* feat(proxy): limit repeated failed Admin UI sign-in attempts
The Admin UI sign-in endpoints accept an unbounded number of password attempts.
All three call authenticate_user, and none of them keeps any record of how many
times a given caller has already been refused, so a misbehaving or misconfigured
client can retry indefinitely at full speed.
A LoginThrottle is now a required argument to authenticate_user, so the accounting
lives at the one function all three endpoints share and a fourth endpoint cannot be
added without deciding what to pass. Failures are counted per username and source
address over a fixed window and further attempts are refused with 429 and a
Retry-After header. The check runs before the database lookup and before the
password comparison, so a refused caller does no further work.
Only genuine credential rejections count. Configuration errors do not, a refused
attempt does not extend the window, and a successful sign-in clears the bucket.
The username is case folded because the user lookup is case insensitive, so casing
cannot multiply the allowance. Both credential rejections now return one identical
message. SSO is unaffected; it never calls this function.
max_failed_login_attempts (10) and failed_login_window_seconds (900) are read from
config.yaml, with LITELLM_DISABLE_LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT to turn the accounting off. They
are deliberately not database backed, so editing YAML always wins and an operator
refused by a bad value can recover.
* test(proxy): clear failed-login TTLs when resetting the throttle between tests
* feat(proxy): harden Admin UI login throttling
* docs(proxy): clarify login throttle configuration
* fix(proxy): keep the login throttle inside the type budget and fail safe on secret errors
* fix(proxy): warn about per-worker sign-in counters without a module global
* fix: honor environment login throttle settings
* fix: satisfy login setting type checks
* refactor(proxy): keep authenticate_user within the C901 budget after merge
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): write failed-login counters and their expiry in one Redis call
Use RedisCache.async_increment_with_floor (a single Lua INCRBY + EXPIRE) for the
shared login counters instead of the two-step INCRBYFLOAT then EXPIRE, so a
counter can never be committed to Redis without its expiry. The repair in
_remaining_window now only covers expiries stripped out of band (PERSIST, a
restore) and uses the same atomic call
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): resolve the login rate limit kill switch once per process
Reading LITELLM_DISABLE_LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT through get_secret_bool on every
unauthenticated sign-in attempt meant a hosted secret manager in read mode
was queried once per password guess, before any counter was checked
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): count failed sign-ins in Redis alone while it answers
Every worker spends one shared budget and a successful sign-in clears it for all
of them. This worker's own counter is only consulted while Redis raises, so an
outage degrades to per-worker accounting instead of switching the control off
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): keep counting the failed sign-ins Redis missed once it answers again
A guess is recorded in exactly one place, Redis or this worker's own store when Redis
refused it, so the count is the sum of the two. Redis is read through
async_batch_get_counts, which raises on failure, instead of async_get_cache, which
swallows it into None and read as an empty counter
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(proxy): read the shared sign-in counter through a tuple of keys
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(caching): spell out the key collections batch_get_counts accepts
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): warn about per-worker login counters even without general_settings
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(ui): regenerate schema.d.ts after merging main
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(proxy): inject settings and Redis cache into LoginThrottle.from_request
Removes the runtime import of proxy_server from login_throttle so the
throttle module no longer participates in the import cycle CodeQL
flagged (py/cyclic-import). Callers pass general_settings and
redis_usage_cache explicitly; behavior is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): drop the section banner comment from the login tests
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(proxy): assert separate login counter stores in the spray regression test instead of a comment
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(proxy): throttle failed Admin UI sign-ins per source and source/username
Replace the username-global lockout with counters keyed by source address and by
source/username pair. Each has a fixed counting window (60s) and a separate
block TTL (300s). Blocks are soft: a correct password still signs in, wrong
passwords from a blocked key take one of 5 held slots per worker and are held
30s before a 429. Once a pair is blocked its failures stop counting against the
source. The source scope runs only when trusted_proxy_ranges is set, IPv6 is
grouped by /64, and per-source limits accept IP and CIDR overrides with
longest-prefix matching. Redis is authoritative through one Lua script per
failure, with bounded per-worker fallback when Redis raises.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): explain the internal patches in the login throttle tests
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): key held sign-in attempts on the source while the source is blocked
An active source block now takes precedence over a pair block, so every blocked username behind one blocked source shares the source's five held slots instead of getting five each
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): apply source overrides to IPv4-mapped IPv6 sign-in sources
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): catch only Redis failures when falling back to local login counters
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): type the login throttle's local store and pass frozen Redis script arguments
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): keep the sign-in hold pool from refusing a correct password
The held-attempt cap ran before the password check, so five parked wrong
guesses from a blocked source turned the soft block into a lockout for the
real user. The slot is now taken only after a wrong password, and the
pool-full refusal carries the block's remaining time as Retry-After
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): stub DATABASE_URL in the hold-pool regression test so it passes off the dev box
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(proxy): drop a comment that restated the NUM_WORKERS assignment
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): match IPv4-mapped IPv6 peers against IPv4 trusted proxy ranges
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): keep mapped-notation trusted proxy ranges matching mapped peers
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(proxy): hard-block throttled Admin UI sign-ins with no credential bypass
A blocked source, or source and username pair, is now refused with 429 before the database lookup and password check, in place of the soft block that held wrong guesses for 30 seconds and let a correct password through. The env admin credentials and the master key typed into the login form are refused like any other credential while blocked; recovery is the master key as an API bearer token, which never goes through the sign-in path
trusted_proxy_ranges: [] now means clients connect directly, so the peer address is the source and the per-source limit stays on. Only an unset or malformed value leaves the topology unknown, warns at startup and turns the per-source limit off
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(proxy): move login throttle sentinels into constants
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(proxy): derive the per-username sign-in allowance from the address limit
The per-address-and-username allowance is now half the effective address allowance, rounded up, instead of a separate max_failed_login_attempts_per_user setting. A per-address override therefore raises or effectively removes both limits for that address, and no second override table is needed
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(proxy): raise the sign-in block explicitly and type the empty settings mapping
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(proxy): round the per-username sign-in allowance down and exempt an address with an override of 0
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): import LoginThrottle under TYPE_CHECKING for the throttle helper annotation
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): break ties between equivalent login limit overrides deterministically
Two spellings of one network share a prefix length, so the exemption wins the tie, then the higher limit, regardless of mapping order
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): treat a malformed trusted_proxy_ranges entry as an undeclared topology
A list with an entry that is not an address or CIDR range no longer switches
the per-source Admin UI sign-in limit on against the direct peer address, so a
typo cannot make a shared ingress address the bucket for every user behind it
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): reject blank trusted_proxy_ranges entries before they are dropped
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Yucheng Zhu <yucheng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
GET /model/info?litellm_model_id= went through _get_proxy_model_info, a copy of _enrich_model_info_with_litellm_data that missed the unpriced check, so the same deployment read as null in the list and as 0 on the id lookup. The id lookup now delegates to the shared helper, so the two paths cannot drift again
The per-address-and-username allowance is now half the effective address allowance, rounded up, instead of a separate max_failed_login_attempts_per_user setting. A per-address override therefore raises or effectively removes both limits for that address, and no second override table is needed
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
_apply_general_settings_side_effects grew a fourth argument when the reload
started comparing the resolved pass-through list, and this dispatch test calls
it positionally, so it failed with a TypeError.
Both write paths now go through the same refusal, so /config/field/update and
/config/update answer identically instead of each phrasing its own rule.
A successful write now applies to the SettingsStore, so the next read sees it.
Without this, /config/field/info reported a key the dashboard had just stored
as "not set" until the process reloaded from the database.
resolve() no longer takes a KeyRule it never reads; the store picks the row.
The matrix tests resolve through SettingsStore instead of calling resolve
directly, so the section and key in each case actually route a lookup.
ConfigFieldInfo and ConfigList type `source` as the FieldSource literal, and
the dashboard API types are regenerated for the two new fields.
The precedence used to vary per key: some keys let a stored row win, some
let the file win, some merged the two. That meant an operator could not
answer "which value is live?" without knowing the key.
Now file presence decides ownership. A key the config file declares is
config-owned, whatever the database holds, and a key the file omits falls
back to the stored row. KeyRule no longer carries a RuleKind, only which
row the stored value lives in.
Writes to a config-owned key are refused at the two surfaces that reach
the database instead of being stored and silently ignored: save_config
and /config/field/update both 400 naming the key and the config file path.
Both read endpoints now report source and editable off the same
SettingsStore, so /config/field/info and /config/list can no longer
disagree inside one process.
Replaces the 786-case checked-in JSON fixture with cases generated from
the rule table, so the matrix tests no longer assert that resolve() agrees
with a snapshot of resolve().
BREAKING CHANGE: a dashboard or /config/field/update write to a setting
the config file declares now returns 400 instead of being stored. Remove
the key from the config file to let the database own it.
Non-admin keys may only start transcription jobs whose media and transcript output live in the S3 buckets listed in general_settings.transcribe_media_buckets, and may not supply DataAccessRoleArn or JobExecutionSettings. The setting is editable from the Admin UI general settings table (new List editor) and DB values load into the running proxy when config.yaml does not set it
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
A blocked source, or source and username pair, is now refused with 429 before the database lookup and password check, in place of the soft block that held wrong guesses for 30 seconds and let a correct password through. The env admin credentials and the master key typed into the login form are refused like any other credential while blocked; recovery is the master key as an API bearer token, which never goes through the sign-in path
trusted_proxy_ranges: [] now means clients connect directly, so the peer address is the source and the per-source limit stays on. Only an unset or malformed value leaves the topology unknown, warns at startup and turns the per-source limit off
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
_PROXY_MaxBudgetLimiter re-checked spend:user:{id} against user_max_budget in
async_pre_call_hook without the zero-cost model exemption that
_user_max_budget_check applies in auth, so free models were rejected with
"Max budget limit reached." once a user was over budget. Auth already owns
this check, so the hook is deleted rather than taught the exemption again
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The persisted UI settings were read once at startup, so a proxy admin
flipping a runtime flag through PATCH /update/ui_settings only changed the
pod that served the request. Every other pod kept serving the old value
until it restarted.
add_deployment, the reload the scheduler runs every 30s, now re-reads the
row and applies the runtime flags before it takes the model reconcile lock,
so a change made through one pod reaches the rest within one reload
interval. The startup hook and the two settings endpoints share that helper
instead of each repeating the flag copy.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018PUCupsaarVLJy4iDFx256
Replace the username-global lockout with counters keyed by source address and by
source/username pair. Each has a fixed counting window (60s) and a separate
block TTL (300s). Blocks are soft: a correct password still signs in, wrong
passwords from a blocked key take one of 5 held slots per worker and are held
30s before a 429. Once a pair is blocked its failures stop counting against the
source. The source scope runs only when trusted_proxy_ranges is set, IPv6 is
grouped by /64, and per-source limits accept IP and CIDR overrides with
longest-prefix matching. Redis is authoritative through one Lua script per
failure, with bounded per-worker fallback when Redis raises.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds a daily spend table without api_key or user_id, written atomically alongside
LiteLLM_DailyUserSpend from the batched writer, reconciled from history by a
scheduled job that advances a marker in LiteLLM_Config, and read by the key-free
arm of the aggregated usage query once the marker covers the requested range.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Follows the Management API modernization design: plural resource under
/management/v1, {data, meta} response envelope, unknown request fields
rejected with 422, and RFC 9457 problem+json for request-level errors.
Body validation failures under /management/v1 now answer 422 instead of
the 400 query-parameter problem. /user/bulk_new is removed.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Move jwt_handler.bind_agent_lookup out of the YAML and DB agent loading paths and into
ProxyStartupEvent._initialize_jwt_auth so agents created via the API or UI after startup,
with no agents in config and no DB agent reload, still resolve for agent_id_jwt_field
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
