A blocked source, or source and username pair, is now refused with 429 before the database lookup and password check, in place of the soft block that held wrong guesses for 30 seconds and let a correct password through. The env admin credentials and the master key typed into the login form are refused like any other credential while blocked; recovery is the master key as an API bearer token, which never goes through the sign-in path
trusted_proxy_ranges: [] now means clients connect directly, so the peer address is the source and the per-source limit stays on. Only an unset or malformed value leaves the topology unknown, warns at startup and turns the per-source limit off
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Replace the username-global lockout with counters keyed by source address and by
source/username pair. Each has a fixed counting window (60s) and a separate
block TTL (300s). Blocks are soft: a correct password still signs in, wrong
passwords from a blocked key take one of 5 held slots per worker and are held
30s before a 429. Once a pair is blocked its failures stop counting against the
source. The source scope runs only when trusted_proxy_ranges is set, IPv6 is
grouped by /64, and per-source limits accept IP and CIDR overrides with
longest-prefix matching. Redis is authoritative through one Lua script per
failure, with bounded per-worker fallback when Redis raises.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The Admin UI sign-in endpoints accept an unbounded number of password attempts.
All three call authenticate_user, and none of them keeps any record of how many
times a given caller has already been refused, so a misbehaving or misconfigured
client can retry indefinitely at full speed.
A LoginThrottle is now a required argument to authenticate_user, so the accounting
lives at the one function all three endpoints share and a fourth endpoint cannot be
added without deciding what to pass. Failures are counted per username and source
address over a fixed window and further attempts are refused with 429 and a
Retry-After header. The check runs before the database lookup and before the
password comparison, so a refused caller does no further work.
Only genuine credential rejections count. Configuration errors do not, a refused
attempt does not extend the window, and a successful sign-in clears the bucket.
The username is case folded because the user lookup is case insensitive, so casing
cannot multiply the allowance. Both credential rejections now return one identical
message. SSO is unaffected; it never calls this function.
max_failed_login_attempts (10) and failed_login_window_seconds (900) are read from
config.yaml, with LITELLM_DISABLE_LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT to turn the accounting off. They
are deliberately not database backed, so editing YAML always wins and an operator
refused by a bad value can recover.
* test(proxy): add harness for proxy_server.py behavior-pinning
Creates tests/test_litellm/proxy/proxy_server/ with:
- conftest.py: 11 shared fixtures (app, client, mock_prisma, auth_as,
mock_router with parametrized response builders, normalize, etc.)
- _coverage_check.py: per-PR coverage gate (line + branch) against a
baseline, self-selects target by inspecting which placeholder files
have been filled
- _pin_check.py: AST-based gate that verifies every pin-list item has
>=1 happy + >=1 error test with a real assertion (no status-only)
- test_harness_smoke.py: 19 smoke tests covering every fixture +
both scripts end-to-end
- 26 placeholder test files (one docstring each) reserved for
follow-up PRs per the directory ownership in the Notion plan
- .coverage_baseline pinned at 0% so future PRs measure deltas
against new-tests-only and aren't entangled with the broader
scattered test suite
Adds a dedicated proxy-server job to test-unit-proxy-endpoints.yml
so this directory's runtime + coverage are tracked independently.
Plan: https://www.notion.so/36c43b8acdab81ee845fd5365128a2fc
* ci(proxy-endpoints): allow workflow_dispatch
Lets the workflow be triggered manually on a branch via
`gh workflow run`, which is needed for the verify-first
flow on workflow changes before opening a PR.
* test(proxy): address review feedback on proxy_server harness
- conftest.py: anchor sys.path insert to __file__ (Path(__file__).resolve().parents[4])
instead of CWD-relative os.path.abspath("../../../../") which resolved
to the wrong directory when pytest is launched from the repo root.
- _coverage_check.py: actually read .coverage_baseline and use it as
the floor (line_min = max(target, baseline)). Closes the gap between
the PR description's "delta semantics" and what the script was doing.
With baseline=0.0 today this is a no-op; future PRs that update the
baseline cause regressions (test deletions etc.) to trip the gate
even if the static PR target is still met.
- _pin_check.py: drop unreachable startswith("_") guard
(test_*.py glob never yields underscore-prefixed names) and read
each test file once instead of twice.
