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* test: add logging e2e coverage (s3_v2, gcs_bucket, team langfuse callback, datadog failure) Five new live e2e scenarios raising Logging & Guardrails registry coverage: s3_v2 success and failure objects read back from the real S3 bucket, gcs_bucket success record read back through the GCS JSON API (with nextPageToken pagination and per-request bearer minting), team-scoped Langfuse callback delivery with non-team isolation, and DataDog failure event delivery queried by indexed model_group. datadog_reader gains query-based variants of the marker search; the langfuse cell is a new registry row. Bucket readers settle past a full flush interval so a late duplicate cannot hide from the exactly-one assertions * test: cover clock-skew day prefix in gcs read-back and retry team callback propagation * test: key the s3 failure read-back on the provider error, not payload absence * chore: rerun ci * chore: rerun ci after config sync * chore: rerun ci with pr lane env * chore: rerun ci * chore: rerun ci * chore: rerun ci * chore: rerun ci * chore: rerun ci * test: add guardrail e2e coverage (presidio masking, bedrock post and during call, moderation on messages) (#38553) * test: add guardrail e2e coverage (presidio masking, bedrock post/during, moderation on messages) * test: require the phone placeholder positively in the presidio masking predicate * test: count only the 400 verdict body as a bedrock post_call block * test(e2e): exempt the guardrail config echo from the post_call leak assertion * test(e2e): pin the fail-closed contract for an unknown guardrail name (skipped, product gap) * test(e2e): tolerate the readiness 503 from a transient db blip in the callback-config probes
35 lines
8.9 KiB
YAML
35 lines
8.9 KiB
YAML
# Guardrail enforcement (behavior features). Grounded in litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/.
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# Rolls up into the "Logging & Guardrails" dashboard module together with logging.*
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- {id: guardrail.presidio.pre_call.masks, module: guardrail, tier: P0, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [masks], exercised_on: [chat_completions, messages], source: "guardrail_hooks/presidio.py", rationale: "PII masking pre-call; data-leak blast radius"}
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- {id: guardrail.presidio.post_call.masks, module: guardrail, tier: P0, hook_point: post_call, assertions: [masks], exercised_on: [chat_completions, messages], source: "guardrail_hooks/presidio.py", rationale: "Mask PII in model output"}
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- {id: guardrail.presidio.logging_only.masks, module: guardrail, tier: P0, hook_point: logging_only, assertions: [masks], exercised_on: [chat_completions, messages], source: "guardrail_hooks/presidio.py", rationale: "Redact in logs without blocking"}
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- {id: guardrail.bedrock.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P0, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/bedrock_guardrails.py", rationale: "AWS content guardrail blocks harmful input"}
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- {id: guardrail.litellm_content_filter.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P0, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "test_team_disable_global_guardrail_e2e.py", rationale: "Local content-filter default-on blocks banned keyword pre-call"}
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- {id: guardrail.litellm_content_filter.pre_call.allows, module: guardrail, tier: P0, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [allows], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "test_team_disable_global_guardrail_e2e.py", rationale: "Team disable_global_guardrails bypasses default-on content filter"}
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- {id: guardrail.litellm_content_filter.apply_endpoint.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P0, hook_point: apply_endpoint, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_endpoints.py:apply_guardrail", rationale: "POST /guardrails/apply_guardrail blocks banned content for customers that call the apply surface directly"}
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- {id: guardrail.litellm_content_filter.apply_endpoint.allows, module: guardrail, tier: P0, hook_point: apply_endpoint, assertions: [allows], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_endpoints.py:apply_guardrail", rationale: "POST /guardrails/apply_guardrail returns clean text for allowed input"}
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- {id: guardrail.bedrock.during.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P0, hook_point: during, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/bedrock_guardrails.py", rationale: "During-call moderation for streaming"}
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- {id: guardrail.bedrock.post_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P0, hook_point: post_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/bedrock_guardrails.py", rationale: "Block harmful output"}
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- {id: guardrail.lakera.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P0, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions, messages], source: "guardrail_hooks/lakera_ai_v2.py", rationale: "Prompt-injection block pre-execution"}
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- {id: guardrail.lakera.post_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P0, hook_point: post_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/lakera_ai_v2.py", rationale: "Post-call injection on multi-turn chains"}
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- {id: guardrail.openai_moderations.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P0, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions, messages, responses], source: "guardrail_hooks/openai/moderations.py", rationale: "Content policy for regulated industries; vendor §10 category matrix across chat/messages/responses (LIT-4778)"}
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- {id: guardrail.aim.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P1, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions, messages], source: "guardrail_hooks/aim/aim.py", rationale: "Security guardrail malicious-input"}
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- {id: guardrail.aim.post_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P1, hook_point: post_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/aim/aim.py", rationale: "Output security check"}
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- {id: guardrail.ibm_guardrails.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P1, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/ibm_guardrails/ibm_detector.py", rationale: "Enterprise multi-policy"}
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- {id: guardrail.ibm_guardrails.post_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P1, hook_point: post_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/ibm_guardrails/ibm_detector.py", rationale: "Output policy validation"}
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- {id: guardrail.semantic_guard.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P1, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/semantic_guard", rationale: "Semantic policy compliance"}
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- {id: guardrail.block_code_execution.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P1, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/block_code_execution", rationale: "Code-injection prevention"}
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- {id: guardrail.tool_permission.pre_call.allows, module: guardrail, tier: P1, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [allows], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/tool_permission.py", rationale: "Grant allowed tools"}
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- {id: guardrail.tool_permission.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P1, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/tool_permission.py", rationale: "Block unauthorized tools"}
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- {id: guardrail.microsoft_purview.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P1, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/microsoft_purview/purview_dlp.py", rationale: "DLP sensitive-data disclosure"}
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- {id: guardrail.headroom.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P1, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/headroom/headroom.py", rationale: "Anomaly detection threshold"}
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- {id: guardrail.generic_guardrail_api.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P1, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/generic_guardrail_api/generic_guardrail_api.py", rationale: "Vendor-agnostic custom API"}
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- {id: guardrail.pangea.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P1, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/pangea/pangea.py", rationale: "API security + DLP"}
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- {id: guardrail.niche_providers.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P2, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: grammar, rationale: "SMOKE cohort: lasso/hiddenlayer/model_armor/qualifire/guardrails_ai/cato/cisco/akto/prompt_security/promptguard/zscaler/vigil/etc"}
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- {id: guardrail.niche_providers.post_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P2, hook_point: post_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: grammar, rationale: "SMOKE niche output filtering"}
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- {id: guardrail.niche_providers.pre_call.allows, module: guardrail, tier: P2, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [allows], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: grammar, rationale: "SMOKE niche allow-path passthrough"}
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- {id: guardrail.tool_policy.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P2, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/tool_policy/tool_policy_guardrail.py", rationale: "Tool-use policy enforcement"}
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- {id: guardrail.mcp_security.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P2, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [mcp_operations], source: "guardrail_hooks/mcp_security", rationale: "MCP protocol security"}
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- {id: guardrail.llm_as_a_judge.pre_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P2, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "guardrail_hooks/llm_as_a_judge", rationale: "LLM-based judgment guardrail"}
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- {id: guardrail.litellm_content_filter.pre_mcp_call.blocks, module: guardrail, tier: P1, hook_point: pre_mcp_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [mcp_operations], source: "guardrail_hooks/litellm_content_filter/content_filter.py:_scan_mcp_tool_call_arguments", rationale: "A general content-filter guardrail configured mode=pre_mcp_call blocks a banned keyword in an MCP tool call's arguments before it reaches the upstream MCP server; a clean argument passes"}
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- {id: guardrail.dispatch.pre_call.rejects_unknown_name, module: guardrail, tier: P1, hook_point: pre_call, assertions: [blocks], exercised_on: [chat_completions], source: "proxy guardrail dispatch (per-request `guardrails` selector)", rationale: "A request naming a guardrail this proxy does not serve must fail closed with a 4xx; today it is silently served unguarded, so a typo'd name drops the protection the caller asked for"}
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