* test: retire tests/old_proxy_tests, which holds no tests
Twenty files named test_*.py, and pytest collects nothing from any of them:
uv run pytest tests/old_proxy_tests --collect-only -q
no tests collected, 16 errors in 114.17s
They are manual snippets against a running proxy, written at module level with
no test function, no assertion and no entry point, so the only thing the name
buys them is a place on the coverage allowlist. Sixteen of the twenty cannot
even be imported in this environment, wanting langchain, llama_index or
google.api_core, and ten still point at 0.0.0.0:8000, which stopped being the
proxy's default port some time ago.
Nothing outside the directory refers to it apart from the allowlist entry, which
goes with it. The other loose contents go too: five load_test_*.py scripts, a
bursty variant, two committed log files, an essay fixture and a stray .js
snippet.
Allowlist paths 88 -> 68, test files 2422 -> 2402, and no job loses anything it
was running. Recoverable from history if a snippet turns out to be someone's
habit.
* test: drop the retired old_proxy_tests paths from the coverage allowlist
The agent job's CircleCI glob collected `tests/agent_tests/**/test_*.py` and then
piped it through `grep -v` to drop `local_only_agent_tests/`. `assert_ci_coverage.py`
reads the glob but not the pipeline, so those two files looked covered and were
invisible to the census. The glob now excludes them structurally and they carry an
allowlist entry instead, which is a decision on the record rather than a hidden
filter. The collected file set is unchanged: `tests/agent_tests/` holds exactly one
CI-runnable test at the top level.
`tests/scim_tests/` held a single JSON fixture and no tests, referenced from nowhere.
`.github/workflows/` is for workflows. Both stray scripts move to `.github/scripts/`
with their callers updated: the price-file updater is invoked by
`auto_update_price_and_context_window.yml`, and the translation-report runner by
`make test-llm-translation`. The audit listed the latter as orphaned, but Makefile
line 317 still runs it, so it moves rather than being deleted.
The rollout heads-up workflow was a deliberate one-shot for the agent-shin rollout.
That rollout is done, the triage and auto-close workflows have been running daily
since June, so the pre-flip warning window is long past. Its script and dedicated
test go with it, and the sibling workflow-invariant test drops its entry.
Nine workflow files existed only to make a single call to _test-unit-base.yml
with a different test-path. Adding a shard meant adding a file; changing
anything shared meant editing nine. One matrix caller replaces them, so a shard
is now one entry.
Check names are unchanged, which is the whole constraint. A reusable-workflow
job reports as "<job name> / <inner job name>", so setting `name` to the shard id
alone reproduces today's context strings exactly: the eleven the matrix produces
are eleven of the twenty-three "/ Run tests" contexts the branch ruleset
requires, matched string for string. No ruleset edit is needed and none should
be made for this.
Every matrix entry states its timeouts even where they equal the base defaults.
An absent matrix key renders as an empty string rather than falling back, and an
empty string is not a number, so a partially-specified entry would fail the call.
tests/proxy_unit_tests keeps test-unit-proxy-db.yml. It is already a matrix and
its shard-coverage guard reads that file by name, so folding it in belongs with
generalising that guard into assert_ci_coverage.py rather than here. Its twelve
shards are the remaining required contexts.
test-unit-documentation.yml stays too: it does not call the base workflow.
A 503 from POST /revoke means the proxy could not write the single-use record, so clearing the local record left a live refresh token nobody could revoke and a hint to retry with nothing left to retry. lite logout now keeps the record, exits 1, and asks to be run again shortly. A refused or unreachable revocation still clears the record and warns as before, and a re-login that replaces a record keeps its existing warning because the new record already stands
revoke_refresh_token discarded the single-use claim result, so a revocation that arrived while Redis was unreachable answered 200 and left the refresh token live. The token endpoint reported the same outage as invalid_grant "already used". The guard now reports first, replayed, or unavailable, and both endpoints answer 503 temporarily_unavailable for an outage (RFC 7009 section 2.2.1, RFC 6749 section 5.2), which the CLI surfaces as a one-line warning while keeping the key it has
The lite group resolves the stored key once for every command and renews a --pkce key on the way in. lite up then asked the token file again, so every start sent a second refresh to the proxy, and once the refresh token was burned the refusal printed twice. _ensure_fresh_login now reuses the key the group resolved when the group read it from the token file, and only re-reads the file after the interactive login it starts itself. Also covers print-token through the group with a renewing session in the tests
The cli group already resolves the stored key for the server it was pointed
at, so print-token re-ran the renewal and, when the refresh token had been
revoked, posted to /token twice and printed the reason twice. print-token now
reuses the group's result whenever the stored record was issued for that
server and no --api-key or LITELLM_PROXY_API_KEY took precedence, and only
resolves the key itself when invoked bare for a different server.
A PKCE credential whose renewal is refused (for example after lite logout ran
on another copy of it) used to fail lite auth print-token with the classic
'Token expired. Run lite login again' hint and no reason, while lite whoami
already named lite login --pkce. fresh_api_key now reports why a renewal
failed through a warn callback whenever no sibling rotation rescued it, the
CLI prints that reason on stderr, and the expiry hint names the command that
produced the credential. Both READMEs document the admin revocation semantics
and the Redis precondition for refresh single use on several workers.
The stamp both orders the two stores and drives is_cli_token_fresh, and
nothing tied the two together, so a login that inherits a stamp from the
future could stop being a deliberate trade without anything failing.
Also corrects the lint-format-check-changed comment: git pathspecs match
recursively, so the target checks a superset of the CI step rather than
an identical set.
Discovery checks that every endpoint sits on the proxy origin, but the CLI's
requests.Session followed redirects, and requests replays a POST body on
307 and 308, so a token or revocation endpoint answering with one of those
would have sent the code and verifier, or the refresh token, wherever
Location pointed. Every POST now goes out with allow_redirects=False and a
3xx answer fails the command with a message naming where it pointed
A proxy on the default remote cost map never produced a prompt cache
breakpoint: the published map has the gpt-5.6 entries without
supports_prompt_cache_breakpoint, so the model-map gate returned False
for every listed model and only LITELLM_LOCAL_MODEL_COST_MAP=True (the
repo .env, hence the passing unit tests) made the feature work. The hook
now honors the flag when the entry carries one, True or False, and
otherwise applies the GPT-5.6+ version rule to the model name, so a map
that lags the flag still gets the OpenAI dialect. The model-map tests
pin litellm.model_cost to the bundled backup map and a new test drives
the hook against an unflagged gpt-5.6 entry.
completion() and acompletion() take base_url as an alias for api_base
that only lands on api_base after the cache control hook ran, so a
GPT-5.6 call at a non-OpenAI gateway given through base_url still got
the dialect. Both seed calls and the unstamped request-params read now
look at base_url too.
ResponsesAPIRequestUtils.merge_prompt_management_input reshaped hook
output in place, retyping text parts to input_text on the caller's own
message objects. The merge now shapes a copy of each message as it
emits it, so the identity-based merge keeps working on the hook's
objects and nothing the hook or the client owns is mutated.
The consent page offers the team picker, but a form posted without a team
sealed a teamless grant and the token endpoint minted an unscoped
credential for a team member, escaping the team attribution classic lite
login always applies. The minter now refuses such a grant on redemption
and refresh alike; memberships whose team rows are gone still count as no
team so they cannot lock a user out
FakeSecretVault could only stand in for a discarding backend by passing
KeyringDiscardsWrites as its `failure`, which also made read() and erase()
hand it back. Neither SecretRead nor SecretErase admits that outcome and the
real KeyringVault never produces it there, so the login path's match was
falling through on a value it can never see. Give the double a `discards`
flag that reports it from write() alone, which is what the null backend does.
Also widen lint-format-check-changed's pathspec. Git wildmatch runs without
FNM_PATHNAME here, so 'litellm/**/*.py' still requires an intermediate
directory and silently skipped all 21 top-level modules, litellm/__init__.py
and litellm/main.py among them. All 21 already pass ruff format.
The cache control hook also runs on litellm.responses() input. On a
GPT-5.6 deployment it wrapped a string-content item into a chat-shaped
{"type": "text"} part, which the Responses API rejects, and it never
marked input_text, input_image or input_file parts, so no breakpoint and
no prompt_cache_options reached the provider. Add the Responses part
types to the eligible block set and translate chat-shaped text parts on
non-assistant items to input_text in
ResponsesAPIRequestUtils.merge_prompt_management_input, which both the
async and the sync prompt management sites go through.
The dialect also fired for any GPT-5.6 name that resolved to provider
openai, including deployments pointed at a custom api_base that does not
understand prompt_cache_breakpoint. Decide it once per request from the
provider, the model map and the resolved api_base (request, then
litellm.api_base, then OPENAI_BASE_URL / OPENAI_API_BASE): only
api.openai.com and *.api.openai.com hosts speak the dialect, a top-level
prompt_cache_options opts a custom target in, and litellm_proxy/ targets
never get it. maybe_seed_default_injection_points takes api_base and
stamps the finished decision on the points as _litellm_openai_dialect so
the sync completion() path, whose hook params do not carry api_base,
honors it; maybe_inject_cache_control takes api_base from the
/v1/messages handler.
Eligibility now comes from a supports_prompt_cache_breakpoint model map
flag on the OpenAI gpt-5.6 entries, exposed through
litellm.utils.supports_prompt_cache_breakpoint, with the GPT version rule
kept only for models the map does not know. The OpenAI dialect no longer
reserves a slot for tool_config points, which OpenAI has no cache block
for, and with_prompt_cache_breakpoint plus the chat bridge helper return
a new block instead of mutating their input.
A login the keychain took but the token file could not record leaves the
keychain naming a later sign-in than the file does. Reading only the file
then stamps the next login below that keychain entry, and a clock that
went back far enough puts the superseded credential back in use.
The comment above the extra named cryptography as one of the heavy imports a
thin install leaves out. That stopped being true when keyring joined the
extra: on Linux it reaches the Secret Service through secretstorage, which
depends on cryptography.
The stamp in the keychain entry is what decides that secret against one still
sitting in the token file, and it came straight off the wall clock. A clock
that stepped backwards between two logins therefore handed the win to the
older of them: a login the keychain took but the token file could not be
pointed at was resolved back to the credential it replaced, and the fresh one
was erased from the keychain on the way past.
save_cli_token now reads the stamp already on disk and pins the new sign-in
just above it, so the ordering never depends on the clock having moved
forwards. On a clock that did, this changes nothing.
The two stores hold different credentials on that path, so the rollback a
migration does would hand the superseded one back out. The login that could not
replace the file already named the state, and logout reports it too.
A login the keychain accepted whose token file could not be replaced left the
superseded secret on disk, and the next load preferred the file unconditionally,
so it served the old credential and erased the new one from the keychain on the
way past. The keychain entry now carries the timestamp of the sign-in that minted
it, and the two stores are compared on that instead.
The discovery document is accepted only when its issuer is the --base-url the user
typed and every endpoint and the resource share that origin (RFC 8414 section 3.3),
so a tampered or redirected document can no longer point the code, verifier, or
refresh token at another host. After a failed refresh the re-read token record is
used only when it continues the same credential (same proxy, token endpoint, and
resource) and has not expired, so a concurrent login against a different proxy can
never hand this one its key
When the resolved deployment is provider openai and the model is GPT-5.6 or
newer, the cache control hook now writes prompt_cache_breakpoint on the
targeted content block and sets prompt_cache_options to explicit mode unless
the caller already passed one. The /v1/messages bridges carry the marker
through (the Responses bridge moves a marked system prompt into a developer
message, since top-level instructions cannot hold one). Breakpoint counting
and the stand-down check recognise both marker kinds, and client breakpoints
already present in messages are no longer subtracted from the cap twice.
Fixes#37509
A pre-flight that times out leaves its write parked inside the keychain, holding
it against every later call, so the next read blocks on the main thread with no
timeout of its own. Anything that resolves the credential more than once in a
process hits it: an SDK Client built a second time never returns.
The vault now remembers the silence and reports the keychain unreachable for the
rest of the process rather than queueing behind the parked call.
The two tests that assert on reasoning cost read reasoning_tokens off the
response and required it to be nonzero, without ever asking the model to
reason. Both now send reasoning_effort, so the assertion rests on a
parameter the test sets rather than on the model's default behavior.
The cache-breakdown test sends it on its prime call too: OpenAI's prefix
cache keys on the reasoning setting as well as the tokens, so priming at
a different effort never produces a read.
The proxy's OAuth authorization server (dynamic registration, PKCE S256,
loopback redirects, single-use codes, refresh rotation) gains a proxy-API
audience: /authorize?resource=<proxy origin> renders a consent page with
team selection and /token mints the same per-user credential lite login
mints, so a native CLI can sign a user in through the system browser and
call /v1/* with user and team attribution. Adds GET /.well-known/litellm-cli-auth
as the versioned discovery contract for non-Python clients, POST /revoke
(RFC 7009) for logout, and lite login --pkce, lite logout, and
lite auth print-token on the CLI side. Proxy-API grants only ever redirect
to a loopback address and the server never picks a team on the user's behalf.
Fixes#37332
Both /v1/messages bridges (Responses API adapter for openai/* and the
chat-completions adapter) now derive prompt_cache_key from the first 64
characters of metadata.user_id, next to the existing user mapping. The
chat bridge only sets it when the resolved provider advertises
prompt_cache_key in its supported params, so providers that reject
unknown params are unaffected. A prompt_cache_key sent explicitly by the
client always wins over the derived value.
Fixes#37508
`lite up` treats a token record whose key the keychain would not hand over as no
login at all, and that clause had no test: every existing freshness test passed a
record carrying a real key, so deleting the clause left the whole suite green
The base install smoke check now also asserts keyring is absent, which is what
makes the lazy import in cli_keyring meaningful. keyring ships in the cli extra
only, so a plain `pip install litellm` must not be able to reach it
When a full disk refuses the replacement file and a read-only token file
refuses the rewrite in place, the only way left to get the secret off disk
is to remove the file carrying it. That file was also the note saying the
keychain went unchecked, so its absence made the next logout read a
keychain that was never confirmed as one already known to be clean.
Removing it is what frees the room the replacement was refused for, so the
note is written again on the way out and the logout after this one still
warns.
The forwarded-keys record moves off the shared metadata dict onto the
per-request kwargs, where _update_kwargs_with_deployment consumes it, so
sibling requests that share a metadata dict (abatch_completion) can no
longer clear it mid-routing. Per-tier litellm_params from the hook
response are never treated as forwarded marker params, and a deployment
only beats a forwarded value when it sets its own, not when it carries a
LiteLLM_Params default such as merge_reasoning_content_in_choices=False.
The final streaming usage frame only carries usage.cost when the proxy runs
with litellm_settings.include_cost_in_streaming_usage: true, and that flag is
readable only off the module-level litellm setting. There is no header, key,
or management route that turns it on per request, so a test cannot ask the
shared e2e proxy for it, and the proxy's config does not live in this repo.
The registry row stays as an uncovered gap with the reason recorded, rather
than being deleted, so the behavior is still on the list of things we want
covered once the gateway config is reachable.
The StreamOptions model, ChatBody.stream_options, Usage.cost, and
AnthropicMessagesResponse.id existed only for that test, so they go with it.
- accept the Live SDK's models/<id> and LiteLLM's vertex_ai/<id> when rewriting the setup model
- keep a dict service account intact instead of stringifying it
- treat same-target deployments holding different credentials as ambiguous
- guard both websocket states before every close so a second close cannot raise
- build the sendable close codes from the public CloseCode enum
Five e2e tests over routes a customer drives through the gateway, each one
pinning a fix that currently has no live coverage.
The dedicated /openai_passthrough prefix used to be swallowed by the
provider-scoped /{provider}/v1/files and /{provider}/v1/batches routes, which
bound "openai_passthrough" as a provider name and failed inside the gateway
before ever reaching OpenAI. Two tests now upload a file and list batches
through that prefix and assert OpenAI's own objects come back.
Streamed /openai_passthrough/v1/responses and /openai_passthrough/v1/embeddings
are relayed to OpenAI but still have to be costed, since the customer budgets
against this traffic. Both used to land a row the gateway could not use: the
streamed responses call logged a zero-cost row under a random id, and
embeddings wrote no row at all. Each test now reconciles the logged spend and
token counts against the response the caller was actually served.
GET /v1/files narrowed its data to the caller's own rows but left first_id and
last_id addressing the shared provider account's page, handing any caller raw
provider file ids belonging to other tenants. The new test asserts both cursors
address rows in the page the caller can see.
ResourceManager.defer now accepts any callable rather than one returning None,
so a delete that answers with a response model can be deferred as-is.
An `auto_router/<alias>` marker entry's litellm_params (for example
`aws_region_name: eu-west-3`) were forwarded onto every routed call with
setdefault and then won the `{**litellm_params, **kwargs}` merge against
the selected tier's own values, so a Bedrock tier pinned to us-east-1 was
called in eu-west-3 and failed with 400.
The hook now records which keys it actually forwarded on the request's
metadata bucket, and `_update_kwargs_with_deployment` drops every
forwarded key the selected deployment defines itself, so marker params
only fill gaps a tier leaves open. Request-supplied values still win over
both. The stamp is stripped from logged metadata like its siblings.
Fixes#37613
`lite whoami` led with "Authenticated" whenever a token file was on disk, even when the
keychain holding the credential would not give it up. The notice about that sat below the
account lines, so the session read as a working one and sent the user looking for the
problem anywhere but the keychain
Taking the secret out of ~/.litellm/token.json stages a replacement and moves it into
place, which needs room for a second file and a directory that will accept a new entry.
A full disk refuses the first and a read-only ~/.litellm the second, and logout gave up
there: it removed the file when it could, dropping the record that the keychain had never
been confirmed clear, so the logout after it reported a clean keychain it never checked
Shortening the file already in place needs neither, so the logout scrub and the legacy
migration now fall back to overwriting it where it lies. On a read-only ~/.litellm the
logout the user asked for now happens, instead of coming back with instructions to delete
the file by hand
On models without supports_mid_conversation_system, a system entry between
an assistant tool_use turn and the user tool_result turn became a user turn
in that position and the provider rejected the request ("tool_use ids were
found without tool_result blocks immediately after"). That run of entries
now goes right after the tool_result turn, where consecutive user turns
merge upstream. The converted turn also carries only role and content, as
the hoist did, so an entry with extra keys no longer 400s with "Extra
inputs are not permitted".
The e2e cache priming re-sends the identical first turn until its own cache
entry reads back before the reminder turn goes out, since Vertex can take a
few seconds to serve a freshly written entry.
Take the resolver and its timeout as parameters of the bounded helper and
bind the vertex one once at module level, so the timeout tests drive an
injected fake instead of patching a shared singleton.
A ~/.litellm that has gone read-only, or one left root-owned by a sudo login,
refuses both the scrubbed rewrite and the removal. The removal was unguarded,
so 'lite logout' ended in a PermissionError traceback with the credential still
readable in the file. It now comes back as an outcome the command reports,
naming the file and what to do about it, and a file that holds no secret is
still not worth alarming anyone over.
