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* feat(guardrails): add Alice by ActiveFence guardrail
Adds `guardrail: alice` — policy-based guardrails for prompts and model
responses, evaluated against ActiveFence's Alice.
What makes this different from the other providers: Alice evaluates against
policies configured per *application*, and a proxy typically fronts several of
them, so the application cannot be a static config value. It is named on the
LiteLLM virtual key instead:
curl $PROXY/key/generate -H "Authorization: Bearer $LITELLM_MASTER_KEY" \
-d '{"key_alias": "payments-bot",
"metadata": {"alice_app_id": "payments-bot"}}'
read via `CustomGuardrail._get_admin_metadata`, with `key_alias` as the
fallback. That helper is what makes it trustworthy: it reads whichever metadata
holder the proxy wrote the authenticated key's values into — which differs by
route — and the proxy strips caller-supplied `user_api_key_*` from both, so a
caller cannot point its own traffic at an application with laxer policies than
the one its key was issued for. A request whose key names no application is
refused rather than evaluated against a guess.
Implements `apply_guardrail` only, so pre_call, during_call, post_call and
streaming all come from UnifiedLLMGuardrails. Blocks with
GuardrailRaisedException; masks by substituting Alice's redacted text; a MASK
carrying no replacement blocks rather than passing the original through. A
verdict reporting `errors[]` is treated as a failure, not a pass — otherwise a
half-evaluated message would be allowed. `unreachable_fallback` (already on
LitellmParams) chooses fail-closed or fail-open on transport failure.
Config:
guardrails:
- guardrail_name: alice
litellm_params:
guardrail: alice
mode: [pre_call, post_call]
api_key: os.environ/ALICE_API_KEY
21 tests in tests/test_litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/test_alice.py
cover registration, credential resolution, the app-id ladder including the
forged-metadata case, every verdict, and both unreachable policies.
No new LitellmParams field, so no schema.d.ts regeneration is needed.
* refactor(guardrails): post to Alice's LiteLLM endpoint and forward verbatim
Switches from `/v2/evaluate/message` — Alice's single-text endpoint — to
`/v2/evaluate/litellm`, which takes the hook's arguments as they arrive and
answers with a verdict.
That inverts where the work happens, and shrinks this plugin accordingly. It
now selects nothing and renames nothing: it posts `{input_type, inputs,
request_data}` and enforces `{verdict, categories, correlation_id, message,
replacements}`. Which parts of a conversation are worth evaluating, and how a
verdict is reached, are decided by Alice — so changing either is a change on
their side rather than a LiteLLM upgrade for every user.
The app-id resolution this plugin carried is gone with it. Alice reads the
application off the authenticated key's metadata itself, from the payload it is
handed, so the ladder here was duplicating a decision the far side already
makes. The security property is unchanged and still comes from the proxy
stripping caller-supplied `user_api_key_*` before a guardrail sees the request.
Masking is now positional — the far side chose which texts it was answering
for, so it says which by index. Only `texts` is written; a new
`structured_messages` object would make the chat translation layer skip the
`texts` write-back and silently drop the edits. A mask that lands nowhere
blocks rather than passing the original through.
`request_data` carries live Python objects (an OpenTelemetry span among them),
so `_json_safe` copies it into something serialisable by a mechanical rule
rather than a field list — a list drifts from what the far side needs, a rule
cannot. Serialising naively raises, and that error would read as "guardrail
unavailable" on every request.
26 tests, covering verbatim forwarding, each verdict, positional masking, the
`structured_messages` identity trap, both unreachable policies, and the
serialiser's handling of unserialisable values and cycles.
* fix(alice guardrail): satisfy lint and code-quality CI gates
- Bound _json_safe's recursion and register it in recursive_detector's
ignore list (it already caps depth and dedupes cycles by id, matching
the repo's established pattern for legitimate bounded recursion).
- Clear ruff-strict budget breaches: annotate __init__'s return type,
raise TypeError (not ValueError) for a bad response body, type
_json_safe's payload as object instead of Any, and file-scope-ignore
ANN401 for **kwargs (forwarding it as object broke the call into
CustomGuardrail.__init__, confirmed via basedpyright).
- Clear type-discipline budget breaches: suppress the construction/
annotation checks on one-shot HTTP payloads, the module-level
guardrail registries, and _json_safe's bounded accumulator; narrow
AliceVerdict's list fields to tuples and _evaluate's request_data to
Mapping[str, object] where nothing downstream mutates them.
* test(alice guardrail): assert the guardrail actually registers
The registration test called init_guardrails_v2 and asserted nothing, so it
passed whether or not the guardrail was ever registered — TQ001 in the
test-quality gate, and a fair catch: a test that cannot fail is not covering
the thing it names.
Now asserts exactly one AliceGuardrail lands in litellm.callbacks under the
configured name.
This surfaced only after the ruff-strict and type-discipline gates stopped
failing ahead of it; the lint job runs its gates in sequence, so an earlier
failure masks every later one.
* fix(alice guardrail): reach 100% patch coverage, drop the ActiveFence naming
Codecov flagged 10 uncovered lines, all of them error paths — which is where a
guardrail most needs covering, since each one decides whether traffic flows
unscreened.
Two of the ten turned out to be dead rather than untested, and are removed:
- `except GuardrailRaisedException: raise` in apply_guardrail. `_evaluate`
raises httpx errors, Timeout and TypeError, never that — so the clause could
never fire.
- the trailing `json.dumps` probe in `_json_safe`. Everything json.dumps
handles natively is caught by the isinstance branches above (a dict or list
subclass included), so anything reaching the bottom — bytes, datetime, an
OpenTelemetry span — cannot cross the wire regardless. It now says so and
returns None.
The rest are now tested: a timeout, 502/503/504 as unreachable, a 4xx as NOT
unreachable (a rejected credential is our misconfiguration, not an outage, and
must not fail open), a non-object response body, and a model whose model_dump
raises.
Also drops "by ActiveFence" throughout — the product is Alice — and points the
header at alice.io. `ui_friendly_name` is now "Alice", which is the key
guardrailLogoMap and the garden card look up, so all three moved together.
* fix(alice guardrail): strip caller credentials, widen unreachable detection, block partial MASK
Addresses PR review: request_data no longer forwards secret_fields.raw_headers or
the root api_key to Alice (the caller's Authorization token in the clear otherwise);
HTTP 500, malformed JSON, and a non-object body now route through the configured
unreachable_fallback instead of raising raw, so fail_open still fails open on those;
a MASK verdict with even one out-of-range replacement now blocks entirely instead of
silently letting the rest through unmasked. Also tightens request_data's type and
documents the known streaming-mask limitation on the class.
* fix(alice guardrail): strip credentials at any depth, stop filtering on texts
secret_fields/api_key/headers/provider_specific_header can appear nested
under proxy_server_request, metadata, litellm_metadata, and their
requester_metadata/body sub-paths in a real captured payload — a
top-level-only strip missed all of those. _json_safe now drops these keys
by name wherever they occur during serialization, so a new nesting path
can't reintroduce the leak.
apply_guardrail also stopped skipping the call whenever texts was empty,
even when tool_calls/images/structured_messages carried content — that
was the plugin making a selection decision Alice's design says belongs on
the far side. It now only skips when none of the selectable fields have
anything in them.
* fix(alice guardrail): route an undecodable response body through the fallback
`response.json()` raises UnicodeDecodeError when the body carries bytes that
are not valid UTF-8, and that escaped the except clause: UnicodeDecodeError is
a *sibling* of json.JSONDecodeError under ValueError, not a subclass of it, so
naming only JSONDecodeError left it uncaught. Both fallback modes surfaced a
raw decoding error instead of applying unreachable_fallback — which for a
fail_open deployment meant a hard failure where it had asked for an allow.
Named explicitly rather than widening to ValueError, so the clause still says
which three conditions it means. Tested under both policies.
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