litellm/tests/integration/mcp/test_mcp_credentials.py
devin-ai-integration[bot] 102619d47a
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test: migrate proxy security, schema migration and MCP legacy tests (#45937)
* test: migrate proxy security, schema migration and MCP legacy tests

* test: run the MCP proxy e2e upstream under the SDK1 peer in integration-mcp

* test: warm the baseline store before timing the locked projection

* test(e2e): hold the stack exclusively while the semantic filter flag is flipped

* test(mcp): scope the in-process proxy e2e fixtures to their module

The session-scoped autouse fixture deleted DATABASE_URL and overrode LITELLM_MASTER_KEY for the rest of the worker, which broke every later test in the integration mcp suite

* test(e2e): assert the semantic filter keeps listed tools instead of a ranking

Which Datadog tool an OpenAI embedding ranks first is not something litellm owns, so the test now checks that the kept tools are a non-empty subset of the key's listing within top_k

* test(mcp): keep the in-process proxy e2e tests on one worker

loadgroup spread the file's tests across workers and interleaved them with other files, so the module-scoped in-process proxy was torn down and restarted between tests and requests timed out

* test(mcp): name the upstream requests that carried the wrong token

The bare all() assertion hid which request broke the forwarded token, which made an intermittent CircleCI failure undiagnosable

---------

Co-authored-by: yuneng <yuneng@berri.ai>
2026-10-11 16:17:24 -07:00

671 lines
32 KiB
Python

import base64
import re
import textwrap
import uuid
from collections.abc import Iterator
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Final
import pytest
from integration._support.client import Gateway, Scenario, eventually, gateway_from_environment
from integration._support.database import read_rows
from integration._support.mcp import (
ENTRY_POINTS,
EntryPoint,
McpCaller,
McpPeer,
Outcome,
ScriptedTool,
call_tool,
forget_mcp,
mcp_peer,
openapi_peer,
register_mcp,
scripted_peer,
text_result,
tool_calls,
tool_names,
)
from integration._support.oauth_server import oauth_server
from integration._support.process import owned_proxy
from pydantic import TypeAdapter
ADD: Final = {"a": 2, "b": 3}
STATIC_MODES: Final = (
("api_key", b"x-api-key", "{secret}"),
("bearer_token", b"authorization", "Bearer {secret}"),
("basic", b"authorization", "Basic {basic}"),
("authorization", b"authorization", "{secret}"),
)
def _header(call: dict[str, object], name: bytes) -> bytes | None:
headers: Final = call["headers"]
assert isinstance(headers, dict)
value: Final = headers.get(name)
return value if isinstance(value, bytes) else None
def _one_call(peer: McpPeer) -> dict[str, object]:
sent: Final = tool_calls(peer.drain())
assert len(sent) == 1, sent
return sent[0]
def _plaintext_rows(identity: str, secret: str) -> list[dict[str, object]]:
return read_rows(
'SELECT server_id FROM "LiteLLM_MCPServerTable" WHERE server_id = %s '
"AND (credentials::text LIKE %s OR static_headers::text LIKE %s)",
(identity, f"%{secret}%", f"%{secret}%"),
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize(("auth_type", "header", "shape"), STATIC_MODES)
def test_static_credential_reaches_the_peer_in_its_mode_shape_and_is_encrypted_at_rest(
gateway: Gateway, auth_type: str, header: bytes, shape: str
) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
secret: Final = "user:" + uuid.uuid4().hex
basic: Final = base64.b64encode(secret.encode()).decode()
identity: Final = register_mcp(
scenario, peer, "cred" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8], auth_type=auth_type, credentials={"auth_value": secret}
)
key: Final = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
peer.drain()
response: Final = call_tool(gateway, key, identity, tool_names(gateway, key, identity)["add"], ADD)
assert response.status_code == 200, response.text
assert _header(_one_call(peer), header) == shape.format(secret=secret, basic=basic).encode()
assert _plaintext_rows(identity, secret) == [], "credential stored in plaintext"
def test_create_response_does_not_echo_the_stored_credential(gateway: Gateway) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
secret: Final = "create-secret-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
alias: Final = "cred" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
response: Final = gateway.request(
"POST",
"/v1/mcp/server",
{
"server_name": alias,
"alias": alias,
**peer.registration(),
"auth_type": "bearer_token",
"credentials": {"auth_value": secret},
},
)
scenario.cleanups.callback(forget_mcp, gateway, response.json()["server_id"])
assert response.status_code == 201, response.text
assert response.json()["alias"] == alias
assert response.json().get("credentials") is None
assert secret not in response.text
def test_editing_the_credential_rotates_what_the_peer_receives(gateway: Gateway) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
first: Final = "cred-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
second: Final = "cred-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
identity: Final = register_mcp(
scenario, peer, "cred" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8], auth_type="bearer_token", credentials={"auth_value": first}
)
key: Final = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
name: Final = tool_names(gateway, key, identity)["add"]
peer.drain()
assert call_tool(gateway, key, identity, name, ADD).status_code == 200
assert _header(_one_call(peer), b"authorization") == f"Bearer {first}".encode()
rotated: Final = gateway.request(
"PUT", "/v1/mcp/server", {"server_id": identity, "credentials": {"auth_value": second}}
)
assert rotated.status_code == 202, rotated.text
observed: Final = eventually(
lambda: (call_tool(gateway, key, identity, name, ADD).status_code, tool_calls(peer.drain())),
lambda value: any(_header(call, b"authorization") == f"Bearer {second}".encode() for call in value[1]),
)
assert all(_header(call, b"authorization") != f"Bearer {first}".encode() for call in observed[1][-1:])
assert _plaintext_rows(identity, second) == [] and _plaintext_rows(identity, first) == []
@pytest.mark.parametrize("entry", ENTRY_POINTS)
def test_caller_headers_for_other_servers_and_unknown_headers_never_reach_the_peer(
gateway: Gateway, entry: EntryPoint
) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, mcp_peer() as other, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
alias: Final = "cred" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
other_alias: Final = "cred" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
identity: Final = register_mcp(scenario, peer, alias)
other_id: Final = register_mcp(scenario, other, other_alias)
key: Final = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity, other_id]})
leak: Final = "leak-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
caller: Final = McpCaller(
gateway,
key,
entry,
alias,
headers={
f"x-mcp-{other_alias}-authorization": f"Bearer {leak}",
"x-integration-unknown": leak,
"cookie": f"session={leak}",
},
)
peer.drain()
outcome: Final = caller.call(f"{alias}-add", ADD, identity if entry in ("mcp", "root", "sse", "rest") else None)
assert outcome.ok, outcome.raw
call: Final = _one_call(peer)
assert leak.encode() not in b"".join(_header(call, name) or b"" for name in call["headers"]), call["headers"]
assert tool_calls(other.drain()) == ()
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
("auth_type", "per_server_header"),
(("none", True), ("true_passthrough", False)),
)
def test_callers_own_litellm_key_never_reaches_the_peer_over_rest(
gateway: Gateway, auth_type: str, per_server_header: bool
) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
alias: Final = "cred" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
identity: Final = register_mcp(scenario, peer, alias, auth_type=auth_type)
key: Final = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
caller_headers: Final = {
"x-litellm-api-key": f"Bearer {key}",
(f"x-mcp-{alias}-authorization" if per_server_header else "Authorization"): f"Bearer {key}",
}
peer.drain()
response: Final = call_tool(
gateway, key, identity, tool_names(gateway, key, identity)["add"], ADD, headers=caller_headers
)
assert response.status_code == 200, response.text
assert response.json()["isError"] is False
observed: Final = peer.drain()
calls: Final = tool_calls(observed)
assert len(calls) == 1, calls
header_sets: Final = tuple(
TypeAdapter(dict[bytes, bytes]).validate_python(request["headers"]) for request in observed
)
assert all(all(key.encode() not in value for value in headers.values()) for headers in header_sets), (
"caller key appeared in the recorded MCP header set"
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("entry", ("server_mcp", "rest"))
def test_empty_primary_header_does_not_expose_authorization_key(gateway: Gateway, entry: EntryPoint) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
alias: Final = "cred" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
identity: Final = register_mcp(scenario, peer, alias, extra_headers=["x-upstream-token", "x-tenant"])
key: Final = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
caller: Final = McpCaller(
gateway,
key,
entry,
alias,
headers={
"x-litellm-api-key": "",
"Authorization": f"Bearer {key}",
f"x-mcp-{alias}-authorization": f"Bearer {key}",
"x-upstream-token": key,
"x-tenant": "tenant-control",
},
)
peer.drain()
outcome: Final = caller.call(f"{alias}-add", ADD, identity if entry == "rest" else None)
assert outcome.ok, outcome.raw
observed: Final = peer.drain()
calls: Final = tool_calls(observed)
assert len(calls) == 1, calls
assert _header(calls[0], b"x-tenant") == b"tenant-control"
header_sets: Final = tuple(
TypeAdapter(dict[bytes, bytes]).validate_python(request["headers"]) for request in observed
)
assert all(all(key.encode() not in value for value in headers.values()) for headers in header_sets), (
"empty primary header prevented scrubbing the admitted Authorization key"
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("entry", ENTRY_POINTS)
def test_extra_headers_cannot_forward_gateway_admission_key(gateway: Gateway, entry: EntryPoint) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
alias: Final = "cred" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
identity: Final = register_mcp(
scenario, peer, alias, extra_headers=["X-LiteLLM-API-Key", "x-tenant"],
)
key: Final = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
caller: Final = McpCaller(gateway, key, entry, alias, headers={"x-tenant": "tenant-control"})
peer.drain()
outcome: Final = caller.call(f"{alias}-add", ADD, identity if entry != "server_mcp" else None)
assert outcome.ok, outcome.raw
observed: Final = peer.drain()
calls: Final = tool_calls(observed)
assert len(calls) == 1, calls
assert _header(calls[0], b"x-tenant") == b"tenant-control"
header_sets: Final = tuple(
TypeAdapter(dict[bytes, bytes]).validate_python(request["headers"]) for request in observed
)
assert all(all(key.encode() not in value for value in headers.values()) for headers in header_sets), (
"gateway admission key reached the upstream through Extra Headers"
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("entry", ("server_mcp", "rest"))
def test_openapi_extra_headers_cannot_forward_gateway_admission_key(gateway: Gateway, entry: EntryPoint) -> None:
with openapi_peer() as peer, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
alias: Final = "cred" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
identity: Final = register_mcp(
scenario, peer, alias, extra_headers=["X-LiteLLM-API-Key", "x-tenant"],
)
key: Final = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
caller: Final = McpCaller(gateway, key, entry, alias, headers={"x-tenant": "tenant-control"})
peer.drain()
outcome: Final = caller.call(f"{alias}-getpet", {"petId": "7"}, identity if entry == "rest" else None)
assert outcome.ok, outcome.raw
observed: Final = peer.drain()
assert [(request["method"], request["path"]) for request in observed] == [("GET", "/pets/7")]
headers: Final = TypeAdapter(dict[bytes, bytes]).validate_python(observed[0]["headers"])
assert headers.get(b"x-tenant") == b"tenant-control"
assert all(key.encode() not in value for value in headers.values()), "gateway admission key reached OpenAPI"
def test_server_scoped_caller_header_reaches_only_its_server(gateway: Gateway) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, mcp_peer() as other, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
alias: Final = "cred" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
other_alias: Final = "cred" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
identity: Final = register_mcp(scenario, peer, alias)
other_id: Final = register_mcp(scenario, other, other_alias)
key: Final = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity, other_id]})
token: Final = "user-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
caller: Final = McpCaller(
gateway, key, "mcp", None, headers={f"x-mcp-{alias}-authorization": f"Bearer {token}"}
)
peer.drain()
other.drain()
assert caller.call(f"{alias}-add", ADD).ok
assert caller.call(f"{other_alias}-add", ADD).ok
assert _header(_one_call(peer), b"authorization") == f"Bearer {token}".encode()
assert _header(_one_call(other), b"authorization") is None
def test_extra_headers_allowlist_forwards_only_named_headers(gateway: Gateway) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
alias: Final = "cred" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
identity: Final = register_mcp(scenario, peer, alias, extra_headers=["x-tenant"])
key: Final = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
caller: Final = McpCaller(gateway, key, "server_mcp", alias, headers={"x-tenant": "acme", "x-other": "no"})
peer.drain()
assert caller.call(f"{alias}-add", ADD).ok
call: Final = _one_call(peer)
assert _header(call, b"x-tenant") == b"acme"
assert _header(call, b"x-other") is None
def test_byok_server_uses_the_calling_users_stored_credential_and_fails_closed_without_one(gateway: Gateway) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
alias: Final = "byok" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
identity: Final = register_mcp(scenario, peer, alias, auth_type="api_key", is_byok=True)
owner: Final = scenario.user()
stranger: Final = scenario.user()
owner_key: Final = scenario.key(user_id=owner, object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
stranger_key: Final = scenario.key(user_id=stranger, object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
secret: Final = "byok-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
stored: Final = gateway.client.post(
f"/v1/mcp/server/{identity}/user-credential",
json={"credential": secret},
headers={"x-litellm-api-key": owner_key},
)
assert stored.status_code in (200, 201), stored.text
scenario.cleanups.callback(
gateway.client.delete,
f"/v1/mcp/server/{identity}/user-credential",
headers={"x-litellm-api-key": owner_key},
)
assert (
read_rows(
'SELECT credential_b64 FROM "LiteLLM_MCPUserCredentials" WHERE server_id = %s AND credential_b64 LIKE %s',
(identity, f"%{secret}%"),
)
== []
)
name: Final = f"{alias}-add"
peer.drain()
granted: Final = call_tool(gateway, owner_key, identity, name, ADD)
assert granted.status_code == 200, granted.text
assert _header(_one_call(peer), b"x-api-key") == secret.encode()
denied: Final = call_tool(gateway, stranger_key, identity, name, ADD)
assert denied.status_code == 401, denied.text
assert tool_calls(peer.drain()) == ()
removed: Final = gateway.client.delete(
f"/v1/mcp/server/{identity}/user-credential", headers={"x-litellm-api-key": owner_key}
)
assert removed.status_code in (200, 204), removed.text
eventually(lambda: call_tool(gateway, owner_key, identity, name, ADD), lambda value: value.status_code == 401)
assert tool_calls(peer.drain()) == ()
def _listings(peer: McpPeer) -> tuple[dict[str, object], ...]:
return tuple(
item
for item in peer.drain()
if isinstance(item.get("body"), dict) and item["body"].get("method") == "tools/list"
)
def test_oauth2_byok_listing_sends_the_minted_token_not_the_users_stored_secret(gateway: Gateway) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, oauth_server() as auth, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
alias: Final = "cc" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
identity: Final = register_mcp(
scenario,
peer,
alias,
auth_type="oauth2",
oauth2_flow="client_credentials",
is_byok=True,
token_url=auth.issuer + "/token",
credentials={"client_id": "cc-client", "client_secret": "cc-secret-" + uuid.uuid4().hex},
)
owner: Final = scenario.user()
owner_key: Final = scenario.key(user_id=owner, object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
secret: Final = "byok-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
stored: Final = gateway.client.post(
f"/v1/mcp/server/{identity}/user-credential",
json={"credential": secret},
headers={"x-litellm-api-key": owner_key},
)
assert stored.status_code in (200, 201), stored.text
scenario.cleanups.callback(
gateway.client.delete,
f"/v1/mcp/server/{identity}/user-credential",
headers={"x-litellm-api-key": owner_key},
)
peer.drain()
auth.drain()
response: Final = gateway.client.get(
"/mcp-rest/tools/list", params={"server_id": identity}, headers={"x-litellm-api-key": owner_key}
)
assert response.status_code == 200, response.text
assert "add" in {tool["name"] for tool in response.json()["tools"]}, response.text
assert [request["grant_type"] for request in auth.token_requests()] == ["client_credentials"]
listings: Final = _listings(peer)
assert len(listings) == 1, listings
sent: Final = _header(listings[0], b"authorization")
assert sent is not None and auth.is_live(sent.decode().removeprefix("Bearer ")), sent
assert secret.encode() not in sent, "stored BYOK secret replaced the minted token on tools/list"
@pytest.mark.parametrize(("auth_type", "header", "shape"), STATIC_MODES[:2])
def test_byok_rest_listing_sends_the_servers_static_credential_not_the_users_stored_secret(
gateway: Gateway, auth_type: str, header: bytes, shape: str
) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
alias: Final = "byok" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
static: Final = "static-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
identity: Final = register_mcp(
scenario, peer, alias, auth_type=auth_type, is_byok=True, credentials={"auth_value": static}
)
owner: Final = scenario.user()
owner_key: Final = scenario.key(user_id=owner, object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
secret: Final = "byok-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
stored: Final = gateway.client.post(
f"/v1/mcp/server/{identity}/user-credential",
json={"credential": secret},
headers={"x-litellm-api-key": owner_key},
)
assert stored.status_code in (200, 201), stored.text
scenario.cleanups.callback(
gateway.client.delete,
f"/v1/mcp/server/{identity}/user-credential",
headers={"x-litellm-api-key": owner_key},
)
peer.drain()
response: Final = gateway.client.get(
"/mcp-rest/tools/list", params={"server_id": identity}, headers={"x-litellm-api-key": owner_key}
)
assert response.status_code == 200, response.text
assert "add" in {tool["name"] for tool in response.json()["tools"]}, response.text
listings: Final = _listings(peer)
assert len(listings) == 1, listings
assert _header(listings[0], header) == shape.format(secret=static, basic="").encode(), listings[0]["headers"]
peer.drain()
called: Final = call_tool(gateway, owner_key, identity, f"{alias}-add", ADD)
assert called.status_code == 200, called.text
assert _header(_one_call(peer), header) == shape.format(secret=secret, basic="").encode()
def test_deprecated_string_x_mcp_auth_lists_a_byok_server_for_a_key_without_a_user(gateway: Gateway) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
alias: Final = "byok" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
identity: Final = register_mcp(scenario, peer, alias, auth_type="bearer_token", is_byok=True)
key: Final = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
peer.drain()
response: Final = gateway.client.get(
"/mcp-rest/tools/list",
params={"server_id": identity},
headers={"x-litellm-api-key": key, "x-mcp-auth": "Bearer hdr"},
)
assert response.status_code == 200, response.text
names: Final = {tool["name"] for tool in response.json()["tools"]}
assert "add" in names, names
listings: Final = _listings(peer)
assert len(listings) == 1, listings
assert listings[0]["headers"].get(b"authorization") == b"Bearer hdr"
_PROBE: Final = "catalog-probe"
_ECHO: Final = "catalog-echo"
_UNLISTED: Final = ""
_GUARDRAIL_CODE: Final = (
"def apply_guardrail(inputs, request_data, input_type):\n"
f' if "{_PROBE}" not in list(inputs.get("texts") or []):\n'
" return allow()\n"
' function = inputs.get("tools", [{}])[0].get("function", {})\n'
f' return block("{_ECHO}[" + function.get("description") + "]")\n'
)
_ECHO_GUARDRAIL_YAML: Final = (
"guardrails:\n"
" - guardrail_name: catalog-echo\n"
" litellm_params:\n"
" guardrail: custom_code\n"
" mode: pre_mcp_call\n"
" default_on: true\n"
" custom_code: |\n" + textwrap.indent(_GUARDRAIL_CODE, 8 * " ")
)
@pytest.fixture(scope="module")
def echo_rig(tmp_path_factory: pytest.TempPathFactory) -> Iterator[Gateway]:
directory: Final = tmp_path_factory.mktemp("catalog-echo")
path: Final = directory / "catalog_echo.yaml"
path.write_text((Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "proxy_config.yaml").read_text() + _ECHO_GUARDRAIL_YAML)
with gateway_from_environment() as gateway, owned_proxy(gateway, directory, {}, config=path, workers=2) as rig:
yield rig
def _echoed_description(outcome: Outcome) -> str:
found: Final = re.search(rf"{_ECHO}\[(.*?)\]", outcome.raw)
assert found is not None, outcome.raw
return found.group(1)
_PROBE_ARGUMENTS: Final = {"probe": _PROBE}
_HEADERS: Final = TypeAdapter(dict[str, str])
def _store_byok_credential(scenario: Scenario, identity: str, key: str, secret: str) -> None:
stored: Final = scenario.gateway.client.post(
f"/v1/mcp/server/{identity}/user-credential", json={"credential": secret}, headers={"x-litellm-api-key": key}
)
assert stored.status_code in (200, 201), stored.text
scenario.cleanups.callback(
scenario.gateway.client.delete, f"/v1/mcp/server/{identity}/user-credential", headers={"x-litellm-api-key": key}
)
def test_rotating_the_credential_drops_the_callers_listing_until_it_lists_again(echo_rig: Gateway) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, echo_rig.scenario() as scenario:
first: Final = "cred-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
second: Final = "cred-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
alias: Final = "rot" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
identity: Final = register_mcp(
scenario, peer, alias, auth_type="bearer_token", credentials={"auth_value": first}
)
key: Final = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
caller: Final = McpCaller(echo_rig, key, "mcp", alias)
assert caller.list_tools().ok
assert _echoed_description(caller.call(f"{alias}-add", _PROBE_ARGUMENTS)) == "Add two integers"
rotated: Final = echo_rig.request(
"PUT", "/v1/mcp/server", {"server_id": identity, "credentials": {"auth_value": second}}
)
assert rotated.status_code == 202, rotated.text
eventually(
lambda: _echoed_description(caller.call(f"{alias}-add", _PROBE_ARGUMENTS)), lambda seen: seen == _UNLISTED
)
peer.drain()
assert caller.list_tools().ok
assert _echoed_description(caller.call(f"{alias}-add", _PROBE_ARGUMENTS)) == "Add two integers"
relisted: Final = _listings(peer)
assert len(relisted) == 1, relisted
assert _header(relisted[0], b"authorization") == f"Bearer {second}".encode(), relisted[0]["headers"]
def test_byok_callers_are_evaluated_against_their_own_listing_and_the_stored_secret_never_keys_the_slot(
echo_rig: Gateway,
) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, echo_rig.scenario() as scenario:
alias: Final = "byok" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
identity: Final = register_mcp(scenario, peer, alias, auth_type="api_key", is_byok=True)
owner_key: Final = scenario.key(user_id=scenario.user(), object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
stranger_key: Final = scenario.key(user_id=scenario.user(), object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
owner_secret: Final = "byok-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
replacement: Final = "byok-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
_store_byok_credential(scenario, identity, owner_key, owner_secret)
_store_byok_credential(scenario, identity, stranger_key, "byok-" + uuid.uuid4().hex)
owner: Final = McpCaller(echo_rig, owner_key, "mcp", alias)
stranger: Final = McpCaller(echo_rig, stranger_key, "mcp", alias)
peer.drain()
assert owner.list_tools().ok
listings: Final = _listings(peer)
assert [_header(item, b"x-api-key") for item in listings] == [owner_secret.encode()], listings
own: Final = _echoed_description(owner.call(f"{alias}-add", _PROBE_ARGUMENTS))
other: Final = _echoed_description(stranger.call(f"{alias}-add", _PROBE_ARGUMENTS))
assert (own, other) == ("Add two integers", _UNLISTED), (own, other)
_store_byok_credential(scenario, identity, owner_key, replacement)
assert _echoed_description(owner.call(f"{alias}-add", _PROBE_ARGUMENTS)) == "Add two integers", (
"the slot is keyed by the client-supplied header, never by the stored credential"
)
sent: Final = eventually(
lambda: (owner.call(f"{alias}-add", ADD).ok, tool_calls(peer.drain())),
lambda value: any(_header(call, b"x-api-key") == replacement.encode() for call in value[1]),
)
assert sent[0], sent
def test_callers_with_different_server_scoped_auth_headers_are_evaluated_against_their_own_listings(
echo_rig: Gateway,
) -> None:
tool: Final = ScriptedTool(
"add",
lambda _: text_result("3"),
description=lambda headers: "Adds for " + headers.get("authorization", "nobody"),
)
with scripted_peer(tool) as peer, echo_rig.scenario() as scenario:
alias: Final = "scoped" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
identity: Final = register_mcp(scenario, peer, alias)
key: Final = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
acme_token: Final = "acme-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
globex_token: Final = "globex-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
acme: Final = McpCaller(echo_rig, key, "mcp", alias, {f"x-mcp-{alias}-authorization": f"Bearer {acme_token}"})
globex: Final = McpCaller(
echo_rig, key, "mcp", alias, {f"x-mcp-{alias}-authorization": f"Bearer {globex_token}"}
)
assert acme.list_tools().ok and globex.list_tools().ok
seen: Final = (
_echoed_description(acme.call(f"{alias}-add", _PROBE_ARGUMENTS)),
_echoed_description(globex.call(f"{alias}-add", _PROBE_ARGUMENTS)),
)
assert seen == (f"Adds for Bearer {acme_token}", f"Adds for Bearer {globex_token}"), seen
assert tool_calls(peer.drain()) == (), "a blocked probe reached the peer"
def test_deprecated_string_x_mcp_auth_callers_on_a_user_less_key_own_separate_listings(echo_rig: Gateway) -> None:
tool: Final = ScriptedTool(
"add",
lambda _: text_result("3"),
description=lambda headers: "Adds for " + headers.get("authorization", "nobody"),
)
with scripted_peer(tool) as peer, echo_rig.scenario() as scenario:
alias: Final = "legacy" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
identity: Final = register_mcp(scenario, peer, alias, auth_type="bearer_token")
key: Final = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
first_token: Final = "first-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
second_token: Final = "second-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
first: Final = McpCaller(echo_rig, key, "mcp", alias, {"x-mcp-auth": f"Bearer {first_token}"})
second: Final = McpCaller(echo_rig, key, "mcp", alias, {"x-mcp-auth": f"Bearer {second_token}"})
assert _echoed_description(first.call(f"{alias}-add", _PROBE_ARGUMENTS)) == _UNLISTED
peer.drain()
assert first.list_tools().ok
listings: Final = _listings(peer)
assert len(listings) == 1, listings
listed_with: Final = _HEADERS.validate_python(listings[0]["headers"])
assert listed_with.get("authorization") == f"Bearer {first_token}", listed_with
warm: Final = eventually(
lambda: _echoed_description(first.call(f"{alias}-add", _PROBE_ARGUMENTS)),
lambda seen: seen != _UNLISTED,
)
assert warm == f"Adds for Bearer {first_token}", warm
assert _echoed_description(second.call(f"{alias}-add", _PROBE_ARGUMENTS)) == _UNLISTED
assert second.list_tools().ok
seen: Final = eventually(
lambda: (
_echoed_description(first.call(f"{alias}-add", _PROBE_ARGUMENTS)),
_echoed_description(second.call(f"{alias}-add", _PROBE_ARGUMENTS)),
),
lambda pair: _UNLISTED not in pair,
)
assert seen == (f"Adds for Bearer {first_token}", f"Adds for Bearer {second_token}"), seen
assert tool_calls(peer.drain()) == (), "a blocked probe reached the peer"
@pytest.mark.parametrize("entry", ("mcp", "server_mcp", "sse"))
@pytest.mark.parametrize("forwarded_token", (False, True))
def test_oauth_passthrough_probe_uses_server_token_without_admission_key(
gateway: Gateway, entry: EntryPoint, forwarded_token: bool
) -> None:
with mcp_peer() as peer, gateway.scenario() as scenario:
alias: Final = "probe" + uuid.uuid4().hex[:8]
identity: Final = register_mcp(
scenario, peer, alias, auth_type="none", oauth_passthrough=True, extra_headers=["Authorization"]
)
key: Final = scenario.key(object_permission={"mcp_servers": [identity]})
upstream_token: Final = "upstream-" + uuid.uuid4().hex
caller: Final = McpCaller(
gateway,
key,
entry,
alias,
headers={
"Authorization": f"Bearer {upstream_token if forwarded_token else key}",
f"x-mcp-{alias}-authorization": "Bearer expired-token"
if forwarded_token
else f"Bearer {upstream_token}",
},
)
peer.drain()
outcome: Final = caller.call(f"{alias}-add", ADD, identity if entry != "server_mcp" else None)
assert outcome.ok, outcome.raw
observed: Final = peer.drain()
probes: Final = tuple(
request
for request in observed
if TypeAdapter(dict[str, object]).validate_python(request["body"]).get("id") == "litellm-mcp-auth-probe"
)
assert probes, "expected an upstream initialize authentication probe"
assert all(_header(probe, b"authorization") == f"Bearer {upstream_token}".encode() for probe in probes)
assert len(tool_calls(observed)) == 1
foreign: Final = tuple(
request for request in observed if _header(request, b"authorization") != f"Bearer {upstream_token}".encode()
)
assert foreign == (), foreign
header_sets: Final = tuple(
TypeAdapter(dict[bytes, bytes]).validate_python(request["headers"]) for request in observed
)
assert all(all(key.encode() not in value for value in headers.values()) for headers in header_sets), (
"upstream authentication probe exposed the gateway admission key"
)