A team can now carry a per-model budget map that every key on the team
inherits. A key's own model_max_budget entry for the same model takes
precedence, so it is gated on and billed to the key alone.
Backend: NewTeamRequest/UpdateTeamRequest accept model_max_budget (validated
like the key-level field, enterprise gated); the value is hydrated onto
UserAPIKeyAuth via the token view, TeamGrants and the carried budget state;
_check_team_model_budget enforces it in the centralized common checks; the
limiter meters spend under team_model_spend:<team>:<model>:<duration> and
skips the team counter when the key overrides; /team/update lets only a
proxy admin raise, re-window or drop a cap; /team/info exposes usage.
The Anthropic context-management compaction summary subrequest runs the
same team gate. Both fallback token-view SQL definitions project the column.
UI: team create and edit forms reuse the key-level ModelMaxBudgetEditor,
premium gated, sending {} to clear and omitting unchanged fields.
A key entry overrides the team cap only when it spend-gates the model
(non-negative max_budget); a row that only carries tpm/rpm limits or a
negative cap leaves the team cap in force.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
MCP sampling catches the denial itself and returns ErrorData, so the central ProxyException handler never sees it. Log the sanitized internal reason there and share the CR/LF stripping through ModelAccessDeniedProxyException.sanitized_internal_message
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Post-auth denials from can_key_call_resolved_model (per-request alias
rewrite, MCP sampling, realtime) never reach the auth exception handler,
so the internal allowlist reason was dropped when
model_access_denied_message was set. Log it once from the ProxyException
response handler and the realtime rejection path instead, and convert
JWT ModelAccessDeniedHTTPException into the specialized ProxyException so
the same boundary covers it
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Replace the username-global lockout with counters keyed by source address and by
source/username pair. Each has a fixed counting window (60s) and a separate
block TTL (300s). Blocks are soft: a correct password still signs in, wrong
passwords from a blocked key take one of 5 held slots per worker and are held
30s before a 429. Once a pair is blocked its failures stop counting against the
source. The source scope runs only when trusted_proxy_ranges is set, IPv6 is
grouped by /64, and per-source limits accept IP and CIDR overrides with
longest-prefix matching. Redis is authoritative through one Lua script per
failure, with bounded per-worker fallback when Redis raises.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The write path no longer dual-writes the global table. The cron rolls up closed UTC days
only, so a pod still flushing the current day can never leave the global table short. The
key-free arm reads days through the marker from the global table and later days from
LiteLLM_DailyUserSpend in one UNION ALL, and the marker comes from the config cache
rather than a per-request database lookup.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Move the WARNING that carries the internal denial detail out of the message formatter and into the auth exception handler. The denial exceptions now carry internal_message so access-group probes and fallback paths that catch and recover from the denial no longer log a false denial for an allowed request
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
