Sort the chat-tool keys once and number duplicates with groupby instead of
rescanning every preceding key per position, so the guardrail merge stays
O(n log n) on client-supplied tool lists. Drop the comment that restated the
unsupported-tool warning in the Responses-to-chat transformation.
tests/test_litellm/llms/mongodb imports pymongo's exception classes to check the
error translation against the real hierarchy, and the shard that runs it
(tests/test_litellm/llms, per test-unit.yml) synced --extra google, proxy,
semantic-router and saml but not mongodb, so 24 of 109 tests would have errored
with ModuleNotFoundError on the first CI run. CircleCI hid this because it syncs
--all-groups --all-extras.
uv export --frozen ... --extra saml -> no pymongo
uv export --frozen ... --extra saml --extra mongodb -> pymongo==4.17.0
Also close the two gaps a mutation run found in the suite: nothing asserted that
a short request timeout shortens server selection as well as connect, and the
existing code 13 case carried "not authorized", which the message markers match
too, so it could not tell whether the code was still being checked. 28 of 28
mutants now die.
update_in_memory_litellm_params validated mode into GuardrailEventHooks members while __init__ stores the plain strings LitellmParams.mode carries, so readers that stringify event_hook (akto, straiker) saw different values on the serving worker than on re-initialized workers. Presidio forced post_call assignments go through the same shape, and Straiker recomputes configured_modes on every update
* fix(proxy): share per-model budget counters across replicas through the spend counter cache
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): keep the shared fake Redis store immutable
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Native AgentCore A2A always sent either a fresh generated runtime session id
or the single configured runtimeSessionId, so related turns lost context and
unrelated callers shared one AgentCore microVM. The runtime session id is now
params.message.contextId scoped to the calling key hash, then runtimeSessionId,
then generated, and is length-validated (33-256) before the header is signed.
Invalid ids surface as JSON-RPC -32602 / HTTP 400 instead of a 500.
Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The type-discipline and test-quality gates blamed the branch for 4 LIT001, 12
LIT002 and 5 TQ008 violations. Rather than suppress them:
- the $vectorSearch and $project stages are MappingProxyType and the query
vector a tuple, verified against live Atlas to encode identically. The outer
pipeline stays a list because pymongo's common.validate_list raises
"pipeline must be a list, not <class 'tuple'>", which a unit test now pins.
- the client caches are Final[dict[...]] and _client_kwargs returns a
MappingProxyType.
- _field_value recurses over the dotted path instead of rebinding a local.
- _client_key declared Final locals in one branch and reassigned them in the
others, so it is split into an early-returning _timeout_ms.
- the injected callables carry explicit Final[Callable[...]] annotations, which
stops pyright resolving self.embedding_fn against litellm.embedding's
overloads.
- get_sync_client and get_async_client take an optional client_class, so the
cache tests inject a recording double instead of patching the importer, and
can assert the connection string and timeouts the client was built with.
SensitiveDataMasker is public SDK surface, so extra_sensitive_patterns moves to
the end of the signature: in slot two it silently reinterpreted an existing
caller's positional override set as extra sensitive patterns.
When the headroom_retrieve tool is exposed to a client that runs its own
tool-execution loop (the LiteLLM MCP gateway path), the client executes the
retrieve call and sends the recovered original content back as a tool result
on the next turn. The guardrail then compressed that row again, and because
CCR is content-addressed it collapsed back to the exact same hash it was just
retrieved from. The model never saw the expansion and the agent looped.
Hold tool-result rows that carry headroom_retrieve output back from the
compression service, the same way the live turn and trailing tool exchange are
already protected, so the expansion survives. Retrieve calls are matched by the
direct headroom_retrieve name and the mcp__<server>__headroom_retrieve gateway
name. Because a long gateway name is truncated past 64 chars in the
OpenAI-translated view the guardrail scans, the pairing also falls back to the
tool-call id read from the request's own untranslated messages, which is never
truncated.
Fixes#38558
Any pre_call guardrail on /v1/responses flattened Codex namespace tools
into ns__member functions and wrote the flattened list back to the
request, so the model called mcp__server__tool with no namespace and
Codex rejected the call as unsupported.
The handler now keeps the client's original tools, hands the guardrail a
deep copy of the flattened ones, and rebuilds data["tools"] by matching
the guardrail's output to the originals by type and name. Unchanged
tools go back as the original objects, a dropped or edited namespace
member changes only that member, and tools the guardrail injects are
still appended.
Fixes#39183
