dict],
jwt_handler: JWTHandler,
prisma_client: Optional[PrismaClient],
user_api_key_cache: UserApiKeyCache,
parent_otel_span: Optional[Span],
proxy_logging_obj: ProxyLogging,
) -> None:
"""Attach team context from x-litellm-team-id to an admin result.
Only applies on LLM API routes so team TPM/RPM limits and attribution
are enforced when admins act on behalf of a team. Admin management
routes ignore the header to preserve pre-existing bypass behavior.
"""
header_team_id = request_headers.get("x-litellm-team-id") if request_headers else None
if not header_team_id or not RouteChecks.is_llm_api_route(route=route):
return
try:
team_object = await get_team_object(
team_id=header_team_id,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
team_id_upsert=jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_upsert,
)
except Exception as e:
# Fall back to pre-PR admin behavior: honor the admin's
# authorization but skip team attribution/limits for this
# request. Log so operators can find the misconfigured caller.
verbose_proxy_logger.warning(
"admin x-litellm-team-id=%r on route=%s could not be resolved (%s); "
"proceeding with admin access, team context NOT attached.",
header_team_id,
route,
e,
)
return
admin_result["team_id"] = header_team_id
admin_result["team_object"] = team_object
@staticmethod
async def _resolve_single_team_fallback(
user_object: Optional[LiteLLM_UserTable],
user_id: Optional[str],
prisma_client: Optional[PrismaClient],
user_api_key_cache: UserApiKeyCache,
parent_otel_span: Optional[Span],
proxy_logging_obj: ProxyLogging,
team_id_upsert: Optional[bool],
) -> tuple:
"""
If JWT did not resolve team_id, but the user belongs to exactly one team
in LiteLLM, load that team (and membership when user_id is set) so that
spend / metadata can be attributed correctly.
Returns (team_id, team_object, team_membership_object).
Any DB error is debug-logged and the tuple is (None, None, None) — no
exception ever propagates from this helper.
"""
if user_object is None or not user_object.teams or len(user_object.teams) != 1:
return None, None, None
_tid = user_object.teams[0]
try:
team_row = await get_team_object(
team_id=_tid,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
team_id_upsert=team_id_upsert,
)
if team_row is None:
return None, None, None
if not user_id:
return _tid, team_row, None
team_membership = await get_team_membership(
user_id=user_id,
team_id=_tid,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
)
return _tid, team_row, team_membership
except Exception:
verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
"JWT single-team fallback error, skipping. team_id=%s",
_tid,
exc_info=True,
)
return None, None, None
@staticmethod
async def _resolve_db_team_fallback(
user_object: LiteLLM_UserTable | None,
user_id: str | None,
requested_model: str | None,
route: str,
jwt_handler: JWTHandler,
enforce_team_based_model_access: bool,
team_id_upsert: bool,
prisma_client: PrismaClient | None,
user_api_key_cache: UserApiKeyCache,
parent_otel_span: Span | None,
proxy_logging_obj: ProxyLogging,
request_method: str | None = None,
) -> tuple[str | None, LiteLLM_TeamTable | None, LiteLLM_TeamMembership | None]:
"""
Resolve a team for a user whose JWT carries no team claims by selecting
the first DB team membership that loads successfully and, when a model is
requested, can access that model — mirroring the per-team model-access
check the claim-based path enforces, so a team's `models` restriction is
not bypassed by the fallback.
The same `team_allowed_routes` gate the claim-based path applies is
enforced here too, so a DB-selected team cannot reach a route the JWT
config excludes for team-role callers. Auth-enforced passthrough routes
are exempt from that gate by design (they are governed by the team's
`allowed_passthrough_routes`, re-checked by the caller).
The resolved team's membership row is loaded too (when user_id is set) so
per-team membership budget limits are enforced on the fallback path the
same as on the claim-based path.
Raises HTTP 403 when the user has no usable DB team membership and
`enforce_team_based_model_access` is set; otherwise returns (None, None, None).
"""
from litellm.proxy.proxy_server import llm_router
user_team_ids = user_object.teams if user_object else []
team_route_allowed = JWTAuthManager._is_team_route_allowed(
route=route, request_method=request_method, jwt_handler=jwt_handler
)
any_team_resolved = False
for candidate_team_id in user_team_ids:
try:
team_object = await get_team_object(
team_id=candidate_team_id,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
team_id_upsert=team_id_upsert,
)
except HTTPException:
continue
any_team_resolved = True
if requested_model:
try:
await can_team_access_model(
model=requested_model,
team_object=team_object,
llm_router=llm_router,
team_model_aliases=None,
)
except ProxyException:
continue
if not team_route_allowed:
continue
verbose_proxy_logger.debug(
"JWT DB team fallback: resolved team_id=%s from user DB membership",
candidate_team_id,
)
if user_id:
return (
candidate_team_id,
team_object,
await get_team_membership(
user_id=user_id,
team_id=candidate_team_id,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
),
)
return candidate_team_id, team_object, None
if enforce_team_based_model_access:
if requested_model and any_team_resolved:
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail=(
f"No team you are a member of has access to the requested "
f"model: {requested_model}. Check `/models` to see the models "
f"available to you."
),
)
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail=("User is not a member of any team. Add the user to a team via the LiteLLM UI or API."),
)
return None, None, None
@staticmethod
def _is_team_route_allowed(
route: str,
request_method: str | None,
jwt_handler: JWTHandler,
) -> bool:
"""
Whether a team-role caller may reach `route` per the JWT config's
`team_allowed_routes`. Auth-enforced passthrough routes are exempt
here; their team's `allowed_passthrough_routes` gate runs separately.
"""
normalized_method = request_method.upper() if isinstance(request_method, str) else None
return RouteChecks.is_auth_enforced_pass_through_route(
route=route, method=normalized_method
) or allowed_routes_check(
user_role=LitellmUserRoles.TEAM,
user_route=route,
litellm_proxy_roles=jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth,
)
@staticmethod
def _raise_header_team_membership_denial(team_id: str) -> NoReturn:
"""
The single denial shape for a provisional x-litellm-team-id header,
raised identically for nonexistent teams and for teams the user is not
a member of, so the response does not reveal whether a team id exists.
"""
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail=(f"Team '{team_id}' (from x-litellm-team-id header) is not in your team memberships."),
)
@staticmethod
def _validate_header_team_in_db_membership(
team_id: str,
user_object: LiteLLM_UserTable | None,
) -> None:
"""
A provisional team_id from the x-litellm-team-id header (accepted without
JWT-team validation when the JWT carries no team claims) must exist in the
user's DB team memberships before it becomes request context.
"""
user_team_ids = user_object.teams if user_object else []
if team_id in user_team_ids:
return
JWTAuthManager._raise_header_team_membership_denial(team_id)
@staticmethod
async def auth_builder(
api_key: str,
jwt_handler: JWTHandler,
request_data: dict,
general_settings: dict,
route: str,
prisma_client: Optional[PrismaClient],
user_api_key_cache: UserApiKeyCache,
parent_otel_span: Optional[Span],
proxy_logging_obj: ProxyLogging,
request_headers: Optional[dict] = None,
request_method: Optional[str] = None,
) -> JWTAuthBuilderResult:
"""Main authentication and authorization builder"""
# Check if OIDC UserInfo endpoint is enabled, but fall back to standard
# JWT auth if the token itself is a well-formed JWT (3-part structure).
if jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.oidc_userinfo_enabled and not jwt_handler.is_jwt(token=api_key):
verbose_proxy_logger.debug("OIDC UserInfo is enabled. Fetching user info from UserInfo endpoint.")
# Use the access token to fetch user info from OIDC UserInfo endpoint
jwt_valid_token: dict = await jwt_handler.get_oidc_userinfo(token=api_key)
else:
# Default behavior: decode and validate the JWT token
jwt_valid_token = await jwt_handler.auth_jwt(token=api_key)
# Check custom validate
if jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.custom_validate:
if not jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.custom_validate(jwt_valid_token):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail="Invalid JWT token",
)
# Check RBAC
rbac_role = jwt_handler.get_rbac_role(token=jwt_valid_token)
await JWTAuthManager.check_rbac_role(
jwt_handler,
jwt_valid_token,
general_settings,
request_data,
route,
rbac_role,
)
# Check Scope Based Access
scopes = jwt_handler.get_scopes(token=jwt_valid_token)
if jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.enforce_scope_based_access and jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.scope_mappings:
JWTAuthManager.check_scope_based_access(
scope_mappings=jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.scope_mappings,
scopes=scopes,
request_data=request_data,
general_settings=general_settings,
)
object_id = jwt_handler.get_object_id(token=jwt_valid_token, default_value=None)
# Get basic user info
user_id, user_email, valid_user_email = await JWTAuthManager.get_user_info(jwt_handler, jwt_valid_token)
# Get IDs
org_id = jwt_handler.get_org_id(token=jwt_valid_token, default_value=None)
end_user_id = jwt_handler.get_end_user_id(token=jwt_valid_token, default_value=None)
team_id: Optional[str] = None
team_object: Optional[LiteLLM_TeamTable] = None
object_id = jwt_handler.get_object_id(token=jwt_valid_token, default_value=None)
if rbac_role and object_id:
if rbac_role == LitellmUserRoles.TEAM:
team_id = object_id
elif rbac_role == LitellmUserRoles.INTERNAL_USER:
user_id = object_id
# Check admin access
admin_result = await JWTAuthManager.check_admin_access(
jwt_handler, scopes, route, user_id, org_id, api_key, jwt_valid_token
)
if admin_result:
await JWTAuthManager._attach_team_from_header_for_admin(
admin_result=admin_result,
route=route,
request_headers=request_headers,
jwt_handler=jwt_handler,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
)
return admin_result
# Get team with model access
## Check if team_id is specified via x-litellm-team-id header
all_team_ids = JWTAuthManager.get_all_team_ids(jwt_handler, jwt_valid_token)
specific_team_id = jwt_handler.get_team_id(token=jwt_valid_token, default_value=None)
# The DB fallback only applies when the token carries no team identity at
# all. `get_all_jwt_team_ids` ignores `team_id_default` so a configured
# default does not hide a claimless token, `get_team_alias` covers
# alias-only tokens so the alias still resolves via
# `find_and_validate_specific_team_id`, and `team_id is None` excludes
# the RBAC team-role path (which already set `team_id`); otherwise a
# provisional x-litellm-team-id header could override an RBAC-asserted team.
db_team_fallback = (
jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.fallback_to_db_teams
and not jwt_handler.get_all_jwt_team_ids(token=jwt_valid_token)
and not jwt_handler.get_team_alias(token=jwt_valid_token, default_value=None)
and team_id is None
)
if specific_team_id and not db_team_fallback:
all_team_ids.add(specific_team_id)
header_team_id = JWTAuthManager.get_team_id_from_header(
request_headers=request_headers,
allowed_team_ids=all_team_ids,
fallback_to_db_teams=db_team_fallback,
)
if header_team_id:
team_id = header_team_id
# A provisional header team (accepted only because the JWT carries no
# team claims) is validated against DB membership further down; never
# upsert it here or an attacker-supplied x-litellm-team-id would create
# an orphaned team row before that check runs. A genuine membership team
# already exists, so suppressing the upsert in that case costs nothing.
try:
team_object = await get_team_object(
team_id=team_id,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
team_id_upsert=(jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_upsert and not db_team_fallback),
)
except HTTPException:
if not db_team_fallback:
raise
JWTAuthManager._raise_header_team_membership_denial(team_id)
elif not team_id and not db_team_fallback:
## SPECIFIC TEAM ID
(
team_id,
team_object,
) = await JWTAuthManager.find_and_validate_specific_team_id(
jwt_handler,
jwt_valid_token,
prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj,
)
if not team_object and not team_id:
## CHECK USER GROUP ACCESS
team_id, team_object = await JWTAuthManager.find_team_with_model_access(
team_ids=all_team_ids,
requested_model=request_data.get("model"),
route=route,
request_method=request_method,
jwt_handler=jwt_handler,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
)
# The RBAC role-claim path (rbac_role == TEAM) sets team_id without
# loading team_object, so fetch it here before gating an auth-enforced
# passthrough route on the team's allowed_passthrough_routes.
if (
team_id
and team_object is None
and RouteChecks.is_auth_enforced_pass_through_route(
route=route,
method=(request_method.upper() if isinstance(request_method, str) else None),
)
):
team_object = await get_team_object(
team_id=team_id,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
team_id_upsert=jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_upsert,
)
if team_id and not JWTAuthManager._team_has_passthrough_route_access(
team_object=team_object,
route=route,
request_method=request_method,
):
JWTAuthManager._raise_team_passthrough_route_denial(route=route)
# Extract alias fields for resolution (if configured)
org_alias = jwt_handler.get_org_alias(token=jwt_valid_token, default_value=None)
# get_objects returns effective_user_id for downstream spend attribution (GH #26789).
(
user_object,
org_object,
end_user_object,
team_membership_object,
user_id,
) = await JWTAuthManager.get_objects(
user_id=user_id,
user_email=user_email,
org_id=org_id,
end_user_id=end_user_id,
team_id=team_id,
valid_user_email=valid_user_email,
jwt_handler=jwt_handler,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
route=route,
org_alias=org_alias,
)
# Derive org_id from org_object if resolved by alias
resolved_org_id = org_object.organization_id if org_object else org_id
await JWTAuthManager.sync_user_role_and_teams(
jwt_handler=jwt_handler,
jwt_valid_token=jwt_valid_token,
user_object=user_object,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
)
# If JWT did not resolve team_id, attempt a team fallback.
if team_id is None and db_team_fallback:
(
team_id,
team_object,
team_membership_object,
) = await JWTAuthManager._resolve_db_team_fallback(
user_object=user_object,
user_id=user_id,
requested_model=request_data.get("model"),
route=route,
jwt_handler=jwt_handler,
enforce_team_based_model_access=jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.enforce_team_based_model_access,
team_id_upsert=jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_upsert,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
request_method=request_method,
)
# The earlier passthrough gate ran when team_id was None; re-check
# against the DB-resolved team so a fallback-selected team must also
# pass the auth-enforced passthrough allowlist.
if team_id and not JWTAuthManager._team_has_passthrough_route_access(
team_object=team_object,
route=route,
request_method=request_method,
):
JWTAuthManager._raise_team_passthrough_route_denial(route=route)
elif team_id is None:
(
team_id,
team_object,
team_membership_object,
) = await JWTAuthManager._resolve_single_team_fallback(
user_object=user_object,
user_id=user_id,
prisma_client=prisma_client,
user_api_key_cache=user_api_key_cache,
parent_otel_span=parent_otel_span,
proxy_logging_obj=proxy_logging_obj,
team_id_upsert=jwt_handler.litellm_jwtauth.team_id_upsert,
)
elif db_team_fallback and team_id == header_team_id:
JWTAuthManager._validate_header_team_in_db_membership(
team_id=team_id,
user_object=user_object,
)
if not JWTAuthManager._is_team_route_allowed(
route=route,
request_method=request_method,
jwt_handler=jwt_handler,
):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=403,
detail=(
f"Team '{team_id}' (from x-litellm-team-id header) is not allowed to access route '{route}'."
),
)
## MAP USER TO TEAMS
await JWTAuthManager.map_user_to_teams(
user_object=user_object,
team_object=team_object,
)
# Validate that a valid rbac id is returned for spend tracking
JWTAuthManager.validate_object_id(
user_id=user_id,
team_id=team_id,
enforce_rbac=general_settings.get("enforce_rbac", False),
is_proxy_admin=False,
)
# check if user is proxy admin
is_proxy_admin = bool(user_object and user_object.user_role == LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN)
return JWTAuthBuilderResult(
is_proxy_admin=is_proxy_admin,
team_id=team_id,
team_object=team_object,
user_id=user_id,
user_object=user_object,
org_id=resolved_org_id, # Use resolved org_id (from alias lookup if applicable)
org_object=org_object,
end_user_id=end_user_id,
end_user_object=end_user_object,
token=api_key,
team_membership=team_membership_object,
jwt_claims=jwt_valid_token,
)