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* feat(proxy): audit remaining system-wide settings updates Extends the audit logging framework introduced in the parent PR to the rest of the LiteLLM_Config writers and the two adjacent settings tables: /config/update (general, environment_variables, litellm_settings, router_settings sections), /config/field/update, /config/field/delete, /config/callback/delete, /update/default_team_settings, /update/mcp_semantic_filter_settings, /add/allowed_ip, /delete/allowed_ip, /update/sso_settings, /update/ui_theme_settings, /update/ui_settings. Each writer records the actor, action, the affected config section, and a redacted before/after snapshot. SSO and UI settings rows use their own table_name (LiteLLM_SSOConfig, LiteLLM_UISettings). The /config/callback and /update/sso_settings audits fire BEFORE the proxy reload and the env cleanup step respectively, so a failure in either leaves the audit row intact. The audit-actor parameter on _update_litellm_setting is now required rather than optional; the chokepoint covers default_team and mcp_semantic_filter for free, and a future caller that forgets the actor fails loudly instead of silently skipping the audit. The two direct-calling tests pass a dummy actor. The environment_variables section redacts every value rather than relying on key-name matching, because it carries credentials under non-secret-looking uppercase keys (e.g. DATABASE_URL). * fix(proxy): capture redacted SSO before-snapshot in audit log Greptile review of #31754 flagged update_sso_settings as the one endpoint where before_value is permanently None, so the LiteLLM_SSOConfig audit trail has no pre-change state. An auditor reviewing a secret-rotation event could see what the SSO settings were changed to but not what they were before. Read the existing SSO row before the upsert, decrypt it via proxy_config._decrypt_db_variables, and pass it as before_value. create_config_audit_log's secret-name redaction then masks the *_client_secret fields, so neither the old nor the new plaintext secret lands in the audit row. Add a regression test asserting the before-snapshot reflects the pre-change values for non-secret fields (google_client_id) and is redacted for secret fields (google_client_secret). Mutation-checked against reverting to before_value=None. The pre-existing SSO tests now also mock litellm_ssoconfig.find_unique since the endpoint reads it; the read returns None for tests that do not care about the before-state. * fix: remove committed zero init migration * refactor(proxy): audit config writes via asyncio.create_task everywhere PR A's chokepoint audit call was refactored from a blocking await to asyncio.create_task so that a post-save audit-log failure could not surface as a 500 to the caller. The 12 other audit call sites added in this PR were still using await, reintroducing the exact 500-after-commit exposure at every sibling endpoint. Wrap them all in asyncio.create_task to match the model_management_endpoints / key_management_endpoints / hooks / config_override_endpoints / team_callback_endpoints / cache_settings_endpoints house pattern, so the codebase tells one story. The two direct-invocation tests (test_update_config_general_settings and test_delete_config_general_settings, which call the handler in-process rather than via TestClient) yield with `await asyncio.sleep(0)` after the handler returns so the scheduled audit task runs before the assertion. --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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| .. | ||
| test_scim_key_deactivation.py | ||
| test_scim_patch_user.py | ||
| test_scim_transformations.py | ||
| test_scim_v2_discovery.py | ||
| test_scim_v2_endpoints.py | ||