The suite used to mint its own RS256 tokens from a stand-in issuer, which
could only ever prove the proxy agreed with the tests: the claims were
whatever the tests chose to sign. Every JWT bug worth catching lives in the
shape of what an identity provider really emits, so the suite now runs
against Keycloak (realm in idp_realm.json), provisions a group and a user per
test through its admin API, and signs in through the direct-access grant.
That changes what the tokens look like: sub is Keycloak's opaque user uuid
rather than a friendly name, groups arrives from a protocol mapper, aud is
the IdP's own audience, and the JWKS carries an encryption key beside the
signing key so the proxy has to select on kid. The expiry case now takes a
one-second token from a second client in the realm and waits for it to lapse
instead of forging a stale exp.
The proxy config the suite needs is unchanged. CI runs it against a Keycloak
deployed beside the ephemeral stack, which lives in the releaser repo.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EX13mWex6RaBo9PYnkAtFW
Add tests/e2e/jwt_issuer.py, a test-only RS256 issuer that serves a JWKS
document and signs arbitrary claims over an open loopback-only /token
endpoint, so e2e tests can mint tokens without ever holding a signing key.
One key per process keeps the proxy's cached JWKS valid for the whole run.
Add the first five live JWT auth tests in tests/e2e/other: a valid token for
an existing team is accepted and its spend row carries the claimed team and
user, a tampered signature and an expired token are refused with 401, a
token naming a team that does not exist is refused with 403, and a plain
sk- virtual key keeps working with enable_jwt_auth on. Harness unit tests
cover the issuer itself. Team and user create/delete land on the shared
ProxyClient (warn-only teardown, /user/delete typed as the int it returns)
instead of a fourth per-suite copy.
Document the issuer command, the E2E_JWT_ISSUER_PORT convention (default
4190), JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_URL and the litellm_jwtauth config block in
tests/e2e/CONTRIBUTING.md, and register the new cells in other.yaml.
* test(e2e): add other suite covering master-key auth and health lifecycle
Covers the other.* holding-pen cells that were uncovered: master-key
valid_allows/invalid_denied on the admin /user/list gate, and the
lifecycle probes liveness.ping, readiness.public_probe,
readiness.reports_db_status, and readiness_details.authenticated_diagnostics.
New tests/e2e/other/ suite on the shared ProxyClient; the health probes
send no auth header to prove the public routes need no credential, and the
details route is asserted to reject an anonymous caller while exposing
version/db diagnostics to the master key.
* test(e2e): cover block_code_execution and openai_moderation guardrails
Extends the guardrails suite with two built-in guardrails registered per
request (default_on=False, opted in via the chat body's guardrails selector)
so neither intercepts unrelated traffic on the shared proxy.
block_code_execution.pre_call.blocks: a python code block plus a run-this
request is intercepted with the canned content-blocked message and the model
never runs, while the same code block asked about with don't-run-it reaches
the model. Verified live.
openai_moderations.pre_call.blocks: a flagged prompt is rejected 400 naming
the moderation policy while a benign prompt passes. The guardrail calls
OpenAI's moderation API; verifying it needs an OpenAI key with moderation
quota (this account currently 429s the moderation endpoint).
Adds a shared create_backend_model helper and a generic register() plus
per-request guardrails/max_tokens on the client so more built-ins can reuse
the same path.
* test(e2e): cover presidio PII masking (pre_call + post_call)
Registers a presidio guardrail per request (default_on=False) with the
analyzer/anonymizer bases supplied in the registration params, so the test
controls its own dependency and needs no proxy restart.
presidio.pre_call.masks: a repeat-verbatim request comes back with the
<EMAIL_ADDRESS> placeholder and never the raw email, proving the prompt was
anonymized before the model saw it.
presidio.post_call.masks: with apply_to_output the model's own emitted email
is masked on the way out, so the caller never receives the raw value.
Both verified live against real presidio analyzer + anonymizer containers.
logging_only is intentionally not covered: /spend/logs exposes no prompt
messages to read back the masked log, and a logging_only run also masked the
response, contradicting its contract; noted in the module docstring for a
follow-up.
* test(e2e): cover presidio logging_only masking via OTEL read-back
Adds the third presidio cell, guardrail.presidio.logging_only.masks. The
logging_only contract (mask what is logged, do not block) is verified by
reading the request's gen-AI span back from the real OTEL destination: the
span's gen_ai.input.messages attribute carries the <EMAIL_ADDRESS> placeholder,
never the raw email, and the call itself is not blocked.
Reads the trace via the shared OtelReader, promoted from logging/ to the suite
root so both suites use it. The masked prompt is polled to a deadline because
logging_only masks the payload asynchronously and the span can briefly export
before the mask lands. Drops the throwaway chat_send in favor of the existing
transport.send for the call-id capture.
* fix(e2e): tolerate cross-pod guardrail sync delay in team-opt-out test
Stage runs multiple gateway pods behind the shared key. POST /guardrails
registers a new default-on guardrail in-process immediately only on the
pod that served the create call; every other pod picks it up on its next
periodic DB sync (proxy_server.py, every 30s), so the very next chat call
can race a pod that has not synced yet. Poll to a 40s deadline instead of
asserting on the first response, matching the existing pattern in
test_budget_reset_advances_e2e.py.
* test(e2e): cover a guardrail on the MCP tool-call path (content_filter pre_mcp_call)
Adds guardrail.litellm_content_filter.pre_mcp_call.blocks: against the real
Datadog MCP server, a content_filter guardrail configured mode=pre_mcp_call
blocks a banned keyword in an MCP tool call's arguments with HTTP 400 attributed
to the pre_mcp_call hook, and lets a clean argument reach the upstream server.
The guardrail attaches with default_on because per-key/request guardrail
selection is dropped from the synthetic MCP request the hook sees; the banned
keyword is unique per run so default_on only intercepts this test's own call.
mode must be pre_mcp_call - a pre_call config silently no-ops on tools/call
because the event type is rewritten for call_mcp_tool.
Drives the tool directly via /mcp-rest/tools/call for a deterministic check of
the same pre_mcp_call enforcement the OpenAI-SDK chat path hits when a model
invokes an MCP tool.
* fix(e2e): mid-conversation messages test uses client.proxy not client.gateway
EndpointsClient exposes .proxy after the Gateway->ProxyClient rename; the
mid-conversation system test still referenced .gateway, which fails the e2e
basedpyright gate. Aligns it with the rest of the harness.
* test(e2e): address review on the guardrail coverage
MCP tool-call guardrail: poll the banned call until the guardrail is enforced
instead of asserting on the first call, so the control-plane -> data-plane
guardrail sync cannot race the check into a false pass-through; add a repeat
banned call after enforcement to guard against a partial-propagation state.
OpenAI moderation: distinguish a moderation-endpoint 429 (rate limit / no
moderation quota) from a guardrail failure, so an account-capability gap reads
as such rather than as "did not block". Runs green with a moderation-capable key.
* test(e2e): close partial-propagation false-pass in MCP guardrail block test
The single post-block repeat call could be load-balanced back to the same
already-synced data-plane pod, so the test could pass while another pod still
lacked the guardrail and let the banned MCP call reach Datadog. Anchor a wait to
the guardrail create time (every pod is guaranteed to have DB-synced only after a
full ~30s sync interval), then require the banned call to stay blocked across
several attempts; a pass-through after that window is a real leak, not a race.
* test(e2e): drop xfail-style rate-limit branch from openai_moderation test
OpenAI's /v1/moderations is free and returns 200 with the env key (verified
directly), so the RateLimitedError branch mislabeled the failure: a 429 there is
insufficient_quota (no account billing), not throttling. The branch also only
printed a softer message before failing anyway, an xfail-in-disguise the e2e rules
forbid. A 429 now falls through and fails loudly with the full result.
