* fix(proxy): attribute gate-rejected requests to their endpoint in cache analytics
Requests rejected before dispatch (bad key, blocked key, budget, rate limit, malformed body) were spend-logged with an empty call_type because the synthesized logging object never reached the failure lifter. The caching dashboard rolled all of them, plus failed calls on info routes such as /model/info, into one Unknown group.
Resolve call_type from the matched route first, falling back to body shape, and keep the synthesized logging object on request_data so the lifter sees it. Log bare auth exceptions with the 401 ProxyException the client gets so error_code is never empty. Exclude info routes from the cache analytics groups and error breakdown. The dashboard explains the Unknown group when older rows still produce one.
Resolves LIT-5884
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): keep the raw auth exception for failure callbacks
Record the client-facing status in the spend log through a separate client_exception argument so custom failure callbacks still receive the exception auth raised.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): keep the route for multi-operation endpoints and exclude info routes from cache filter options
Routes such as /v1/files map to several operations (create, list) and the
method is not available in the failure hook, so a rejected request there is
filed under its route instead of the first mapped call type. The key alias and
model filter-option queries now apply the same info-route exclusion as the
groups and error breakdown, so every offered filter value returns data. The
info-route exclusion and Unknown grouping are now covered against a real
Postgres in tests/proxy_behavior/spend/test_cache_activity.py
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): drop client_exception, the spend log row never used it
The DB spend row for a gate rejection is written by _ProxyDBLogger from the
original exception, so the status-bearing copy only reached the in-memory
logging payload. Live runs at the tip still recorded bare auth exceptions as
Unknown/Exception, the same as the base branch. Removing the plumbing keeps
this PR to endpoint attribution and the info-route exclusion
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: yucheng <yucheng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The streaming pipeline step only takes a post-call hook on routes whose
translation assembles the streamed response (chat completions, Responses,
Messages). On /v1/completions, the Gemini streamGenerateContent route, and
A2A streams the pipeline is skipped with the merge-base warning and the hook
runs on its own afterwards, instead of getting a None response while the
header says the guardrail ran. A guardrail that overrides
async_post_call_streaming_iterator_hook next to its post-call hook keeps its
native per-chunk path rather than running buffered through the adapter
Every test this PR adds now annotates its fixture and parametrize
parameters. The submit-time warning for a tag-matched deferred policy
names only the policies, since a wildcard attachment pattern would let
caller-provided tag text reach the log.
A guardrail that removes or adds a tool call on an ended stream used to be
silently ignored: every handler substitutes the original list on a count
mismatch and the executor skipped its observer once the translation could
deliver rewrites. The executor now tracks the count change on the observer
and releases the original chunks with the discard warning on every
translation, matching what the merge base did for any tool call rewrite
Retrieval re-matches only the key, team, and model scopes, so a post_call
policy that reached a pending background response through a request-body
tag does not govern the completed response. Log that at submit, next to the
deferral, and cover the retrieval re-match with tag-scoped tests.
The per-chunk hook skipped pipeline-managed guardrails whenever the request
route was empty, while the gated stream could still fail to resolve a
translation and release the buffered stream ungoverned. The gate now needs a
translation resolved from the route, the iterator hook resolves it once and
hands it to the gated stream, and the ungoverned release branch is gone.
The per-chunk streaming hook skipped every guardrail stepped by a post_call pipeline, even when the pipeline is left out of the stream for lacking the unified apply_guardrail interface, so a default_on guardrail that only implements async_post_call_streaming_hook stopped governing streams it governed on the merge base. The skip set now comes from the pipelines that gate the stream, the same way the iterator hook already computes it
A post_call pipeline step whose guardrail only implements the older
async_post_call_success_hook used to skip the stream entirely: PR #38721
fails that shape open with a warning. The streaming step now assembles the
buffered stream into the response the hook expects, runs the hook, ends the
stream with the hook's exception when it raises, and delivers the hook's
rewrite through the same event write-back the unified guardrails use on
chat, Responses, and Messages streams (Messages gets the Anthropic shape).
A stream a pipeline manages no longer runs the same hook again after the
stream ends. A guardrail with neither the unified interface nor a post-call
hook keeps the fail-open, as does a rewrite the buffer cannot be patched
with.
A POST /v1/responses with background: true returns a queued response, so the
post_call pipelines attached at submit time had nothing to inspect. They now
defer on queued and in_progress responses and run on GET /v1/responses/{id}
instead: the retrieval resolves the response id back to its deployment,
re-attaches the policies that governed the original model, and reports them
in the x-litellm-applied-* headers of the retrieval response.
A post_call pipeline guardrail that rewrites a streamed tool call (its
arguments or its name) now has that rewrite written back across the buffered
chunks on chat, Responses, and Messages streams, so the client receives the
rewritten tool call instead of the original. The chat handler rewrites the
first fragment of each tool-call index and blanks the rest, the Responses
handler syncs the function_call output items and their argument events, and
the Messages handler rewrites the tool_use content_block_start and
input_json_delta events in both dict and SSE-bytes chunks.
The delivers_ended_stream_text_rewrites flag becomes
delivers_ended_stream_rewrites, since the write-back now covers both text and
tool calls, and the executor only discards a tool-call rewrite on translations
without write-back or on a shape the translation refuses.
The streaming loop skipped every guardrail stepped by a post_call pipeline, even when the pipeline was dropped from the stream for lacking the unified apply_guardrail interface, so a default_on guardrail that only implements async_post_call_streaming_iterator_hook stopped governing streams it governed on the merge base. The skip set now comes from the pipelines that will gate the stream
A post_call pipeline now releases the original stream instead of refusing the
request on every shape it has no handler for: a background request, a pipeline
guardrail without the unified apply_guardrail interface, a route with no
endpoint translation, a buffered stream no translation resolves, and a rewrite
the translation cannot write back (tool-call edits, text edits on translations
without write-back, n>1 chat, an unended Anthropic stream, a Responses dump
with no event envelope). Each case logs a warning naming the policy and
guardrail. Real blocks and writable text masks are unchanged.
* fix(proxy): deliver budget alerts on webhook-only alerting and accept ALERTING_WEBHOOK_URL
ProxyLogging.budget_alerts forwarded to the alerting pipeline only when
'slack' was in general_settings.alerting, so alerting: ['webhook'] plus
WEBHOOK_URL silently never delivered a budget alert (the config
/health/services?service=webhook exists to test). Forward when 'webhook'
is present too; SlackAlerting.send_alert already fans out per channel.
Also accept a provider-neutral ALERTING_WEBHOOK_URL env fallback for the
Slack-format channel (any Slack-compatible receiver works), mark it as a
sensitive var, and de-brand the admin UI alerting copy.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ui): format settings.tsx with prettier
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(ui): regenerate schema.d.ts for updated alerting description
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* ci: retrigger checks after ALERTING_WEBHOOK_URL docs merged
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Buffered streams governed by post_call policy pipelines now deliver text
rewrites back into the stream per surface (chat SSE, responses SSE,
anthropic messages SSE) instead of rejecting the request with a 400
upfront. Rewrites chain across pipeline steps; tool-call rewrites and
translations without stream write-back still withhold the stream.
A litellm_content_filter step with a MASK action masks chat streams through
its own iterator hook under guardrails.add, which pipeline-managed guardrails
skip, so the pipeline path released the stream unmasked. CustomGuardrail now
declares rewrites_streamed_output (mask_response_content by default, any MASK
action for the content filter) and the upfront streaming check names such
steps in the same 400 it gives mask_response_content and incremental_diff
Adds regression tests for the modify_response block on the Anthropic route,
the gate with no iterator overrides, and the per-chunk hook skipping
pipeline-managed guardrails. Corrects the gate docstring: an allow releases
the chunks as the endpoint translation left them, not verbatim
Same-day debt cleanup on code that landed in the last 24 hours. No behavior change.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Post_call pipelines run step hooks against a copied request dict, so guardrail
writes into the metadata bucket (applied_guardrails for the response header,
standard_logging_guardrail_information for spend logs) were dropped when the
guardrail was the first writer. Merge those writes back onto the request on the
post_call allow path, keeping the request payload and the executor's per-step
guardrails activation flag out of it.
Background /v1/responses requests dodge the streaming 400: pre_call sees stream
unset, then the polling task forces stream=true with pre-call logic skipped and
the streaming branch returns before post_call_success_hook, silently bypassing
post_call pipelines. Reject background=true at pre_call the same way as
stream=true.
Also pin the run_in_parallel pipeline-managed exclusion in both hook loops with
regression tests.
* feat(guardrails): honor Lakera v2 skip-message flags and add advisory (inject_system_message) mode
Squashed rebase of bugfix/lakera-v2-skip-system-tool-messages onto latest
litellm_internal_staging (900+ commits ahead; a commit-by-commit rebase hit
repeated conflicts against the same files across earlier review-round
commits, so the branch's cumulative diff was reapplied in one pass instead).
Adds skip_system_message_in_guardrail/skip_tool_message_in_guardrail support
to Lakera v2, a third on_flagged: "inject_system_message" advisory mode, and
the associated masking-safety-guard hardening (multimodal content, non-
maskable message fields, combined messages+input, and structured Responses-
API input in advisory delivery) found across this PR's review rounds.
* fix(guardrails): don't let one invalid guardrail config crash proxy boot
init_guardrails_v2 had no try/except around initialize_guardrail, so a
guardrail whose litellm_params fail validation at construction time (for
example Lakera's on_flagged=inject_system_message combined with
mode=during_call, or a malformed advisory_system_message template) raised
uncaught and crashed the entire proxy at startup, taking down every other,
correctly-configured guardrail in the list. Catch ValueError/TypeError per
guardrail, log a warning, and skip it, matching the same pattern already
used for the DB-driven guardrail-creation path in guardrail_endpoints.py.
* fix(guardrails): preserve message fields and mask PII before advising in Lakera v2
Mask-in-place degraded to a hard block for any message carrying a field
beyond role/content (tool_call_id, tool_calls, name, cache_control), for a
message excluded by skip_system_message_in_guardrail/skip_tool_message_in_guardrail,
or for a message with no inspectable text, since it rewrote data["messages"]
wholesale from a synthetic role/content-only list built for the Lakera API
call. That made masking effectively unusable for any real tool-calling
conversation and made the skip flags flip every PII-only violation to a hard
block instead of masking just the in-scope text.
Replace the wholesale rewrite with a scope-index merge, reusing the same
merge_guardrailed_scoped_messages helper the OpenAI/Anthropic guardrail
translation handlers already use for this: patch content in place on a copy
of each original message actually sent to Lakera, and leave every
skipped/no-text/out-of-scope message untouched at its original position.
This also fixes on_flagged="inject_system_message" (advisory mode) shipping
raw unmasked PII to the model: a PII-only violation is now masked the same
way regardless of on_flagged, and the advisory note is reserved for flags
masking can't resolve on its own.
Addresses maintainer-reported regressions on BerriAI/litellm#34940.
* fix(guardrails): satisfy new lint gates for the masking/advisory fix
Parameterize the write-back helper's dict param and suppress the two new
lint rules that landed on the base while this branch was in flight: TQ008
(patching an internal collaborator) for two pre-existing tests unrelated to
this change, and LIT001 for a param that genuinely needs to mutate the
caller's request dict in place.
* fix(guardrails): normalize role casing in Lakera v2 masking scope, log skipped guardrails louder
Greptile finding: the masking scope helper compared roles case-sensitively
while filter_messages_by_skip_flags (used to build what's actually sent to
Lakera) normalizes casing, so an uppercase-cased "System"/"TOOL" role
survived the scope filter but was excluded from the inspected list. The
resulting length mismatch raised inside the strict positional zip, turning
a maskable PII-only violation into an unhandled request failure. Lowercase
the role comparison to match.
Also, per veria-ai's finding that a skipped invalid guardrail now fails
open: log it at error level with an explicit note that the proxy is
starting without that guardrail, so it's not mistaken for routine info.
* fix(guardrails): mask maskable PII in mixed violations before advising in Lakera v2
on_flagged="inject_system_message" only masked when a violation was
PII-only; a mixed violation (PII plus a non-PII flag like prompt injection)
fell straight through to the advisory branch with the raw PII still in
place, in both async_pre_call_hook and async_moderation_hook. Mask whatever
Lakera returned location data for before appending or logging the advisory,
so a mixed violation never ships raw PII just because something else was
also flagged.
Also degrade to blocking, same as block mode already does, when nothing
can be safely masked at all (multimodal content, or messages combined with
a Responses API input field) instead of showing an advisory note next to
raw, unredacted content.
Widened call_v2_guard/_mask_pii_in_messages/the write-back helper's message
parameters from list to Sequence to match what's actually passed through
from _filter_skipped_messages, instead of duplicating list(...) casts at
every call site.
* fix(guardrails): don't hard-block advisory mode for non-PII flags on non-maskable input
Bugbot finding: gating the entire inject_system_message branch on
is_multimodal_input hard-blocked every flagged request on Responses
instructions, combined messages+input, or multimodal content, including
a prompt-injection-only violation with no PII at all. Masking safety only
matters when there's actual PII to mask; a violation with no PII needs no
masking, so the advisory should still be delivered normally.
Only degrade to blocking when the breakdown actually contains a PII
detection and masking isn't safely possible. Otherwise, mask whatever's
maskable (if any) and deliver the advisory as before.
* fix(guardrails): require payload and breakdown for Lakera v2 advisory mode
Advisory mode's mixed-violation masking safety net can only redact
detected PII when Lakera's response carries both the breakdown (to
detect a PII hit at all) and payload (the location data to mask by).
payload=False or breakdown=False alongside on_flagged='inject_system_message'
silently forwarded raw PII next to the advisory note. Reject that
combination at construction and hot-reload time instead.
* fix(guardrails): skip_system_message_in_guardrail must not force-block Lakera masking
_has_responses_instructions treated any non-empty data["instructions"]
as unsafe to mask regardless of skip_system_message_in_guardrail, even
though that flag excludes the instructions-derived synthetic system
message from what Lakera ever inspects. PII detected purely in the
maskable non-system content was force-blocked instead of masked.
Also fixes pre-existing LIT010 (missing Final) violations in
_has_responses_instructions, _breakdown_has_pii_violation, and
async_post_call_success_hook that the rebase's lowered budget ceiling
now flags.
* chore: retrigger CI (GitHub Actions runner-acquisition failure on prior push)
* fix(guardrails): address maintainer review findings on Lakera v2 advisory mode
- Gate advisory_system_message template validation on on_flagged=
'inject_system_message', since block/monitor mode never reads it.
- Allow on_flagged='inject_system_message' with mode='during_call' at
construction/hot-reload instead of rejecting it; async_moderation_hook
already degrades gracefully (masks if possible, else logs a warning).
- reinitialize_guardrail now restores the previous live instance when the
new config fails to initialize, instead of leaving the guardrail deleted
entirely with nothing enforcing it.
- PATCH /guardrails/{id} rolls back the DB write and returns 422 when the
in-memory sync rejects the new config, instead of persisting a config
that never actually took effect and returning 200.
- Qualifire now rejects on_flagged values it doesn't implement (only
Lakera should accept 'inject_system_message'; LitellmParams flattens
the field across every guardrail config mixin).
* fix(tests): satisfy lint gates and update collateral test for advisory-mode fixes
- Add match= to a too-broad pytest.raises(ValueError), and suppress the
new TQ008 mocker.patch findings (same pattern already used by sibling
scenarios in this test).
- test_init_guardrails_v2_skips_invalid_guardrail_instead_of_crashing_boot
used mode='during_call' + on_flagged='inject_system_message' as its
invalid-config example; that combination is now accepted, so swap in
the payload/breakdown-missing case and add a test confirming during_call
advisory mode constructs successfully.
* docs(CLAUDE.md): auto-capture review learnings without being asked
This session found three real bugs a human maintainer caught after eight
rounds of bot review and live-proxy verification all missed them. Add a
standing instruction to write learnings.md entries the moment a root
cause is understood, in both the repo-wide file and any relevant skill's
own file, instead of relying on being asked.
* feat(guardrails): add scan_raw_request flag so YAML order can't change enforcement
Maintainer finding on BerriAI/litellm#34940: guardrails for the same hook
run sequentially over one shared, progressively-mutated request dict, so
declaring a masking guardrail before a blocking one hides the violation
from it (200 vs 400 depending purely on YAML order).
scan_raw_request opts a guardrail into always evaluating a snapshot taken
before any guardrail in the hook ran, regardless of its declared position.
Same contract as run_in_parallel: block-only, its own mutations discarded.
Verified live: real proxy, real Gemini call, two custom guardrails (a
redactor then a blocker). Same request, same declared order -- without the
flag the blocker never sees the raw secret (200); with it, the blocker
correctly rejects before any provider call (400).
* fix(guardrails): harden scan_raw_request against review findings
- Use safe_deep_copy instead of a bare deepcopy for the raw-request
snapshot; request payloads commonly carry unpicklable objects (e.g. an
otel span in metadata), which previously raised on every guarded
request when tracing was enabled (Bugbot, High).
- Only compute the snapshot when a guardrail actually opted in, and take
it before _maybe_execute_pipelines runs, so a pipeline-mutated payload
can't hide a violation from a scan_raw_request guardrail outside the
pipeline (veria-ai).
- Log a warning when a scan_raw_request guardrail returns a modified
payload, since that mutation is discarded and the combination is
otherwise silently exploitable for a masking-capable integration
misconfigured this way (veria-ai).
* chore(openapi): regenerate lazy snapshot and dashboard schema types
The lazy OpenAPI snapshot (litellm/proxy/_lazy_openapi_snapshot.json) and
the derived dashboard schema.d.ts had drifted stale relative to the
guardrail config model changes across this PR's rounds (advisory mode,
scan_raw_request, and upstream additions picked up by rebasing).
Regenerated via the CI's own documented fix:
uv run python -m litellm.proxy._lazy_openapi_snapshot
npm run gen:api (via make check)
* chore(openapi): pick up cache_hit_filter field after rebase
* fix(guardrails): stop scan_raw_request warning from firing on every call
_process_guardrail_callback always returns a dict once a guardrail runs
(mark_pre_call_hook_ran unconditionally stamps bookkeeping metadata), so
comparing the result to non-None warned on every request even when the
guardrail never touched the payload. Compare against a bookkeeping-only
baseline instead, so only an actual content mutation triggers the warning.
* fix(guardrails): make scan_raw_request snapshots independent of safe_memory_mode
safe_deep_copy can return the original object under litellm.safe_memory_mode,
or alias a per-key reference on copy failure. Under that mode, the
scan_raw_request comparison baseline aliased raw_request_snapshot (and
therefore the live request), letting mark_pre_call_hook_ran write a
premature execution marker that a deployment-level guardrail sharing the
same name would read as "already ran" and skip. Also affected the feature's
core isolation guarantee: input_data itself could alias the live request
under the same mode. Replace every scan_raw_request snapshot with
_independent_snapshot, which never returns an alias, only a genuine copy
or None.
* fix(guardrails): gate during_call mixed-violation masking behind an actual PII check
The during_call branch for a mixed violation under on_flagged=inject_system_message
unconditionally masked and reassigned data["messages"], even for a pure
prompt-injection violation with zero PII, unlike async_pre_call_hook which
already gates the same call behind _breakdown_has_pii_violation. The
unconditional reassignment touched shared request state during a hook
documented as racing with the concurrent LLM dispatch, for no reason when
there was nothing to mask.
* fix(guardrails): stop scan_raw_request from silently no-op'ing on real requests
_independent_snapshot did one whole-dict copy.deepcopy and returned None on
any failure. Every real proxy request carries data["litellm_logging_obj"]
(a Logging instance nesting a live OTel span with a real lock) by the time
pre_call_hook runs, which can never be deep-copied, so the snapshot failed
on every real request and silently fell back to the live, unisolated data
with no warning -- defeating the entire feature in production while every
existing test (none of which set litellm_logging_obj) kept passing.
Rework the helper to deep-copy each top-level key independently, falling
back to the original reference only for the specific key that fails, same
crash tolerance as safe_deep_copy's own per-key fallback. It never returns
None now; only the keys scan_raw_request actually depends on (messages/
input, metadata/litellm_metadata) need to be genuinely independent.
* fix(guardrails): block during_call when PII can't be safely masked
Greptile finding (P1, security): async_moderation_hook's inject_system_message
branch had no equivalent to async_pre_call_hook's degrade-to-blocking case for
a PII violation on input that can't be safely masked (e.g. combined
messages+input). It fell through to the advisory no-op branch and let raw,
unredacted PII reach the model with no protection at all. Raising still
blocks the response from reaching the caller even though during_call races
with the LLM dispatch, the same mechanism on_flagged="block" already relies
on for this hook, so add the same block-instead-of-advisory branch pre_call
already has.
* chore(lint): fix LIT002 ceiling after rebase merge conflict resolution
* fix(lint): suppress genuine LIT002 hits instead of padding the ceiling
My earlier rebase conflict resolution for type-discipline-budget.json's
LIT002 limit was too low, then overcorrected by padding it well above the
actual measured count. Root-caused instead: _independent_snapshot and the
PATCH-endpoint rollback path legitimately construct plain, mutable
request-payload/config dicts (matching this file's existing precedent for
the same shape), so suppress those four sites with `# mutable-ok:` rather
than reshaping code that must stay a plain dict by contract. Set the limit
to the exact current measured total; the small remaining gap vs upstream's
own committed ceiling is pre-existing drift in litellm_internal_staging
itself (its own tree already measures over its committed limit), not
attributable to this PR.
* fix(guardrails): stamp live request when a scan_raw_request guardrail runs
_run_sequential_guardrail_callback and _run_parallel_pre_call_guardrails only
called mark_pre_call_hook_ran on throwaway snapshot copies for a
scan_raw_request guardrail, never on the live request returned to the
caller. A later async_pre_call_deployment_hook (router-level guardrail
re-check) reads that marker on live kwargs to decide whether to skip
re-running the same guardrail; since it was never stamped there, the
guardrail ran a second time on live data, doubling the external call and
re-applying whatever scan_raw_request's contract says should be discarded.
* fix(guardrails): revalidate Qualifire's on_flagged on live config reload
on_flagged was validated only in __init__. The base
CustomGuardrail.update_in_memory_litellm_params is a generic setattr loop
with no revalidation, so a live config update (PUT /guardrails/{id}, no
restart) could setattr on_flagged="inject_system_message" onto a running
instance, bypassing the constructor's rejection -- silently blocking every
flagged request under an "advisory" label. Mirrors LakeraAIGuardrail's own
update_in_memory_litellm_params override added earlier in this PR.
* fix(guardrails): honor scan_raw_request for pipeline-managed guardrails
A scan_raw_request=True guardrail that is itself a pipeline step never saw
raw_request_snapshot: PipelineExecutor.execute_steps had no way to receive
it, and pipeline-managed guardrails are fully excluded from the normal
sequential/parallel loops that implement the flag. Such a guardrail silently
evaluated whatever an earlier pass_data step in the same pipeline had
already rewritten, defeating the flag for pipeline-managed guardrails.
Moves the snapshot helper (renamed independent_snapshot) from proxy/utils.py
to litellm_core_utils/core_helpers.py so pipeline_executor.py can use the
same independent-copy logic without a circular import, threads
raw_request_snapshot through _maybe_execute_pipelines and
PipelineExecutor.execute_steps/_run_step, and discards a scan_raw_request
step's returned data the same way the sequential/parallel loops already do.
* chore(openapi): pick up upstream drift after rebase onto litellm_internal_staging
* fix(guardrails): stop attempting PII masking during during_call in Lakera v2
Greptile finding (P1, security): during_call runs concurrently with the LLM
dispatch. In the common path, the provider call already binds its messages
kwarg before this guardrail's coroutine gets a chance to run, let alone
before its own network round trip to Lakera completes -- masking here can
never reliably reach the outgoing request, and _apply_redacted_messages_back_
preserving_fields reassigns to a new list object rather than mutating in
place, so even winning the race wouldn't help. This affected both the
PII-only and mixed-violation masking branches, all added in this same PR.
Remove masking from async_moderation_hook entirely and let PII violations
fall through to the normal on_flagged branching: block under "block" or
"inject_system_message" (extending the existing multimodal-only block to
cover every PII case, since masking is proven non-functional regardless of
input shape), log-and-allow under "monitor" -- consistent with how every
other violation type in this hook is already handled.
---------
Co-authored-by: Deepanshu <deepanshu.lulla@alpha-sense.com>
LiteLLM_PromptTable is unique on (prompt_id, version, environment) and
version numbering restarts at 1 per environment, but the in-memory
registry keyed prompts as {prompt_id}.v{version} with no environment, so
environments sharing a prompt id shadowed each other and only one
environment's template ever served.
Registry entries are now keyed {versioned_id}::{environment}, and serve
time resolution goes through resolve_prompt_spec(base_id, version,
environment): production > staging > development when no environment is
requested, latest version within the chosen environment when no version
is requested. Chat requests can pin an environment with a new optional
prompt_environment body param, filtered from provider-bound params like
prompt_id and prompt_version. The newest-updated_at dedupe in
_init_prompts_in_db is dropped since registry keys can no longer
collide, and the key-parsing serve helpers plus dead registry getters
are removed
