Adds temp_budget_increase and temp_budget_expiry to the team member edit form with pair validation,
seeds stored values into edit mode, sends both through /team/member_update, and adds cached-key auth
and reservation regression tests for active and expired increases
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
assert_never landed in typing in 3.11, so importing it from typing broke the
3.10 import smoke job and the py310 typing gate. Take it from typing_extensions
like the rest of the proxy does.
Also drop /team/update from test_neighbouring_team_routes_stay_closed. The route
is self-managed now, so the coarse gate admits the caller and update_team decides,
which the sibling test in the same file already asserts.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_018PUCupsaarVLJy4iDFx256
Team admins could never reach POST /team/update: the route gate answered
401 before the handler's team-admin branch ran. This moves /team/update
into the self-managed routes, resolves proxy admin, org admin or team
admin inside the handler, and filters team admins through a new
proxy-wide UI setting, team_admin_editable_team_fields. The setting is
an allow-list of team fields. Empty means team admins cannot edit team
settings and get a 403 pointing at the proxy admin, and changing a field
outside the list fails 403 naming that field. Only values that differ
from what is stored count, since the dashboard resends the whole form.
The registry of fields the setting accepts ships empty on purpose. Each
field lands in its own follow-up PR with its value diff and dashboard
wiring. The Admin UI gains a "Team admin editable fields" section under
Settings > UI and a toast on the team page while editing is disabled.
Refs LIT-5722
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01A6SkwJdfZUmkzfUkrEkqX8
A budget bypass that ships off by default stays open for every deployment
that does not know to look for the flag, so `enforce_fallback_budget` now
defaults to true and `general_settings.enforce_fallback_budget: false` is
the opt-out for anyone who wants the old unguarded behaviour back.
BREAKING CHANGE: a paid fallback target is now refused for callers who are
over their key or user `max_budget`. Deployments relying on fallbacks to
keep serving over-budget callers must set enforce_fallback_budget: false.
Budget is enforced once during auth, against the requested model group.
`_is_model_cost_zero` waives every budget check for a zero-cost group, and the
router then picks a fallback target afterwards, inside `run_async_fallback`,
where nothing re-checks budget. A free model with a paid fallback therefore
bills with no budget gate at all.
Add `fallback_budget_check`, the budget sibling of the existing
`fallback_access_check`: a predicate awaited per fallback target that skips
targets the caller cannot pay for. The primary attempt is untouched, so a
zero-cost model is never blocked by budget and only the paid fallback is
refused.
Counter reads pass `max_budget` so `get_current_spend` verifies against
authoritative recorded spend, matching the auth-time key and user checks; a
counter restored from an older snapshot reads as a hit rather than a clean
miss, so without it a stale-low value would keep admitting paid fallbacks.
A zero-cost fallback target is always allowed, and a team key does not inherit
the key owner's personal budget unless `apply_user_budget_to_team_keys` is set,
matching `_PROXY_MaxBudgetLimiter`.
Scope is key and user budgets. Team, team-member, end-user, org, global and
per-model budgets are not covered yet: those auth-path functions enforce rather
than report, so reusing them would fire threshold alerts and take spend
reservations for a target that is then skipped. Two limitations of that scope
are documented in the module docstring: the check reads the spend counter
rather than reserving against it, so concurrent fallbacks can cross a cap
together; and a request reaching the router without
`metadata["user_api_key_auth"]` is not restricted. Both are shared with
`fallback_model_access.py`.
Opt-in via `general_settings.enforce_fallback_budget`.
Relates to #41344
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Drop the model_access_denied_message setting, its {model} template, the DB
override entry and the Admin UI field. Model access denials now always return
the fixed client message while the allowlist diagnostic is logged at the final
HTTP, realtime and MCP boundaries
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
A team can now carry a per-model budget map that every key on the team
inherits. A key's own model_max_budget entry for the same model takes
precedence, so it is gated on and billed to the key alone.
Backend: NewTeamRequest/UpdateTeamRequest accept model_max_budget (validated
like the key-level field, enterprise gated); the value is hydrated onto
UserAPIKeyAuth via the token view, TeamGrants and the carried budget state;
_check_team_model_budget enforces it in the centralized common checks; the
limiter meters spend under team_model_spend:<team>:<model>:<duration> and
skips the team counter when the key overrides; /team/update lets only a
proxy admin raise, re-window or drop a cap; /team/info exposes usage.
The Anthropic context-management compaction summary subrequest runs the
same team gate. Both fallback token-view SQL definitions project the column.
UI: team create and edit forms reuse the key-level ModelMaxBudgetEditor,
premium gated, sending {} to clear and omitting unchanged fields.
A key entry overrides the team cap only when it spend-gates the model
(non-negative max_budget); a row that only carries tpm/rpm limits or a
negative cap leaves the team cap in force.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Post-auth denials from can_key_call_resolved_model (per-request alias
rewrite, MCP sampling, realtime) never reach the auth exception handler,
so the internal allowlist reason was dropped when
model_access_denied_message was set. Log it once from the ProxyException
response handler and the realtime rejection path instead, and convert
JWT ModelAccessDeniedHTTPException into the specialized ProxyException so
the same boundary covers it
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Move the WARNING that carries the internal denial detail out of the message formatter and into the auth exception handler. The denial exceptions now carry internal_message so access-group probes and fallback paths that catch and recover from the denial no longer log a false denial for an allowed request
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Match the pass-through skip to what FastAPI actually dispatched (the user-defined
endpoint marker or a provider handler's {endpoint:path} param) instead of the
mapped route prefixes, which also cover native routes such as /openai/v1/responses
and /cursor/chat/completions. Wrap the added test lines to the 120-column limit.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Skip router_settings.model_group_alias resolution on registered pass-through
routes, rebuild the rewritten body from the cached client payload instead of the
auth-enriched request_data, and centralize the resolved-scope sentinel in
litellm/constants.py
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Key and team router_settings.model_group_alias aliases were resolved only after the key/team model allowlist checks ran, so a key allowed the alias target was denied when it requested the alias. Resolve the alias during auth and rewrite the request body to the target before the allowlist checks. The alias the client sent is kept in the request scope so the response model still echoes it.
Resolves LIT-3054
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Add litellm_settings.model_access_denied_message, a template ({model} placeholder) returned to clients instead of the detailed "can only access models=[...]" text on key/team/user/org/project and team-member model access denials. The full denial reason is still written to the proxy logs at WARNING. Unset keeps the existing detailed message, status codes and error types are unchanged.
Expose the new setting and the existing expose_router_debug_in_errors flag in the Admin UI general settings (String editor, Boolean toggle with an explicit True default) and allow both as safe DB overrides so they persist and propagate across workers.
Resolves LIT-5283
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
A key inside a team with model_rpm_limit / model_tpm_limit in team metadata could not
override those limits for itself: the v3 limiter always added the team's per-model
descriptor next to the key's, so the tighter team limit won. The docs already say the
resolution order is key metadata > key model_max_budget > team metadata
get_key_own_model_rate_limit returns only what the key sets on itself, and the team
descriptor now carries only the metrics the key does not override, so an rpm-only
override still leaves the team tpm pool enforced
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Auth gate rejections are raised before add_litellm_data_to_request stamps the caller User-Agent and SpendLogsMetadata dropped the field, so failure spend logs and prometheus labels could not identify an abusive client. Stamp requester_ip_address and user_agent on the failure hook payload and carry user_agent through spend log metadata. Request scopes without a headers entry are tolerated.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
