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* fix(alerting): dedupe scheduled Slack spend reports across pods Every pod ran its own weekly/monthly spend report jobs, prometheus fallback stats cron, and daily report loop, so deployments with multiple replicas or uvicorn workers received one copy per pod. Gate each scheduled send behind the shared PodLockManager redis lock. The lock is never released: its TTL (the full reporting window for the weekly interval job, whose per-pod anchors drift by boot time and jitter) doubles as a sent-this-window marker. acquire_lock returning None (no redis wired) proceeds, preserving single-pod behavior. Also generalize the pod lock could-not-acquire log line, which claimed to be about spend tracking for every consumer. Fixes #14809 * fix(alerting): harden spend report locks after adversarial review Weekly lock TTL gets an hour haircut: with ttl equal to the interval, the winner re-fires just before its own key expires, reacquires without a TTL refresh, and the key then lapses in time for a trailing pod to re-send. Job/lock ids move to litellm/constants.py per convention, and spend_report_frequency now rejects non-positive day counts, which previously coerced to an every-second schedule and would now compute a negative lock TTL that silently never sends. Adds the missing test coverage the review flagged: startup_event's pod_lock_manager wiring (identity-asserted), the prometheus closure's positive path, and the ungated immediate prometheus send pinned to exactly one await. * test(alerting): consolidate spend_report_frequency validator coverage Drops a duplicate non-positive-days test and parametrizes the survivor over the suffix half of the validator too * fix(alerting): route the startup prometheus fallback send through the pod lock Greptile caught that the boot-time send still ran once per pod when PROMETHEUS_URL is set, the same duplication class this PR removes * fix(alerting): make report lock acquisition non-reentrant Greptile caught that a pod booting within an hour of the fallback stats cron sent twice: the startup send takes the lock, then the cron fire hits acquire_lock's reacquire branch, which returns True for the holder. Window-marker gates now pass allow_reentrant=False so a live lock blocks everyone including its holder; leader-election consumers keep the reentrant default * test(proxy): give spec'd ProxyLogging mocks a db_spend_update_writer _initialize_slack_alerting_jobs now reads it for the pod lock manager, and spec=ProxyLogging blocks instance-only attributes |
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| .. | ||
| __init__.py | ||
| _harness_smoke_test.py | ||
| conftest.py | ||
| test_alerting.py | ||
| test_callback_capabilities_class.py | ||
| test_callback_capabilities_dataclass.py | ||
| test_during_call_hook.py | ||
| test_guardrail_pipeline.py | ||
| test_internal_usage_cache.py | ||
| test_lifecycle.py | ||
| test_mcp_bridging.py | ||
| test_module_helpers.py | ||
| test_post_call_failure_hook.py | ||
| test_post_call_success_hook.py | ||
| test_pre_call_hook.py | ||
| test_streaming_hooks.py | ||