litellm/tests/e2e/mcp/mcp_client.py
mubashir1osmani 86a02f4f52
test(e2e): cover MCP access-group tool selection at key creation (#34480)
Enterprise MCP users mint virtual keys against tool access groups rather than
explicit server ids. Nothing exercised that end to end.

Registers the upstream MCP server tagged with a server-side access group
(mcp_access_groups), then mints one key granted that group and one granted a
different group. Asserts the granted key sees the tagged server's tools on
tools/list and the other key sees none, so access-group scoping can't leak the
server across the boundary.

Adds mcp_access_groups support to the e2e MCP client (server registration, key
generation, ObjectPermission) and the registry cell
mcp.list_tools.api_key.access_group_scoped.
2026-07-24 16:18:40 -07:00

274 lines
8.4 KiB
Python

"""Client for the MCP e2e suite: admin server registration plus the api_key tool
surface.
An admin registers an upstream MCP server through the management API
(`/v1/mcp/server`, persisted in the DB) and grants a virtual key access to it via
`object_permission.mcp_servers`. Keys then reach the server through the REST bridge
the proxy exposes for api_key auth (`/mcp-rest/tools/list`, `/mcp-rest/tools/call`),
which `user_api_key_auth` gates the same way the JSON-RPC `/mcp` surface does. The
request/response bodies are co-located here because only this suite speaks MCP.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
from collections.abc import Mapping
from dataclasses import dataclass
from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, RootModel
from e2e_http import Headers, NoBody, Result, unwrap
from models import KeyGenerateBody, ObjectPermission
from proxy_client import ProxyClient
McpToolArg = str | int | float | bool | list[str] | dict[str, str]
McpToolArguments = Mapping[str, McpToolArg]
class ApiKeyHeaders(Headers):
x_litellm_api_key: str = Field(serialization_alias="x-litellm-api-key")
class McpServerNewBody(BaseModel):
server_name: str
alias: str
url: str
transport: str = "http"
auth_type: str | None = None
static_headers: dict[str, str] | None = None
allowed_tools: list[str] | None = None
mcp_access_groups: list[str] | None = None
class McpServerNewResponse(BaseModel):
server_id: str
class McpServerRow(BaseModel):
server_id: str
alias: str | None = None
url: str | None = None
class McpServersListResponse(RootModel[list[McpServerRow]]):
pass
class McpToolMcpInfo(BaseModel):
server_id: str | None = None
alias: str | None = None
class McpToolEntry(BaseModel):
name: str
description: str | None = None
mcp_info: McpToolMcpInfo | None = None
class McpToolsListResponse(BaseModel):
tools: list[McpToolEntry] = []
error: str | None = None
message: str | None = None
def tool_names_for_server(self, server_id: str) -> frozenset[str]:
return frozenset(
tool.name
for tool in self.tools
if tool.mcp_info is not None and tool.mcp_info.server_id == server_id
)
def tool_name_containing(self, server_id: str, needle: str) -> str | None:
needle_l = needle.lower()
for tool in self.tools:
if tool.mcp_info is None or tool.mcp_info.server_id != server_id:
continue
if needle_l in tool.name.lower() or tool.name.lower().endswith(needle_l):
return tool.name
return None
class BlockedWordSpec(BaseModel):
keyword: str
action: str = "BLOCK"
class ContentFilterMcpParams(BaseModel):
"""litellm_content_filter params scoped to the MCP tool-call hook. mode is
pre_mcp_call because a pre_call config silently no-ops on the tools/call path
(the event type is rewritten to pre_mcp_call for call_mcp_tool), and default_on
is required there because per-key/request guardrail selection is dropped from
the synthetic MCP request the hook sees."""
guardrail: str = "litellm_content_filter"
mode: str = "pre_mcp_call"
default_on: bool = True
blocked_words: list[BlockedWordSpec]
class GuardrailSpecBody(BaseModel):
guardrail_name: str
litellm_params: ContentFilterMcpParams
class GuardrailCreateBody(BaseModel):
guardrail: GuardrailSpecBody
class GuardrailCreateResponse(BaseModel):
guardrail_id: str
class McpCallToolBody(BaseModel):
name: str
arguments: dict[str, McpToolArg]
server_id: str
class McpCallContent(BaseModel):
type: str | None = None
text: str | None = None
class McpCallToolResponse(BaseModel):
model_config = ConfigDict(populate_by_name=True)
content: list[McpCallContent] = []
is_error: bool | None = Field(default=None, alias="isError")
@property
def first_text(self) -> str | None:
return self.content[0].text if self.content else None
@property
def all_text(self) -> str:
return "\n".join(part.text for part in self.content if part.text)
@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
class McpClient:
proxy: ProxyClient
def register_server(
self,
*,
server_name: str,
alias: str,
url: str,
transport: str = "http",
auth_type: str | None = None,
static_headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
allowed_tools: list[str] | None = None,
mcp_access_groups: list[str] | None = None,
) -> str:
return unwrap(
self.proxy.transport.post(
"/v1/mcp/server",
headers=self.proxy.transport.master,
json=McpServerNewBody(
server_name=server_name,
alias=alias,
url=url,
transport=transport,
auth_type=auth_type,
static_headers=static_headers,
allowed_tools=allowed_tools,
mcp_access_groups=mcp_access_groups,
),
response_type=McpServerNewResponse,
)
).server_id
def delete_server(self, server_id: str) -> None:
_ = self.proxy.transport.delete(
f"/v1/mcp/server/{server_id}",
headers=self.proxy.transport.master,
json=NoBody(),
response_type=NoBody,
)
def registered_servers(self) -> list[McpServerRow]:
return unwrap(
self.proxy.transport.get(
"/v1/mcp/server",
headers=self.proxy.transport.master,
params=NoBody(),
response_type=McpServersListResponse,
)
).root
def generate_key(
self,
*,
user_id: str,
mcp_servers: list[str] | None,
mcp_access_groups: list[str] | None = None,
models: list[str] | None = None,
) -> str:
object_permission = (
ObjectPermission(mcp_servers=mcp_servers, mcp_access_groups=mcp_access_groups)
if mcp_servers is not None or mcp_access_groups is not None
else None
)
return self.proxy.generate_key(
KeyGenerateBody(
models=models if models is not None else [],
user_id=user_id,
object_permission=object_permission,
)
)
def list_tools(self, key: str) -> Result[McpToolsListResponse]:
return self.proxy.transport.get(
"/mcp-rest/tools/list",
headers=ApiKeyHeaders(x_litellm_api_key=key),
params=NoBody(),
response_type=McpToolsListResponse,
)
def register_mcp_content_filter(self, *, name: str, blocked_keyword: str) -> str:
"""Register a default-on content-filter guardrail that runs on the MCP
tool-call hook (pre_mcp_call) and blocks a single keyword. The keyword is
unique per test, so default_on only ever intercepts this test's own
banned tool call on the shared proxy."""
return unwrap(
self.proxy.transport.post(
"/guardrails",
headers=self.proxy.transport.master,
json=GuardrailCreateBody(
guardrail=GuardrailSpecBody(
guardrail_name=name,
litellm_params=ContentFilterMcpParams(
blocked_words=[BlockedWordSpec(keyword=blocked_keyword)],
),
)
),
response_type=GuardrailCreateResponse,
)
).guardrail_id
def delete_guardrail(self, guardrail_id: str) -> None:
_ = self.proxy.transport.delete(
f"/guardrails/{guardrail_id}",
headers=self.proxy.transport.master,
json=NoBody(),
response_type=NoBody,
)
def call_tool(
self,
key: str,
*,
server_id: str,
name: str,
arguments: McpToolArguments,
) -> Result[McpCallToolResponse]:
return self.proxy.transport.post(
"/mcp-rest/tools/call",
headers=ApiKeyHeaders(x_litellm_api_key=key),
json=McpCallToolBody(
name=name, arguments=dict(arguments), server_id=server_id
),
response_type=McpCallToolResponse,
)
def build_client(proxy: ProxyClient) -> McpClient:
return McpClient(proxy=proxy)