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191 commits
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d1cfe17518
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feat(mcp): add portable catalog pagination (#44446)
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* feat(mcp): add portable authorized catalog pagination * fix(mcp): preserve routing and isolation across catalog pages * fix(mcp): preserve bare calls after complete catalog pages * test(mcp): verify bare calls with cached database catalog revisions * test(mcp): cover refreshed authority and failed catalog continuations * refactor(mcp): narrow pagination interfaces and preserve listed metadata * fix(mcp): publish listed metadata only after successful pagination * fix(mcp): defer bare routes until aggregate listing succeeds * fix(mcp): refresh key access groups on catalog pages * fix(mcp): accept read-only optional catalog headers * fix(mcp): preserve consolidated listing metadata after restack * fix(mcp): propagate unexpected catalog continuation failures * fix(mcp): preserve key grants when a user record is absent --------- Co-authored-by: Joshua Valluru <326636767+joshua-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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950da7c2ec
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fix(mcp): keep worker MCP configurations consistent via a catalog revision (#42568)
* fix(mcp): refresh server catalog for each gateway operation * fix(mcp): reject configuration changes during scoped dispatch * fix(mcp): refresh shared catalog state for each operation * fix(mcp): refresh catalog before native alias routing * docs(mcp): clarify native route resolution order * test(mcp): align streaming fixture and generated API documentation * fix(mcp): preserve discovery published during catalog refresh * fix(mcp): coalesce queued catalog reads without a stale window * fix(mcp): reconcile concurrent route changes when publishing catalog * test(mcp): provide catalog scope in post-call hook fixtures * fix(mcp): retain valid live routes and handlers during refresh * fix(mcp): keep refreshed OpenAPI operation membership authoritative * test(mcp): preserve logging fixtures after catalog integration * fix(mcp): isolate transport test admission state and exhaust OAuth outcomes * refactor(mcp): narrow catalog consistency change to ticket scope Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(mcp): gate catalog refresh on a database revision marker Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(mcp): refresh waiters that observed a newer catalog revision Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test(mcp): awaitable catalog revision doubles in prisma mocks Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(mcp): satisfy catalog refresh lint and type gates * test(mcp): provide catalog scope in toolset fixtures * test(mcp): exercise temporary OAuth through catalog operations * fix(mcp): share active catalog snapshots across discovery tasks * fix(mcp): retain discovered routes across cached catalog operations * fix(mcp): preserve local tool ownership across discovery * refactor(mcp): satisfy tightened immutability lint ceiling Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(mcp): authorize local handlers by registered server ownership * fix(mcp): check registered handler freshness and isolate fixtures * fix(mcp): read catalog revisions and snapshots from the writer * fix(mcp): resolve access groups from the operation catalog * fix(mcp): preserve empty access group restrictions * fix(mcp): retain rediscovered routes across concurrent updates * fix(mcp): enforce registered ownership for local tool dispatch * fix(mcp): preserve issuer discovery across catalog snapshots --------- Co-authored-by: Joshua Valluru <326636767+joshua-berri@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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47afd1ba0b
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test: fix shared-provider discovery, Codex catalog size and generated master key mismatches in CircleCI suites (#44905)
* test(integration): isolate Codex catalog and provider discovery fixtures Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test(integration): keep model discovery constant import-safe Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: align test keys and CI env with generated master keys Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: mateo <mateo@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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c3a23fe499
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refactor: expose core private helpers under public names (#44871)
* refactor: expose core private symbols with compatibility aliases Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * types: narrow core migration diagnostics Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: preserve runtime behavior in core symbol migration Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: preserve core private usage migration behavior Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: preserve private value rebinding compatibility Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: restore optional imports and cover public helpers Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: exempt router property from call coverage Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: align recursive detector ignore names Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: mateo <mateo@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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837c6a7481
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fix(security): remove the publicly known master key from the repo (#44718)
* fix(security): hash the publicly known master key Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * docs: replace weak master key examples and regenerate artifacts Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: replace weak key fixtures with generated test keys Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * ci: generate master keys for proxy startup Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: preserve lens dev key entropy Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: restore proxy key compatibility in scrub examples Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: scrub merged SSO fixture and refresh dashboard bundle Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(ci): stabilize test keys and metadata collection Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * chore: drop the rebuilt dashboard bundle Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: mateo <mateo@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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0ea166c160
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fix(mcp): preserve upstream tool schemas and parameter headers (#44425)
* fix(mcp): preserve tool schemas and modern parameter headers * fix(mcp): allow bounded cold schema worker startup * fix(mcp): align catalog deadlines and bound schema traversal --------- Co-authored-by: Joshua Valluru <326636767+joshua-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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2b85808011
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feat(mcp)!: disable stdio MCP servers by default (#44066)
* feat(mcp)!: disable stdio MCP servers by default stdio MCP servers now only run when the proxy is started with LITELLM_ENABLE_MCP_STDIO=true. While it is off, existing stdio servers stay registered but never start: tool listings skip them quietly, direct tool calls and health checks return a 403 naming the env var, and creating or updating a stdio server is rejected. The flag is read from the process environment only, so DB-stored environment_variables cannot turn it on. The UI reads mcp_stdio_enabled from /.well-known/litellm-ui-config to grey out the stdio transport, show a banner on stdio forms, and badge stdio server cards. BREAKING CHANGE: stdio MCP servers are off by default. Set LITELLM_ENABLE_MCP_STDIO=true in the proxy environment and restart to keep using them. * fix(mcp): ignore stdio flag from config file and read UI flag from the selected worker LITELLM_ENABLE_MCP_STDIO set under environment_variables in config.yaml is now skipped like the DB-stored value, so only the process environment can enable stdio. The dashboard reads mcp_stdio_enabled from the proxy it is managing, so a control plane shows each worker's own setting. * test(mcp): cover non-mapping payloads in the shared transport validator * fix(mcp): skip blocked stdio servers quietly in every listing and keep the UI unchanged until the flag loads Prompt, resource and resource-template listings now skip a blocked stdio server at debug level like tool listing does, instead of logging a warning per server on every call. The dashboard only treats stdio as disabled once the proxy explicitly reports mcp_stdio_enabled false, so a proxy with the flag on, or an older one without the field, renders exactly as before with no flicker while loading. * fix(mcp): route blocked stdio tool calls to the flag error and warn once per server A gateway tools/call naming a blocked stdio server's tool now returns the LITELLM_ENABLE_MCP_STDIO message instead of "Tool not found". The "will not start" warning moves out of build_mcp_server_from_table, which DB reload re-runs on every cycle for rows with a NULL updated_at and which drafts and test-connection also call. It now fires when a row first enters the registry or changes transport. * fix(ui): explain on the server detail page why a stdio server is inert The Overview and MCP Tools tabs showed "No tools available" with no reason while stdio is disabled. The detail page now shows the same warning banner as the edit form, and hands off to the form's banner once editing starts. * refactor(ui): name the stdio banner conditions on the server detail page Keeps local/no-long-condition-chain within its budget * fix(proxy): log the ignored DB-stored LITELLM_ENABLE_MCP_STDIO warning once The DB config sync re-reads environment_variables on every cycle, so a stored flag logged the warning on each sync per worker |
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ba77646991
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ci: move provider-independent MCP tests into tests/unit and run mcp-integration from litellm-tests (#42904)
* ci: fix the litellm-tests unit job with sysmon coverage, an env allowlist and coverage upload on failure * test: replace key-dependent proxy, enterprise and mcp unit tests with synthetic values and integration and e2e coverage * test: drop key reads at the legacy proxy, enterprise and mcp paths and wire the gemini pass-through split * ci: move caching, proxy-extras, gateway and enterprise tests into tests/unit and run them from litellm-tests under their legacy flags * ci: move caching, proxy-extras, gateway and enterprise tests into tests/unit and run them from litellm-tests under their legacy flags * ci: move tests/proxy_unit_tests to tests/unit/proxy and run the proxy-db shards from litellm-tests * ci: move provider-independent MCP tests into tests/unit and run mcp-integration from litellm-tests * ci: fail the unit shard when circleci tests split errors * test: drop restating comments from the gemini pass-through split * build: point the local proxy unit targets at the nested tests/unit/proxy tree * ci: exit the unit shard cleanly when circleci tests split assigns it no files --------- Co-authored-by: yuneng <yuneng@berri.ai> |
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b72a030501
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test: take keys out of the legacy proxy, enterprise and mcp unit tests before moving them (#42901)
* ci: fix the litellm-tests unit job with sysmon coverage, an env allowlist and coverage upload on failure * test: replace key-dependent proxy, enterprise and mcp unit tests with synthetic values and integration and e2e coverage * test: drop key reads at the legacy proxy, enterprise and mcp paths and wire the gemini pass-through split * ci: fail the unit shard when circleci tests split errors * test: drop restating comments from the gemini pass-through split * ci: exit the unit shard cleanly when circleci tests split assigns it no files --------- Co-authored-by: yuneng <yuneng@berri.ai> |
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7210403e23
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fix(mcp): apply post-call rewrites without stale structured output (#41530)
* fix(mcp): apply async_post_mcp_tool_call_hook content changes to the tool result Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(mcp): drop structuredContent when a post-call hook rewrites tool content Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(mcp): satisfy type discipline and result contract Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test(mcp): document internal logging patch Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(mcp): avoid Final assignments inside callback loops Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(mcp): run every post-call hook and chain the rewritten content Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * chore(mcp): credit the original fix from #33403 Co-authored-by: eric <mitrecx@163.com> Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test(mcp): cover post-call logging fallback paths Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test(mcp): cover proxy hook logging context Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(mcp): preserve native structured guardrail replacements * fix(mcp): invalidate stale structure after direct content edits * fix(mcp): reconcile direct edits after callback exceptions * fix(mcp): preserve successful in-place callback rewrites --------- Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: eric <mitrecx@163.com> Co-authored-by: Joshua Valluru <326636767+joshua-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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0d0f73cd14
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fix(mcp): restore legacy SSE and bounded cancellation cleanup (#42382)
* fix(mcp): restore legacy SSE and bounded cancellation cleanup * fix(mcp): drain termination despite repeated task cancellation * fix(mcp): admit virtual keys on legacy SSE message routes * fix(mcp): preserve cancellation through late transport failures * fix(mcp): preserve process exits during cleanup * test(mcp): drain idle sockets before server shutdown --------- Co-authored-by: Joshua Valluru <326636767+joshua-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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9002749e29 | fix(mcp): preserve Python 3.10 imports and integration test seams | ||
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b6dd3d932c
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Merge pull request #42019 from BerriAI/litellm_master_key_boot_enforcement
feat(proxy)!: refuse to start with an unset, empty, or publicly known master key |
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ecf17513fb | refactor(proxy): rename the local development override to dangerously_permit_weak_or_unset_master_key so the name says exactly what it permits | ||
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479360ae87 | test(mcp): restore scoped execution and credential isolation regressions | ||
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57c757e9d7
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Revert "test(mcp): verify scoped execution and OAuth credential isolation" | ||
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3c9c860de7 | test(proxy): set the unsafe-proxy override at the remaining test boot sites and isolate the boot test from a leaked scheduler | ||
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e0b6bae516 | test(mcp): cover scoped execution and OAuth credential isolation | ||
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6f74aa80c0 | chore: merge main into MCP regression coverage branch | ||
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aea13ee03b | fix(mcp): preserve legacy behavior on SDK2 and streamline verification | ||
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7410d00d2e |
merge(main): resolve mcp server.py import conflict and relock
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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0d2963fe89 |
test(mcp): update MCP suites for SDK2 handler signatures and ctx var
Call handlers with ServerRequestContext and params models, seed the litellm contextvar instead of the removed SDK request_ctx, forward headers/auth through the httpx2 MockTransport factory, and add regressions for handler registration, context propagation, and modern protocol-version rejection. Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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545bbeb001 |
test(mcp): update MCP suites for SDK 2 APIs
Rename McpError/isError/inputSchema-style references to the SDK 2 spellings, parse the JSONRPCMessage union with a TypeAdapter, and drive the SDK transports off httpx2 MockTransport injection where respx can no longer intercept. Adjust for SDK 2 behavior: the initialize handshake negotiates handshake-era protocol versions only, an empty SSE stream surfaces CONNECTION_CLOSED, non-2xx tool responses surface INTERNAL_ERROR MCPError instead of HTTPStatusError, and the SDK read timeout carries the JSON-RPC REQUEST_TIMEOUT code. Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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ce48a3fbcc |
test(mcp): give the new cache and tombstone patches TQ008 reasons and match the keyword eviction call
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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15b45839e1 | test(mcp): enforce security regression contracts through live gateway | ||
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c59fc6dc28
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fix(mcp): reject initialize with 403 when the key grants no MCP servers (#40616)
* fix(mcp): reject initialize with 403 when the key grants no MCP servers Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test(mcp): e2e expects 403 initialize for a key with no MCP servers Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(mcp): mention IP filtering in the no-servers initialize denial and keep zero-grant tool coverage Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: mateo <mateo@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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902dd7b2b6
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fix(mcp): log proxy tool dispatch exceptions (#40351) | ||
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1a9c6ce390
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fix(mcp): preserve proxy logging and authorization coverage (#40337)
* test(mcp): exercise /mcp/proxy authorization against the real registry instead of patched manager methods * fix(mcp): preserve proxy logging and authorization coverage * test(mcp): respect the proxy FastAPI import boundary |
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754a2afe12
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feat(mcp): add schema discovery proxy mode (#40298) | ||
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7256bd307a
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fix(mcp): scope allow-all servers to virtual keys (#39531) | ||
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5767a2da0f
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fix(mcp): follow tools/list pagination from upstream servers (#39172)
* fix(mcp): follow tools/list pagination from upstream servers Adopts BerriAI/litellm#32244 by Jupiter363 onto litellm_internal_staging with merge conflicts resolved * fix(mcp): degrade buggy pagination to partial results and bound the preview walk A repeated nextCursor now returns the tools collected so far instead of discarding every page with a RuntimeError, an empty-string cursor is treated as terminal, load_mcp_tools shares the same pagination walk instead of returning only the first page, and the tools/list preview is bounded by the listing timeout instead of only the per-request timeout times the page cap * fix(mcp): annotate deliberate rebind for the preview timeout scope * fix(mcp): bound the shared pagination walk with an overall listing deadline The per-request session read timeout restarts on every page, so direct SDK callers of list_tools and load_mcp_tools could run up to the page cap with no overall bound. The walk now returns the tools collected so far when max(MCP_CLIENT_TIMEOUT, MCP_TOOL_LISTING_TIMEOUT) expires * fix(mcp): let a per-server timeout extend the pagination deadline MCPClient carries a per-server timeout that can exceed the global default; list_tools now passes max(self.timeout, MCP_TOOL_LISTING_TIMEOUT) into the shared walk so a deliberately slow server is not silently truncated at the global deadline * fix(mcp): honor per-server timeouts in the preview deadline and test the walk sessionless The preview deadline now extends with the created client's own timeout, and the pagination walk's cap, repeated-cursor, and empty-cursor cases are tested directly against the helper instead of through patched SDK internals * fix(mcp): forward the preview request's per-server timeout to the temporary server model The tools preview built its temporary MCPServer without the request's timeout field, so the client factory always fell back to the global default and a per-server timeout could never extend the preview's listing deadline (or its per-request timeout). |
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09ff5bf6cd | Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/litellm_internal_staging' into litellm_deflake_20260821 | ||
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c3bcb6f64f
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test(mcp): drain the logging worker after each test so queued callbacks cannot leak into the next test (#38228)
LoggingWorker now carries still-queued coroutines onto the next event loop (
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bb27bfd9a7
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fix(http_handler): dispose aiohttp session when AsyncHTTPHandler is finalized without a running loop (#36670)
* fix(http_handler): dispose aiohttp session when finalized without a running loop AsyncHTTPHandler.__del__ can only schedule an async close when a running event loop exists at finalization time; in any other context (worker threads whose loop has closed, sync contexts, interpreter shutdown) the RuntimeError from get_running_loop() is swallowed and the underlying aiohttp ClientSession is abandoned to GC, emitting 'Unclosed client session' / 'Unclosed connector' warnings. This is the disposal gap left after the recycle-time fix: clients created for short-lived event loops (the loop-id-keyed LLM client cache mints one handler per loop) are never recycled - they live and die with their loop, and their finalization is precisely the loop-less case. Fix: - no running loop: fall back to the connector's synchronous teardown via LiteLLMAiohttpTransport._mark_connector_closed - the same finalizer-safe path used for dead-loop recycles - honoring _owns_session so a shared session is never closed. - running loop: keep the async close, but hold a strong reference to the scheduled task until it completes (a bare create_task() result may be collected before running), mirroring _background_close_tasks. Tests: loop-less finalization closes a dead-loop session; running-loop finalization registers and drains the close task; the sync fallback respects session ownership. All three fail without the fix. * lint: conform new finalizer code to the type-discipline budget Final on the five never-rebound locals (LIT010); the class-level task registry keeps its mutable set with the sanctioned mutable-ok reason, mirroring the aiohttp transport's registry (LIT001). * lint: reasoned pyright ignore on the cross-class teardown call The handler deliberately reuses the transport's finalizer-safe connector teardown; no public seam exists and an async close can never run at loop-less finalization. Clears the net-new reportPrivateUsage the basedpyright budget gate flagged once the LIT stage passed. * fix(http_handler): retrieve exceptions from finalizer close tasks A bare discard done-callback dropped the task without consuming its exception, so a failing aclose() emitted "Task exception was never retrieved" at GC, the same noise class this path exists to remove. Mirror the transport's _on_close_task_done: discard, early-return on cancellation, retrieve and debug-log the exception. * fix(http_handler): dispose foreign-loop sessions instead of scheduling aclose on the live loop GC on a live loop (e.g. the app's) of a handler whose session belongs to another, possibly dead, loop scheduled aclose() on the current loop, the cross-loop path the transport refuses. Route both that case and the loop-less case through the transport's lifecycle-aware _close_recycled_session, which picks async close on the session's own loop, threadsafe handoff, or the synchronous connector teardown. Regression test: a dead-loop session collected while another loop runs is disposed without scheduling anything on that loop. * chore: retrigger CI (test_mcp_logging payload-order flake, also failed on litellm_spendlogs_fallback_metadata minutes earlier) * test(mcp): select the MCP tool-call payload instead of the last-delivered one TestMCPLogger kept a single last-writer slot; an async success event from another call (a mocked acompletion whose log task lands late) races the MCP event for it, so the cost assertions intermittently read the wrong payload. This PR's finalizer change shifts task interleaving on the loop and tips that latent race over (also seen on an unrelated PR minutes earlier). Collect call_type=call_mcp_tool payloads in their own list and assert on those. * test(mcp): MCPLoggerHook inherits the order-independent payload capture It duplicated TestMCPLogger's init and success handler verbatim; the hook test reads the same MCP payload selection, so subclass instead. |
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54ea379c91 |
fix(tests): drain the logging worker queue between MCP tests
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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6a0d03914c
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test: drop the cwd-relative sys.path.insert calls from the test suite (#37802)
* test: drop the cwd-relative sys.path.insert calls from the test suite
TQ003 stands at 1,077 across 1,058 files, and 1,015 of them are the same shape:
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath("../..")) and its deeper siblings. The
argument resolves against the working directory rather than the file, so from
the repo root, where every job runs pytest, it inserts the directory two levels
above the checkout. It has never pointed at litellm. The package is installed
into the environment anyway, which is what actually makes the import work, and
what the rule's message has said all along.
Removing them leaves 1,634 imports of sys and os with no remaining reference,
and those go too, except where another test module imports the name back out of
the file. The rest of TQ003 is 62 call sites that resolve against __file__ or a
variable, which are a different question and are left alone.
Collection is identical either way: 45,871 tests and the same 51 pre-existing
collection errors before and after, and ruff reports no new undefined name.
* test: drop the duplicate imports the sys.path sweep exposed to F811
* test(pre-call-utils): restore the os import the new bedrock tests need
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e9d40a8f73 |
test: enforce F811 so a duplicate definition cannot silently replace the first
A name bound twice keeps only the second binding. In `tests/` that is nearly always a repeated import, harmless but misleading, and the same rule is what catches the cases that are not harmless: a local that shadows an import the module still calls, and a second `def test_x` that quietly replaces the first. 311 of the 344 sites were repeated imports and came out with ruff's own fix. The remaining 33 needed a decision. Four modules imported a name they never used because a local definition below already shadowed it. Two comprehensions bound `call` over `unittest.mock.call`, which those modules import and use. One test rebound the two module handles its nested reload closure had captured. One class attribute shadowed an unused `status` import. The load-test fixtures move to a conftest, which is how pytest is meant to share them, so the test module no longer imports three fixture names it never calls. The nine `prisma_client` parameters keep a narrow `noqa`: pytest resolves that fixture by name before the body runs, so the parameter never shadows anything. |
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21e9632713
|
test: add six ruff rules that catch tests which cannot fail (#37709)
`assert False` inside a `try:` raises AssertionError, which the `except Exception` right below it catches, so several tests reported green no matter what the code did. `pytest.fail` raises Failed, a BaseException, and escapes. A bare `a == b` statement is evaluated and discarded. Nine of those sat in tests, and one was comparing against a model name the router never produces. Selects B011, B015, B018, PT015, PLR0133 and PLW0127 in ruff-tests.toml alongside F821, with all 50 existing violations fixed, so no budget file or ratchet is needed. CI already runs this config over tests/. |
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33a92bd48f |
fix(mcp): keep REST tool listing in step with key/team grant enforcement
The REST listing filter matched key/team grants through _tool_name_matches, which after the prefix-boundary change answers for every spelling routing accepts. Key-level entries in mcp_tool_permissions and toolset rows name a tool on one server and dispatch compares them bare, so a wire-form entry advertised a tool that tools/call then refused. REST listing now goes through filter_tools_by_key_team_permissions, the same function the MCP list path uses. Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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7be3ddd0ff |
fix(mcp): recover the tool-name prefix boundary from registered prefixes
The gateway publishes a tool as `<server prefix><separator><tool name>` and has to recover that boundary on the way back in, to compare a called name against a toolset or allow/deny list and to rebuild the native name sent upstream. Several sites recovered it by cutting at the FIRST separator and others reconstructed it by hand from `MCPServer.name` with a literal `-`, so both disagreed with the prefix the server actually publishes `get_server_prefix` publishes short_prefix, then alias, then server_name, then server_id; it never reads `name`. A server with no alias therefore publishes its hyphen-filled UUID `server_id` as the prefix, and cutting at the first separator leaves most of the UUID glued to the tool name. Every comparison against the stored `(server_id, tool_name)` toolset row then misses: an allowlist denies a tool the list endpoint just advertised, and a disallowed entry stops blocking, which fails open Recover the boundary in one place instead. `match_known_server_prefix` matches a name against the server's registered prefixes, longest first so a prefix that itself contains the separator beats a shorter prefix that is merely its leading segment, and returns None when the name carries none of them. `strip_known_server_prefix` and `is_tool_name_prefixed` both delegate to it, and the sites that receive a wire name call the owner rather than re-deriving the boundary. `split_server_prefix_from_name` stays for the routing pair it was written for, with a docstring saying so The server-level permission checks are the other half. They run after the boundary is already resolved, so their input is bare and the correction there is to derive the wire form rather than strip it back out; stripping a stored entry a second time cuts a boundary the caller already consumed, which breaks a native name that itself opens with the server prefix. Deriving from `get_server_prefix` alone is not enough either, because routing resolves an inbound name against every prefix from `iter_known_server_prefixes`, so enforcement keyed to the published spelling answers for fewer names than are reachable. Turning `LITELLM_USE_SHORT_MCP_TOOL_PREFIX` on republishes every tool under the short ID while an entry stored under the alias stays routable and silently stops being enforced, which is a fail-open on a config nobody edited. `iter_known_tool_name_spellings` yields the bare name plus the wire form under each accepted prefix, and the allow list, the deny list, `allowed_params` and the routing map that `_create_prefixed_tools` builds now all key off that one function, so the set of names enforcement honors and the set routing accepts cannot drift apart `_tool_name_matches` takes the server as a required argument, so a future caller cannot silently fall back to guessing, and it matches against that same spelling set, so `tools/list` hides exactly what dispatch refuses. Answering for fewer spellings in the filter than enforcement honors leaves a blocked tool advertised, which is how the alias-form entry above stayed listed even once the call was refused. The OpenAPI registry lookup builds its key the same way registration does, via `add_server_prefix_to_name` and `get_server_prefix`, because registration used exactly one key; a server whose `name` differs from its published prefix stops missing its own tools |
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43e4af73f0
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Merge pull request #33631 from BerriAI/litellm_lit4517_messages_mcp_gateway
feat(mcp): support MCP servers on the Anthropic /v1/messages API |
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89c87ae59a
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test(e2e): mcp suite for key-without-access denial (#33752)
Add an e2e suite at tests/e2e/mcp/ that proves MCP authorization over the api_key auth family. An admin registers an upstream MCP server through the management API (POST /v1/mcp/server, persisted in the DB and picked up without a restart) and queues its deletion. Two keys are created against that one server: one granted access through object_permission.mcp_servers and one with no MCP grant. The permitted key is a live control proving the upstream is reachable and the tool is callable, so a denial on the ungranted key is an authorization decision rather than a dead server. The denied key then sees none of the server's tools on tools/list and is refused a tools/call with a 403 access_denied. A deterministic self-hosted FastMCP upstream (add/multiply over streamable-http) is added to the e2e compose stack so the suite runs offline with a known tool set. KeyGenerateBody gains an optional typed object_permission so the shared gateway can create a key with an MCP grant. |
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cf23df9431 |
fix(mcp): require every reference to opt in before auto-executing tools
_should_auto_execute_tools returned True as soon as any MCP reference set require_approval="never", so a request that mixed a "never" reference with an "always" or "manual" one auto-executed every tool call the model produced, including the approval-gated ones. A prompt could name the approval-required tool and have it run with no approval. Make the gate fail closed: auto-execute only when every reference opts in with "never". A single approval-required reference (including the object form or an unset value) returns the model's tool calls to the caller instead of running them, so an approval-gated tool can never be auto-invoked. This is the shared decision behind /chat/completions, /responses, the streaming iterator and the new /v1/messages path, so all four fail closed from one change. The common case, every reference "never", is unchanged. The alternative, executing the "never" calls and returning only the approval-required ones, needs partial execution that the Anthropic tool loop cannot express without fabricating tool_result blocks for the calls it withheld, so the whole-request fail-closed gate is the safe minimum. A future change can add per-call partial execution if a caller needs it. Test covers the mixed and manual cases; reverting to "any never" fails it. |
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f776ea7f9b |
feat(mcp): per-server outcomes for aggregate tools/list and truthful single-server REST statuses
The aggregate MCP tools/list absorbed every per-server failure (upstream 401/403/5xx, timeouts,
network errors) into that server contributing zero tools, making a broken upstream indistinguishable
from a healthy server with no tools; the single-server REST list masked the same failures as
{"tools": [], "error": null, "message": "Successfully retrieved tools"}
Phase 2 of the MCP error-handling framework (LIT-4419): the manager fetch hops now raise a
classified MCPServerListError (faults/list_outcomes.py: total classifier, frozen outcome values)
instead of returning [], and each boundary applies the relay-vs-absorb policy matrix. The aggregate
keeps serving the healthy subset but records each server's outcome, surfaced on the tools/list
result _meta under litellm.ai/server_outcomes (the SDK passes a ListToolsResult through unwrapped)
and in spend logs as per_server_list_outcomes. Single-server REST requests relay truthful statuses
(unreachable/upstream_error 502, timeout 504, internal 500) and access denials now surface as real
403s instead of 200 unexpected_error bodies; upstream 403s surface through MCPUpstreamAuthError
like 401s. Outcome wire values carry category and status code only, never upstream prose
Resolves LIT-4421
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db2402754a
|
feat(mcp): let users select the entra_obo token_exchange profile in the UI and API (#32144)
* feat(mcp): let users select the entra_obo token_exchange profile in the UI and API
The backend token_exchange arm supports two wire dialects via token_exchange_profile
("rfc8693" default, or "entra_obo" for Microsoft Entra's On-Behalf-Of, the RFC 7523
jwt-bearer grant), but it could only be set through config.yaml. This surfaces it to the
create/update REST API and the dashboard so an admin can create an entra_obo server there,
completing the parity started in the parent PR for the other token-exchange fields.
token_exchange_profile becomes a dedicated column on LiteLLM_MCPServerTable, mirroring the
sibling fields: it is added to the request models, read column-first in
build_mcp_server_from_table with the credentials-blob as a back-compat fallback and a
default of rfc8693, and carried through both runtime-to-table builders so registry
round-trips preserve it. It is a non-secret dialect selector, so it is not scrubbed from
non-admin or virtual-key responses.
In the dashboard a Profile dropdown (RFC 8693 vs Microsoft Entra OBO) is added to the
token-exchange section. Entra OBO carries the target resource in the scope, so selecting it
makes the scope required and hints the api://<app-id>/.default form, while audience and
subject_token_type (which that dialect ignores) are hidden.
* fix(mcp): extend the blob-to-column lift and non-admin scrubbing to token_exchange_profile
token_exchange_profile gets the same storage contract as the other three
token-exchange settings: the column is authoritative, a blob copy is the legacy
shape — lifted into the column on every write and stripped from the stored
blob — and switching auth_type away from token exchange clears it
(_AUTH_FLOW_SCOPED_FIELDS). Both restricted-view sanitizers scrub it for
uniformity, and the edit form's auth-switch payload nulling includes it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(mcp): assert every token-exchange setting is configurable via config.yaml
Pins the config surface: token_exchange_endpoint, audience, subject_token_type
and token_exchange_profile load from top-level config keys onto the built
server and through to the resolver spec; omitted keys resolve to their
documented defaults (RFC 8693 subject token type, rfc8693 profile), and
token_exchange servers need no oauth2_flow.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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ff6dc33291
|
feat(mcp): support oauth2_token_exchange auth type via REST API and dashboard (#31772)
* feat(mcp): support oauth2_token_exchange auth type via REST API and dashboard OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange (RFC 8693, a.k.a. OBO) for MCP servers could previously only be configured through config.yaml; the create/update REST API and the dashboard had no way to express it. This wires token_exchange_endpoint, audience, and subject_token_type end to end. These three are persisted as dedicated columns on LiteLLM_MCPServerTable, mirroring how token_url and oauth2_flow are stored, so the edit form prefills them and they are unaffected by the credentials-blob clearing on auth_type change. build_mcp_server_from_table reads the columns first and falls back to the credentials blob so servers persisted before the columns existed still load. client_id and client_secret continue to ride the existing encrypted credentials path. On the dashboard, "OAuth Token Exchange (OBO)" is a distinct auth-type option with its own field section. The McpOAuthMode classifier gains a token_exchange arm keyed off auth_type; the previous catch-all oauth2 mode was renamed from "obo" to "authorization_code" so the two on-behalf-of mechanisms are no longer conflated. The token-exchange IdP endpoint and audience are scrubbed from non-admin and virtual-key responses, matching how token_url is treated. * fix(ui): gate the MCP list-401 re-auth on authorization_code, not token_exchange The renamed 401 gate keyed off isTokenExchange, but that condition exists for authorization_code: when a stored per-user credential is present yet the tools/list 401s (the backend's refresh could not mint a token), the user must re-authorize via the browser flow. token_exchange has no gateway-side authorize step, so the Authorize gate never applied to it. The prior isObo flag was undefined (a compile error) and, per this file's convention and its tests, meant authorization_code; renaming it to isTokenExchange changed the behavior and broke the mcp_tools auth-gate test for an authorization_code server whose token expired with no usable refresh. Gate on isAuthorizationCode instead and drop the now-unused isTokenExchange * fix(mcp): clear flow-scoped endpoint config when a server's auth_type changes Switching an existing oauth2 server to oauth2_token_exchange left the old flow's token_url on the row. The OBO resolver treats token_exchange_endpoint or token_url as the configured exchange endpoint, so the stale value both suppressed the RFC 9728/8414 discovery this PR adds and sent the exchange grant (client credentials plus the user's subject token) to the previous flow's token endpoint update_mcp_server now mirrors its existing stale-credentials rule for the flow-scoped columns (authorization_url, token_url, registration_url, oauth2_flow, token_exchange_endpoint, audience, subject_token_type): when auth_type changes, each one is cleared unless the same request explicitly provides it, so a deliberate override in the switch request still wins. Updates that keep the auth_type never touch these columns, which keeps legacy OBO rows that use token_url as their exchange endpoint working The edit form sends explicit nulls for the previous flow's fields on an auth type switch; antd preserves unmounted field values by default, so without this the old token_url would be re-sent verbatim and read as an explicit override. Transitions are detected against the persisted auth_type, so saves that keep the auth type send nothing extra Reported by Cursor Bugbot on the PR * fix(mcp): lift legacy blob token-exchange settings into their columns on every write The three token-exchange settings live in dedicated columns but also exist on MCPCredentials as the pre-column REST shape. Writes now lift incoming blob values into the columns (an explicit top-level value wins, including an explicit null) and strip them from the stored blob; the same-auth credentials merge migrates legacy rows the same way. The read-time column-or-blob fallback then only ever serves rows current code has never written, so clearing a column to re-enable RFC 9728/8414 discovery can no longer be silently undone by a stale blob copy. Also asserts the auth-switch clearing fires on the external fields_set path (PUT /v1/mcp/server). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(mcp): single source for the RFC 8693 default subject_token_type The default was applied at four egress build sites plus two model defaults, each with its own copy of the literal. All sites now share DEFAULT_SUBJECT_TOKEN_TYPE from litellm.types.mcp. A DB-level DEFAULT is deliberately not used: Prisma writes explicit values on insert, so a column default would rarely apply, and NULL-means-RFC-default keeps existing rows correct. Also documents two review decisions in place: the audience column keeps the RFC 8693 parameter name (RFC 8707 resource indicators are already a separate concept named resource in the v2 egress types), and the migration's out-of-order timestamp is safe under prisma migrate deploy. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: fix import sort order in outbound_credentials/types.py (I001 strict budget) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): purge legacy blob copies when a token-exchange column is written without credentials The migrate-on-write in the credentials merge lifts blob values into null columns, which is correct for legacy rows but could repopulate a column an admin had cleared in an earlier no-credentials update (that path never touched the blob, so the stale copy survived to be lifted later). An explicit token-exchange column write (set or clear) now migrates the row even when the update carries no credentials: untouched null columns are lifted, every blob copy is stripped, and unrelated blob keys stay as-is. A cleared column can then never be resurrected, because no write path leaves a blob copy behind. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(mcp): state the blob-to-column lift contract on the legacy credential keys The three token-exchange keys on MCPCredentials are the pre-column REST shape (the only REST shape from 2026-05 until this PR). Document on both the blob type and the request models that the dedicated columns are authoritative and that writes lift blob values into them and strip the stored copy. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): scrub subject_token_type in the non-admin and virtual-key sanitizers The other two token-exchange fields were cleared while subject_token_type was left visible. It is a public RFC 8693 URN with no disclosure value, but the sanitizers' rule is that these views receive no token-exchange config at all — cleared for uniformity. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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0e56fc39e2
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feat(mcp): make token_exchange (OBO) production-ready - discovery threading + audit hardening + RFC 9728 challenge (#31622)
* feat(mcp): thread the caller token into tools/list discovery for token_exchange
A token_exchange (OBO) server's tools could not be discovered through the aggregator: the list path
never threaded the caller's token, so every tools/list hit the no-subject branch. v1 masked this with
its client_credentials fallback (discovery used a service token); v2 dropped that fallback, so listing
had no credential and the OBO server's tools never appeared - and an MCP client lists before it calls.
Thread the inbound subject_token into the list path the same way the call path does, gated on
auth_type oauth2_token_exchange so the caller's bearer never leaks into other modes:
_get_tools_from_server takes an oauth2_headers param, extracts the token via _extract_bearer_token, and
passes it to _create_mcp_client; server.py forwards oauth2_headers at the list call site.
authorization_code (resolves off identity plus stored token), the static/config modes, and the
background registry refresh are unaffected, and the list path's existing graceful degradation
(catch -> empty list) is preserved.
* fix(mcp): harden token_exchange OBO from the audit (strip, TTL/expires_in, subject_token_type)
- _should_strip_caller_authorization returns True for oauth2_token_exchange, so the inbound subject
token is never forwarded upstream raw - only the IdP-exchanged token is (matches authorization_code).
- _parse_expires_in accepts a JSON float / numeric-string expires_in, and _ttl_seconds caps the cache
TTL at the token's real remaining lifetime so a short-lived exchanged token is never served stale.
- to_server_spec normalizes a falsy subject_token_type to the default URN, parity with v1.
The subject/key disambiguation (never exchange the LiteLLM key; Authorization: Bearer <litellm-key>
support for /mcp) is intentionally a separate cross-cutting PR off staging, not part of this OBO work.
* fix(mcp): stop caller header bypassing OBO exchange; thread subject into prompts/resources
The per-server x-mcp-* override guard in _create_mcp_client only kept the v2 spec
for authorization_code, so a caller-supplied header silently disabled the RFC 8693
exchange on a token_exchange server and forwarded the raw bearer upstream. Extend
the guard to token_exchange so the exchange always runs and the caller cannot
substitute an arbitrary upstream credential.
prompts/list+get, resources/list+read, and resource-templates/list never threaded
the OBO subject token, so those operations failed closed (401 / empty) on a
token_exchange server. Thread the caller's bearer as the subject for those paths
too, gated on the token_exchange mode via a shared _obo_subject_token helper.
* fix(mcp): keep the OBO/authz_code resolver credential authoritative; centralize OpenAPI strip
A guardrail (e.g. MCPJWTSigner), static_headers, or any other injected Authorization could
shadow the resolver-owned credential for token_exchange / authorization_code servers, so the
upstream would receive e.g. the signer's JWT instead of the exchanged token and reject it. In
_create_mcp_client the resolver-owned credential now wins: a conflicting header is dropped and
the minted/stored token reaches upstream. No behavior change for none/passthrough/static modes,
where an injected Authorization still wins as before.
The OpenAPI/local _request_extra_headers forwarder gated its Authorization strip on
has_client_credentials only, so an OpenAPI-backed token_exchange server with
extra_headers:[Authorization] forwarded the raw subject token upstream and never exchanged. It
now uses the centralized _should_strip_caller_authorization so it matches the managed paths.
* feat(mcp): RFC 9728 challenge for token_exchange (OBO) unauthorized
OBO previously returned an opaque 401 (Bearer error="invalid_request") with no discovery
info, and any IdP exchange failure collapsed to a retryable 503. Now an OBO server behaves like
a standards-compliant OAuth resource server:
- A missing/rejected subject token returns the RFC 9728 / RFC 6750 challenge: 401 +
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="...", error="invalid_token", so a spec-compliant
MCP client can discover the IdP, SSO, and retry with a fresh subject token.
- The protected-resource metadata for a token_exchange server advertises the JWT-auth issuer(s)
(JWT_ISSUER / litellm_jwtauth.issuers) as authorization_servers -- the IdP that issues and
validates the subject -- instead of the gateway.
- An IdP 4xx (subject rejected) is now a non-retryable 401 (the challenge) instead of a 503, so a
caller with a dead token re-authenticates rather than looping; 5xx/transport stays retryable 503.
* fix(mcp): emit the OBO RFC 9728 challenge preemptively so a no-subject client can discover the IdP
A token_exchange server's tools are not discoverable without a subject token (list is lenient ->
empty), and a tool-call-time 401 is wrapped into a JSON-RPC error so the WWW-Authenticate header is
lost. So a cold-start client never saw the challenge and could not start discovery. Add a
token_exchange branch to the preemptive-401: a no-subject connect to an OBO server now returns
401 + WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata=..., error="invalid_token" at the transport level,
so a spec-compliant client discovers the IdP (the PRM advertises the JWT-auth issuer), SSOs, and
retries with a subject token. Verified live on the per-server endpoint; the with-subject connect
still proceeds (no challenge).
(Also formats two lines from earlier commits in this stack.)
* refactor(mcp): inject root_path into the OBO/OAuth challenge edge
The adapter's raise_user_oauth_challenge and raise_token_exchange_challenge
reached into os.getenv("SERVER_ROOT_PATH") via get_server_root_path(), a
hidden ambient read in a module that is meant to be a pure edge. That coupling
made the preemptive-challenge test order-dependent under xdist: a sibling test
sets SERVER_ROOT_PATH at import without cleanup, leaking the prefix into the
challenge URL and failing the exact-match assertion.
Resolve the root path at the imperative-shell call sites and pass it in
keyword-only, so both challenge builders become pure functions of their inputs.
Extract the shared resource_metadata path construction into a single
oauth_protected_resource_path helper, collapsing the duplicated prefix/name
logic the two functions carried.
Also reduce _create_mcp_client below the strict complexity ceiling by extracting
the v2 credential resolution into _resolve_v2_auth, and extract the OBO
protected-resource-metadata branch into _obo_protected_resource_response (which
shipped without coverage) so discovery can be unit-tested directly.
Tests are now hermetic: the adapter tests pass root_path as a real input rather
than monkeypatching the environment, the stale-session preemptive test asserts
structural invariants instead of the exact prefixed URL, and five new tests
cover the OBO PRM issuer branch end to end.
* feat(mcp): OBO cache-key tenant isolation, reactive 401 retry, v1-parity logs
From a pass over the OBO behavior contract. Three changes to the
token_exchange arm, none of which alters any other auth mode.
The exchanged-token cache key now folds in the caller's tenant alongside
the subject token and exchange config, so two tenants presenting the same
opaque token can never share a cache entry; cross-tenant isolation is
structural rather than incidental to subject-token uniqueness. tenant_id is
threaded from the resolver's Subject; it is keyword-only with an empty
default so the no-tenant case and the existing call sites are unchanged.
The tool-call path gains one reactive retry. When an upstream rejects the
injected token with a 401/403, the gateway invalidates the cached exchange,
re-mints once through the IdP by rebuilding the client, and retries the call
exactly once before surfacing the upstream error, so a token revoked or
rotated upstream mid-TTL self-heals without an infinite loop. It is gated
strictly to oauth2_token_exchange; passthrough, authorization_code,
client_credentials, api_key, and none keep their single-call behavior.
MCPClient.call_tool gains a raise_on_error flag (mirroring list_tools) so
the path can tell an upstream 401 apart from an ordinary tool error and
avoid re-running a non-idempotent tool on a non-auth failure.
The exchanger also emits the v1-parity log lines it had dropped (attempt
with server, endpoint and audience; success; cache hit), while never
logging the form, subject token, secret, or minted token.
* fix(mcp): fail closed with 412 when a token_exchange server has no endpoint
A true token_exchange (OBO) server must use only an explicitly configured
token endpoint; it must never guess an IdP or silently fall back to a weaker
source. Previously an OBO server with client credentials but no
token_exchange_endpoint/token_url deferred to v1, which no-op'd and let the
request connect to the upstream with no credential (an upstream 401 rather
than a clear gateway error).
Now such a server is owned by the v2 arm: _token_exchange_spec builds the spec
even when the endpoint is absent, and the exchanger fails closed with a
precondition_required error that maps to HTTP 412 before any upstream or IdP
call, with the caller's subject token never sent anywhere. A missing
client_id/secret still maps to misconfigured (500); a present-but-rejected
subject still maps to 401; an unreachable IdP still maps to 503. The no-subject
case keeps its existing 401 RFC 9728 challenge.
* feat(mcp): log a refused non-Bearer token_type in the OBO exchange
* fix(mcp): surface OBO/authorization_code list-time 401 as a challenge instead of masking it
* feat(mcp): classify RFC 6749 gateway-fault token-exchange errors as 500, not a caller 401
* test(mcp): absorb fixture uses 500 now that 401/403 are challenge-class at list time
* style(mcp): PEP 604 union in the OBO retry signature to keep the UP007 budget flat
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7eacdd5258
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chore: litellm oss staging 250626 (#31305)
* fix(anthropic): support Bearer auth for custom api_base endpoints (Fixes #30926) * style: format common_utils.py with black * fix(anthropic): extract api_base from litellm_params in batches/files validate_environment * fix(anthropic): scope Bearer key check to custom api_base endpoints * fix(streaming): reset Anthropic message_start cursor (output_tokens=1) when no message_delta arrives The Anthropic streaming protocol emits `message_start.usage.output_tokens=1` as a placeholder cursor; the real cumulative output count only arrives in the final `message_delta` event. When a stream is cancelled before `message_delta` lands (common for thinking models on long-tail prompts), ChunkProcessor._calculate_usage_per_chunk's last-wins accumulator left completion_tokens stuck at 1. Because 1 is truthy, the `completion_tokens or token_counter(text=...)` fallback in calculate_usage() never fired, and requests were billed for 1 output token even when several thousand tokens of text had actually streamed. Fix: track whether any chunk's completion_tokens exceeded 1 (saw_non_cursor_completion). If the only update we saw was the cursor, reset completion_tokens to 0 so the text-based fallback estimates from the real completion content. Legitimate 1-token completions (model returns "Yes." etc.) are unaffected in practice — token_counter on a 1-token completion_output also yields ~1, so billing stays approximately correct. Tests: - TestAnthropicCursorBug (6 cases) — pins the post-fix behavior - TestNonAnthropicStreamingIntact (2 cases) — guards against regression on providers without the cursor pattern All 8 new tests pass; 9 existing streaming_chunk_builder_utils tests still pass. * fix(streaming): scope cursor reset to anthropic provider + recognize message_delta arrival Addresses both Greptile P2 threads on PR #30420: CLASS A — Anthropic-specific heuristic was applied globally ============================================================ The `completion_tokens == 1 and not saw_non_cursor_completion` reset lived in provider-neutral `streaming_chunk_builder_utils.py`. Any non-Anthropic provider that legitimately reports completion_tokens=1 in a single usage chunk (perfectly normal for short OpenAI / Bedrock / Vertex single-token replies with stream_options.include_usage=true) would have its value silently rewritten to 0 and re-billed via token_counter — producing a different number than what the provider actually charged. Fix: gate the reset on `custom_llm_provider == "anthropic"`, resolved from the first chunk's `_hidden_params` (the same field set by streaming_handler.py:722 on the live path). Unknown / missing provider is treated as non-Anthropic and skips the reset, so newer providers and custom plugins are also safe by default. CLASS B — `saw_non_cursor_completion` missed legitimate single-token replies ============================================================ Previous condition was `usage_chunk_dict["completion_tokens"] > 1`, which never fires for an Anthropic stream where the model legitimately emits exactly one output token (e.g., "Yes."). Anthropic still sends message_start (output_tokens=1, the cursor) AND message_delta (output_tokens=1, the real value) — same value, but two distinct usage events. The old check couldn't tell that apart from a cancelled stream where only message_start landed. Fix: track `completion_usage_updates` and flip `saw_non_cursor_completion` when EITHER (1) the value exceeds 1 (definitely not a placeholder), OR (2) we've seen >=2 completion-bearing usage events (positive evidence that message_delta arrived). Cancelled cursor-only streams still have exactly one event and still hit the reset; cache chunks with completion_tokens=0 don't count toward the threshold. Tests ============================================================ - _make_chunk now sets `_hidden_params["custom_llm_provider"]` (default "anthropic") so the gate is exercised by every existing test — none of them needed assertion changes besides the legitimate-single- token case, which now expects exactly 1 (was a fuzzy 0..3 range). - New: test_anthropic_cache_only_chunks_after_message_start_still_resets - New: test_non_anthropic_provider_completion_tokens_one_not_reset - New: test_unknown_provider_completion_tokens_one_not_reset 11/11 tests pass. * chore: add Co-authored-by trailer for attribution Co-authored-by: songkuan-zheng <songkuan-zheng@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(anthropic): preserve messages cache usage * style(anthropic): format messages cache usage helper * fix(anthropic): accept integral float cache token counts Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(anthropic): accept integral float cache token counts * test(anthropic): cover cache usage edge cases * fix(gemini): preserve thoughtSignature for server-side tool responses When Gemini API returns toolCall and toolResponse parts, they might have different thoughtSignatures. Previously, LiteLLM merged them into a single dict, overwriting the response's thoughtSignature with the call's. This fix extracts them separately and re-injects them correctly. TAG=agy CONV=755b21d0-3200-40bc-bd1a-bb58a378a9a6 * fix(gemini): address PR comments on thoughtSignature handling - Fix orphan-response thoughtSignature regression by copying thought_signature to response_thought_signature - Add missing assertions in existing tests - Add new unit tests for orphan-response signature handling TAG=agy CONV=755b21d0-3200-40bc-bd1a-bb58a378a9a6 * feat(mcp): include server alias and server_id in mcp_info response - Add alias and server_id fields to mcp_info object in /mcp-rest/tools/list endpoint - Update rest_endpoints.py to surface alias from server config - Add test coverage in test_mcp_server.py and test_rest_endpoints.py Fixes #31015 * fix(proxy): reject non-finite spend via validate_finite_spend A NaN/-inf spend would bypass spend >= max_budget enforcement. Add a shared finite-value guard, defined above the litellm.proxy.* imports to avoid the module-level cyclic-import warning. * fix(proxy): require admin for any /key/update spend, reject non-finite Gate the admin check on the presence of `spend` (not a value diff): the DB spend lags the live cross-pod counter, so an "unchanged" spend on the non-admin path let a key owner / team member overwrite the live counter below real usage. Also reject NaN/+-inf spend before the DB write. * fix(proxy): invalidate spend counter on /user/update spend change A direct spend change on /user/update wrote the DB row but left the warm cross-pod counter at the stale value, so enforcement kept reading the old spend. Invalidate spend:user:{user_id} after the write (reseed-from-DB), and reject non-finite spend before the write. * fix(cache): route Bedrock semantic-cache sync embedding through the Router (#28244) The semantic cache's embedding model is a proxy Router alias whose AWS credentials (aws_role_name, aws_session_name) live only in the Router deployment's litellm_params. The sync embedding paths called litellm.embedding() directly, bypassing the Router, so they could neither resolve the alias nor assume the configured role; cross-account Bedrock semantic caching failed with "bedrock:InvokeModel is not authorized". On Redis this surfaced at proxy startup because redisvl's CustomTextVectorizer eagerly fires a dimension-probe embedding during cache construction, while llm_router is still None. Fix A: make the sync paths mirror the already-correct async paths. A shared, dependency-injected helper (litellm/caching/_embedding_router.py) decides whether to route through llm_router.embedding(...) when the model is a Router deployment, else fall back to direct litellm.embedding(...). Redis and qdrant sync set_cache/get_cache now precompute the embedding and pass vector= to the backend, exactly as the async astore/acheck already do. Both async _get_async_embedding methods are unified onto the same helper and now forward the caller's full metadata instead of a hand-picked subset. Fix B (Redis only): defer redisvl index construction from __init__ into a lazy, memoized llmcache property, so the dimension-probe embedding fires on first cache use, after llm_router is wired. A failed build is not memoized, so a transient outage recovers on the next request. Known limitation: resolve_embedding_router gates on an exact model-name match (same as the shipped async path); wildcard/alias/team-public routes still fall back to direct embedding. Tracked as a follow-up. * fix(cache): harden embedding-router and shrink Any surface (review) Address review feedback on the semantic-cache aws-role fix (#28244): - resolve_embedding_router now skips deployment entries missing model_name instead of raising KeyError on a malformed model_list (Greptile P2); add a regression test that fails on the old direct-key access. - Replace the `**kwargs: Any` passthrough on the four cache _get_embedding / _get_async_embedding helpers with an explicit, typed `metadata: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None` parameter. The helpers only ever consumed kwargs["metadata"], so this is behavior-preserving, makes the forwarded field obvious at the call site, and removes three bare-Any annotations (keeps the strict-rule ANN401 budget within ceiling). - Note in _build_llmcache that redisvl's dimension-probe embedding adds one extra billable embedding on the first cache request (Greptile P2). * fix(bedrock_mantle): correct responses routing for openai.gpt-5.x models Dashboard Test Connection for bedrock_mantle/openai.gpt-5.4 and openai.gpt-5.5 was failing with maximum recursion depth errors and "model does not exist" Route detection in the bedrock provider matched route tokens by plain substring, so the bedrock_mantle/ prefix was mistaken for the mantle/ invoke route and the body model was rewritten to bedrock_openai.gpt-5.5; route tokens now only match at a path-segment boundary so the bare model name is preserved A responses-mode model whose provider has no responses config bounced forever between the responses API and chat completions; the responses to completion fallback now tags its call so completion() does not bridge back, breaking the loop The Test Connection endpoint hardcoded the test mode to chat, which disabled mode auto-detection for responses-only models; the default is now None so the mode is detected from model capabilities acompletion() now drops a duplicate acompletion kwarg before building the partial and treats model_info=None as an empty dict to avoid a NoneType crash * test(bedrock_mantle): cover route guard and bridge flag; fix reportArgumentType regression Adds the regression coverage codecov flagged on the two responses to completion bridge guard lines and the bedrock route-prefix helper. The handler tests drive both the sync and async fallback paths with litellm.completion and litellm.acompletion mocked, and assert the forwarded kwargs carry _skip_responses_api_bridge=True, so dropping either flag line fails the suite. The common_utils tests assert that bedrock_mantle/openai.gpt-5.x no longer resolves to the mantle route while the genuine mantle/ and bedrock/mantle/ ids still do, exercising both branches of _model_has_route_prefix. Also aligns update_messages_with_model_file_ids model_id to Optional[str], matching its Responses API sibling, so the defensive model_info fallback no longer introduces a new reportArgumentType in completion(); the file-id lookup narrows model_id before the dict get * chore(ui): sync generated OpenAPI types for optional test_connection mode The test_model_connection mode body param default changed from chat to None so the mode is auto-detected from model capabilities, which makes the field optional in the proxy OpenAPI spec. Regenerate the committed schema so the dashboard types match: mode becomes optional and the description and default JSDoc follow the spec, keeping the Check UI API Types Sync gate green * refactor(bedrock): match all explicit route prefixes at path-segment boundary Migrates the remaining substring route checks to the existing _model_has_route_prefix helper so every explicit route token matches only as a leading path segment, consistent with get_bedrock_route and the mantle route. Covers _explicit_converse_route, _explicit_claude_platform_route, _explicit_invoke_route, _explicit_agent_route, _explicit_agentcore_route, _explicit_converse_like_route, _explicit_async_invoke_route and _explicit_openai_route. This also stops invoke/ from substring-matching async_invoke/. Route precedence and order are unchanged, and a note on the segment invariant is added to the helper docstring * test(bedrock): cover explicit route prefix segment matching Exercises all eight migrated _explicit_*_route helpers (converse, converse_like, invoke, async_invoke, agent, agentcore, claude_platform, openai) directly: each matches its token as a leading path segment and rejects the token glued to a preceding segment, so reverting any method to the old substring check fails the suite. Also asserts invoke/ no longer matches async_invoke/ models, the concrete improvement of the segment-boundary migration * test(proxy): assert negative spend is allowed (one-time grant use-case) Negative spend is intentionally permitted so admins can grant extra allowance for the current budget period only, without raising the recurring budget ceiling. Cover it explicitly in validate_finite_spend and via the /user/update invalidation test. * fix(google_genai): forward native generateContent top-level fields Google's native generateContent REST body carries safetySettings, toolConfig, cachedContent and labels at the top level as siblings of generationConfig. The proxy's :generateContent endpoint spread them into agenerate_content as loose kwargs and then dropped them, so callers had to wrap them in extra_body for them to take effect; safetySettings, for instance, was silently ignored The provider config now exposes the native top-level field names and setup_generate_content_call collects whichever are present, merging them into the outgoing request body through the existing extra_body merge so they reach Google verbatim. An explicit extra_body still wins on conflict. The sync generate_content_stream path now also forwards systemInstruction, matching the other three entry points Fixes #12671 Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_016MFtMXokCjT8u6mvyASudK * fix(proxy): resolve env refs for DB-stored models * fix(proxy): restrict DB env ref resolution * fix(proxy): block team DB env ref resolution * fix(lint): resolve ANN401/UP045/C901 strict-gate violations - Replace Optional[X] with X | None (UP045) in 8 files - Replace Any return/param types with concrete types or object (ANN401) - Extract _make_api_key_auth_header helper to reduce get_anthropic_headers complexity below C901 threshold (17 → 14) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(anthropic): preserve x-api-key for custom endpoints; opt-in Bearer via prefix Users who pass a key already prefixed with "Bearer " get Authorization: Bearer. All other keys continue to use x-api-key, preserving backward compatibility with custom api_base endpoints that expect x-api-key rather than Authorization. Also consolidates get_auth_header to reuse _make_api_key_auth_header helper, eliminating the duplicated custom-endpoint routing logic. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * revert(anthropic): restore Bearer routing for non-sk-ant- keys on custom api_base The backwards-compat change broke existing tests that verify the intentional Bearer-for-custom-base behavior (Fixes #30926). Restore original logic while keeping the _make_api_key_auth_header helper for code deduplication. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(anthropic): gate Bearer-for-custom-base behind use_bearer_for_custom_base flag Previously the auth-header switch from x-api-key to Authorization: Bearer applied unconditionally for non-sk-ant- keys on a custom api_base, silently breaking existing deployments that proxied to gateways expecting x-api-key. Introduce use_bearer_for_custom_base: bool = False on _make_api_key_auth_header, get_anthropic_headers, and get_auth_header. validate_environment reads it from litellm_params so callers can opt in per-model without any API surface change. Tests updated to pass use_bearer_for_custom_base=True where Bearer behavior is asserted. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(redis): apply namespace prefix in delete_cache and async_delete_cache (#29981) DEL was the only Redis cache operation that skipped check_and_fix_namespace, so it targeted the raw SHA256 hash (e.g. 3997c4...) rather than the namespaced key (litellm:3997c4...). This caused two problems: a Redis NOPERM error on deployments with an ACL restricting DEL to the litellm:* pattern, and a silent no-op on all other deployments since the un-prefixed key was never stored. * style(anthropic): reformat common_utils.py with Black (--target-version py312) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: preserve cache metadata and spend counters * style: apply ruff format to streaming_iterator.py * refactor: reduce complexity of usage/spend helpers to satisfy strict ruff gate Extract Anthropic message_start cursor reset into _reset_anthropic_cursor_completion_tokens and the cross-pod spend-counter invalidation into _invalidate_user_spend_counter_if_changed, keeping both _calculate_usage_per_chunk and _update_single_user_helper under the max-complexity ceiling. Use builtin generics in the new signatures so no new UP006 violations are introduced. Behavior unchanged. --------- Co-authored-by: rupak-eng <rupakji99@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: songkuan-zheng <252822057+songkuan-zheng@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: songkuan-zheng <songkuan-zheng@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Kannan Priyadharshan <kpd2204@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Marco Georgaklis <mgeorgaklis@google.com> Co-authored-by: Anjaiah Methuku <anjaiahspr@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Andrii Butko <booandrew23@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Kent <kingdooo@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: kunal2002 <k.nayyar2002@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Ali Khan <alirazakhan.offi@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: jesco-absolut <team@srswti.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Matt Hill <mhill@dataminr.com> Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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bbef1b84ab
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feat(mcp): graft v2 resolver onto _create_mcp_client (none + api_key static family) (#31058)
* feat(mcp): add v1 bridge + none/api_key resolver arms (unwired) PR4a of the MCP v2 outbound-credential migration, stacked on the resolver skeleton. Builds the bridge for the first live modes without wiring it onto the request path: - resolver.py: the none arm (NoOpAuth) and the api_key shared-key arm (StaticHeaderAuth from the config); the BYOK source and the other five arms stay not_implemented. - adapter.py: the v1 <-> v2 edge (to_subject, to_server_spec, raise_public, should_defer). to_server_spec maps only none + the static-header family and returns None to defer every other mode to v1. Imports v1, kept out of the package __init__ so the resolver core stays v1-free. - MCPClient gains an optional resolved_auth that feeds the factory's auth= slot, taking precedence over the SigV4 aws_auth; default None keeps current behavior. Nothing calls these from _create_mcp_client yet, so production behavior is unchanged; the graft lands in PR4b. Unit tests cover the two arms, the full mapping table, and the auth plumbing. * feat(mcp): graft v2 resolver onto _create_mcp_client for migrated modes Wire the none + api_key static-family resolver arms from PR4a onto v1's live request path. In _create_mcp_client's HTTP/SSE branch, to_server_spec decides per mode: a migrated mode resolves through the injected UpstreamCredentialProvider and feeds the resulting httpx.Auth into the new resolved_auth slot; every other mode returns None and falls through to the unchanged v1 construction. resolve_mcp_auth now runs only when the mode defers, so a migrated server skips the v1 token-exchange / M2M I/O. stdio is untouched: auth_type/auth_value never reach the upstream on the stdio path (_get_auth_headers is HTTP/SSE only), so there is nothing to graft there. No v1 code is deleted yet; resolve_mcp_auth's static return still backs stdio and the not-yet-migrated modes until later PRs retire it. * test(mcp): cover the v2-resolver graft in _create_mcp_client Regression tests for the PR4 graft. Migrated HTTP modes resolve through the provider into resolved_auth: none -> NoOpAuth, and the static api_key family emits the right header per scheme (X-API-Key, Bearer, token, raw authorization, base64 basic). Deferred modes (oauth2) and a missing static token fall back to v1's auth_value. A stdio server with a migrated auth_type still defers to v1, since httpx.Auth never reaches the subprocess. A resolver Error is mapped to the public HTTP contract (401) via an injected provider, exercising the DI seam. * fix(mcp): defer to v1 when an inbound credential would be overridden The graft attaches the resolved static credential as an httpx.Auth, whose auth flow writes its header after extra_headers. That silently overrode an inbound Authorization: a per-request mcp_auth_header override, or a header supplied via a guardrail hook / static_headers / forwarded caller header. v1 lets those win, so the graft had inverted the credential precedence for the migrated static modes. Mirror the v2 egress credential-isolation invariant: defer the request to v1 when mcp_auth_header is set, or when the header the resolved credential would write is already present in extra_headers. none writes no header, so it never defers. * test(mcp): cover the credential-isolation defer guard Regression tests for the precedence fix. A per-request mcp_auth_header override and an Authorization already present in extra_headers (guardrail hook like the JWT signer, static_headers, or a forwarded caller header) both defer a migrated static server to v1 so the inbound credential wins; none stays on v2 and does not clobber an inbound Authorization since NoOpAuth writes nothing. The deferred cases assert resolved_auth is None, which fails if the guard is removed. * refactor(mcp): resolve inbound-header conflict on v2 instead of deferring For an Authorization already supplied via extra_headers (a guardrail hook such as the JWT signer, static_headers, or a forwarded caller header), keep the request on the v2 path and skip resolved_auth rather than deferring to v1. The inbound header still wins since nothing overwrites it, but hooks no longer pin a v1 fallback, which is what lets resolve_mcp_auth be retired once the remaining modes migrate. The mcp_auth_header per-request override still defers to v1, since that value becomes the upstream credential rather than sitting in extra_headers; that defer falls away once the per-user modes stop writing mcp_auth_header. * fix(mcp): clear UP037 lint gate and fix allowed-servers test under the graft adapter.py uses `from __future__ import annotations`, so the quoted "UserAPIKeyAuth" / "MCPServer" annotations in to_subject/to_server_spec/_shared_key_spec were unnecessary and pushed UP037 over the strict-rule budget; drop the quotes. test_list_tools_only_returns_allowed_servers passed a MagicMock as user_api_key_auth. The graft now builds a Subject from the principal, and the MagicMock's non-string org_id/user_id fail Subject validation, so the listing came back empty. Use a real UserAPIKeyAuth instead (MagicMock for an injected dependency was the anti-pattern here). * test(mcp): assert config token via resolved_auth, not the headers dict test_mcp_server_config_auth_value_header_used inspected _get_auth_headers(), but the graft now carries the static credential on the client's httpx.Auth (resolved_auth) and writes the header at send time, so that dict is empty. Assert the header the StaticHeaderAuth emits onto the request instead. Both config keys (authentication_token, auth_value) stay covered. * chore(typecheck): set reportMatchNotExhaustive slack to 0 The previous slack of 3 put the ceiling at baseline + slack = 4, so a newly non-exhaustive match (for instance dropping an Error arm off a Result match) could land without tripping the gate. Setting slack to 0 pins the ceiling at the current baseline of 1, so any added non-exhaustive match now fails CI while the one pre-existing violation in router.py stays within budget |
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6d6eda8101
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[internal copy of #28008] Support MCP OAuth passthrough and issuer-scoped JWT auth (#28356)
* fix(proxy): point /metrics 401 at the opt-out flag Operators upgrading past |