* test(ci): fix four CircleCI regressions on main
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(ci): stop reloading auth_checks in unit tests
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(constants): cover CLI JWT expiry env parsing
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(gateway): restore proxy lifespan after importing gateway.main in launch tests
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: mateo <mateo@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(anthropic): workload identity federation and pluggable identity sources
Backend half of #38818 (internal copy of the fork PR #38013), rebuilt as one
commit on top of litellm_internal_staging without the dashboard changes.
Deployments on anthropic/ without a static api_key can exchange an OIDC
workload assertion for a short-lived sk-ant-oat01 token through a shared
RFC 7523 JWT-bearer engine. The assertion comes from a mounted token file,
an env token, a LiteLLM-signed issuer, or Keycloak, chosen per deployment,
per named credential, or through ANTHROPIC_IDENTITY_SOURCE. The federation
fields are server-owned: refused inline in request bodies and on
POST /model/new, proxy-admin only on credentials, and the token exchange
is pinned to api.anthropic.com unless LITELLM_ANTHROPIC_WIF_ALLOWED_HOSTS
adds a host. GET /credentials/{name}/jwks exports the public key set of a
LiteLLM-signed credential for the Claude Console.
The OpenAI federation trio from #39613 rides along on the backend side with
the same server-owned handling.
Fixes#28607
Resolves LIT-6107
Co-authored-by: derhornspieler <15236687+derhornspieler@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(anthropic): let batch-result downloads mint from deployment params and accept host:port allowlist entries
The files handler enabled workload identity on batch-result downloads but never received the
deployment's litellm_params, so a deployment authenticating through a named credential could only
mint from process-wide env vars. It now threads litellm_params through to the auth header the way
the batch retrieve path already does.
LITELLM_ANTHROPIC_WIF_ALLOWED_HOSTS entries written as host:port were read by urlsplit as a scheme,
so the allowlist kept the raw entry while the exchange compared bare hostnames and refused the
gateway. Entries are now parsed as network locations whether or not they carry a scheme.
* fix(types): move the WIF kwargs key sets to a leaf module so the kwargs funnel imports without a cycle
* test(anthropic): pin case-insensitive matching of WIF exchange-host allowlist entries
* fix(anthropic): end workload identity federation errors without a period so the router suffix reads cleanly
* fix(proxy): decrypt stored litellm_params before the WIF write gate
* fix(proxy): hide WIF secret references from /health output
* fix(proxy): keep the proxy error shape on credential endpoint refusals
* fix(proxy): hide identity token file paths from /health output
* fix(anthropic): rename the federation workspace param so Bedrock's anthropic_workspace_id keeps working
The Bedrock Claude Platform route already reads anthropic_workspace_id from
optional_params, so banning that spelling as a server-owned federation
parameter broke a pre-existing client capability. The federation field is now
anthropic_federation_workspace_id (env ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_WORKSPACE_ID),
which restores the base branch's behavior for Bedrock callers, drops the
Bedrock-specific hint from the refusal message, and deletes the unconditional
ban constant that no longer had a reader
* fix(auth): share one exchanged token across workers reading the same assertion
Anthropic accepts each identity assertion exactly once, so two uvicorn
workers reading the same token file both minting from it means the second
exchange is denied with jti_reused. Minted tokens now land in a per-user
0700 cache directory guarded by a file lock, so workers on the same host
reuse one exchange until the token expires or the assertion rotates. A 401
is only retried when the re-read assertion actually differs, and the denial
hint explains jti_reused. LITELLM_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_CACHE_DIR moves the cache
and an empty value disables it
* fix: keep anthropic federation from being shadowed or leaked
An empty or whitespace-only ANTHROPIC_API_KEY counted as set, so a federated
deployment sent an empty x-api-key on every call instead of minting a token.
Blank values now read as unset, and a real static key on a federated deployment
logs once that it outranks federation and nothing is being federated.
The exchange-host allowlist matched hostnames only, so a second process on
another port of an allowed host was trusted with the workload's identity token.
An entry that names a port now trusts that port alone, while a bare host still
trusts every port.
The shared token store exists so the workers reading one projected token file do
not each spend its single-use jti. A source that mints its own assertion per
exchange shares nothing with another worker, so it no longer writes a live token
to disk for a lookup that can never hit.
* fix: unlink a staged token file a failed write leaves behind
The 401 denial hint now also says federation ignores ANTHROPIC_WORKSPACE_ID, which the Bedrock Claude platform provider already reads.
* refactor: move anthropic jwks derivation behind a provider-owned tagged union
* fix: unlink the staged token file when its write fails at close
A buffered write only reaches the disk when the handle closes, so a full disk surfaces at close and left the staging file behind holding a usable token.
* fix(anthropic): close the staging descriptor before writing the shared token file
* fix(wif): judge federation writes by what they set, not what is stored
The admin gate read the stored deployment, so a team admin lost edit, delete
and Test Connection on any deployment carrying federation params. It now
returns early unless the submitted fields touch the federation surface, and a
Test Connection probe that points the deployment at its own api_base is still
refused, with the 403 no longer wrapped into a 500
The rest of the same review pass: POST /model/new refuses only a blocking
value of `blocked`, so a client that always sends `blocked: false` is not
turned away; a request body can no longer pick which federated identity to
mint as by naming a stored credential; an advisory refresh the executor
refuses disarms the entry instead of wedging the identity until the follower
timeout; the static-key shadow warning resolves its env fallback inside the
cache instead of once per request; credential writes drop nulls before
storing them; the token exchange validates the endpoint URL before reading an
assertion and keeps refusing redirects across a client heal; /health hides
every server-owned federation field from non-admins; and the async create_file
and create_batch paths say which setting is missing when the provider resolves
no URL
* fix(proxy): let a deployment write name a federated credential
reject_federated_credential_reference runs from is_request_body_safe, which
pre_db_read_auth_checks calls on every route, so it also fired on POST
/model/new, /model/update, /model/{id}/update and /health/test_connection. A
proxy admin could no longer attach a federated credential to a deployment over
the API or the Admin UI, leaving a static config.yaml entry as the only way to
configure the feature the rejection told the caller to go configure, and
_reject_non_admin_wif_write never got to make the call it exists to make.
is_request_body_safe now takes the route and skips only the credential-reference
check on the routes that reach can_user_make_model_call. Federation fields typed
inline into a body stay refused everywhere, and a call naming a federated
credential still cannot pick the identity it mints as.
* refactor(proxy): derive health display policy from the federation key sets
The health check module hand-copied the five workload identity fields whose
value is a credential, so a shared proxy surface named provider-specific
parameters and a newly added secret-bearing field would have gone on being
displayed until someone remembered both places
WIF_SECRET_BEARING_KEYS now sits beside the key sets it splits out of,
types/utils derives secret_bearing_wif_litellm_params from it, and the health
layer splats that tuple the same way it already splats the admin-only one
* fix(anthropic_wif): treat blank identity-source fields as unset
* test(proxy): classify the federation params in the credential slot registry
main's registry test (#43298) now fails the build for any credential-named
deployment param without a classification. The five federation fields that
carry a token, a token file path, or a signing or client secret reference are
Unplanted, matching WIF_SECRET_BEARING_KEYS; the four remaining Keycloak
settings name a URL, a client id, an auth method, or a scope and are NotSecret
* fix(anthropic_wif): declare federation params as owned connection leaves and chart their metrics
Register the 18 Anthropic and 3 OpenAI federation params as frozen
ConnectionSettings leaves so the owned-kwarg registry, the kwargs funnel
and the request-body ban list read one declaration. Pass the deployment
api_base through to the count-tokens handler instead of a pre-suffixed
URL, which doubled the /count_tokens path on main's prompt-cache
predictor. Add the five litellm_anthropic_wif_* families to the
all-metrics Grafana dashboard.
* fix(credentials): gate PATCH on WIF fields resolved from model_id
The credential PATCH handler checked server-owned workload identity
federation fields only on the values the caller sent, while a body that
named a deployment through model_id had its credential values resolved
after that check. A non-admin could therefore copy a federated
deployment's WIF fields onto an ordinary credential. Resolve the incoming
values first and run the non-admin gate on them, matching the POST path
* fix(anthropic): count tokens with ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN through the shared auth header
Count-tokens walked its own credential ladder: a static key, else skip minting when
ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN is set, else mint a federated token. With only the auth token set it
forwarded nothing and the proxy silently fell back to its local tokenizer while chat on the
same deployment authenticated with that token. The handler now takes the auth header that
AnthropicModelInfo.aget_auth_header resolves, the same ladder chat, files, batches and skills
use, and merges the oauth beta a minted or consumer token carries with the token-counting beta
---------
Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: derhornspieler <15236687+derhornspieler@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <happymvw@gmail.com>
* fix(auth): resolve hidden model_group_alias entries in the zero-cost budget check
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(auth): key the zero-cost cache by the resolved model group
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(auth): keep the zero-cost verdict per requested name and include hidden aliases
* test(integration): audit the zero-cost bypass through hidden model_group_alias names
* test(router): cover the extracted routing strategy switch
* test(integration): record a pre-flip burst before the alias flip
---------
Co-authored-by: jesus <jesus@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
log_db_metrics wrapped whole cache-first auth helpers and always emitted a ServiceTypes.DB success event, so in-memory cache hits showed up as postgres <fn> spans and DB service metrics. The decorator now installs a ContextVar witness that _TrackedPrismaEngine marks on every Prisma query and transaction call, and the DB event is emitted only when the witness was marked. Real reads keep their existing call_type names, the failure path and the PROXY batch-write branch are unchanged, and Redis instrumentation is untouched.
A decorated helper that reaches Prisma only through another decorated helper (get_key_object -> get_object_permission, get_team_object_by_alias -> get_object_permission, get_tag_object -> get_tag_objects_batch) used to emit two events for one query. The inner wrapper now marks its witness as reported when it emits a success or DB failure event, and only unreported activity is handed up to the enclosing witness, so the inner event is the one that survives. An outer helper that also queries Prisma directly or through undecorated callees still gets its own event.
Tests: get_user_object and get_org_object cache hits emit no DB event; a get_user_object miss through the generated Prisma client emits exactly one postgres get_user_object event; decorator-level tests cover nested calls emitting only the inner event, outer calls with their own query, inner non-DB failures, bounded lookups and sibling-request isolation.
Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat: add Bespoke Nimble gateway and OSS classifier support
* feat: accept Ollama's nimble model name for the Bespoke provider
* test: exempt the POST-only bespoke decisions route from the all-methods check
test_pass_through_routes_support_all_methods requires every built-in
pass-through route to accept every HTTP method unless it is listed in
PROTOCOL_CONSTRAINED_PASS_THROUGH_ROUTES. /bespoke/v1/systemone is
POST-only like /laya/v1/systemone, so the test failed at this branch
and passed at the merge base. List it alongside Laya.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(proxy): extract shared spend log read policy
* test(proxy): use named bindings for spend scope regression
* test(proxy): reuse existing spend log query harness
* test(proxy): cover spend log permission lookup adoption
* chore(proxy): relocate existing spend query baseline
* refactor(proxy): make scope query returns explicit
* refactor(proxy): inject deferred log permission lookup
* test(proxy): cover teamless management compatibility lookup
* refactor(proxy): compose user and team log grants
* refactor(proxy): share generic authorization composition
* refactor(proxy): compose trace read permissions
* refactor(proxy): centralize spend and trace authorization
* refactor(proxy): strengthen spend and trace scope types
* refactor(proxy): flatten log read scope into owned logs
Replace the AnyOf grant tree with a flat OwnedLogs(user_id, team_ids) scope,
and OwnedTraces(logs, api_key_hash) for traces, since every consumer flattened
the tree back into that shape.
A caller with no user id now gets an empty scope instead of matching ownerless
rows through Prisma's IS NULL. The dead request_id guard in ui_view_spend_logs
is removed, and the management facets inject the log team lookup and reuse
read_scope_sql instead of the list shim.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(proxy): run spend scope tests through one SQLite emulator
Replace the string-matching payload emulator and the hand-rolled Prisma where
interpreter with one SQLite helper that runs the real scope SQL. Session scope
tests now go through the endpoint, including the no-user caller that must not
match ownerless rows. Drop duplicated lookup-failure and trace mapping cases.
load_permitted_log_team_ids returns no teams without a database instead of
relying on the resolver's broad except.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(proxy): unify log and trace ownership permissions
* test(tracing): align fixtures with ownership read scopes
* refactor(tracing): align query scopes with row ownership
* refactor(spend): make ownership SQL predicates explicit
* test(spend): validate ownership SQL against PostgreSQL
* docs(traces): drop key-row visibility from query help guide
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(spend): reach the empty-memberships branch in team lookup test
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(ui): regenerate dashboard API types
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* wip
* wip
* test(traces): separate root status from diagnostic error counts
* test(traces): cover normalization precedence and fallbacks
* chore(cache): remove stray comments from trace PR
* test(traces): name lens test for shared query path
* fix(traces): place query implementation before test module
* test(traces): use unified read scope in migration tests
* ci(rust): allow feature checks to finish
* ci(mcp): allow dependency resolution to finish
* fix(traces): preserve key visibility and safe spend attribution
* test(e2e): jwt auto_register map-existing-key repro
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(jwt): auto_register_map_existing_key maps JWT to the user's existing virtual key
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(jwt): exclude blocked keys from auto_register_map_existing_key reuse
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(jwt): route existing-key lookup through VerificationTokenRepository
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(e2e): stop requiring LITELLM_SALT_KEY for the owned JWT gateway
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(e2e): gate the owned JWT gateway tests behind E2E_OWNED_GATEWAY
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(jwt): only reuse keys that can call LLM routes in auto_register_map_existing_key
Skip Admin UI session keys and keys whose allowed_routes restrict them to
anything other than llm_api_routes (management, read_only, password-reset
sessions). Mapping a JWT to one of those left the user with 401s or 403s on
every LLM call, since the mapping persists.
* fix(jwt): scope auto_register_map_existing_key reuse to the JWT-resolved team
Only reuse a key whose team_id matches the team auth_builder resolved for
the JWT (no team matches no team), so a personal key can no longer bypass
the resolved team's model and budget limits.
With the flag on, the first JWT request now falls through to the same
virtual-key checks later mapped requests get, instead of returning early,
so a reused key's own limits apply from request one rather than 200 then
403. Flag off keeps the early return unchanged.
* fix(jwt): keep the early return when no master key is set
Without a master key the generic virtual-key path returns a bare
INTERNAL_USER object, so falling through on the first auto-registered
request dropped the key's team, models and budgets. Only fall through when
a master key is configured.
Tests now assert the reused key per team rather than the query shape, and
cover the flag-off early return and the no-master-key case.
* test(jwt): assert on race-loser's returned key, not only mocks (TQ002)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(jwt): close the auto_register_map_existing_key race, shared-claim and expiry holes
A key auto_register just minted is never adopted by a concurrent request, so the race loser's cleanup can no longer delete a key another request mapped and cascade its mapping away (503, user left with no key)
Reuse only happens when the claim value is the JWT-resolved user_id. A shared claim such as azp or client_id falls back to minting, so one user can no longer land on another user's personal key and budget
Only keys that never expire are reused, so an expiring key can no longer pin the claim to a permanent 401
Integration tests on a real proxy and Postgres cover all three. The race test holds the first mapping insert in a Postgres relay, so the interleaving is forced rather than timed. The where-clause shape unit tests are replaced by these, since only a real database proves the filter
* test(e2e): create the reused key in the team the JWT resolves to
The flag only reuses a key in the JWT-resolved team, and this identity's groups claim resolves to its team, so a teamless key was never eligible and the test could not pass
* test(integration): match the held statement across TCP reads
The relay looked for the trigger inside one read, so an insert split across two reads was never held and the race test would fail waiting for it. It now matches one exact trigger over a window that keeps the end of the previous read
* fix(jwt): gate key reuse on the claim field, not on the claim value
Requiring the claim value to equal the resolved user_id skipped reuse for users matched through the sso_user_id or case-insensitive email fallback, whose stored user_id differs from the JWT sub. That is the lookup LIT-5378 asks for. Reuse is now allowed when the virtual key claim is the user_id or user_email JWT field, globally or for the token's issuer, which still keeps shared claims such as azp or client_id on the mint path
* fix(jwt): let an issuer's own user field replace the global one when gating key reuse
An issuer that identifies users by uid no longer treats the global sub field as a user identity claim, so a shared sub under that issuer mints instead of reusing a personal key
* test(jwt): make the flag-off test fail when the flag no longer gates key reuse
The flag-off test used a config where sub was not a user identity claim, so deleting the flag check still passed. Configure user_id_jwt_field=sub so only the flag keeps the lookup off, and drop test docstrings
* chore(lint): drop mutable-ok suppressions that LIT013 flags as no-ops
---------
Co-authored-by: yuneng <yuneng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: mrinal <mrinal@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Mrinal Chanshetty <mchanshetty@Mrinals-MacBook-Pro.local>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: add Laya gateway and classifier backend
* test: cover the pass-through model_group pin and repair the shard fakes
MockRequest in tests/pass_through_unit_tests gains an httpx.URL and an ASGI
scope, which get_request_route now reads inside
_init_kwargs_for_pass_through_endpoint, and the POST-only /laya/v1/systemone
route joins the protocol-constrained exemptions. A built-in pass-through pins
metadata.model_group to the resolved model so a client cannot choose its own
per-model budget key; test_pass_through_endpoints now proves that on a
non-Laya route and drops a duplicated assertion.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* add test case for /rag/query and stronger auth check
* style(proxy): ruff format auth_checks.py
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): build rag query vector store ids immutably and test the no-registry path
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): integration coverage for /v1/rag/query vector store allowlist
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): audit cells for /v1/rag/query vector store allowlist
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): consolidate vector store allowlist audit coverage
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): type RAG vector store request body
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Mrinal Chanshetty <mrinal@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): move auth, hooks, policy_engine and client tests into tests/unit/proxy
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): stub HIBP through respx by disabling the aiohttp transport
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): share the httpx transport fixture across proxy unit tests
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): restore proxy globals without a missing-value sentinel
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): package moved dirs and stub the login breach check at the HTTP boundary
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): isolate the mcp server manager per test
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: yuneng <yuneng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Auth's spend counter MGET scope spans common checks, model budget check and reservation;
reservation increments go out as one pipeline; post-call reconcile adjustments ride the ordinary
increment pipeline and update_cache uses one batched read. Over-budget reservation counters are
charged one at a time so a rejection never touches the counters after it; post-call counter keys are
derived from ids without validating a UserAPIKeyAuth.
Resolves LIT-8881
Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* ci: fix the litellm-tests unit job with sysmon coverage, an env allowlist and coverage upload on failure
* test: replace key-dependent proxy, enterprise and mcp unit tests with synthetic values and integration and e2e coverage
* test: drop key reads at the legacy proxy, enterprise and mcp paths and wire the gemini pass-through split
* ci: move caching, proxy-extras, gateway and enterprise tests into tests/unit and run them from litellm-tests under their legacy flags
* ci: move caching, proxy-extras, gateway and enterprise tests into tests/unit and run them from litellm-tests under their legacy flags
* ci: move tests/proxy_unit_tests to tests/unit/proxy and run the proxy-db shards from litellm-tests
* ci: fail the unit shard when circleci tests split errors
* test: drop restating comments from the gemini pass-through split
* build: point the local proxy unit targets at the nested tests/unit/proxy tree
* ci: exit the unit shard cleanly when circleci tests split assigns it no files
---------
Co-authored-by: yuneng <yuneng@berri.ai>
