The tool_search x bedrock_invoke cell only ever probed the first turn, so
nothing in the suite has sent a server_tool_use block back to a provider.
Every turn of a real Claude Code session after the first carries the
server_tool_use and tool_search_tool_result blocks the previous turn
produced, and that path was uncovered.
Adds probe_tool_search_multiturn, which takes the real assistant turn
back, answers any client-side tool_use with the id the model actually
emitted, and replays the whole thing as history with the tools still
declared. The assertion refuses to go green unless both server-tool
blocks made it into the replayed history, so a first turn truncated at
max_tokens reads as a failure instead of a vacuous pass.
The replay assertion's red paths never run in a green cell, so they get
markerless harness tests of their own alongside the existing
_builder_unit_tests tree.
No production code.
* fix(proxy): cache tag-name registry so unregistered request tags skip Postgres
Request tags are free-form attribution labels, so most have no LiteLLM_TagTable
row. get_tag_objects_batch never cached that absence: every tagged request ran
a find_many that came back empty, and under Prisma pool contention those
per-request queries queued for minutes inside user_api_key_auth.
Cache the bounded set of registered tag names under one aggregate key with the
management-object TTL. Uncached request tags are filtered against it before any
per-tag DB fetch, so unregistered tags cost zero DB reads on a warm path. An
empty registry is cached as a valid answer; DB errors are not cached and fall
back to the per-tag lookup; tables past TAG_REGISTRY_MAX_SIZE cache an overflow
sentinel that disables filtering. Tag create/update/delete endpoints now evict
the registry and per-tag keys and publish cross-worker invalidation (they
previously evicted nothing). The per-tag write-back also gains the management
TTL it was missing, and the hand-built tag:{name} key strings are replaced with
a shared builder.
* fix(proxy): skip per-request end-user DB reads via restricted-id registry
Every request carrying a user id ran get_end_user_object, and with high-cardinality
auto-created end-user rows (hundreds of thousands of ids, all restriction fields
NULL) the per-pod cache missed on nearly every request, so each one paid a Postgres
find_unique that queued behind the Prisma pool during background-job bursts. True
misses were never cached, and unknown ids paid the read twice per request.
Cache the bounded set of end-user ids that carry any restriction (blocked, budget,
region, default model, or object permission) under one aggregate key with the
management-object TTL. When an id misses the per-id cache and is absent from a
usable registry, get_end_user_object returns None with zero DB reads; restricted
ids keep today's fetch-and-cache path. The skip is bypassed whenever
litellm.max_end_user_budget_id is set (default budgets make unrestricted rows
behaviorally distinct from missing rows), validate_end_user_id_in_db is on
(existence checks need the row), or the token carries end_user_max_budget from
custom auth (the row's recorded spend seeds the budget counter). Empty registries
cache as a valid answer, DB errors are never cached, and oversized tables cache an
overflow sentinel that disables filtering. Customer create/update/block/delete now
evict the registry and per-id keys and publish cross-worker invalidation (they
previously evicted nothing), and the per-id write-back gains the management TTL it
was missing so Redis entries no longer live forever.
* refactor(proxy): single generic registry loader with error sentinel and single-flight
Code review follow-ups on the two registry caches. Registry DB errors now cache
the overflow sentinel for a short REGISTRY_ERROR_NEGATIVE_CACHE_TTL window and
log at warning, so a degraded Postgres stops paying the failing registry scan on
every request on top of the per-id fallback. Cold registry loads are single-flight
per worker behind per-registry locks with a recheck after acquire, so a TTL expiry
no longer fans out one full-table scan per in-flight request. The tag and end-user
loaders collapse into one _load_bounded_registry with per-entity fetch closures,
and the triplicated evict-then-broadcast protocol becomes one evict_and_broadcast
helper beside publish_auth_cache_invalidation, shared by the tag, customer, and
project eviction paths.
* chore(lint): suppress fail-safe registry excepts and ratchet BLE001 budget
* docs(proxy): trim registry cache commentary to single-line why docstrings
* fix(lint): move tag fetch return to else block to satisfy TRY300 budget
Bedrock invoke /v1/messages streaming reports cache_read_input_tokens and
cache_creation_input_tokens on message_stop.usage while attaching
amazon-bedrock-invocationMetrics to the same chunk. The stream decoder
rebuilt that chunk's usage block from inputTokenCount/outputTokenCount
alone, which exclude cache reads and writes, so the cache breakdown was
destroyed before _promote_message_stop_usage could surface it and cache
tokens were billed at $0. Merge instead of replace, and also map
cacheReadInputTokenCount/cacheWriteInputTokenCount when Bedrock reports
the cache itemization inside the invocation metrics.
Co-authored-by: Brian Cox <3924351+brian5021@users.noreply.github.com>
Azure rejects the legacy `max_tokens` key for the whole gpt-5 name family, but
`AzureOpenAIGPT5Config.is_model_gpt_5_model` deliberately excludes `gpt-5-chat*`
so those deployments fall through to `AzureOpenAIConfig`, which sends `max_tokens`
verbatim and gets a 400 back on every request that carries it, `/health` probes
included.
One predicate was answering two independent questions. Split it: the new
`AzureOpenAIConfig.requires_max_completion_tokens` covers the whole gpt-5 name
family and drives only the rename, while `is_model_gpt_5_model` keeps keying
reasoning_effort, the temperature clamp and the dropped penalties off the
reasoning question, so #13781 stays fixed.
Adds an opt-in operator allow-list, litellm_settings::bedrock_request_metadata_fields, that forwards LiteLLM key, team and end-user identity plus client spend_logs_metadata into Bedrock request metadata so Bedrock spend can be grouped in AWS Cost Explorer.
Covers all three Bedrock surfaces: the Converse body requestMetadata field, and a signed X-Amzn-Bedrock-Request-Metadata header on Invoke chat completions and on Invoke /v1/messages, where the header is the only viable leg.
The resolver reads both metadata variable names, reserves the whole user_api_key_ prefix against caller-supplied keys, caps the client slot budget explicitly at 16 minus the reserved count, and drops rather than rejects auto-injected values that violate Bedrock constraints. Caller-supplied requestMetadata keeps its existing 400 semantics.
The request-metadata field and header are proxy-owned whenever forwarding is enabled. A caller-supplied value, reachable through the generic extra_headers passthrough, is dropped unconditionally and compared case-insensitively, and is replaced only by the proxy's own value, so identity in the AWS billing record cannot be forged. Absence of a resolved value still means absence on the wire rather than a fallback to the caller's. The guardrail headers keep their existing no-displace behaviour.
* fix(guardrails): scan text on /guardrails/apply_guardrail for Azure Content Safety
The two Azure Content Safety guardrails never implemented apply_guardrail, so the
endpoint fell through to the base no-op and answered 200 with the caller's text
echoed back, having scanned nothing.
Implementing that method also flips the proxy's unified-vs-native dispatch, which
would move request traffic off these guardrails' own hooks. Add an opt-out that
keeps every lifecycle event on the native hooks, so only the endpoint changes.
* test(guardrails): cover the remaining native-hook opt-out dispatch sites
Adds regression tests for the parallel post-call path, the MCP post-call hook, and
the policy engine step, so every read of the opt-out flag fails when removed.
- decode upstream first frame as utf-8 instead of ascii
- reject model-restricted keys at connect to match HTTP model enforcement
- log the actual request path for /openai_passthrough traffic
The log details drawer moved off Ant Design in 03d2b16bc, so its section
header renders lucide ChevronUp/ChevronDown rather than antd's UpOutlined
and DownOutlined. The collapse test still waited on .anticon-up and
.anticon-down, which no longer exist anywhere under view_logs, so it
failed on every run and burned all three attempts identically.
Point the three assertions at .lucide-chevron-up and .lucide-chevron-down,
matching how the dashboard's other suites address lucide icons.
Resolves the transform_create_file_response conflict by keeping the
_uploaded_object_size handoff over the response Content-Length read,
and adds the rebind-ok justification LIT011 now requires for the
upload-size litellm_params handoff after the base budget ratcheted.
* fix(panw_prisma_airs): scan tool call args as plain text, not a tool_event
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(panw_prisma_airs): type the tool call argument extractor
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(panw_prisma_airs): cover tool call error fallback and dict masking paths
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(panw_prisma_airs): scan tool names with args and tolerate custom tool calls
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(panw_prisma_airs): scan tool call arguments that arrive already parsed
The tool call slice types arguments as a string, so a client posting parsed JSON
failed validation and the whole tool call, name included, read as unscannable and
was skipped without ever reaching AIRS. The OpenAI request path forwards
client-supplied tool_calls verbatim, so that shape is reachable.
Coerce non-string arguments instead of rejecting them, so the content is scanned.
* fix(panw_prisma_airs): route tool-block masked data by scan side, not by key name
Merging #37036 (already on staging) with this PR produces no conflict and a
silent bug. #37036 withholds prompt_masked_data on response-side tool blocks,
which was right while tool calls went out as a request-side tool_event: AIRS
reported the model's arguments under that key. This PR scans tool calls as
ordinary prompt/response text, so the side of the scan now decides which key
holds what. The model's arguments arrive under response_masked_data, already
covered by _CLIENT_HIDDEN_SCAN_FIELDS, and prompt_masked_data goes back to
being the caller's own input -- one of the audit fields LIT-5638 asks for.
Left as merged, a response-side tool block drops that field with nothing to
flag it.
- Tool-path block branch calls _build_error_detail without also_hide
- also_hide parameter removed; after this change it has no callers
- Regression test asserts both directions: model output withheld, caller
input preserved. It fails against the auto-merged combination.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(panw_prisma_airs): a wrong-typed tool name must not suppress the scan
_ToolCallFunctionSlice types name as str, and _get_tool_call_function turns any
ValidationError into (None, None), which _scan_tool_calls_for_guardrail reads as
an unscannable tool call and skips. So a client posting "name": 123 keeps its
arguments off the wire to AIRS entirely -- no error, no log, no block. The
OpenAI request path forwards client tool_calls verbatim, so this is reachable by
any caller holding a valid key.
_coerce_arguments already existed for exactly this failure mode on the sibling
field. Widening it to cover name closes the gap:
name='transfer_funds' AIRS called: 1x args scanned: True
name=123 (int) AIRS called: 0x args scanned: False <- before
name=123 (int) AIRS called: 1x args scanned: True <- after
Reported by Cursor Bugbot on fd9f6396e5.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Yucheng Zhu <yucheng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This cell needs the websearch_interception callback and a declared search
backend, both listed in its own module docstring. The ephemeral e2e stack
ships neither, so the request falls through to the bedrock transformation
and takes the by-design 400 that tells you to enable interception.
The cell has never been green here: the error path merged about an hour and
a half before the cell did, and the last full suite to pass predates the
cell entirely. Skip it with the reason recorded so the run reports honestly
instead of carrying a permanent red, and unskip once the stack ships the
config the docstring already spells out.
Both providers reworded the error strings these two cells pinned, so the
suite went red without any behavior changing. Anthropic's auth error is now
"API key is invalid." rather than "invalid x-api-key", and OpenAI rejects an
empty upload with "This model does not support the format you provided.",
which names neither "file" nor "audio".
Assert the durable shape instead. The otel cell pins the machine-readable
authentication_error type plus a non-empty message, and the embedded JSON
still has to parse, which is what proves the attribute survived untruncated.
The transcription cell pins that the 400 relays the provider's own rejection
and is typed as a client input error, so a regression that swallows the
provider reason or returns a 500 still fails.
The google ai studio responses test still asserted tools == [], but the
transformation now pops empty tools and tool_choice before calling
completion, so assert the keys are absent.
test_openai_endpoints pinned claude-3-sonnet-20240229, which Bedrock has
retired; move it to us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929-v1:0.
The AssemblyAI EU passthrough test depended on a credential that no longer
resolves in CI, and the US path plus the bad-key case already cover the
route; drop it rather than keep a permanently red case.
The playground, logs drawer and AI Hub modal moved off antd, so the specs
that reached for .ant-select, .ant-drawer-content, .ant-modal and
.ant-radio-button-wrapper no longer match anything and time out.
Address the same controls through their accessible role and name instead,
which holds across the component library swap and reads closer to what a
user does.
* fix(guardrails): return the full PANW AIRS scan response on blocked requests
The blocked-request error detail was assembled from a hardcoded allowlist, so audit fields like prompt_detection_details, prompt_masked_data, source, transaction_id and session_id never reached the client even though AIRS returned them.
Resolves LIT-5638
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* style(guardrails): drop redundant comment in AIRS error detail
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(panw_prisma_airs): withhold response_masked_data from the blocked-response error
The full AIRS passthrough also reached the response-side block path, where
response_masked_data carries the model's own generation. That branch is only
reached when mask_response_content is False, so the operator had explicitly
declined to deliver that text, and the error body handed it back anyway.
Withhold response_masked_data from the client-visible detail. prompt_masked_data
stays: it is the caller's own input and one of the fields the ticket asks for.
Every other AIRS field, including prompt_detection_details, source,
transaction_id and session_id, is unchanged.
* fix(panw_prisma_airs): withhold generated tool args from response-side blocks
_scan_tool_calls_for_guardrail calls AIRS with is_response=False because
tool_event is request-side in the AIRS schema, so AIRS returns the scanned
tool arguments under prompt_masked_data. When the tool calls being scanned
are the model's own output, that key holds generated content, and the
_CLIENT_HIDDEN_SCAN_FIELDS default (response_masked_data, empty on this
path) does not cover it. With the default mask_response_content=False the
block branch then shipped the model's masked tool arguments in the 400 --
the same content channel this PR closed for response_masked_data.
_build_error_detail takes an extra_hidden_fields argument so the withholding
stays in one place, and the tool-call block branch passes prompt_masked_data
when is_response is True. Request-side blocks are unchanged and still carry
prompt_masked_data, which is what LIT-5638 asks for.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style(panw_prisma_airs): apply ruff format
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Yucheng Zhu <yucheng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Probe the column before the scheduler registers CheckBatchCost, closing the window where a retrieve that decided the poller was inactive billed a batch the first poll cycle then billed again. Also drop narration docstrings and section banners from the new tests.
The retrieve path now defers a managed batch's accounting to CheckBatchCost, which
bills the key, team, and tags stored on the managed object row. The /v1/batches
create hook never persisted api_key or request_tags there (only the passthrough
creates did), so the poller attributed the cost to the user alone and the creating
key's spend stayed at zero.
* fix(ptu): stop a PTU deployment billing for grounded search
A PTU deployment is billed by the flat cost of its reserved capacity, so the
model write endpoints refuse a rate the caller supplies and zero the ones already
stored. search_context_cost_per_query escaped both: it holds its rates in a table
keyed by context size, and the guard only recognised a number as a price, so a
grounded request on a PTU deployment kept billing per search on top of the flat
cost.
A table now counts as a price when it holds a non-zero rate. It is zeroed in
place rather than emptied the way tiered_pricing is, because an absent table
means the provider's own default rate rather than free, so dropping it would
start a charge instead of stopping one. For the same reason an all-zero table is
not read as a price: it is how an operator expresses free.
* fix(ptu): zero the search rate on every PTU deployment
A deployment that never stored its own search table is the normal case, and an
absent table means the provider's default rate, so the zeroing has to be written
unconditionally the way the per-token zeros already are. Writing it only where a
table was already stored left the default path billing per grounded search, which
is the charge this set out to stop.
The predicate that reads a table is split out rather than recursing, since the
repo's recursion gate rejects an unignored recursive function and one level is
all a rate table needs.
