Terraform's convention is that create does not seize a resource the
configuration never made, and credential_values holds secrets that are never
read back into state, so a silent takeover overwrites values no plan showed.
A name collision now fails with the terraform import command that adopts the
existing credential explicitly, and adopt_existing = true opts into taking it
over during create. The provider detects the conflict by the proxy's 409 and
keeps the Prisma string match as a fallback for older proxies
Credential names and model_id went into URLs raw, so a name with a slash or a
question mark hit the wrong route. Every credential URL is now built from a
package const through fmt.Sprintf with url.PathEscape or url.QueryEscape,
which the endpoint audit can resolve. Toggling adopt_existing alone no longer
sends a PATCH, so it does not rewrite the stored secret
* feat(terraform): vendor terraform-provider-litellm as source of truth with endpoint drift CI
* fix(terraform): address review feedback on vendored provider
Replace deprecated io/ioutil with io. Remove the unused org/team CRUD
client methods so the endpoint audit only tracks live call sites
(54 -> 46). Redact request/response logs by parsing the JSON and
recursively masking sensitive fields, which fixes the nested-object
leak in the old credential_values regex, with a regex fallback for
non-JSON payloads; covered by new unit tests. Docs: stop showing
api_key inside vector store litellm_params and document that Sensitive
attributes still persist in plaintext state, recommending
litellm_credential_name and an encrypted state backend.
* fix(terraform): stop persisting server-returned litellm_params into vector store state
The vector store Read wrote litellm_params straight back from the API
response into state. The proxy redacts secrets in those responses, so
the readback overwrote user config with redaction sentinels and caused
perpetual diffs, and against a server that returns raw values it would
persist secrets into a non-Sensitive attribute. Read now preserves the
config value like the credential and model resources do, litellm_params
is marked Sensitive, and a regression test pins that a server-returned
api_key never lands in state
* fix(terraform): send role on team member update and stop persisting server env into MCP state
The team member update payload omitted role, and the proxy leaves role
unchanged when the field is absent, so a role downgrade reported as
applied by Terraform never took effect on the proxy. The update now
always sends the configured role (the attribute is Required).
The MCP server resource wrote env straight back from API responses
into a non-Sensitive attribute, pulling admin-visible secrets into
state and, for sanitized responses, blanking user config. Read now
preserves the config value, env is marked Sensitive, and the docs warn
against passing secrets via args. Regression tests cover both fixes
and fail against the previous behavior.
