* fix: reuse cached credentials in VertexAIPartnerModels instead of creating new VertexLLM per request
VertexAIPartnerModels.completion() was creating a throwaway VertexLLM()
instance on every call to get an access token, bypassing the credential
cache inherited from VertexBase. This caused a fresh token fetch for
every single request, adding significant latency overhead.
Fix: call super().__init__() to initialize VertexBase's credential cache,
and use self._ensure_access_token() instead of a new VertexLLM instance.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: apply same credential caching fix to VertexAIGemmaModels and VertexAIModelGardenModels
Same bug as VertexAIPartnerModels: both classes had `pass` in __init__
instead of `super().__init__()`, and created throwaway VertexLLM()
instances per request instead of using self._ensure_access_token().
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(vertex_ai): single-flight credential refresh to prevent thundering herd
When GCP credentials expire under high concurrency, all requests
simultaneously call credentials.refresh() via asyncify, saturating the
40-thread anyio pool and blocking the proxy for 20+ seconds.
This adds:
- Per-credential asyncio.Lock in get_access_token_async for single-flight
refresh (1 coroutine refreshes, others wait on the lock)
- Background refresh when token_state is STALE (usable but near expiry),
returning the current token immediately with zero added latency
- threading.Lock on the sync get_access_token path
- Uses google-auth's TokenState enum (FRESH/STALE/INVALID) instead of
reimplementing expiry logic
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: address PR review comments
- Use asyncio.create_task() instead of deprecated get_event_loop().create_task()
- Track in-flight background refresh tasks to prevent duplicate refreshes
when multiple STALE-path callers pass through the lock before the first
background task completes
- Add token validation in the STALE branch (consistent with FRESH/INVALID)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: lazy-import TokenState to avoid breaking when google-auth is not installed
Also extract helper methods to bring get_access_token_async under the
PLR0915 statement limit (50).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: apply Black formatting to test file and update uv.lock
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: remove user-provided project_id from log messages (CodeQL log injection)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: avoid leaking token value in error message, log type instead
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore: restore uv.lock to match litellm_oss_branch
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: remove project_id from remaining log message (CodeQL log injection)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: remove remaining project_id from log and error messages
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replace hardcoded _is_claude_4_6_model() string matching with
supports_output_config flag in model_prices_and_context_window.json,
accessed via _supports_factory(). This follows the project's established
pattern for model capability checks (per AGENTS.md rule #8).
Bedrock Invoke now conditionally preserves output_config for models
that declare supports_output_config=true (currently Claude 4.6 models),
while stripping it for older models to avoid request rejection.
Ref: https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/22797
The async/sync delete_response_api_handler always passed json=data into
httpx.delete, where data is {} from the transformer. httpx serializes that
to a 2-byte body. The Azure Responses DELETE endpoint now rejects any
request body with code: unexpected_body, breaking
test_basic_openai_responses_delete_endpoint on the llm_responses_api_testing
job. Build the kwargs dict and only set json= when data is truthy.
Add unit tests that patch httpx.delete and assert json/data are not in the
captured kwargs for the Azure DELETE path (sync and async).
The proxy's ingress hardening (commit 842eea0131) now strips client-supplied
`mock_response` from the request body unless the calling key or team has the
`allow_client_mock_response: true` admin-metadata flag set. The e2e model
access tests rely on `mock_response` to short-circuit the LLM call, so without
the flag they hit real backends — the bedrock wildcard route fakes out to a
shared example endpoint that now 404s on unsupported paths, causing
`test_model_access_patterns[key_models2-bedrock/anthropic.claude-3-True]`
(and the bedrock/anthropic.* row that pytest -x never reaches) to fail.
Set `allow_client_mock_response: true` on every key and team this test file
provisions so `mock_response` is preserved end-to-end.
Cover the full litellm.rerank()/arerank() path with HTTP mocked, asserting
metadata.requester_metadata reaches the Discovery Engine :rank body as
userLabels (and stays absent when no metadata is set). Catches plumbing
regressions that unit tests on transform_rerank_request alone would miss.
The wrapper had no production callers after transform_parsed_response
was refactored to call _resolve_json_mode_non_streaming directly.
Updated the parametrized test to call the underlying method.
Two Greptile P2s addressed:
1. (security) The audit-log row for an ``add_team_callbacks`` call would
serialize the entire ``callback_vars`` block — including
``langfuse_secret_key``, ``langsmith_api_key``, and the GCS service
account path — verbatim into ``LiteLLM_AuditLogs``. Anyone with read
access to the audit table could harvest team callback credentials.
Same risk for ``disable_team_logging`` when the team's existing row
has populated ``callback_settings.callback_vars``.
Add ``_redact_callback_secrets``: deep-copies the metadata snapshot
and replaces every ``callback_vars`` value with ``***REDACTED***``.
The keys are kept so an auditor can still see *which* fields
changed. Applied to both before and after snapshots.
2. ``asyncio.create_task`` is fire-and-forget; if the audit-log write
raises (transient DB error etc.) the exception is silently
discarded by the event loop and the audit row is just missing —
the exact gap this PR is closing. Attach a ``done_callback`` that
logs the exception at warning level via ``verbose_proxy_logger`` so
the operator sees there's a gap.
Tests assert that callback values are not present in the serialized
audit payload (both for ``add_team_callbacks`` and for
``disable_team_logging`` when the team's existing row has
populated secrets).
The two mutating endpoints in team_callback_endpoints.py
(``/team/{id}/callback`` POST and ``/team/{id}/disable_logging``) wrote
team metadata without emitting an audit-log row. The disable variant
is the worst case: a logging-control action that itself isn't logged,
so an admin (or compromised admin) could zero out a team's
observability with no forensic trail.
Add ``_emit_team_callback_audit_log`` mirroring the
``store_audit_logs``-gated pattern already used in team_endpoints.py
for /team/new and /team/update. When ``litellm.store_audit_logs`` is
True, both endpoints now emit an ``LiteLLM_AuditLogs`` row capturing
the calling user, the API key, and the before/after team metadata.
When the flag is False the helper is a no-op, so non-Enterprise
deployments are unaffected.
The ``litellm_changed_by`` header is now also accepted on
``/team/{id}/disable_logging`` to match the existing
``add_team_callbacks`` shape; the header is optional so existing
callers are unaffected.
Variant scope: the file has three endpoints — both mutating variants
are now logged. The read-only ``GET /team/{id}/callback`` is unchanged.
Other unlogged callback / logging-control admin endpoints elsewhere in
the proxy (e.g. ``/cache/settings``, ``/config_overrides/hashicorp_vault``)
are out of scope here and would be addressed in a separate PR.
Tests cover both endpoints in both ``store_audit_logs`` states and
verify that the captured before/after metadata reflects the actual
mutation, plus that the ``litellm-changed-by`` header overrides the
auth user_id when supplied.
