* feat(proxy): limit repeated failed Admin UI sign-in attempts
The Admin UI sign-in endpoints accept an unbounded number of password attempts.
All three call authenticate_user, and none of them keeps any record of how many
times a given caller has already been refused, so a misbehaving or misconfigured
client can retry indefinitely at full speed.
A LoginThrottle is now a required argument to authenticate_user, so the accounting
lives at the one function all three endpoints share and a fourth endpoint cannot be
added without deciding what to pass. Failures are counted per username and source
address over a fixed window and further attempts are refused with 429 and a
Retry-After header. The check runs before the database lookup and before the
password comparison, so a refused caller does no further work.
Only genuine credential rejections count. Configuration errors do not, a refused
attempt does not extend the window, and a successful sign-in clears the bucket.
The username is case folded because the user lookup is case insensitive, so casing
cannot multiply the allowance. Both credential rejections now return one identical
message. SSO is unaffected; it never calls this function.
max_failed_login_attempts (10) and failed_login_window_seconds (900) are read from
config.yaml, with LITELLM_DISABLE_LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT to turn the accounting off. They
are deliberately not database backed, so editing YAML always wins and an operator
refused by a bad value can recover.
* test(proxy): clear failed-login TTLs when resetting the throttle between tests
* feat(proxy): harden Admin UI login throttling
* docs(proxy): clarify login throttle configuration
* fix(proxy): keep the login throttle inside the type budget and fail safe on secret errors
* fix(proxy): warn about per-worker sign-in counters without a module global
* fix: honor environment login throttle settings
* fix: satisfy login setting type checks
* refactor(proxy): keep authenticate_user within the C901 budget after merge
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): write failed-login counters and their expiry in one Redis call
Use RedisCache.async_increment_with_floor (a single Lua INCRBY + EXPIRE) for the
shared login counters instead of the two-step INCRBYFLOAT then EXPIRE, so a
counter can never be committed to Redis without its expiry. The repair in
_remaining_window now only covers expiries stripped out of band (PERSIST, a
restore) and uses the same atomic call
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): resolve the login rate limit kill switch once per process
Reading LITELLM_DISABLE_LOGIN_RATE_LIMIT through get_secret_bool on every
unauthenticated sign-in attempt meant a hosted secret manager in read mode
was queried once per password guess, before any counter was checked
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): count failed sign-ins in Redis alone while it answers
Every worker spends one shared budget and a successful sign-in clears it for all
of them. This worker's own counter is only consulted while Redis raises, so an
outage degrades to per-worker accounting instead of switching the control off
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): keep counting the failed sign-ins Redis missed once it answers again
A guess is recorded in exactly one place, Redis or this worker's own store when Redis
refused it, so the count is the sum of the two. Redis is read through
async_batch_get_counts, which raises on failure, instead of async_get_cache, which
swallows it into None and read as an empty counter
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(proxy): read the shared sign-in counter through a tuple of keys
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(caching): spell out the key collections batch_get_counts accepts
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): warn about per-worker login counters even without general_settings
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(ui): regenerate schema.d.ts after merging main
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(proxy): inject settings and Redis cache into LoginThrottle.from_request
Removes the runtime import of proxy_server from login_throttle so the
throttle module no longer participates in the import cycle CodeQL
flagged (py/cyclic-import). Callers pass general_settings and
redis_usage_cache explicitly; behavior is unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): drop the section banner comment from the login tests
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(proxy): assert separate login counter stores in the spray regression test instead of a comment
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(proxy): throttle failed Admin UI sign-ins per source and source/username
Replace the username-global lockout with counters keyed by source address and by
source/username pair. Each has a fixed counting window (60s) and a separate
block TTL (300s). Blocks are soft: a correct password still signs in, wrong
passwords from a blocked key take one of 5 held slots per worker and are held
30s before a 429. Once a pair is blocked its failures stop counting against the
source. The source scope runs only when trusted_proxy_ranges is set, IPv6 is
grouped by /64, and per-source limits accept IP and CIDR overrides with
longest-prefix matching. Redis is authoritative through one Lua script per
failure, with bounded per-worker fallback when Redis raises.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): explain the internal patches in the login throttle tests
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): key held sign-in attempts on the source while the source is blocked
An active source block now takes precedence over a pair block, so every blocked username behind one blocked source shares the source's five held slots instead of getting five each
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): apply source overrides to IPv4-mapped IPv6 sign-in sources
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): catch only Redis failures when falling back to local login counters
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): type the login throttle's local store and pass frozen Redis script arguments
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): keep the sign-in hold pool from refusing a correct password
The held-attempt cap ran before the password check, so five parked wrong
guesses from a blocked source turned the soft block into a lockout for the
real user. The slot is now taken only after a wrong password, and the
pool-full refusal carries the block's remaining time as Retry-After
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): stub DATABASE_URL in the hold-pool regression test so it passes off the dev box
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(proxy): drop a comment that restated the NUM_WORKERS assignment
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): match IPv4-mapped IPv6 peers against IPv4 trusted proxy ranges
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): keep mapped-notation trusted proxy ranges matching mapped peers
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(proxy): hard-block throttled Admin UI sign-ins with no credential bypass
A blocked source, or source and username pair, is now refused with 429 before the database lookup and password check, in place of the soft block that held wrong guesses for 30 seconds and let a correct password through. The env admin credentials and the master key typed into the login form are refused like any other credential while blocked; recovery is the master key as an API bearer token, which never goes through the sign-in path
trusted_proxy_ranges: [] now means clients connect directly, so the peer address is the source and the per-source limit stays on. Only an unset or malformed value leaves the topology unknown, warns at startup and turns the per-source limit off
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(proxy): move login throttle sentinels into constants
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(proxy): derive the per-username sign-in allowance from the address limit
The per-address-and-username allowance is now half the effective address allowance, rounded up, instead of a separate max_failed_login_attempts_per_user setting. A per-address override therefore raises or effectively removes both limits for that address, and no second override table is needed
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(proxy): raise the sign-in block explicitly and type the empty settings mapping
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(proxy): round the per-username sign-in allowance down and exempt an address with an override of 0
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): import LoginThrottle under TYPE_CHECKING for the throttle helper annotation
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): break ties between equivalent login limit overrides deterministically
Two spellings of one network share a prefix length, so the exemption wins the tie, then the higher limit, regardless of mapping order
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): treat a malformed trusted_proxy_ranges entry as an undeclared topology
A list with an entry that is not an address or CIDR range no longer switches
the per-source Admin UI sign-in limit on against the direct peer address, so a
typo cannot make a shared ingress address the bucket for every user behind it
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): reject blank trusted_proxy_ranges entries before they are dropped
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Yucheng Zhu <yucheng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The two pass-through reload tests register real FastAPI routes on the
shared proxy app and only clean up the internal registry, so any test
running after them in the same worker sees stray /v1/kept-* and
/v1/deleted-* routes. test_component_allowlists counts those as
uncovered and fails. Snapshot app.routes and the registry up front and
restore both in a finally block.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The per-address-and-username allowance is now half the effective address allowance, rounded up, instead of a separate max_failed_login_attempts_per_user setting. A per-address override therefore raises or effectively removes both limits for that address, and no second override table is needed
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The reload only re-registered pass-through endpoints when the stored row
still carried the key, so deleting the row left the deleted routes serving
traffic until the process restarted.
It now compares the resolved list before and after the row is applied and
rebuilds on any difference, including a deletion that resolves back to the
config file's list or to nothing.
This matches what _apply_retention_settings already does with the retention
values, so the two reload effects no longer disagree about what counts as a
change.
The tests assert the proxy's registry of live pass-through routes, which is
what decides whether a request is routed upstream or falls through to the
auth error, rather than that the registration helper was called.
The two dashboard toggles under litellm_settings wrote through save_config,
so the refusal applied, but they mutated the litellm module global first: a
refused write still took effect in the running process until the next reload.
Both now check before they mutate.
/config/field/delete drops the stored key without touching the store, so a
deleted key kept reading back from the process. It now refreshes the store
like the other write paths.
/config/list reported source and editable for the general_settings rows but
not for the litellm_settings ones, so the dashboard would have shown a
config-declared toggle as editable.
Both write paths now go through the same refusal, so /config/field/update and
/config/update answer identically instead of each phrasing its own rule.
A successful write now applies to the SettingsStore, so the next read sees it.
Without this, /config/field/info reported a key the dashboard had just stored
as "not set" until the process reloaded from the database.
resolve() no longer takes a KeyRule it never reads; the store picks the row.
The matrix tests resolve through SettingsStore instead of calling resolve
directly, so the section and key in each case actually route a lookup.
ConfigFieldInfo and ConfigList type `source` as the FieldSource literal, and
the dashboard API types are regenerated for the two new fields.
The precedence used to vary per key: some keys let a stored row win, some
let the file win, some merged the two. That meant an operator could not
answer "which value is live?" without knowing the key.
Now file presence decides ownership. A key the config file declares is
config-owned, whatever the database holds, and a key the file omits falls
back to the stored row. KeyRule no longer carries a RuleKind, only which
row the stored value lives in.
Writes to a config-owned key are refused at the two surfaces that reach
the database instead of being stored and silently ignored: save_config
and /config/field/update both 400 naming the key and the config file path.
Both read endpoints now report source and editable off the same
SettingsStore, so /config/field/info and /config/list can no longer
disagree inside one process.
Replaces the 786-case checked-in JSON fixture with cases generated from
the rule table, so the matrix tests no longer assert that resolve() agrees
with a snapshot of resolve().
BREAKING CHANGE: a dashboard or /config/field/update write to a setting
the config file declares now returns 400 instead of being stored. Remove
the key from the config file to let the database own it.
A blocked source, or source and username pair, is now refused with 429 before the database lookup and password check, in place of the soft block that held wrong guesses for 30 seconds and let a correct password through. The env admin credentials and the master key typed into the login form are refused like any other credential while blocked; recovery is the master key as an API bearer token, which never goes through the sign-in path
trusted_proxy_ranges: [] now means clients connect directly, so the peer address is the source and the per-source limit stays on. Only an unset or malformed value leaves the topology unknown, warns at startup and turns the per-source limit off
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
A budget bypass that ships off by default stays open for every deployment
that does not know to look for the flag, so `enforce_fallback_budget` now
defaults to true and `general_settings.enforce_fallback_budget: false` is
the opt-out for anyone who wants the old unguarded behaviour back.
BREAKING CHANGE: a paid fallback target is now refused for callers who are
over their key or user `max_budget`. Deployments relying on fallbacks to
keep serving over-budget callers must set enforce_fallback_budget: false.
The failure hook received data without the resolved id when body parsing or
add_litellm_data_to_request raised, so proxy-only spend logging minted a fresh id
that did not match the error log or the x-litellm-call-id header. The id is now
part of the request data from the start and merged over the parsed body, which
also removes the post-hoc in-place assignment
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Budget is enforced once during auth, against the requested model group.
`_is_model_cost_zero` waives every budget check for a zero-cost group, and the
router then picks a fallback target afterwards, inside `run_async_fallback`,
where nothing re-checks budget. A free model with a paid fallback therefore
bills with no budget gate at all.
Add `fallback_budget_check`, the budget sibling of the existing
`fallback_access_check`: a predicate awaited per fallback target that skips
targets the caller cannot pay for. The primary attempt is untouched, so a
zero-cost model is never blocked by budget and only the paid fallback is
refused.
Counter reads pass `max_budget` so `get_current_spend` verifies against
authoritative recorded spend, matching the auth-time key and user checks; a
counter restored from an older snapshot reads as a hit rather than a clean
miss, so without it a stale-low value would keep admitting paid fallbacks.
A zero-cost fallback target is always allowed, and a team key does not inherit
the key owner's personal budget unless `apply_user_budget_to_team_keys` is set,
matching `_PROXY_MaxBudgetLimiter`.
Scope is key and user budgets. Team, team-member, end-user, org, global and
per-model budgets are not covered yet: those auth-path functions enforce rather
than report, so reusing them would fire threshold alerts and take spend
reservations for a target that is then skipped. Two limitations of that scope
are documented in the module docstring: the check reads the spend counter
rather than reserving against it, so concurrent fallbacks can cross a cap
together; and a request reaching the router without
`metadata["user_api_key_auth"]` is not restricted. Both are shared with
`fallback_model_access.py`.
Opt-in via `general_settings.enforce_fallback_budget`.
Relates to #41344
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Already shaped ProxyException and HTTPException errors passing through the moderations, audio speech, Anthropic Messages, and handle_exception_on_proxy paths now answer with the x-litellm-call-id header the route logged under, without overwriting a header the exception was raised with. The GET /v1/batches failure hook receives the resolved request data so the spend log request_id matches the response header and the error log
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Drop the model_access_denied_message setting, its {model} template, the DB
override entry and the Admin UI field. Model access denials now always return
the fixed client message while the allowlist diagnostic is logged at the final
HTTP, realtime and MCP boundaries
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Overlapping routing_groups persisted from the Admin UI raised inside
Router._init_routing_groups during the DB config reconcile, which skipped
loading SSO, guardrails and the other DB-backed settings while leaving the
proxy healthy. /config/update now returns 400 for overlapping models,
duplicate names, the reserved default name and unknown strategies before
writing, the Router builds every group selector before replacing its state
so a rejected update keeps the previous groups routing, and the proxy applies
routing_groups separately from the other router settings so an already
persisted invalid value is logged and skipped instead of aborting the
reconcile. The Admin UI modal blocks picking a model another group owns.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Post-auth denials from can_key_call_resolved_model (per-request alias
rewrite, MCP sampling, realtime) never reach the auth exception handler,
so the internal allowlist reason was dropped when
model_access_denied_message was set. Log it once from the ProxyException
response handler and the realtime rejection path instead, and convert
JWT ModelAccessDeniedHTTPException into the specialized ProxyException so
the same boundary covers it
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Replace the username-global lockout with counters keyed by source address and by
source/username pair. Each has a fixed counting window (60s) and a separate
block TTL (300s). Blocks are soft: a correct password still signs in, wrong
passwords from a blocked key take one of 5 held slots per worker and are held
30s before a 429. Once a pair is blocked its failures stop counting against the
source. The source scope runs only when trusted_proxy_ranges is set, IPv6 is
grouped by /64, and per-source limits accept IP and CIDR overrides with
longest-prefix matching. Redis is authoritative through one Lua script per
failure, with bounded per-worker fallback when Redis raises.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Add litellm_settings.model_access_denied_message, a template ({model} placeholder) returned to clients instead of the detailed "can only access models=[...]" text on key/team/user/org/project and team-member model access denials. The full denial reason is still written to the proxy logs at WARNING. Unset keeps the existing detailed message, status codes and error types are unchanged.
Expose the new setting and the existing expose_router_debug_in_errors flag in the Admin UI general settings (String editor, Boolean toggle with an explicit True default) and allow both as safe DB overrides so they persist and propagate across workers.
Resolves LIT-5283
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Releasing the slot unconditionally from the route raced the limiter's own
success handler on the logging worker: both could read the same stashed
acquisition before either cleared it, and under the integer in-memory
fallback that double-decrements the counter. The route now releases only on
exits without a success callback (pre-call rejection, pre-call cancellation,
and Phase 2 exits without the success stamp), matching the HTTP disconnect
path's ownership rule.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
