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https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm.git
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All three send a `telemetry` object in the arguments to Datadog's search_datadog_logs tool. Datadog tightened that tool's input schema to reject unknown properties, so every call now fails validation with 'unexpected additional properties ["telemetry"]' before the behavior each test exists to prove is reached. `telemetry` was never a documented Datadog parameter; the tests relied on the server ignoring extra properties. The proxy transmitted exactly what the tests supplied and surfaced the upstream error faithfully, so this is test-side. The covers markers and registry rows stay put: the collector counts a cell as covered only when a test pytest would actually run declares it, so skipping hands all four cells back to the gap list where they belong.
93 lines
3.9 KiB
Python
93 lines
3.9 KiB
Python
"""Live e2e: a virtual key without MCP access is denied a real MCP server's tools.
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An admin registers the Datadog remote MCP server through the management API
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(persisted in the DB, picked up without a restart) and queues its deletion. Two
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keys are created against that one server: one granted access through
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`object_permission.mcp_servers` and one with no MCP grant at all. The permitted
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key is the control that proves the upstream is alive and the tool is callable,
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so a failure on the denied key is an authorization denial rather than a dead
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server. The denied key must then see none of the server's tools on `tools/list`
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and must be refused with a 403 on `tools/call`.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import pytest
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from datadog_mcp import SEARCH_LOGS_TOOL, register_datadog_mcp
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from e2e_config import DD_SEARCH_FROM, unique_marker
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from e2e_http import unwrap
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from lifecycle import ResourceManager
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from mcp_client import McpClient
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pytestmark = pytest.mark.e2e
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def _key(client: McpClient, resources: ResourceManager, *, mcp_servers: list[str] | None) -> str:
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label = "allowed" if mcp_servers else "denied"
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key = client.generate_key(user_id=f"e2e-mcp-{label}-{unique_marker()}", mcp_servers=mcp_servers)
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resources.defer(lambda: client.proxy.delete_key(key))
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return key
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class TestMcpKeyWithoutAccessIsDenied:
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@pytest.mark.covers("mcp.list_tools.api_key.denied_without_permission")
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def test_list_tools_denied_without_permission(
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self,
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client: McpClient,
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resources: ResourceManager,
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) -> None:
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server_id = register_datadog_mcp(client, resources)
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client.await_registered(server_id)
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permitted_key = _key(client, resources, mcp_servers=[server_id])
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denied_key = _key(client, resources, mcp_servers=None)
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_ = client.await_tool(permitted_key, server_id, SEARCH_LOGS_TOOL)
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denied_tools = unwrap(client.list_tools(denied_key)).tool_names_for_server(server_id)
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assert denied_tools == frozenset(), (
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f"ungranted key saw the server's tools; tools/list leaked across the permission "
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f"boundary: {denied_tools}"
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)
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@pytest.mark.skip(
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reason=(
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"LIT-5052: the control call proving a granted key CAN invoke the tool sends a "
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"`telemetry` argument that Datadog's search_datadog_logs tool now rejects, so it "
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"errors with 'unexpected additional properties [\"telemetry\"]' and the denial "
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"assertion is never reached. `telemetry` was never a documented Datadog "
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"parameter; the test relied on the server ignoring unknown properties. Unskip "
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"once the argument is dropped."
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)
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)
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@pytest.mark.covers("mcp.call_tool.api_key.denied_without_permission")
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def test_call_tool_denied_without_permission(
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self,
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client: McpClient,
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resources: ResourceManager,
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) -> None:
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server_id = register_datadog_mcp(client, resources)
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client.await_registered(server_id)
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permitted_key = _key(client, resources, mcp_servers=[server_id])
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denied_key = _key(client, resources, mcp_servers=None)
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tool_name = client.await_tool(permitted_key, server_id, SEARCH_LOGS_TOOL)
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search_args = {
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"query": "service:litellm",
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"from": DD_SEARCH_FROM,
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"to": "now",
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"max_tokens": 1000,
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"telemetry": {"intent": "e2e control call proving granted key can invoke Datadog MCP"},
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}
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permitted_call = client.await_call_tool(
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permitted_key, server_id=server_id, name=tool_name, arguments=search_args
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)
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assert permitted_call.is_error is not True, f"granted key's tool call errored: {permitted_call}"
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denied = client.await_call_tool_denied(
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denied_key, server_id=server_id, name=tool_name, arguments=search_args
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)
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assert "access_denied" in denied.body, f"403 was not an MCP access denial: {denied.body}"
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