litellm/tests/e2e/coverage_registry/mcp.yaml
yuneng-jiang a43f128a74
test(e2e): add coverage registry and collector (#32304)
Introduce the e2e coverage denominator: 282 behavior cells across the six
tracking modules (LLMs, MCPs, Management/UI, Reliability & Performance,
Logging & Guardrails, Other), one validated YAML row each, plus a collector
that diffs the registry against @pytest.mark.covers markers and reports
coverage per module.

The registry rows validate against a pydantic discriminated union so a row
cannot carry a field from another module. The collector is static: a
collect-only pass reads the markers, so it runs no test and needs no live
proxy. Register the covers marker suite-wide so that pass works under
--strict-markers.

This is a draft for review. Tiers are proposed rather than signed off, and a
few cells still need a support check or a prune.
2026-07-07 15:51:20 -04:00

113 lines
3.3 KiB
YAML

# MCP module. Grounded in litellm/proxy/_experimental/mcp_server/. See tests/e2e/CLAUDE.md for the grammar.
- id: mcp.list_tools.api_key.succeeds
module: mcp
tier: P0
operation: list_tools
auth_family: api_key
assertions: [succeeds]
source: "server.py:637"
rationale: Core operation; most common auth path; high usage
- id: mcp.list_tools.api_key.denied_without_permission
module: mcp
tier: P0
operation: list_tools
auth_family: api_key
assertions: [denied_without_permission]
source: "mcp_server_manager.py:1409"
rationale: Permission guard is high blast-radius; multi-tenant safety
- id: mcp.call_tool.api_key.succeeds
module: mcp
tier: P0
operation: call_tool
auth_family: api_key
assertions: [succeeds]
source: "server.py:849"
rationale: Primary operation; customer-critical; high usage
- id: mcp.call_tool.api_key.denied_without_permission
module: mcp
tier: P0
operation: call_tool
auth_family: api_key
assertions: [denied_without_permission]
source: "rest_endpoints.py:305-386"
rationale: Tool-level permission guard; multi-tenant safety
- id: mcp.list_tools.bearer.succeeds
module: mcp
tier: P1
operation: list_tools
auth_family: bearer
assertions: [succeeds]
source: "server.py:662"
rationale: OAuth/bearer token flow; upstream delegation
- id: mcp.call_tool.bearer.succeeds
module: mcp
tier: P1
operation: call_tool
auth_family: bearer
assertions: [succeeds]
source: "server.py:886"
rationale: Bearer token forwarding for tool invocation
- id: mcp.list_tools.oauth.succeeds
module: mcp
tier: P1
operation: list_tools
auth_family: oauth
assertions: [succeeds]
source: "rest_endpoints.py:138-188"
rationale: Interactive OAuth2 flow; live token management
- id: mcp.call_tool.oauth.succeeds
module: mcp
tier: P1
operation: call_tool
auth_family: oauth
assertions: [succeeds]
source: "db.py user_oauth_credential lookup"
rationale: OAuth2 token passthrough; per-user credential storage
- id: mcp.list_tools.none.succeeds
module: mcp
tier: P1
operation: list_tools
auth_family: none
assertions: [succeeds]
source: "mcp_server_manager.py:1485-1492"
rationale: Public/anonymous servers; delegate_auth_to_upstream
- id: mcp.call_tool.none.succeeds
module: mcp
tier: P1
operation: call_tool
auth_family: none
assertions: [succeeds]
source: "rest_endpoints.py:305-334"
rationale: No upstream auth required; demo servers
- id: mcp.get_prompt.api_key.succeeds
module: mcp
tier: P1
operation: get_prompt
auth_family: api_key
assertions: [succeeds]
source: "server.py:1042"
rationale: Prompt op; same auth stack as tools
- id: mcp.read_resource.api_key.succeeds
module: mcp
tier: P1
operation: read_resource
auth_family: api_key
assertions: [succeeds]
source: "server.py:1177"
rationale: Resource op; same permission model as tools
- id: mcp.list_prompts.api_key.succeeds
module: mcp
tier: P2
operation: list_prompts
auth_family: api_key
assertions: [succeeds]
source: "server.py:993"
rationale: Smoke-level; same auth stack as list_tools
- id: mcp.list_resources.api_key.succeeds
module: mcp
tier: P2
operation: list_resources
auth_family: api_key
assertions: [succeeds]
source: "server.py:1089"
rationale: Smoke; rarely used; same auth model as tools