* fix(proxy): default max_idle_connection_lifetime to 60s on DB URLs
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): regenerate schema.d.ts for database_max_idle_connection_lifetime
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): keep URL-pinned max_idle_connection_lifetime over config value
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ui): keep litellm_credential_name from LiteLLM Params JSON when no credential is selected
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(ui): drop null litellm_credential_name from AddModelPanel payload fixture
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ui): validate JSON litellm_credential_name against accessible credentials
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): enforce proxy-admin-only credential attachment on model create/update
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): raise ProxyException for unauthorized credential attach and gate /model/update
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(proxy): fold credential-change detection into can_user_attach_credential to satisfy complexity budget
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): decrypt stored credential name before unchanged-credential comparison
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): cover credential attach rejection on add_new_model and patch_model
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): annotate proxy-global patches with test-quality suppressions
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Clicking a Base UI select entry found by text or by a title attribute is a
race. The text node exists one render before the popup finishes entering,
and until then the positioner still carries pointer-events: none, so
user-event refuses the click and the test throws. Querying by role only
matches once the popup is exposed to the accessibility tree, which is after
that window closes.
Route the 37 remaining select interactions through chooseSelectOption, which
does the role query. Instrumenting the converted files shows the text query
resolving while the popup was still pointer-blocked on 6 of 41 samples; the
role query was never blocked.
Seven files kept their text queries because their popup entries carry no
accessible role, so there is nothing to query by.
The page set its headings, table borders, sidebar labels and tag pills
inline with a fixed light palette (#202124, #5f6368, #dadce0, #f8f9fa,
#fff), so in dark mode it drew dark text on hardcoded white surfaces.
Move those to the foreground/muted/border/card/info tokens, matching
the back link and Create Guardrail button that already used them.
* feat(guardrails): add Alice by ActiveFence guardrail
Adds `guardrail: alice` — policy-based guardrails for prompts and model
responses, evaluated against ActiveFence's Alice.
What makes this different from the other providers: Alice evaluates against
policies configured per *application*, and a proxy typically fronts several of
them, so the application cannot be a static config value. It is named on the
LiteLLM virtual key instead:
curl $PROXY/key/generate -H "Authorization: Bearer $LITELLM_MASTER_KEY" \
-d '{"key_alias": "payments-bot",
"metadata": {"alice_app_id": "payments-bot"}}'
read via `CustomGuardrail._get_admin_metadata`, with `key_alias` as the
fallback. That helper is what makes it trustworthy: it reads whichever metadata
holder the proxy wrote the authenticated key's values into — which differs by
route — and the proxy strips caller-supplied `user_api_key_*` from both, so a
caller cannot point its own traffic at an application with laxer policies than
the one its key was issued for. A request whose key names no application is
refused rather than evaluated against a guess.
Implements `apply_guardrail` only, so pre_call, during_call, post_call and
streaming all come from UnifiedLLMGuardrails. Blocks with
GuardrailRaisedException; masks by substituting Alice's redacted text; a MASK
carrying no replacement blocks rather than passing the original through. A
verdict reporting `errors[]` is treated as a failure, not a pass — otherwise a
half-evaluated message would be allowed. `unreachable_fallback` (already on
LitellmParams) chooses fail-closed or fail-open on transport failure.
Config:
guardrails:
- guardrail_name: alice
litellm_params:
guardrail: alice
mode: [pre_call, post_call]
api_key: os.environ/ALICE_API_KEY
21 tests in tests/test_litellm/proxy/guardrails/guardrail_hooks/test_alice.py
cover registration, credential resolution, the app-id ladder including the
forged-metadata case, every verdict, and both unreachable policies.
No new LitellmParams field, so no schema.d.ts regeneration is needed.
* refactor(guardrails): post to Alice's LiteLLM endpoint and forward verbatim
Switches from `/v2/evaluate/message` — Alice's single-text endpoint — to
`/v2/evaluate/litellm`, which takes the hook's arguments as they arrive and
answers with a verdict.
That inverts where the work happens, and shrinks this plugin accordingly. It
now selects nothing and renames nothing: it posts `{input_type, inputs,
request_data}` and enforces `{verdict, categories, correlation_id, message,
replacements}`. Which parts of a conversation are worth evaluating, and how a
verdict is reached, are decided by Alice — so changing either is a change on
their side rather than a LiteLLM upgrade for every user.
The app-id resolution this plugin carried is gone with it. Alice reads the
application off the authenticated key's metadata itself, from the payload it is
handed, so the ladder here was duplicating a decision the far side already
makes. The security property is unchanged and still comes from the proxy
stripping caller-supplied `user_api_key_*` before a guardrail sees the request.
Masking is now positional — the far side chose which texts it was answering
for, so it says which by index. Only `texts` is written; a new
`structured_messages` object would make the chat translation layer skip the
`texts` write-back and silently drop the edits. A mask that lands nowhere
blocks rather than passing the original through.
`request_data` carries live Python objects (an OpenTelemetry span among them),
so `_json_safe` copies it into something serialisable by a mechanical rule
rather than a field list — a list drifts from what the far side needs, a rule
cannot. Serialising naively raises, and that error would read as "guardrail
unavailable" on every request.
26 tests, covering verbatim forwarding, each verdict, positional masking, the
`structured_messages` identity trap, both unreachable policies, and the
serialiser's handling of unserialisable values and cycles.
* fix(alice guardrail): satisfy lint and code-quality CI gates
- Bound _json_safe's recursion and register it in recursive_detector's
ignore list (it already caps depth and dedupes cycles by id, matching
the repo's established pattern for legitimate bounded recursion).
- Clear ruff-strict budget breaches: annotate __init__'s return type,
raise TypeError (not ValueError) for a bad response body, type
_json_safe's payload as object instead of Any, and file-scope-ignore
ANN401 for **kwargs (forwarding it as object broke the call into
CustomGuardrail.__init__, confirmed via basedpyright).
- Clear type-discipline budget breaches: suppress the construction/
annotation checks on one-shot HTTP payloads, the module-level
guardrail registries, and _json_safe's bounded accumulator; narrow
AliceVerdict's list fields to tuples and _evaluate's request_data to
Mapping[str, object] where nothing downstream mutates them.
* test(alice guardrail): assert the guardrail actually registers
The registration test called init_guardrails_v2 and asserted nothing, so it
passed whether or not the guardrail was ever registered — TQ001 in the
test-quality gate, and a fair catch: a test that cannot fail is not covering
the thing it names.
Now asserts exactly one AliceGuardrail lands in litellm.callbacks under the
configured name.
This surfaced only after the ruff-strict and type-discipline gates stopped
failing ahead of it; the lint job runs its gates in sequence, so an earlier
failure masks every later one.
* fix(alice guardrail): reach 100% patch coverage, drop the ActiveFence naming
Codecov flagged 10 uncovered lines, all of them error paths — which is where a
guardrail most needs covering, since each one decides whether traffic flows
unscreened.
Two of the ten turned out to be dead rather than untested, and are removed:
- `except GuardrailRaisedException: raise` in apply_guardrail. `_evaluate`
raises httpx errors, Timeout and TypeError, never that — so the clause could
never fire.
- the trailing `json.dumps` probe in `_json_safe`. Everything json.dumps
handles natively is caught by the isinstance branches above (a dict or list
subclass included), so anything reaching the bottom — bytes, datetime, an
OpenTelemetry span — cannot cross the wire regardless. It now says so and
returns None.
The rest are now tested: a timeout, 502/503/504 as unreachable, a 4xx as NOT
unreachable (a rejected credential is our misconfiguration, not an outage, and
must not fail open), a non-object response body, and a model whose model_dump
raises.
Also drops "by ActiveFence" throughout — the product is Alice — and points the
header at alice.io. `ui_friendly_name` is now "Alice", which is the key
guardrailLogoMap and the garden card look up, so all three moved together.
* fix(alice guardrail): strip caller credentials, widen unreachable detection, block partial MASK
Addresses PR review: request_data no longer forwards secret_fields.raw_headers or
the root api_key to Alice (the caller's Authorization token in the clear otherwise);
HTTP 500, malformed JSON, and a non-object body now route through the configured
unreachable_fallback instead of raising raw, so fail_open still fails open on those;
a MASK verdict with even one out-of-range replacement now blocks entirely instead of
silently letting the rest through unmasked. Also tightens request_data's type and
documents the known streaming-mask limitation on the class.
* fix(alice guardrail): strip credentials at any depth, stop filtering on texts
secret_fields/api_key/headers/provider_specific_header can appear nested
under proxy_server_request, metadata, litellm_metadata, and their
requester_metadata/body sub-paths in a real captured payload — a
top-level-only strip missed all of those. _json_safe now drops these keys
by name wherever they occur during serialization, so a new nesting path
can't reintroduce the leak.
apply_guardrail also stopped skipping the call whenever texts was empty,
even when tool_calls/images/structured_messages carried content — that
was the plugin making a selection decision Alice's design says belongs on
the far side. It now only skips when none of the selectable fields have
anything in them.
* fix(alice guardrail): route an undecodable response body through the fallback
`response.json()` raises UnicodeDecodeError when the body carries bytes that
are not valid UTF-8, and that escaped the except clause: UnicodeDecodeError is
a *sibling* of json.JSONDecodeError under ValueError, not a subclass of it, so
naming only JSONDecodeError left it uncaught. Both fallback modes surfaced a
raw decoding error instead of applying unreachable_fallback — which for a
fail_open deployment meant a hard failure where it had asked for an allow.
Named explicitly rather than widening to ValueError, so the clause still says
which three conditions it means. Tested under both policies.
Ports the Model Hub search to the AI Hub Agent Hub tab and the admin
/agents toolbar as a client-side filter over agent name and description.
Extracts the hub search matching into utils/searchUtils and fixes the
public Model Hub rendering the whole catalog when a search matches
nothing (LIT-5230)
Updates browserslist for GHSA-73wf-gq98-2v4g and GHSA-c83g-rgw3-j3cx, both CVSS 7.5. The vulnerabilities are fixed in 4.28.7; bump to 4.28.8, published 2026-08-08.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The invite-dialog test only read data-orientation, so a regression inside
the shared field variants could restore the full-width bar and still pass.
Assert the classes that carry the layout, cover the two SSO call sites the
fix also changed, and pin the vertical/horizontal contract on the primitive.
bg-none only clears background-image, so the buttons fell back to the
browser's default button background instead of the transparent one the
inline style had.
key_edit_view opened a select and then clicked the option it found by
title text or by raw text. Both queries match the moment the option
enters the DOM, which is one render before the popup finishes entering.
Until then the positioner still carries an inline pointer-events: none,
and user-event refuses to click through it.
That is a race, and a fast machine loses it. Five of the file's 84 tests
failed on every local run while CI stayed green, which is the worst shape
for a test to have: it is only ever red on the machine of whoever is
trying to change the code.
tests/test-utils.tsx already ships chooseSelectOption for exactly this.
It finds the option by role and waits for the positioner to release
pointer events before clicking. The five call sites now use it, and the
helper takes the direct user-event API as well as a setup() instance so
callers do not have to restructure to use it.
Five consecutive full-file runs pass where every previous run failed.
Also finishes this file's screen queries, which brings
prefer-screen-queries to its target of 18.
The page painted every surface, border and text color inline with a
fixed light palette (#202124, #5f6368, #dadce0, #f8f9fa, #fff), so in
dark mode it drew dark text on hardcoded white cards.
Move the whole component to the foreground/muted/border/card/info
tokens, which already resolve for both themes.
The tool cards hardcoded light colors as inline styles (#fff, #fafafa,
#f0f0f0, #f6ffed), so in dark mode the theme's light foreground text
landed on a white card and became unreadable.
Swap the inline hex for the existing card/muted/border/success tokens,
which already carry both light and dark values.
Two changes, both about finding elements the way a user finds them.
Twenty-six test files destructured queries off render and called them
bare. Those queries are scoped to the render container, so they quietly
miss anything portalled into the body, and they read as if they were
free functions. They now go through screen.
ChatMessageBubble and the key info panel derived elements by walking
closest/parentElement/firstElementChild and then asserted on the classes
they found. A wrapper element anywhere in between broke them. The bubble
surface, the avatar and the budget reset value now publish a test id, so
the assertions survive markup changes and still fail when the styling
they check actually regresses.
Budgets drop with the counts: prefer-screen-queries 221 to 21,
no-node-access 723 to 716.
The 21 remaining prefer-screen-queries are not all fixable: 18 of them
are within(dialog) results in MCPToolsetsTab, which the rule cannot tell
apart from a render result. Target is 18, not 0.
The shared DataTable test reached for elements by CSS selector and by
walking parentElement chains, then asserted on Tailwind class strings. It
had no role queries at all, so a wrapper div anywhere in the render tree
broke it while changing nothing a user sees.
Columns, rows and headers are now found the way a user finds them: by
role and by the text on screen. The compact skeleton row is compared
against the loaded row's height rather than a hard-coded h-8, so renaming
the class no longer breaks the test but shrinking the row still does.
The fillHeight and maxBodyHeight cases stay class assertions. jsdom has
no layout engine, so there is nothing behavioural to assert there. What
they no longer do is derive their elements from incidental nesting: the
three layout wrappers and the header now publish a stable test id, which
is also why the resizer's write-only data-resizer attribute became one.
Budgets drop with the counts: no-container 150 to 133, no-node-access 760
to 723.
Turn on testing-library/no-node-access, no-container and
prefer-screen-queries as warnings and baseline them in eslint-budgets.json
so the counts can only go down.
These three rules catch tests that assert on DOM structure rather than on
what a user can observe: reaching through parentElement chains, querying
the container by CSS selector, and destructuring queries off render
instead of going through screen. Those assertions break on refactors that
change nothing a user sees, and stay green when the behaviour underneath
is broken.
Baselines are the current counts, so nothing fails today.
Classification timing and session affinity are the same operator question,
so Advanced: Classification Method now carries a single "How often to
classify" radio: every request, every new user message, or once per session.
The session choice writes session_affinity and stays disabled on custom tier
sets, where the backend rejects it. Advanced: Affinity keeps the deployment
switch alone.
The serializer always writes classification_mode, matching session_affinity
on the line below it, so an explicitly stored every_request survives an
untouched save instead of being dropped back to the backend default.
max_budget and reset_at already live on the matching budget_limits entry, so
repeating them (as budget_limit and reset_at) only invited confusion about which
copy is authoritative.
budget_limits now comes back exactly as stored on /key/info and /v2/key/info.
The per-window usage moves to a sibling budget_limits_usage field keyed by
budget_duration (current_spend, budget_limit, reset_at), mirroring
model_max_budget_usage, so the stored shape that /key/update accepts never
carries a computed field.
* feat(ui): auto-router controls for context-window escalation
Adds an Advanced: Context Window Escalation section to the auto-router
form, both create and edit arms, with the toggle for
enable_context_window_escalation and a clamped decimal input for
context_window_escalation_buffer. An untouched control keeps both keys
out of the payload so the router tracks the backend defaults; an
explicit opt-out (false) survives the edit round-trip through the
managed-keys projection and the hydrator, and preset prefill maps both
keys straight through so a preset cannot silently drop them
Resolves LIT-6601
* fix(ui): clearing the context-window buffer removes it from the payload
Both review bots converged on the same defect: an emptied buffer field
early-returned in commitBuffer, the draft was discarded on blur, and the
stale number reappeared and stayed in the saved config, contradicting
the copy that an empty field tracks the backend default. An empty commit
now removes the key, which the managed-keys projection propagates as a
real deletion on edit. Also trims the narrative comments the review
flagged as restating behavior
* fix(ui): keep litellm_credential_name from LiteLLM Params JSON when no credential is selected
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(ui): drop null litellm_credential_name from AddModelPanel payload fixture
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Shadow eval jobs previously targeted only virtual keys, so deployments on
pure JWT auth (which present no key at all) could never sample their
traffic. Jobs now carry a typed (target_type, target_id) pair covering
keys, teams, and users; sampling matches the identity every request
resolves to at auth time, so team and user jobs cover JWT traffic with
no client changes.
Resolves LIT-6578
* feat(complexity_router): escalate oversized prompts to a tier that fits before dispatch
The classifier scores complexity and never prompt size, so a long agentic
session whose newest ask is trivial classifies SIMPLE onto a small-window
tier and the provider rejects it with a context-window 400 that nothing
retries. The gate runs after classification on every decision path
(classify tail and session-affinity pin), estimates prompt tokens
including the out-of-band carriers (top-level system, tools,
instructions), and when the decided tier provably cannot hold the prompt
moves the request to the lowest configured tier with a model whose
declared window fits, restricting the pick to fitting models when the
decided tier can keep it. Models with no resolvable window are never
escalated away from or onto, escalated decisions are never written as
session pins, and the decision records context_escalated plus the
original tier in spend logs.
Resolves LIT-6503
* fix(complexity_router): judge groups by smallest window, bound skips by bytes, filter adaptive picks
Review-round rework, one mechanism per finding. A group is judged by its
smallest resolvable deployment window, since the core router picks within
a group with no fit check. The counting skip is gated on UTF-8 byte
length, which BPE token counts can never exceed, so token-dense scripts
cannot slip past it; only a real tokenizer count ever moves a request and
a failed count leaves the placement alone. The fit facts now filter every
adaptive phase including cold start and the tier fallbacks. Window
questions adopt the declared provider and never resolve authenticating
providers, and a router instance without get_model_list degrades the gate
to a no-op. Tests rebuilt on real Router instances resolving deployment
model_info end to end, plus a full-path test through
async_get_available_deployment
The UI e2e suite had a class of assertions that pin how the dashboard is
built rather than what it does, so an ordinary refactor turns them red
without any user-visible change.
Geometry. The auto-router template select had two tests made of pixel
arithmetic plus a data-side="bottom" check, which is Base UI's own
positioner signal. The regression they guard (#38554) is a popup opening
on top of the control that spawned it, so both cases collapse to one
invariant: the options never cover the trigger. It now runs at both
viewport heights and reads the popup as role=listbox. The models header
test compared the tabs and refresh centers within 2px, which a padding
change flips; it now asserts the two share a row.
Structure. The logs drawer test walked xpath=../../.. from a text node
and read collapsed state off chevron icon classes. SectionHeader now
renders a real disclosure button with aria-expanded, and its two copy
buttons carry distinct names instead of both being "Copy". Sidebar group
toggles expose aria-expanded too, so the migration spec can ask for a
collapsed group by state rather than by nesting depth.
Positional lookups. keyRow.locator("button").first(), row.locator("td")
.first() and getByTestId(grid).locator("div").first() all named a
position where they meant an action; they now name the control. Table
scoping moves from "table tbody" to role=row.
Timing. Nine waitForTimeout calls are gone. Every assertion that followed
them already retried to its own timeout, so the sleeps only slowed the
run down.
Both files under tests/users/ were wrapped in test.skip("...", () => {}),
which registers one skipped test and never runs the body, so the four
tests inside had never executed and were written against a UI that has
since changed (the search placeholder is "Search by email…", the ID
filters moved into a drawer, pagination is labelled "Go to previous
page"). Rewritten against the current surface: the suite goes from 104
collected tests to 107.
Left in place deliberately: the chip and dialog-footer data-slot
selectors, because the accessible names they work around live in
components/ui/, which is shadcn CLI-managed and not hand-edited.
* feat(spend_tracking): persist router metadata in spend logs for internal router models
* test(spend_tracking): expect router_metadata key in exact-payload tests, type the routed-kwargs helper
