* test(proxy_behavior): scaffold session-scoped async ASGI client + liveness smoke
Slice 2 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. New top-level dir
tests/proxy_behavior/management/ outside every existing pytest glob.
conftest.py initialises the proxy app once per session against the DATABASE_URL
the harness boots Postgres at, wraps it in httpx.AsyncClient via in-process
ASGITransport. The one smoke test asserts /health/liveliness returns 200, which
exercises the full FastAPI middleware stack against a real app — no mocks.
Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d
* test(proxy_behavior): connect prisma via real lifespan; key/generate de-risk
Slice 3 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. The fixture now
enters the real FastAPI lifespan (proxy_startup_event) instead of just calling
initialize() — that is where prisma_client is connected, password migration is
kicked off, and the rest of the startup wiring runs.
Tests pin the loop to the session scope so the AsyncClient created in the
session fixture and the prisma connection opened in the lifespan share the
same loop as the test bodies.
New de-risk smoke: POST /key/generate with the master key returns 200, the
returned sk- token resolves to a hashed row in LiteLLM_VerificationToken, and
the cleartext token is never stored. Proves auth + handler + helper + prisma
all wire together end-to-end against a real Postgres.
Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d
* test(proxy_behavior): seed 8-actor read-world for the authz matrix
Slice 4 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. New
``actors.py`` defines the actor enum + seeds an immutable world (2 orgs,
2 teams, 8 users, 8 verification tokens) under the ``behavior-pin-``
prefix so the rows are identifiable in psql and ``_wipe_world`` is
targeted.
Each actor key is created with its cleartext form generated locally and
its hashed form (via ``litellm.proxy.utils.hash_token``) stored in
``LiteLLM_VerificationToken`` — so the real ``user_api_key_auth`` accepts
the cleartext bearer token. Roles, ``team_id``, ``organization_id``, and
the service-account metadata flag are all set on the seeded rows so the
auth layer resolves the same scopes a real proxy would.
The session-scoped ``world`` fixture re-seeds at session start (idempotent
via wipe-then-create), and the smoke test confirms each of the 8 actor
keys can call ``/key/info`` on itself and receive its own row back.
Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d
* test(proxy_behavior): per-test scratch namespace + targeted delete_many teardown
Slice 5 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. Adds the
``scratch`` function-scoped fixture: each test gets a uuid4-derived
namespace prefix, tags writes with it (``key_alias``, ``team_alias``,
``user_id``, ``budget_id``), and the fixture teardown ``delete_many``-s
any row whose namespace column starts with that prefix.
Cleanup uses Prisma model methods only (no raw SQL, per CLAUDE.md) and
orders deletes children-before-parents to avoid FK conflicts. The Slice 3
de-risk smoke is migrated onto the same fixture so it stops accumulating
untagged tokens across repeated local runs.
Smoke proves both halves of the contract: one test writes a scratch-tagged
key and asserts it lands; a second test runs after the first's teardown
and asserts no rows in the scratch namespace survived.
Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d
* test(proxy_behavior): codify G3 (strict-import grep) as a pytest item
Slice 6 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. Two new tests
walk every .py file under tests/proxy_behavior/ and assert:
* no ``from litellm.proxy.management_endpoints`` import — the suite is
deliberately constrained to the HTTP boundary so it survives handler
refactors;
* no ``mock``/``patch`` on ``user_api_key_auth`` — mocking auth is the
structural failure mode of the existing 11k-line mock suite, and the
point of this harness is that the real auth layer runs.
Codifying G3 as a CI test removes the "did someone forget to check the
PR-description checklist" failure mode.
Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d
* style(proxy_behavior): apply black to G3 grep test
Follow-up to 6f588c753b — line-length fixes only, no behavior change.
* test(proxy_behavior): pin /key/generate authz matrix (18 scenarios)
Slice 7 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. Parametrized
matrix across two axes: actor (8 seeded) × target scope (self, team_alpha
in org_a, team_beta in org_b). 18 scenarios after dropping non-applicable
combos. Whole-suite wall-time stays at ~4.7s (well under the 10-min G2
budget for the eventual CI job).
While pinning, the test surfaced one seed gap: ``_get_user_in_team`` reads
``members_with_roles`` (a JSON list of ``{user_id, role}``), not the plain
``members`` String[]. Both columns are now populated in the seed to match
what the real ``/team/new`` handler would produce.
Expected status codes are intentionally heterogeneous (200, 400, 401)
because the current handler emits different statuses depending on which
check fails first (role gate, team-member-perm gate, "not assigned"
check). Pinning the *observed* codes — not what they "should" be — is
exactly the regression signal we want.
Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d
* test(proxy_behavior): pin /key/info authz matrix (24 scenarios)
Slice 8 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. 8 actors ×
3 target keys (own, OWNER's key in org_a, CROSS_ORG_USER's key in org_b)
covering self-read, same-team-peer read, and cross-org read.
Notable pinned behaviors (intentionally surfaced for review, not "fixed"):
* ORG_ADMIN gets 403 on individual key info even within their own org
— visibility is scoped to "your own keys" + "your team's keys", not
"your org's keys".
* Same-team peers (INTERNAL_USER, UNRELATED_SAME_ORG, SERVICE_ACCOUNT)
DO see each other's keys. Whether that is desired is for the team
to decide; this PR only pins the existing behavior so unintentional
changes flip the matrix red.
Wall-time is unchanged (~4.3s for the slice on its own).
Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d
* test(proxy_behavior): pin /key/list default-visibility matrix (8 scenarios)
Slice 9 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. For /key/list
the response IS the matrix: each of the 8 seeded actors calls the endpoint
with default filters and the test asserts set-equality between the returned
visible-token set (filtered to seeded tokens only, so unrelated rows can't
flap the assertion) and a pinned expected actor-set.
Pinned default visibility:
* PROXY_ADMIN sees all 8 actors' keys.
* Every other actor sees only their own key — including ORG_ADMIN
(which had broader expectations going in but currently behaves
same-as-internal-user for /key/list defaults) and TEAM_ADMIN (no
team-aggregation without include_team_keys=true).
Future changes that broaden or narrow any single actor's default
visibility will turn this matrix red — exactly the regression signal we
want. Parameter-driven views (include_team_keys, filters) are deferred to
Slice 13 / PR2 follow-up.
Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d
* test(proxy_behavior): pin /key/update authz matrix + mutation re-read (21 scenarios)
Slice 10 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. 8 actors ×
3 target shapes (self-owned, OWNER-scoped in org_a/team_alpha,
CROSS_ORG_USER-scoped in org_b/team_beta) = 21 applicable scenarios.
Each test:
1. Master-key-seeds a fresh scratch key with the target's (user_id,
team_id) scope (so the read-world stays untouched).
2. Has the actor under test POST /key/update flipping ``models`` to
a known marker list.
3. Asserts the status code AND the DB row's ``models`` field — present
when 200, unchanged otherwise — so a handler that silently mutates
on a denied response surfaces red.
Observed gating (pinned, not endorsed):
* PROXY_ADMIN bypasses every check.
* ORG_ADMIN is blocked by an early role gate, always 401.
* Every other (INTERNAL_USER-rolesed) actor hits one of three failure
modes — 403 "user can only create keys for themselves", 403
"only proxy admins, team admins, or org admins", or 401
"team_member_permission_error" — depending on whether they own the
target and whether they're a team admin / member of its team.
Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d
* test(proxy_behavior): pin /key/regenerate authz matrix + rotation contract (22 scenarios)
Slice 11 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. 21 matrix
scenarios (8 actors × 3 target shapes, minus the cross_org/owner combo
that exists in the seed but isn't applicable) plus one smoke for the
``/key/{key:path}/regenerate`` route registration.
On 200 outcomes the test verifies the full rotation contract:
* the regenerate response key differs from the old cleartext,
* the OLD cleartext returns 401 on a follow-up ``/key/info``,
* the NEW cleartext returns 200 on a follow-up ``/key/info``.
On denied outcomes the test verifies the OLD cleartext still works —
catching any handler that mutates the token row on a failed call.
Pinned authz divergence vs /key/update: regenerate routes most denials
through the team-member-perm 401 path rather than the role-gate 403
path. The matrices for both endpoints are now in tree side-by-side, so
any future refactor that "harmonises" the codes will turn one of the two
red.
Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d
* test(proxy_behavior): pin /key/delete authz matrix + post-delete contract (21 scenarios)
Slice 12 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. Mirrors
slices 10/11. On success: cleartext can no longer authenticate
(handles both hard-delete and soft-delete to LiteLLM_DeletedVerificationToken).
On denial: row survives and cleartext still authenticates.
Notable behavior gap with /key/update: same-team peers (internal_user,
unrelated_same_org, etc.) get 403 on /key/delete for OWNER's key — i.e.
cannot delete each other's keys — whereas they CAN read each other's
keys (Slice 8). Delete is stricter than read. Pinned as-is.
Cumulative whole-suite wall-time is 5.9s for all 128 tests on the local
runner — well under the 10-min G2 budget for the CI job in Slice 13.
Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d
* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): add PR-triggered workflow for the behavior suite
Slice 13 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. New
workflow ``test-unit-proxy-mgmt-behavior.yml`` fires ``on: pull_request``
for the same branch set every other proxy unit-test workflow watches
(main, litellm_internal_staging, litellm_oss_branch, litellm_**).
It delegates to the existing reusable ``_test-unit-services-base.yml``
with ``enable-postgres: true``, which already provisions a postgres:14
service container and runs ``prisma db push`` against it before pytest
collects. ``reruns: 0`` because a behavior-pinning matrix that needs
reruns is itself a regression — flakes are signal.
``timeout-minutes: 15`` gives generous headroom over the local 5.9s
whole-suite wall-time; the binding G2 budget is 10 min.
Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d
* docs(proxy_behavior): G4 regression-replay table for Key Tier-1
Slice 14 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. Documents
the regression-replay verification methodology + a 12-row table mapping
recent fix-PRs touching key_management_endpoints.py to the catching
scenarios in the PR1 matrix.
One canonical RED→GREEN cycle is captured verbatim — c7c3df2b02
"extend /key/update admin check to non-budget fields". Under the
parent-of-fix code, 6 scenarios in test_key_update.py flip from 200 to
403; under HEAD code, all 21 pass. The handler swap is the only change
between the two runs, confirming the matrix catches the behavior shift
the fix introduced.
The table also calls out 4 genuine coverage gaps deferred to PR2/PR3:
404-on-missing-key, budget-limit counter assertions, /key/regenerate
upperbound enforcement, and /key/list filter-param views.
Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d
* chore(mutmut): include the behavior suite in tests_dir + G5 triage stub
Slice 15 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. Appends
``tests/proxy_behavior/management/`` to ``[tool.mutmut].tests_dir`` so
the existing mutation-test workflow runs against both the legacy mock
suite AND the new behavior suite — the latter is where the regression
signal will actually surface.
Adds a stub at ``tests/proxy_behavior/management/mutmut_triage/pr1.md``
documenting the G5 triage protocol (zero unreviewed survivors in the 6
Tier-1 handler functions) and a placeholder baseline-metrics table to
fill in after the first manually-triggered mutmut run completes — runs
take hours and run on a manual cadence, so PR1 ships with the wiring +
protocol, not the numbers. The actual baseline is recorded in a
follow-up once ``gh workflow run mutation-test.yml`` finishes.
The kill rate stays telemetry-only, never a gate. G5 (per-survivor
classification) is the binding mutation gate.
Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d
* docs(proxy_behavior): suite README with local-repro + conventions + gates
Slice 16 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. The README
documents:
* The same three commands the CI workflow runs locally (BYO-DATABASE_URL,
no new tooling).
* Suite layout — what each test file covers, which slice it lands.
* The asyncio loop_scope convention required for session fixtures
(httpx AsyncClient + prisma connection) to share a loop with each
test body.
* G3 strict-import convention + the test that enforces it.
* Read-world vs scratch-world fixture conventions.
* Behavior-pinning philosophy: pin observed codes; flag, don't judge.
* Where each G1–G5 + PR1.M1–M3 gate's evidence lives.
Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d
* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): drop xdist (workers=0) to fix seed race
First run on PR #28321 failed with UniqueViolation on
``behavior-pin-budget`` plus cascading missing-membership FK errors. Both
xdist workers entered ``seed_world()`` concurrently against the shared
Postgres service container; whichever lost the race left the world in a
half-seeded state and downstream tests ran against missing
team_membership rows.
Whole-suite wall-time is ~7s sequentially, so disabling xdist here costs
nothing — and the seed itself is the wrong place to add per-worker
isolation (the world is intentionally shared so set-equality assertions
in /key/list have a deterministic expected set).
* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): seed scratch keys via proxy_admin actor, not master
Second CI run failed: ``/key/generate`` with explicit ``user_id`` returned
403 "User can only create keys for themselves. Got user_id=X, Your ID=None"
in every test that called ``_create_scratch_key`` with a per-actor user_id.
The bare master key's auth path was producing ``user_id=None`` in the
fresh CI Postgres, which doesn't trigger the PROXY_ADMIN bypass in
``_user_can_only_create_keys_for_themselves`` reliably. Locally the same
master key path worked, masking the issue.
Fix: every ``_create_scratch_key`` helper now takes a seeder cleartext
and the test bodies pass ``world.keys[Actor.PROXY_ADMIN].cleartext``.
That actor was seeded with ``user_role=PROXY_ADMIN`` AND a concrete
``user_id``, so the bypass fires deterministically in both environments.
No behavior shift in the matrices themselves — all 128 scenarios still
pass locally; only the setup helper's auth identity changed.
The bare-master smoke (test_smoke + test_scratch_teardown) is intentionally
left on the master key path: those tests don't pass ``user_id`` in the
body so they don't hit the user_id-mismatch gate.
* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): diag — run world-seed test first + bump max-failures
Third CI run failed identically: seeded PROXY_ADMIN actor's auth resolves
to ``user_id=None`` even though the DB row has the right ``user_id``. The
suite was aborting at maxfail=10 inside test_key_delete, so test_world_seed
(which would tell us whether the seed itself is reachable) never ran in CI.
Two diagnostic moves on this push, no behavior change:
* Rename ``test_world_seed.py`` → ``test_aaa_world_seed.py`` so it's
the first collected file. If it passes in CI we know the seed is
fine and the bug lives downstream; if it fails the same way the
bug is in the auth resolution path.
* Bump ``max-failures`` to 200 for this workflow so we see the full
failure surface instead of stopping at the first cascading setup
error. Will tighten back down once the suite is green.
Adds one new test ``test_proxy_admin_actor_can_create_keys_for_others``
that explicitly exercises the PROXY_ADMIN bypass via /key/generate with
an explicit user_id — the same shape the matrix setup helper uses but
without the matrix machinery muddying the diagnostic.
* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): await LiteLLM_VerificationTokenView creation in fixture
Fourth CI run still failed because the proxy's lifespan kicks off
``prisma_client.check_view_exists()`` as a fire-and-forget background
task — that task is what creates ``LiteLLM_VerificationTokenView``, the
SQL view ``user_api_key_auth`` queries to resolve a token to its
user_id / user_role / team.
On a fresh Postgres (CI), the first test races the background task. The
view doesn't exist when the first auth call runs, the resolver falls
through to a degraded path that returns ``user_id=None``, and every
matrix test that depends on the seeded actor's identity then fails
confusingly with "Got user_id=X, Your ID=None" 403s. Locally the view
persists across pytest runs so the race is invisible.
Fix: await ``prisma_client.check_view_exists()`` explicitly inside the
session ``proxy_app`` fixture, after the lifespan enters but before the
fixture yields. Deterministic regardless of whether the underlying DB is
fresh (CI) or warm (local).
* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): widen diagnostic to dump token / user / view shape
The fifth CI run isolated the failure to ``/key/generate`` with explicit
user_id while ``/key/info`` works for the same seeded PROXY_ADMIN actor.
The auth context's user_id is None even though the DB row has it set.
This commit widens the diagnostic test: on failure, dump the raw token
row's user_id, the user row's user_role, and what
``LiteLLM_VerificationTokenView`` actually returns for the seeded token.
If the view returns user_id=None we know the view shape is the problem;
if the view returns the right user_id we know it's a downstream code
path stripping it.
* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): unambiguous diagnostic view query
Previous diagnostic's raw SQL had an ambiguous user_id column from
joining the view with the user table, so the diagnostic itself crashed
before printing useful state. Simplified to query just the view's columns.
* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): add auth-resolver chain diagnostic
Six runs and the underlying data (token row, user row, view row) all
verified correct in CI, but auth still returns user_id=None. This
diagnostic calls the resolver primitives directly:
1. ``prisma.get_data(table_name="combined_view")`` → raw view object
2. ``get_key_object(...)`` → cached/DB UserAPIKeyAuth
3. ``get_user_object(...)`` → LiteLLM_UserTable row
4. ``_is_user_proxy_admin`` / ``_get_user_role``
and prints each intermediate via captured stdout (-s). Whichever step
returns None/False in CI is where the chain breaks. Imports come from
``litellm.proxy.auth`` (not management_endpoints), so G3 still passes.
* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): set LITELLM_MASTER_KEY env so lifespan doesn't wipe it
Real root cause of every CI run that returned ``Your ID=None`` for the
seeded actors:
* In ``initialize()``, ``master_key`` is set from the config YAML's
``general_settings.master_key`` (load_config code path at
proxy_server.py:4174).
* Then the FastAPI lifespan (``proxy_startup_event``) runs and at line
776 does ``master_key = get_secret_str("LITELLM_MASTER_KEY")``,
which UNCONDITIONALLY overwrites the global.
* In CI the env var is unset, so the post-lifespan ``master_key`` is
None.
Downstream every auth path degrades: master-key requests don't bypass
because ``secrets.compare_digest(api_key, None)`` raises and is caught
to ``is_master_key_valid=False``; seeded-actor requests cache a
``UserAPIKeyAuth`` whose ``user_role`` never resolves through the
PROXY_ADMIN bypass; ``_is_allowed_to_make_key_request`` then hits the
``user_id`` mismatch path with ``Your ID=None``.
Locally my shell happened to have ``LITELLM_MASTER_KEY`` set from a prior
session, which is why every local run was green and CI red — exactly the
"don't generalize from your environment to CI" memory.
Fix: ``os.environ.setdefault("LITELLM_MASTER_KEY", MASTER_KEY)`` and
``os.environ.setdefault("CONFIG_FILE_PATH", config_path)`` before
entering the lifespan, so its re-read produces the same value as
``initialize()``.
Whole-suite still green locally (130 tests, ~6.4s).
* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): force premium_user=True so /key/regenerate isn't gated
Ninth CI run cleared every ``Your ID=None`` failure (the master_key env
fix worked end-to-end) and exposed the next thin layer of failures:
``/key/regenerate`` returns 500 "Regenerating Virtual Keys is an
Enterprise feature" in CI because the proxy can't see a
``LITELLM_LICENSE``. Locally my license is set, so the matrix passes.
The behavior matrix is supposed to pin authz, not licensing — so flip
``proxy_server.premium_user = True`` directly, both before and after the
lifespan (the lifespan re-runs ``_license_check.is_premium()`` and would
otherwise reset it). With premium gating disabled, the regenerate matrix
exercises the same authz path /key/update does.
Whole-suite still green locally (130 tests, ~6.3s).
* test(proxy_behavior): trim debug diagnostics, restore default max-failures
Followup to the CI-bring-up sequence: now that the suite is green in CI
(130 → 129 tests after this trim; 156s wall-time on ubuntu-latest), drop
the diagnostic noise left over from debugging the master_key wipe:
* Rename ``test_aaa_world_seed.py`` back to ``test_world_seed.py`` —
no longer needs to run first.
* Remove ``test_auth_resolver_returns_correct_user_id_and_role`` —
that test reached into private auth helpers to localize the bug
between the DB and ``UserAPIKeyAuth``; it has served its purpose
and isn't HTTP-boundary.
* Keep ``test_proxy_admin_actor_can_create_keys_for_others`` (without
the failure-time dump) — it's a real authz contract that pins the
PROXY_ADMIN bypass on /key/generate, and would catch a regression
of the same conftest interaction this sequence revealed.
* Drop the workflow's ``max-failures: 200`` override — that was a
debug aid for seeing the full failure surface in CI. Default of 10
is right for a stable suite.
* chore(proxy_behavior): drop empty mutmut triage stub, fold protocol into README
The mutmut_triage/pr1.md file was a placeholder for numbers and
classifications that don't exist yet — the first mutmut run is a manual
follow-up. Empty stubs aren't evidence; deleting it.
The G5 protocol (run the workflow, triage survivors in the six Tier-1
handler functions, kill-or-accept-with-reason, zero unreviewed) moves
into the suite README's "Gate evidence" block. The real triage file
will land alongside the first mutmut follow-up.
pyproject.toml's [tool.mutmut].tests_dir entry stays — that's the
one-line wiring that makes the existing (manual-trigger) mutation-test
workflow include our suite next time someone runs it. Comment updated
to drop the dead file reference.
* chore(proxy_behavior): drop README + trim comments
Removes the suite README — its contents (local repro, layout, conventions)
were either restated by the file structure or already covered by the
workflow YAML and pyproject.toml. Trims docstrings and inline comments
across every test file to keep only non-obvious WHY (the masking
``_get_user_in_team`` reads, the LiteLLM_VerificationTokenView models-can't-
be-NULL gotcha, the org_admin/peer-visibility surprise, the rotation
contract).
Suite still 129 green locally.
* test(proxy_behavior): address Greptile review — env force, pagination, dedup
- conftest: force LITELLM_MASTER_KEY / CONFIG_FILE_PATH unconditionally
instead of setdefault. An ambient LITELLM_MASTER_KEY with a different
value would make the proxy authenticate on that key while the tests
still send MASTER_KEY → silent 401s.
- test_key_list: paginate /key/list instead of a single size=100 request.
size is capped at 100 by the endpoint, so on a non-fresh DB a single
page could truncate PROXY_ADMIN's view and a seeded key could fall off
the page. Walk total_pages.
- conftest: hoist the duplicated _create_scratch_key helper (copy-pasted
and already diverged across test_key_{update,regenerate,delete}.py)
into a single shared create_scratch_key.
- Delete regression_replay/README.md — G4 regression-replay evidence
belongs in the PR description, not a committed doc file (repo docs
policy + the effort's own plan both say so). Content moved to the PR.
* Add support for environment variable in interactions api
* Add sdk support for gemini create agent
* Add agents endpoint support via proxy
* Add outputs of each api
* Add routing for model and agents param
* Remove redundant condition in get_provider_agents_api_config
LlmProviders.GEMINI.value is literally the string "gemini", so the
second clause of the or was checking the exact same thing as the first.
Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: forward query-param credentials to list/get/delete/versions Gemini agent endpoints
The list_gemini_agents, get_gemini_agent, delete_gemini_agent, and
list_gemini_agent_versions endpoints previously constructed a hardcoded
data dict with no mechanism to pass provider credentials. Unlike
create_gemini_agent (POST, reads litellm_params_template from body),
these GET/DELETE endpoints gave no way for multi-tenant callers to
supply a per-request api_key or other LiteLLM params.
Fix:
- Add _merge_query_params_into_data() helper that reads query parameters
from the request and merges them into the data dict without overwriting
already-set keys (e.g. path params like 'name').
- Support a JSON-encoded litellm_params_template query parameter
(matching the POST body pattern) as well as flat key=value pairs
(e.g. api_key=AIza...).
- Apply the helper in all four affected endpoints.
- Add 13 unit tests covering the helper and each endpoint.
Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: pass model=None for managed agent proxy endpoints to prevent agent name polluting data["model"]
Endpoints acreate_agent, aget_agent, adelete_agent, and alist_agent_versions
were passing model=<agent_name> to base_process_llm_request. This caused
common_processing_pre_call_logic to write the agent name into self.data["model"],
which then triggered spurious model-alias mapping, rate-limiting lookups, and
logging tied to a non-existent model deployment.
The agent name is already carried in data["name"] and is passed correctly to
the SDK functions (litellm.interactions.agents.*). There is no reason to also
set model=<agent_name>; the correct value is model=None for all five managed-agent
management routes.
Adds tests/test_litellm/proxy/google_endpoints/test_managed_agents_model_param.py
to verify all five managed-agent endpoints pass model=None.
Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: address greptile P1/P2 review comments
P1 (router.py): Restore fallback/retry support for acreate_interaction
and create_interaction. Both were silently moved to _init_interactions_api_endpoints
(direct call, no fallbacks). Moved them back to _ageneric_api_call_with_fallbacks
so users with configured fallback models keep retry behaviour.
P1 security (agents_endpoints.py): Remove flat query-param credential
path (e.g. ?api_key=AIza...) from _merge_query_params_into_data.
Credentials in URL query strings appear verbatim in server access logs,
CDN edge logs, and browser history. Only the JSON-encoded
litellm_params_template query param (matching the POST body pattern) is
retained.
P2 (interactions/http_handler.py): Extract _BaseHTTPHandler with shared
_handle_error, _sync_client, and _async_client helpers. InteractionsHTTPHandler
now extends _BaseHTTPHandler. The _async_client reads the provider from
litellm_params instead of hardcoding GEMINI.
P2 (interactions/agents/http_handler.py): AgentsHTTPHandler now extends
InteractionsHTTPHandler (which inherits _BaseHTTPHandler) so all shared
HTTP infrastructure is reused rather than duplicated. Removes the
hardcoded LlmProviders.GEMINI from the async client path.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: address CI failures from greptile review fixes
- black: format interactions/agents/main.py and utils.py
- tests: update test_gemini_agents_endpoints.py to match new
_merge_query_params_into_data behaviour (flat credential params are
rejected; only JSON-encoded litellm_params_template is accepted)
- ci: add test_gemini_agents_endpoints.py to endpoints-and-responses
shard in test-unit-proxy-db.yml so assert-shard-coverage passes
- tests: add _initialize_managed_agents_endpoints and
_init_managed_agents_api_endpoints test coverage so router_code_coverage
passes; also fix TestRouterCreateInteractionRouting to reflect that
acreate_interaction now correctly routes through
_ageneric_api_call_with_fallbacks (restoring fallback support)
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: remove InteractionsHTTPHandler._handle_error override to fix type errors
AgentsHTTPHandler extends InteractionsHTTPHandler and calls
self._handle_error(provider_config=agents_api_config) where
agents_api_config is BaseAgentsAPIConfig. Python MRO resolved _handle_error
to InteractionsHTTPHandler._handle_error which expected BaseInteractionsAPIConfig,
causing 10 mypy arg-type errors in interactions/agents/http_handler.py.
Removing the redundant override lets both classes inherit _BaseHTTPHandler._handle_error
(provider_config: Any) which is structurally correct for both config types.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: agent-only interactions and managed agents provider routing
Resolve None custom_llm_provider in agents HTTP client lookup and set
custom_llm_provider on GenericLiteLLMParams for all agent CRUD paths.
Stop mapping agent names to proxy model routing; route interactions
through _init_interactions_api_endpoints with fallbacks only when model
is set. Consolidate duplicate router elif branches for interaction APIs.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Fix greptile review
* test(agents): add unit tests for managed agents SDK and HTTP handler
Adds coverage for the new `litellm.interactions.agents` surface area:
- main.py: sync/async entry points (create/list/get/delete/list_versions),
provider config lookup, logging-obj helper, async error wrapping
- http_handler.py: every CRUD method (sync + async paths), `_is_async`
dispatch branches, and provider error mapping through GeminiAgentsConfig
- utils.py: get_provider_agents_api_config for supported / unsupported
providers
Brings patch coverage on these files from <25% to ~100% so codecov/patch
is satisfied.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(gemini-agents): fix misleading credential-passing examples in GET/DELETE docstrings (#28293)
The four GET/DELETE endpoint docstrings (list_gemini_agents,
get_gemini_agent, delete_gemini_agent, list_gemini_agent_versions)
documented passing per-request credentials as flat query parameters
(e.g. ?api_key=AIza...). However, _merge_query_params_into_data only
reads the JSON-encoded litellm_params_template query parameter and
intentionally ignores flat params (URL query strings appear verbatim
in access logs, browser history, and Referer headers).
Callers following the documented curl examples would have their
credentials silently dropped and hit auth failures against Gemini.
Update the examples to use the supported JSON-encoded
litellm_params_template query parameter, matching _merge_query_params_into_data's own docstring.
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(agents): rename provider-agnostic agent response types
Move GeminiAgent{ListResponse,DeleteResult,VersionsResponse} to
provider-neutral names (AgentListResponse, AgentDeleteResult,
AgentVersionsResponse) so the BaseAgentsAPIConfig interface no longer
references Gemini-specific type names.
* fix(gemini-agents): close veria-flagged credential-escalation gaps
Two high-severity findings from the veria-ai PR review are addressed:
1. **api_base override could leak the shared Gemini key**
GeminiAgentsConfig.validate_environment falls back to GOOGLE_API_KEY /
GEMINI_API_KEY when no api_key is supplied. Combined with caller-controlled
api_base on the proxy CRUD endpoints, an authenticated user could redirect
the outbound request to an attacker-controlled host and capture the
operator's shared Gemini key from the x-goog-api-key header. The config
now refuses env-fallback whenever api_base is explicitly overridden.
2. **Managed-agent CRUD exposed to ordinary LLM keys**
The new /v1beta/agents routes live in google_routes (i.e. llm_api_routes),
so any non-admin LLM key can reach them. Unlike /v1beta/models/...:
generateContent these endpoints are NOT model-routed and have no
model_list-supplied credentials, so env-fallback would let any LLM key
list / create / delete agents inside the operator's Gemini project. Each
endpoint now calls _enforce_caller_supplied_provider_key, which requires
non-admin callers to supply their own Gemini api_key via
litellm_params_template. Proxy admins keep the env-fallback convenience.
Tests cover non-admin rejection, admin allow-through, the api_base override
guard, and SDK env-fallback when api_base is not overridden.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(router): restore strict assert_called_once_with on interactions default-provider test
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ci): flag codecov uploads and enable carryforward
Coverage uploads from GHA and CircleCI were unflagged. Commits that
receive the push-triggered workflows more than once (re-runs, or branches
cut at the same SHA) accumulated many overlapping flagless sessions, and
Codecov's per-commit merge dropped the largest, ubiquitously-imported
files (router.py, proxy_server.py, main.py, utils.py, cost_calculator.py)
from the report even though the uploaded XMLs contained them.
- codecov.yaml: flag_management.default_rules.carryforward: true
- GHA reusable bases: tag each upload with its workflow/shard name
- CircleCI: tag the combined upload "circleci"; also combine the
agent / google_generate_content_endpoint / litellm_utils datafiles
that were produced and required but missing from the combine list
* fix(ci): close coverage gaps in proxy-legacy, router-unit, auth-ui, caching-redis
- test-unit-proxy-legacy: route through _test-unit-base so the full
proxy_unit_tests suite (incl. comprehensive test_proxy_server*.py) is
measured and uploaded with per-group flags (was plain pytest, no --cov)
- _test-unit-services-base: declare the enable-redis input + the six
secrets test-unit-caching-redis passes; that workflow had a workflow_call
signature mismatch and startup_failed on every push (never ran).
Changes are additive/optional - proxy-db and security callers unchanged
- circleci: add --cov + persist + combine + upload-coverage requires for
litellm_router_unit_testing (tests/router_unit_tests) and
auth_ui_unit_tests (tests/proxy_admin_ui_tests); neither was covered
anywhere. Redundant -k subset jobs left as-is (local_testing covers them)
* fix(ci): remove dead GHA Redis workflow; keep Redis on CircleCI only
CircleCI redis_caching_unit_tests already runs the exact same files
(tests/local_testing/test_dual_cache.py, test_redis_batch_optimizations.py,
test_router_utils.py) with --cov, and that datafile is already combined
and uploaded. The GHA test-unit-caching-redis workflow was redundant and
had never run (workflow_call signature mismatch -> startup_failure on
every push).
- Delete .github/workflows/test-unit-caching-redis.yml
- Revert _test-unit-services-base.yml to the flag-fix state (drop the
enable-redis input / secrets / env wiring added only to prop up the
GHA Redis workflow); the verified per-upload flags line is kept
- The only single-star "litellm_*" branch glob lived in the deleted
file; no other single-star globs exist, so none remain to widen
* fix(ci): keep proxy-legacy as a standalone job to preserve required check names
Routing proxy-legacy through the reusable workflow renamed each check from
the bare matrix name (e.g. "proxy-response-and-misc") to
"proxy-response-and-misc / Run tests". Those bare names are required status
checks in branch protection, so the old contexts never reported and PRs sat
"Expected — Waiting for status to be reported" indefinitely.
Restore the original standalone matrix job (job name == matrix name, so the
required contexts report again) and add coverage in place: --cov on pytest
plus an OIDC Codecov upload flagged proxy-legacy-<group>. Net effect of the
gap-#2 fix is preserved (flagged coverage for tests/proxy_unit_tests/**)
without changing any check name.
* revert(ci): drop all proxy-legacy changes from this PR
tests/proxy_unit_tests/** is already fully covered by test-unit-proxy-db
(its shard-coverage guard fails CI if any file in that dir is unassigned),
which this PR already flags + carryforwards. Adding --cov and id-token:write
to the legacy pull_request job was redundant and put OIDC on a job that runs
untrusted PR code. Restore the file to the base version verbatim so this PR
no longer touches proxy-legacy at all (also restores its original required
check names). Retiring proxy-legacy in favor of proxy-db on pull_request is
a separate effort that needs a branch-protection change.
pytest-cov treats --cov=<module-name> as a Python package and emits XML
paths relative to the package root, stripping the litellm/ prefix
(`proxy/proxy_server.py` instead of `litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py`).
Codecov's auto-prefix heuristic then drops every file whose basename is
ambiguous in the repo — `proxy_server.py` (3 copies under enterprise/),
`router.py` (2 copies), `utils.py` (20+), `main.py` (20+), `constants.py`
(2). The 11 highest-fix-rate hotspots have never appeared in Codecov.
Switching to --cov=./litellm treats the argument as a path, which makes
coverage.xml emit repo-relative paths (`litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py`).
Each path is unambiguous, so Codecov resolves all files correctly.
Verified locally: rerunning a single proxy_unit_tests test with
--cov=./litellm produced `filename="litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py"`,
`filename="litellm/router.py"`, and `filename="litellm/types/router.py"`
as distinct entries — exactly the disambiguation Codecov needs.
Touches every workflow that uploads coverage: the two reusable GHA
workflows (_test-unit-base.yml, _test-unit-services-base.yml),
test-mcp.yml, and all 14 invocations in .circleci/config.yml.
Audit of .github/workflows/ via gh run history shows the following have
either never run or have been dormant for 10+ weeks. CI coverage that
still matters is preserved on CircleCI (e.g. llm_translation_testing).
Removed workflows:
- test-litellm.yml — workflow_dispatch only, last run 2026-02-12 (cancelled);
CCI local_testing_part1/2 covers the same tests
- llm-translation-testing.yml — last run 2025-07-10; replaced by CCI
llm_translation_testing job (run_llm_translation_tests.py kept for the
make test-llm-translation target)
- run_observatory_tests.yml — last run 2026-03-03 (cancelled)
- scan_duplicate_issues.yml — last run 2026-03-02 (failure)
- publish_to_pypi.yml — never run
- read_pyproject_version.yml — fires on every push to main but its echoed
version output is not consumed by any downstream step
Removed orphan files (no callers in workflows, CCI, or Makefile):
- .github/workflows/README.md — documented only publish_to_pypi.yml
- .github/workflows/update_release.py + results_stats.csv
- .github/actions/helm-oci-chart-releaser/
* fix: patch Host-header auth bypass in get_request_route
Starlette reconstructs request.url from the Host header. A malformed
Host like `localhost/?x=1` causes Starlette to build the full URL as
`http://localhost/?x=1/health`, which url-parses to path="/". Since "/"
is in LiteLLMRoutes.public_routes, all protected routes became reachable
without authentication.
Fix: read scope["path"] (set by uvicorn from the HTTP request line,
not derivable from headers) instead of request.url.path. Sub-path
deployments are handled via scope["app_root_path"] / scope["root_path"],
mirroring Starlette's own base_url construction logic.
Affected variants confirmed fixed:
Host: localhost/?x=1
Host: localhost:4000/?x=1
Host: localhost/#test
Host: localhost:4000/#test
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style: reduce comments in route fix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: block credential fields in RAG ingest vector_store options
Credential fields (vertex_credentials, aws_access_key_id, api_key, etc.)
in ingest_options.vector_store are now rejected at the API boundary with
a 400 error. Credentials must be configured server-side.
Previously any authenticated user could supply a vertex_credentials dict
with type=external_account pointing credential_source.file at an
arbitrary path (e.g. /proc/1/environ) and token_url at an
attacker-controlled server. google-auth's identity_pool.Credentials
refresh() would read the file and POST its contents to the attacker.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: block /key/update self-escalation by assigned users
Non-admin users who were assigned a key (created_by != caller) could
update any non-budget field — models, rpm_limit, guardrails, etc. —
without admin authorization, allowing privilege self-escalation.
Gate: only the key creator (created_by == caller) may edit their own
key without admin check; budget changes always require admin regardless
of creator status. All other callers must pass _check_key_admin_access.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: block user-controlled api_base in RAG ingest vector_store options
A user-supplied api_base in ingest_options.vector_store caused the server
to forward its configured provider credentials (Gemini, OpenAI) to an
attacker-controlled endpoint via SSRF.
Add api_base to the blocked credential params set alongside api_key and
the existing credential fields.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: restrict /utils/transform_request to PROXY_ADMIN and apply body safety check
Any authenticated internal_user could POST arbitrary provider config
(aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, etc.) to /utils/transform_request and have
the server forward its credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint.
- Gate the endpoint on PROXY_ADMIN role (403 for all other roles)
- Call is_request_body_safe() to reject banned params even for admins
- Convert ValueError from safety check to HTTP 400
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: apply banned-param check to /utils/transform_request
Without is_request_body_safe(), any authenticated user could pass
aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, or aws_web_identity_token to
/utils/transform_request and have the server forward its configured
provider credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint during SDK
credential resolution.
Applies the same banned-param blocklist already used by LLM endpoints.
Endpoint remains accessible to all authenticated users.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: block SSRF via api_base in /prompts/test dotprompt YAML frontmatter
Any frontmatter key not in ["model","input","output"] flowed into
optional_params and was merged into the LLM call data dict, bypassing
is_request_body_safe. An attacker with any bearer key could set
api_base in YAML to redirect the outbound LLM request — including the
provider API key — to an attacker-controlled host.
Fix: call is_request_body_safe on the constructed data dict after
optional_params are merged, before invoking ProxyBaseLLMRequestProcessing.
ValueError from the banned-param check is surfaced as HTTP 400.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Update litellm/proxy/rag_endpoints/endpoints.py
Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: coerce nested config strings before banned-param check
_NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS descent used isinstance(nested, dict) which silently
skipped litellm_embedding_config when delivered as a JSON string via
multipart/form-data. Banned params (api_base, aws_sts_endpoint, etc.)
nested inside the stringified value were invisible to is_request_body_safe.
_NESTED_METADATA_KEYS already used _coerce_metadata_to_dict which parses
JSON strings before checking. Apply the same coercion to _NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: replace substring match with prefix match in is_llm_api_route
mapped_pass_through_routes used `_llm_passthrough_route in route` (substring)
so any admin-only path whose URL contained a provider name (openai, anthropic,
azure, bedrock, etc.) was misclassified as an LLM API route and bypassed the
admin gate in non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check.
Confirmed live: non-admin key could GET /credentials/by_name/openai (read
masked provider API key) and DELETE /credentials/openai (delete credential).
Fix: use exact match or startswith(prefix + "/") — the same pattern used
everywhere else in RouteChecks — so only routes that actually start with a
passthrough prefix are allowed through.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: stabilize PR #27878 test failures
- key_management_endpoints: extend can_skip_admin_check to team keys so
team members with /key/update permission can update non-budget fields.
can_team_member_execute_key_management_endpoint already validates team
membership + permission and raises if unauthorized; reaching the admin
check on a team key means the caller was authorized.
- test: set created_by on mock key in
test_update_key_non_budget_fields_allowed_for_internal_user so
caller_is_creator resolves correctly (MagicMock default ≠ user_id).
- auth_utils.get_request_route: guard against non-dict request.scope
(e.g. MagicMock in unit tests) to prevent a MagicMock leaking into
UserAPIKeyAuth.request_route and failing Pydantic validation.
- ci: assign test_multipart_bypass_repro.py to the proxy-runtime shard
in test-unit-proxy-db.yml to satisfy the shard-coverage check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(lint): add explicit str() cast in get_request_route for MyPy
scope.get() returns Any|None which MyPy cannot coerce to str implicitly.
Wrap both scope.get() calls in str() to satisfy the type checker.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: guard bare-/ root_path strip + make total_spend migration idempotent
auth_utils.get_request_route: when Starlette sets scope["app_root_path"]
to "/" (e.g. behind some middleware), the old stripping logic would
remove the leading slash from every path ("/team/new" → "team/new"),
breaking route matching and causing auth to misclassify protected routes.
Skip stripping when root_path is bare "/".
migration: add IF NOT EXISTS to total_spend ALTER TABLE so the migration
is safe to replay when a prior partial run already created the column.
Without this guard, prisma migrate deploy fails on CI DBs that were
partially migrated, causing all subsequent DB operations (including
/team/new) to 500.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: require creator still owns key for personal-key bypass in /key/update
caller_is_creator now requires both created_by == caller AND user_id ==
caller. Previously checking only created_by let a demoted admin who
originally created a key for another user continue editing non-budget
fields on it after reassignment, bypassing _check_key_admin_access.
Adds regression test: creator whose key was reassigned is blocked (403).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: extract auth checks to fix PLR0915 + broaden max_budget assertion
internal_user_endpoints._update_single_user_helper exceeded 50 statements
(PLR0915). Extract authorization checks into _check_user_update_authz helper
to bring statement count under the limit.
test_validate_max_budget: assert "negative" (substring of both the local
"cannot be negative" and the CI "non-negative finite number" messages) so
the test is stable regardless of which exact wording the function uses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): resolve cache handling issues in _lookup_deprecated_key
- Updated the in-memory cache for deprecated key lookups to store a 3-tuple (active_token_id, cache_expires_at_ts, revoke_at_ts) instead of a 2-tuple, ensuring proper unpacking and backward compatibility.
- Removed duplicate cache reads and added logic to handle legacy cache entries gracefully.
- Enhanced unit tests to cover scenarios for cache hits, DB misses, and respect for revoke_at timestamps, ensuring robust handling of the grace-period key-rotation feature.
* refactor(proxy): streamline cache handling in _lookup_deprecated_key
- Simplified the cache retrieval logic by directly unpacking the 3-tuple cache entries, removing the need for backward compatibility checks for 2-tuple entries.
- Updated unit tests to ensure that pre-warmed 3-tuple cache entries are served correctly without unnecessary database lookups.
* chore(ci): add new unit test for deprecated key grace period
- Included `test_deprecated_key_grace_period.py` in the CI workflow to enhance coverage for deprecated key handling scenarios.
* fix(proxy): remove unnecessary check for revoke_at in _lookup_deprecated_key
- Eliminated the redundant check for None on revoke_at, streamlining the logic for handling deprecated keys in the cache. This change enhances the efficiency of the key lookup process.
* test(proxy): add end-to-end tests for deprecated key lookup behavior
- Introduced a new test class `TestDeprecatedKeyLookupDbE2E` to validate the behavior of deprecated key lookups against a real Prisma-backed database.
- The test ensures that old key hashes resolve correctly and that repeated lookups utilize the in-memory cache without errors.
- Cleaned up the `_lookup_deprecated_key` function by removing an unnecessary check for `revoke_at`, enhancing the efficiency of the key lookup process.
* ci: add manually-triggered mutation testing smoke workflow
Adds a workflow_dispatch-only GitHub Actions workflow that runs mutmut
against a single source/test pair (router_settings_endpoints) to validate
the tooling end-to-end before scaling.
The workflow reinstalls litellm non-editable so the mutants/ sandbox is
not shadowed by the editable .pth on sys.path, and sets PYTHONPATH so
the trampolined sandbox copy wins over site-packages.
mutmut itself is pulled in via uv run --with so it does not appear in
uv.lock or affect the shared dev environment.
Includes a temporary push: trigger scoped to this branch so we can
iterate before the workflow file lands on the default branch — to be
removed before merging (workflow_dispatch only requires the file on the
default branch to surface the manual trigger button).
* ci(mutation): disable rerun and xdist plugins for mutmut runs
mutmut's in-process pytest.main() call hits
`INTERNALERROR: no option named 'filtered_exceptions'` from
pytest-retry's pytest_configure hook. Reruns are also wrong for
mutation testing — a "failed" mutant test that gets retried would
mask which mutants are killed vs. survive. Disable retry,
rerunfailures, and xdist via pytest_add_cli_args in [tool.mutmut].
* ci(mutation): uninstall pytest-retry before mutmut runs
`-p no:retry` (and similar names) didn't match pytest-retry's
entry-point name, so the plugin still loaded and crashed during
mutmut's "Running clean tests" phase. Uninstalling the package is
surgical and doesn't depend on guessing the entry-point name.
* ci(mutation): emit per-survivor diffs to run-page summary + artifact
The previous artifact only contained `mutmut results` text (which in
mutmut 3.x lists survivor names but not the actual mutations). Adds:
- `mutmut export-cicd-stats` to produce mutmut-cicd-stats.json with the
killed/survived/total scoreboard.
- `mutmut show <name>` per surviving mutant to capture each mutation as
a unified diff.
- A `mutmut-report.md` that combines summary + run-progress tail +
per-survivor diffs, written to both the artifact and
$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY (visible on the run page, no download needed).
- Corrected artifact paths: stats files live under mutants/, not the
project root.
- The trampolined source file from the sandbox so survivors can be
inspected even outside `mutmut show`.
* ci(mutation): document intended manual weekly cadence in trigger comment
* ci(mutation): generate ACH-style report with embedded function bodies
Replaces the inline bash markdown generation with a Python script that:
- Groups survivors by function (one section per function, function body
shown once per section, surviving mutants nested as subsections)
- Embeds each enclosing function's source via Python AST (so the agent
has full context, not just a 3-line `mutmut show` diff)
- Inlines the existing test file(s) listed in [tool.mutmut].tests_dir
- Writes an ACH-style task description at the bottom following the
prompt template from arXiv 2501.12862
Output goes to mutation-report.md (artifact) and the head of the file
is appended to $GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY for at-a-glance visibility.
* fix(mutation report): correctly parse function names with leading underscores
mutmut's mutant-name prefix is x_ (single underscore), so a function
named _foo produces mutants x__foo__mutmut_N. The previous regex
\.x__(.+)__mutmut_ ate the function's leading underscore as part of
the prefix. Changed to \.x_(.+)__mutmut_ so leading underscores are
preserved in the captured function name; verified for normal, leading-
underscore, and dunder-method names.
* feat(mutation report): full Meta ACH-style rendering with MUTANT delimiters
For each surviving mutant, parse the mutmut sandbox trampoline file and
render the mutated function as it appears in the source — with the
differing lines wrapped in `# MUTANT START` / `# MUTANT END` comments,
matching the format from Meta's ACH paper (arXiv 2501.12862, Table 1).
Renames the function header back to its original name so the agent sees
the function as it would appear in the file. Falls back to the unified
diff if the trampoline lookup fails.
Handles replace, insert, and delete diff ops; uses difflib's
SequenceMatcher to find the differing line ranges.
The unified diff is preserved in a collapsible <details> block as
secondary context.
* ci(mutation): scope to whole management_endpoints folder, drop temp push trigger
Final scope before merge:
- paths_to_mutate / tests_dir broadened from one file to the entire
management_endpoints source/test folders
- Trigger is now `workflow_dispatch` only — the temporary push: block
used during workflow iteration is removed
- timeout-minutes bumped from 60 to 350 (just under the GH-hosted job
cap of 360); whole-folder mutation against ~15 files / ~7.5k LOC can
take a few hours
- Artifact path for the trampoline files glob-expanded to cover all
files under mutants/litellm/proxy/management_endpoints/
* fix(mutation report): warn when multiple functions in a file share a name
Addresses the Greptile review concern: ast.walk's first-match-wins
behavior could embed the wrong function body when a file defines the
same name in multiple places (e.g., a module-level helper and a class
method). mutmut's mutant identifier does not carry class context, so
we can't always determine which definition was mutated.
find_function_in_file now returns the start line of every matching
definition; render() surfaces a "Note: N functions named X" warning
in the report when there is more than one match. The first match is
still embedded as the body — the warning tells the reader to verify
manually instead of silently using the wrong context.
Smoke-tested against the existing artifact: single-match files render
unchanged.
* Fix mutation report anchors
* Fix mutation report TOC anchors
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
The assert-shard-coverage guard in test-unit-proxy-db.yml failed because
test_request_size_limit_middleware.py was added under tests/proxy_unit_tests/
but not referenced by any matrix entry. Assigning it to the proxy-runtime
shard, which already covers other server-runtime tests (proxy_routes,
proxy_gunicorn, server_root_path).
* fix(projects): fire useProjects hook for all authenticated users, not just admins
* fix(routes): add /project/list and /project/info to internal_user_routes allowlist
* fix(projects): use members_with_roles + LiteLLM_UserTable.teams for membership checks
* feat(ui): add "Your Usage" view for admin users on usage page
Admins were forced to use the global usage view with no way to scope it
to their own activity without manually searching for themselves in the
user filter dropdown.
Adds a new "Your Usage" option (admin-only) to the usage view selector.
When selected, it locks the data to the admin's own user_id and hides
the "Filter by user" dropdown.
* feat(ui): wire my-usage view to admin's own user_id in UsagePageView
When usageView is "my-usage", effectiveUserId resolves to the logged-in
admin's own userID. The "Filter by user" dropdown is hidden in this
view (only shown for "global").
* add: screenshots for usage page Your Usage admin fix
* fix(ui): gate useProjects on admin roles to fix failing unit test
* feat(proxy): add /project/list and /project/info to internal user routes
* fix(enterprise): use members_with_roles and litellm_usertable.teams for project access checks
* remove .github screenshots and workflow file from PR
The pre-release detector in create-release.yml uses `\.dev` (literal dot
before `dev`), which matches PEP 440 canonical tags like `1.84.0.dev2`
but misses the SemVer/Docker form `1.84.0-dev.2` (hyphen-dev). Per the
release design doc's PyPI<->Docker mapping rule, both forms are valid
production-track release tags and both are pre-releases (opt-in via
`pip install --pre litellm`), so the workflow should mark them as
GitHub pre-releases either way.
Change the regex to `[-.]dev` so it accepts `.dev` and `-dev`.
`prerelease: false` was hardcoded, so dispatching create-release with
`1.84.0rc1`, `1.84.0.dev42`, or legacy `v1.83.13-nightly` would publish
them as stable releases on the GitHub Releases page. Derive the flag
from the tag instead.
The detector matches `rc`, `.dev`, `nightly`, `alpha`, `beta`. PEP 440
post-releases (`1.84.0.post1`) and legacy `-stable[.patch.N]` are
stable maintenance releases per PEP 440, so they intentionally do not
match.
The tag validator required a leading `v`, so dispatching create-release
with `1.84.0` (or `1.84.0rc1`, `1.84.0.dev42`, `1.84.0.post1`) failed
even though those are the new naming convention. Make the leading `v`
optional in both create-release.yml and create-release-branch.yml so
both legacy (`v1.83.10-stable`, `v1.83.14.rc.1`, `v1.82.3.dev.9`,
`v1.82.3-stable.patch.4`, `v1.83.13-nightly`) and new PEP 440 forms are
accepted during the transition. Refresh the input descriptions to show
the new examples.
Add a new CI workflow that rejects pull requests from forks when they:
- Modify uv.lock (any change at all)
- Add new dependencies to any pyproject.toml file (root, litellm-proxy-extras, enterprise)
Security properties:
- Uses pull_request (not pull_request_target) so no secrets are exposed
- All action refs pinned to full SHA hashes
- persist-credentials: false on all checkouts
- permissions: {} (no GitHub token permissions)
- No user-controlled input in run: blocks (no script injection)
- Proper TOML parsing via stdlib tomllib (not regex on raw text)
- Only triggers when dependency files are actually changed (paths filter)
Internal PRs (from branches in the canonical repo) skip the job entirely.
Co-authored-by: Krrish Dholakia <krrish-berri-2@users.noreply.github.com>
Replaces the rm-and-symlink hack with a plain actions/checkout
using path: docs/my-website. The previous approach failed on this
branch because docs/my-website no longer exists in the repo (its
parent docs/ directory was also removed), so ln -s had nowhere
to create the symlink.
Also adds the same checkout step to test-unit-documentation.yml,
which was silently relying on docs/my-website existing in-tree
for test_env_keys.py and test_router_settings.py.
The file was moved to tests/enterprise/litellm_enterprise/proxy/management_endpoints/
and is covered by the CircleCI litellm_mapped_enterprise_tests job. The stale path
was causing pytest to error with 'file or directory not found'.
The `_test-unit-services-base.yml` reusable workflow attached every job
to the `integration-postgres` GHA environment to read three "secrets":
DATABASE_URL, POSTGRES_USER, POSTGRES_PASSWORD. These are not secrets —
the postgres service container is spawned per-job on localhost and
destroyed with the job, so the user/password are bootstrap values for a
throwaway container and the URL is always `postgresql://…@localhost:…`.
Each environment attachment produces a "temporarily deployed to
integration-postgres" deployment record, which the PR timeline renders
as a message per matrix shard per push. With 14 proxy-db shards that's
~14 notifications per push, drowning the PR conversation.
Changes:
* Hardcode POSTGRES_USER/POSTGRES_PASSWORD/POSTGRES_DB and the derived
DATABASE_URL in `_test-unit-services-base.yml`.
* Delete the `environment: integration-postgres` attachment.
* Delete the `secrets:` declarations on the reusable workflow and on
the two callers (test-unit-proxy-db.yml, test-unit-security.yml).
* The `services:` container still starts a fresh postgres per job;
the connection string now matches what the container boots up with.
Security review: no regression. The environment wasn't gating anything
real — no protection rules configured, no approval gates, and the
branch restriction is already enforced by `on: push: branches: [...]`
on both caller workflows. Zizmor pedantic-mode findings are identical
before and after (same 6 pre-existing findings, zero new ones).
The `integration-postgres` environment and its three "secrets" in repo
settings are now unreferenced and can be deleted from repo admin.
test_db_schema_migration.py has exactly one test, and that test is mostly
waiting on prisma subprocesses (~170s: prisma migrate deploy + prisma
migrate diff). No CPU-bound Python work inside the test body, and only
one test in the file means xdist's parallelism is unused regardless.
Previous run on commit 5df9f397e6: 10.0m wall-clock for the shard, of
which 4:56 was silence between step start and pytest banner — the cost
of 4 xdist workers each cold-starting (pytest plugin load + litellm
import + pytest-cov instrumentation) so that exactly one of them could
pick up the single test.
Switching to workers: 0 takes the serial pytest branch in the base
workflow, which already handles this case correctly (no -n, no --dist).
Single-process startup instead of 4. Expected wall-clock: ~6m.
Two changes:
1. workers: 8 -> 4 on every non-serial proxy-db shard. ubuntu-latest is a
4-core runner; -n 8 oversubscribes 2x and workers block each other
during their cold-start imports (pytest-cov instruments every litellm
module per worker). Measured ~441% CPU locally with -n 8 on 8 cores
(i.e. ~55% effective). Matching -n to physical cores should give
~2x faster worker startup, which is where most of the ~9m wall-clock
per shard goes (7+ minutes is plugin load + xdist imports before any
test runs).
2. Revert the -k split on test_proxy_utils.py. It was split into
proxy-utils-a-h / proxy-utils-i-z as a semantic-adjacent hack; merge
back to a single proxy-utils shard. Still uses --dist=worksteal so
xdist can balance the 188 parametrized cases across workers.
Also drops the now-unused `keyword` input from _test-unit-services-base.yml
and its matching matrix field across all proxy-db entries.
Shard count: 14 -> 13 (+ the assert-shard-coverage guard).
Default GHA matrix job names join every matrix field, producing unreadable
check labels like:
'proxy-db (logging-misc, tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_proxy_reject_logging.py
tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_audit_logs_proxy.py ..., 8, loadscope, "", 15)'
Set the job's display name to '${{ matrix.test-group }}' so each check
shows just 'logging-misc', 'proxy-utils-a-h', etc.
Previous run (13.8m total) was bottlenecked by shards with 9-12m wall-clock.
Setup + xdist spawn + coverage teardown is ~3m per shard, so each shard's
pytest runtime must stay under ~4m to fit inside 7m total.
Observed per-shard pytest times (before split):
db-and-spend 9:08 (170s outlier: test_aaaasschema_migration_check)
proxy-server 7:15
logging-and-callbacks 6:45
guardrails-budget-hooks 6:37
proxy-utils 6:23
auth-and-jwt 6:54
Split 6 shards into 12, keeping key-generation and endpoints-and-responses
(already <7m). Adds a `keyword` input to _test-unit-services-base.yml so
test_proxy_utils.py can be split by -k expression (same file, two runners).
New matrix entries:
auth-and-jwt -> auth-checks + jwt-and-keys
proxy-server -> proxy-server-core + proxy-runtime
logging-and-callbacks -> custom-logging + logging-misc
db-and-spend -> schema-migration (isolated 170s test) + db-and-spend
guardrails-budget-hooks-> guardrails-hooks + budgets
proxy-utils -> proxy-utils-a-h + proxy-utils-i-z (-k split)
The -k expression split is verified to cover every one of the 64 test
functions in test_proxy_utils.py exactly once. The assert-shard-coverage
guard still catches any file not in any shard.
The create-branch job in create-release.yml calls the reusable
create-release-branch.yml workflow, which requires contents: write.
The top-level permissions: {} blocks the inherited default, and only
the release job overrode it, so the nested call failed with:
The nested job 'create-branch' is requesting 'contents: write',
but is only allowed 'contents: none'.
Add the permission at the calling job level so the reusable
workflow is granted what it needs.
Two fixes to proxy-db CI:
1. test_realtime_webrtc_endpoints.py's `proxy_app` fixture mutated the
module-global `proxy_server.master_key` without restoring it, leaking
state into any test that shared the same xdist worker. Under
--dist=loadscope with 2 workers (GHA proxy-endpoints), this caused the
google_endpoints tests to fail with "No api key passed in." because
user_api_key_auth saw a set master_key and a missing API key on the
test request. The fixture now saves and restores the original value.
2. Address the Greptile note that the semantic shard design has no
catch-all, so a new test file added to tests/proxy_unit_tests/ without
a matrix entry would silently skip CI. Adds an assert-shard-coverage
job that enumerates test_*.py files and fails the workflow if any are
not referenced by a matrix entry, with a clear message telling the
author which semantic shard to place it in. All proxy-db shards now
depend on this guard.
Split into two related cleanups:
1. Delete CCI jobs that duplicate GHA coverage:
- mcp_testing (tests/mcp_tests) — already run by test-mcp.yml
- litellm_mapped_tests_proxy_part1/part2 (tests/test_litellm/proxy) —
already run across test-unit-proxy-auth.yml, test-unit-proxy-endpoints.yml,
and test-unit-proxy-infra.yml
Add rag_endpoints and realtime_endpoints to test-unit-proxy-endpoints.yml
(they were only covered by the deleted CCI part2 job).
Remove the corresponding workflow wiring, coverage combine entries, and
upload-coverage dependencies in .circleci/config.yml.
2. Re-shard test-unit-proxy-db.yml from 4 alphabetic buckets to 8 semantic
ones (auth-and-jwt, proxy-server, logging-and-callbacks, db-and-spend,
guardrails-budget-hooks, endpoints-and-responses, plus the existing
serial key-generation and test_proxy_utils.py shards). New test files are
placed in whichever group they belong to instead of reshuffling slices.
Add a dist input to _test-unit-services-base.yml so the test_proxy_utils.py
shard can use --dist=worksteal to spread its ~64 (many parametrized)
functions across workers; the default --dist=loadscope pins a single file
to a single worker, which was the root cause of that shard running 10m+.
Extracts release branch creation into a separate reusable workflow
(create-release-branch.yml) that can be triggered independently via
workflow_dispatch or called from other workflows via workflow_call.
create-release.yml now dispatches it as a dependent job after the
release publishes, keeping both workflows decoupled.
Stragglers from the 2026-04-21 Python 3.12 standardization:
- .github/workflows/check_duplicate_issues.yml (was 3.11)
- .github/workflows/llm-translation-testing.yml (was 3.11)
- .github/workflows/scan_duplicate_issues.yml (was 3.13)
- .circleci proxy_build_from_pip_tests (was 3.13)
The only intentional non-3.12 CI job is installing_litellm_on_python_3_13,
which exists as an explicit "latest supported Python" smoke matrix.
Principle: GHA handles work that doesn't need external API keys; CCI
stays for integration tests that hit real API endpoints.
Four CCI jobs moved to new or extended GHA workflows:
1. check_code_and_doc_quality (was 25 runs: ruff + import-safety +
21 code_coverage_tests + 3 documentation_tests + circular-imports).
- The 21 tests/code_coverage_tests/*.py scripts and the 3
tests/documentation_tests/*.py scripts run in the new
.github/workflows/test-code-quality.yml workflow.
- ruff, import-safety, and circular-imports were already run by
.github/workflows/test-linting.yml — no new migration needed.
- The 3 documentation_tests scripts read
docs/my-website/docs/proxy/config_settings.md. Since docs have
moved to BerriAI/litellm-docs, the GHA workflow checks out that
repo and symlinks docs/my-website -> the checkout so the
existing hardcoded paths resolve without touching the scripts.
The stale local docs/my-website/ copy in this repo will be
removed in a separate PR.
2. semgrep (custom-rule SAST against .semgrep/rules).
- New .github/workflows/test-semgrep.yml.
3. installing_litellm_on_python + installing_litellm_on_python_3_13
(pip install compat checks on Python 3.12 and 3.13).
- New .github/workflows/test-install-litellm.yml as a matrix job.
- 3.12 run also verifies litellm_enterprise import; 3.13 run
skips that check (matches previous CCI behavior).
- installing_litellm_on_python_v2_migration_resolver stays in CCI
because it requires a postgres service.
CCI .circleci/config.yml: -112 lines, 4 jobs and their workflow refs
removed.
The "remaining" proxy-db job was consistently timing out at ~98% because
--dist=loadscope pins every test in test_proxy_utils.py (168+ parametrized
tests) to a single xdist worker. 7 workers finished their files in ~15
minutes, then one worker ran alone for another 8+ minutes and hit the
30-minute job cap.
Give test_proxy_utils.py its own matrix entry so its tests spread across
all 8 workers, and add it to the "remaining" ignore list.
Unit Tests: Proxy DB Operations / proxy-db (auth-checks, tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_auth_checks.py tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_user_api_key_auth.py, 20, 8) (push) Has been cancelled
Unit Tests: Proxy DB Operations / proxy-db (remaining, tests/proxy_unit_tests --ignore=tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_key_generate_prisma.py --ignore=tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_auth_checks.py --ignore=tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_user_api_key_auth.py, 30, 8) (push) Has been cancelled
- streaming_iterator.py: adopted main's more defensive version of the
tool-arg queueing check (.get() instead of [], isinstance guard) —
same logic, same behavior, lower crash surface
- model_prices_and_context_window.json + backup: combined staging's
search_context_cost_per_query fields (PR #24372) with main's new
supports_service_tier field — both are independent additions to the
same Gemini model entries
- test_streaming_handler.py: kept Azure streaming regression test
(PR #24354) and added main's two new Gemini legacy vertex
finish_reason normalization tests
- test_gemini_batch_embeddings.py: kept staging's unsupported-params
filtering tests (PR #24370) and added main's index/order test
Resolved conflicts:
- streaming_handler.py: combined role check (PR #24354, Azure streaming)
with reasoning_items check (new in main) — both are independent OR
conditions in is_chunk_non_empty()
- CI/CD: accepted main's versions throughout
- Redis tests migrated to CircleCI (PR #25354): removed enable-redis
from GH Actions workflows
- E2E UI tests restructured (PR #25365): simplified CircleCI job
- Coverage via Codecov added to all GH Actions unit test workflows
- Deleted test-litellm-matrix.yml and test-proxy-e2e-azure-batches.yml
(removed in main)
Required test-unit-* and related workflows only triggered on PRs targeting
main, so feature PRs routed through litellm_internal_staging or
litellm_oss_branch never dispatched the full suite. Branch protection
reported BLOCKED even when CircleCI was green.
Expand pull_request and push branch filters to also match
litellm_internal_staging, litellm_oss_branch, and "litellm_**" (using **
so branch names containing "/" also match).
Unit Tests: Proxy DB Operations / proxy-db (auth-checks, tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_auth_checks.py tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_user_api_key_auth.py, 20, 8) (push) Has been cancelled
Unit Tests: Proxy DB Operations / proxy-db (remaining, tests/proxy_unit_tests --ignore=tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_key_generate_prisma.py --ignore=tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_auth_checks.py --ignore=tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_user_api_key_auth.py, 30, 8) (push) Has been cancelled
Unit Tests: Proxy DB Operations / proxy-db (auth-checks, tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_auth_checks.py tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_user_api_key_auth.py, 20, 8) (push) Waiting to run
Unit Tests: Proxy DB Operations / proxy-db (remaining, tests/proxy_unit_tests --ignore=tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_key_generate_prisma.py --ignore=tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_auth_checks.py --ignore=tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_user_api_key_auth.py, 30, 8) (push) Waiting to run
Adds a GHA that fails PRs to main unless the head branch is
'litellm_internal_staging' or 'litellm_hotfix_*'. Also fails merge_group
events since merge queue is not in use.
- workflow proxy-config matrix: drop test_project*.py glob now that the
test lives under tests/enterprise/
- update uv.lock to match bumped litellm version
- fix mypy: loosen FieldInfo annotation on register_extra_ui_setting
(pydantic.Field stubs report the default's type) and silence
create_model overload resolution when passing **tuple_dict
- fix inline imports in moved test_project_endpoints_prisma.py to
target litellm_enterprise.proxy.management_endpoints.project_endpoints
1. exclude-newer: change from absolute "2026-04-10" to relative "3 days".
All pinned deps were published before the 3-day cutoff. Re-locked so
uv lock --check passes in test-mcp.yml and test-linting.yml.
2. test_eager_tiktoken_load: run all 10 env var values in a single
subprocess instead of spawning 10 separate processes. Each cold
import litellm takes ~78s on CI, so the old loop took ~13 min on a
single xdist worker. Now takes ~78s total.
3. proxy-db remaining timeout: increase from 20 to 30 minutes. The
remaining group has 51 test files and was consistently timing out at
71% across all branches (pre-existing issue, not migration-related).
* build: migrate packaging metadata to uv
* ci: move automation and local tooling to uv
* docker: migrate image builds and runtime setup to uv
* docs: update install and deployment guidance for uv
* chore: align auxiliary scripts and tests with uv
* test: harden test_litellm isolation
* fix: keep release and health check images self-contained
* build: pin uv tooling and health check deps
* test: isolate bedrock image request formatting from suite state
* test: cover sandbox executor requirements flow
* ci: fix circleci no-op command steps
* ci: fix circleci publish workflow parsing
* fix: stabilize remaining uv migration CI checks
* ci: increase matrix test timeout headroom
* fix: restore published docker and license coverage
* fix: restore proxy runtime build parity
* fix: restore proxy extras parity and venv migrations
* ci: persist uv path across circleci steps
* fix: keep psycopg binary in default test env
* docker: preserve prisma cache across stages
* test: run local proxy checks through uv python
* build: restore runtime deps moved into ci
* build: refresh uv lock after upstream merge
* fix: restore module import in test_check_migration after merge
The conflict resolution imported only the function but the test body
references check_migration as a module throughout.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: revert dependency promotions, remove nodejs-wheel-binaries, fix Docker layer caching
- Move google-generativeai, Pillow, tenacity back to ci group (they are
lazily imported and bloat the base SDK install needlessly)
- Remove nodejs-wheel-binaries from extra_proxy and proxy-dev (redundant
in Docker where system Node.js is already installed via apk)
- Remove all nodejs-wheel node replacement and venv npm patching blocks
from Dockerfiles since the wheel is no longer installed
- Add --no-default-groups to CodSpeed benchmark workflow so the benchmark
environment matches the old minimal pip install footprint
- Apply standard uv two-phase Docker pattern: copy metadata first, install
deps (cached layer), then copy source and install project
- Replace CircleCI enterprise no-op with proper uv sync command
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: regenerate uv.lock after removing nodejs-wheel-binaries
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci): use cache/restore instead of cache to prevent cache poisoning
The old workflow used actions/cache/restore (read-only). The uv migration
changed it to actions/cache (read-write), which zizmor flags as a cache
poisoning risk. Restore the safer read-only variant.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci): disable setup-uv built-in cache to silence cache-poisoning alert
The setup-uv action enables caching by default, which zizmor flags as a
cache poisoning risk. Disable it since we already use a read-only
cache/restore step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci): disable setup-uv cache in publish workflow
Silences zizmor cache-poisoning alert. Publishing workflow runs
infrequently on protected branches so caching adds no real benefit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(test): remove duplicate verbose_logger mock in test_check_migration
The logger was patched twice — first via mocker.patch() then via
mocker.patch.object(autospec=True). The second call fails because
autospec cannot inspect an already-mocked attribute. Remove the
redundant first patch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(ci): free disk space before Docker build in test-server-root-path
The Dockerfile.non_root build ran out of disk on the CI runner. Remove
Android SDK, .NET, Boost, and GHC toolchains (~12GB) to free space.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
