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488 commits
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mateo-berri
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c6eafec396
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Merge origin/litellm_internal_staging into litellm_feat/v1.84.0-mcp-gateway-jwt-auth | ||
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mateo-berri
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0fada28153
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fix(jwt): validate issuer audience at config load + dedicated key-miss exception
- Move JWTIssuerConfig audience-required guard into a Pydantic model_validator so misconfiguration fails at startup instead of on the first request. - Replace the string-match `No matching public key found` filter in get_public_key's multi-URL fallback with a dedicated NoMatchingJWTPublicKeyError; only that specific exception triggers continuation, every other error still surfaces. |
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Sameer Kankute
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b7e978a5c3
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Litellm oss staging 04 21 2026 2 (#26569)
* fix(bedrock): use model info lookup for output_config support instead of hardcoded check Replace hardcoded _is_claude_4_6_model() string matching with supports_output_config flag in model_prices_and_context_window.json, accessed via _supports_factory(). This follows the project's established pattern for model capability checks (per AGENTS.md rule #8). Bedrock Invoke now conditionally preserves output_config for models that declare supports_output_config=true (currently Claude 4.6 models), while stripping it for older models to avoid request rejection. Ref: https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/22797 * fix(vertex_ai): single-flight credential refresh to prevent thundering herd (#26024) * fix(vertex_ai): single-flight credential refresh to prevent thundering herd When GCP credentials expire under high concurrency, all requests simultaneously call credentials.refresh() via asyncify, saturating the 40-thread anyio pool and blocking the proxy for 20+ seconds. This adds: - Per-credential asyncio.Lock in get_access_token_async for single-flight refresh (1 coroutine refreshes, others wait on the lock) - Background refresh when token_state is STALE (usable but near expiry), returning the current token immediately with zero added latency - threading.Lock on the sync get_access_token path - Uses google-auth's TokenState enum (FRESH/STALE/INVALID) instead of reimplementing expiry logic Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: address PR review comments - Use asyncio.create_task() instead of deprecated get_event_loop().create_task() - Track in-flight background refresh tasks to prevent duplicate refreshes when multiple STALE-path callers pass through the lock before the first background task completes - Add token validation in the STALE branch (consistent with FRESH/INVALID) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: lazy-import TokenState to avoid breaking when google-auth is not installed Also extract helper methods to bring get_access_token_async under the PLR0915 statement limit (50). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: apply Black formatting to test file and update uv.lock Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remove user-provided project_id from log messages (CodeQL log injection) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: avoid leaking token value in error message, log type instead Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: restore uv.lock to match litellm_oss_branch Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remove project_id from remaining log message (CodeQL log injection) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: remove remaining project_id from log and error messages Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: reuse cached credentials in VertexAIPartnerModels (#26065) * fix: reuse cached credentials in VertexAIPartnerModels instead of creating new VertexLLM per request VertexAIPartnerModels.completion() was creating a throwaway VertexLLM() instance on every call to get an access token, bypassing the credential cache inherited from VertexBase. This caused a fresh token fetch for every single request, adding significant latency overhead. Fix: call super().__init__() to initialize VertexBase's credential cache, and use self._ensure_access_token() instead of a new VertexLLM instance. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: apply same credential caching fix to VertexAIGemmaModels and VertexAIModelGardenModels Same bug as VertexAIPartnerModels: both classes had `pass` in __init__ instead of `super().__init__()`, and created throwaway VertexLLM() instances per request instead of using self._ensure_access_token(). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(fireworks): add glm-5p1 metadata and parallel_tool_calls (#26069) * fix(chatgpt): preserve responses routing and recover empty output (#25403) (#26219) - preserve existing shared backend `mode` when router deployment registration reuses a provider/model key already in `litellm.model_cost` (prevents alias with `mode: chat` from downgrading shared `chatgpt/gpt-5.4` from `responses` to `chat` and triggering 403s on /v1/chat/completions) - teach the ChatGPT Responses parser to recover `response.output_item.done` entries when `response.completed.output` is empty - add defensive /responses -> /chat/completions bridge fallback that reconstructs output items from raw SSE when `raw_response.output` is empty - regression coverage for shared alias routing, empty completed.output parsing, and SSE bridge recovery Closes #25403 Co-authored-by: afoninsky <andrey.afoninsky@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(deps): relax core runtime dependency pins from exact == to ranges When litellm migrated from Poetry to uv (PR #24905, v1.83.1), the core dependency specifications in pyproject.toml changed from Poetry bare-version strings (e.g. openai = "2.30.0") to PEP 621 exact pins (openai==2.24.0). Poetry bare-version strings are actually caret ranges (^X.Y.Z == >=X.Y.Z,<X+1), but PEP 621 == is exact. This means every downstream package that installs litellm as a library dependency is now forced to downgrade aiohttp, pydantic, openai, click, and 8 other common packages to exact old versions. Fix: restore range specifiers for the 12 core runtime dependencies. The optional extras (proxy, proxy-runtime, etc.) are consumed primarily by Docker images where exact pins are appropriate and are left unchanged. The uv.lock file continues to provide exact reproducibility for Docker builds and CI. Fixes: #26154 * Add Rubrik as officially-supported guardrail plugin (#25305) * Add Rubrik as officially-supported guardrail plugin Adds tool blocking and batch logging integration with an external Rubrik webhook service. The plugin validates LLM tool calls against a policy service (fail-open on errors) and batch-logs all requests/responses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Update Rubrik docs: config.yaml as primary, env vars as fallback Restructures the Quick Start to present config.yaml as the recommended approach with tabbed UI, and environment variables as an alternative fallback. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Add Rubrik env vars to config_settings reference Fixes documentation validation by adding RUBRIK_API_KEY, RUBRIK_BATCH_SIZE, RUBRIK_SAMPLING_RATE, and RUBRIK_WEBHOOK_URL to the environment settings reference table. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Add fallback message when blocking service returns empty explanation Prevents whitespace-only violation message when the tool blocking service blocks tools but returns an empty content field. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(ocr): add Reducto parse OCR support (#26068) * feat(ocr): add Reducto parse OCR support * fix(reducto): address OCR review feedback * chore: refresh uv lockfile * Revert "chore: refresh uv lockfile" This reverts commit |
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Cursor Agent
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86cf3efd16
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/litellm_internal_staging' into litellm_feat/v1.84.0-mcp-gateway-jwt-auth
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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yuneng-jiang
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f99fb5f27f
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chore(ci): merge dev branch (#28314)
* chore(proxy): strict media-type match for form bodies (#27939) * chore(proxy): strict media-type match for form bodies ``_read_request_body`` and ``get_request_body`` routed on ``"form" in content_type`` / ``"multipart/form-data" in content_type``, which match any header containing the literal — ``application/form-json``, ``multiform/anything``, ``application/json; xform=1``. Starlette's ``request.form()`` returns an empty ``FormData`` for any non-canonical type without consuming the body, so the auth-time pre-read saw ``{}`` and skipped the banned-param check while the handler's later ``request.body()`` saw the original JSON payload. Parse the media type per RFC 7231 (substring before ``;``, trimmed, lowercased) and accept only ``application/x-www-form-urlencoded`` and ``multipart/form-data``. Replace both substring sites with the shared ``_is_form_content_type`` helper. Tests pin: case/whitespace/charset variants of the two real types match; ``application/form-json`` and similar substring-match traps fall through to the JSON parse path; real form POSTs continue to route through ``request.form()``. * chore(proxy): extract _is_json_content_type symmetric helper Mirror ``_is_form_content_type`` for the JSON branch of ``get_request_body`` so both classifications share the same media-type normalisation (strip params, trim, lowercase) and any future change to the parsing rules has one place to update. Adds tests for ``_is_json_content_type`` and for ``get_request_body`` covering the canonical JSON / form / unsupported / non-POST paths. * chore(proxy): surface form-parse failures instead of caching empty body Starlette's ``request.form()`` raises ``MultiPartException`` / ``ValueError`` / ``AssertionError`` on malformed multipart input (missing boundary, malformed chunk encoding, etc.). The outer ``except Exception: return {}`` swallowed every form-parse failure and cached an empty parsed body — auth-time pre-reads saw ``{}`` and skipped every banned-param check while a later raw-body re-read in the handler still saw the original payload. Same TOCTOU shape as the substring-match bypass: the auth gate and the handler don't agree on what the body is. Wrap ``request.form()`` in a narrow ``try`` that converts any parse failure to a 400 ``ProxyException``. The outer broad ``except`` is retained for unrelated unexpected errors but no longer covers form-parse-side bypass shapes. Adds a regression test parametrised over the exception classes Starlette can raise from ``request.form()``. * chore(proxy): drop redundant _is_json_content_type test class ``_is_json_content_type`` is a 3-line wrapper around the shared ``_normalize_media_type`` helper. Positive coverage lives in ``TestGetRequestBody.test_json_with_charset_param_parses_as_json``; negative coverage is covered transitively by ``TestIsFormContentType``'s non-form parametrize matrix (anything that isn't a form type falls through to the JSON branch). * chore(proxy): carry ASGI path into WebSocket auth synthetic Request (#27940) ``user_api_key_auth_websocket`` built a synthetic ``Request`` with a two-key scope (``type`` + ``headers``) and set ``request._url = websocket.url``. ``get_request_route`` reads ``scope.get("path", ...)`` and falls back to ``request.url.path`` only when ``path`` is absent. For the WebSocket flow that fallback fires and resolves to the Host-header-derived value (Starlette reconstructs ``websocket.url`` from the Host header), so a malformed Host collapses the resolved route and lets the auth gate compare against the wrong value. Carry the ASGI scope's ``path``, ``root_path``, and ``app_root_path`` into the synthetic scope so the lookup never reaches the fallback on the legitimate path. Regression test pins that the request handed to ``user_api_key_auth`` has ``scope["path"]`` equal to the ASGI scope's path. --------- Co-authored-by: stuxf <70670632+stuxf@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Claude
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488fcc25e1
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fix(jwt,mcp): fall back to global JWKS on unknown issuer; prune fetch locks
- handle_jwt._get_configured_issuer now returns None for tokens whose 'iss' is not in the configured issuers list, letting auth_jwt fall through to the legacy JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_URL path instead of hard-raising. This keeps existing tokens from non-configured IdPs working when an operator adds the new 'issuers' list to a live deployment. - discoverable_endpoints._prune_oauth_metadata_cache now also prunes entries in _OAUTH_METADATA_FETCH_LOCKS whose cache entry has been evicted and whose lock isn't currently held, bounding the locks dict to match the cache it guards. Co-authored-by: Claude <claude@anthropic.com> |
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Claude
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d42a66adb6
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Merge branch 'litellm_internal_staging' into litellm_feat/v1.84.0-mcp-gateway-jwt-auth
Resolved unrelated-history merge using
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Claude
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806b8be451
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fix(mcp,jwt): address greptile review concerns
- Cache _get_agent_object_permission via user_api_key_cache (sentinel for no-permission rows) so MCP requests from agent keys don't hit the DB on every tool-list / tool-call. - Re-raise HTTPException in handle_sse_mcp so 401 + WWW-Authenticate challenges (and other HTTP errors) propagate to SSE clients instead of being swallowed as 500. - Normalise booleans in _validate_token_response so admin rules written as JSON-style "true" / "false" match upstream responses that return Python True / False. - Treat configured JWT issuer claim mappings as advisory: when a mapped field is absent or empty, leave the normalised claim unset instead of raising, matching the global litellm_jwtauth path. Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Sameer Kankute
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e59e34bed3
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Gemini managed agents support (#28270)
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* Add support for environment variable in interactions api * Add sdk support for gemini create agent * Add agents endpoint support via proxy * Add outputs of each api * Add routing for model and agents param * Remove redundant condition in get_provider_agents_api_config LlmProviders.GEMINI.value is literally the string "gemini", so the second clause of the or was checking the exact same thing as the first. Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: forward query-param credentials to list/get/delete/versions Gemini agent endpoints The list_gemini_agents, get_gemini_agent, delete_gemini_agent, and list_gemini_agent_versions endpoints previously constructed a hardcoded data dict with no mechanism to pass provider credentials. Unlike create_gemini_agent (POST, reads litellm_params_template from body), these GET/DELETE endpoints gave no way for multi-tenant callers to supply a per-request api_key or other LiteLLM params. Fix: - Add _merge_query_params_into_data() helper that reads query parameters from the request and merges them into the data dict without overwriting already-set keys (e.g. path params like 'name'). - Support a JSON-encoded litellm_params_template query parameter (matching the POST body pattern) as well as flat key=value pairs (e.g. api_key=AIza...). - Apply the helper in all four affected endpoints. - Add 13 unit tests covering the helper and each endpoint. Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: pass model=None for managed agent proxy endpoints to prevent agent name polluting data["model"] Endpoints acreate_agent, aget_agent, adelete_agent, and alist_agent_versions were passing model=<agent_name> to base_process_llm_request. This caused common_processing_pre_call_logic to write the agent name into self.data["model"], which then triggered spurious model-alias mapping, rate-limiting lookups, and logging tied to a non-existent model deployment. The agent name is already carried in data["name"] and is passed correctly to the SDK functions (litellm.interactions.agents.*). There is no reason to also set model=<agent_name>; the correct value is model=None for all five managed-agent management routes. Adds tests/test_litellm/proxy/google_endpoints/test_managed_agents_model_param.py to verify all five managed-agent endpoints pass model=None. Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: address greptile P1/P2 review comments P1 (router.py): Restore fallback/retry support for acreate_interaction and create_interaction. Both were silently moved to _init_interactions_api_endpoints (direct call, no fallbacks). Moved them back to _ageneric_api_call_with_fallbacks so users with configured fallback models keep retry behaviour. P1 security (agents_endpoints.py): Remove flat query-param credential path (e.g. ?api_key=AIza...) from _merge_query_params_into_data. Credentials in URL query strings appear verbatim in server access logs, CDN edge logs, and browser history. Only the JSON-encoded litellm_params_template query param (matching the POST body pattern) is retained. P2 (interactions/http_handler.py): Extract _BaseHTTPHandler with shared _handle_error, _sync_client, and _async_client helpers. InteractionsHTTPHandler now extends _BaseHTTPHandler. The _async_client reads the provider from litellm_params instead of hardcoding GEMINI. P2 (interactions/agents/http_handler.py): AgentsHTTPHandler now extends InteractionsHTTPHandler (which inherits _BaseHTTPHandler) so all shared HTTP infrastructure is reused rather than duplicated. Removes the hardcoded LlmProviders.GEMINI from the async client path. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix: address CI failures from greptile review fixes - black: format interactions/agents/main.py and utils.py - tests: update test_gemini_agents_endpoints.py to match new _merge_query_params_into_data behaviour (flat credential params are rejected; only JSON-encoded litellm_params_template is accepted) - ci: add test_gemini_agents_endpoints.py to endpoints-and-responses shard in test-unit-proxy-db.yml so assert-shard-coverage passes - tests: add _initialize_managed_agents_endpoints and _init_managed_agents_api_endpoints test coverage so router_code_coverage passes; also fix TestRouterCreateInteractionRouting to reflect that acreate_interaction now correctly routes through _ageneric_api_call_with_fallbacks (restoring fallback support) Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix: remove InteractionsHTTPHandler._handle_error override to fix type errors AgentsHTTPHandler extends InteractionsHTTPHandler and calls self._handle_error(provider_config=agents_api_config) where agents_api_config is BaseAgentsAPIConfig. Python MRO resolved _handle_error to InteractionsHTTPHandler._handle_error which expected BaseInteractionsAPIConfig, causing 10 mypy arg-type errors in interactions/agents/http_handler.py. Removing the redundant override lets both classes inherit _BaseHTTPHandler._handle_error (provider_config: Any) which is structurally correct for both config types. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix: agent-only interactions and managed agents provider routing Resolve None custom_llm_provider in agents HTTP client lookup and set custom_llm_provider on GenericLiteLLMParams for all agent CRUD paths. Stop mapping agent names to proxy model routing; route interactions through _init_interactions_api_endpoints with fallbacks only when model is set. Consolidate duplicate router elif branches for interaction APIs. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * Fix greptile review * test(agents): add unit tests for managed agents SDK and HTTP handler Adds coverage for the new `litellm.interactions.agents` surface area: - main.py: sync/async entry points (create/list/get/delete/list_versions), provider config lookup, logging-obj helper, async error wrapping - http_handler.py: every CRUD method (sync + async paths), `_is_async` dispatch branches, and provider error mapping through GeminiAgentsConfig - utils.py: get_provider_agents_api_config for supported / unsupported providers Brings patch coverage on these files from <25% to ~100% so codecov/patch is satisfied. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * docs(gemini-agents): fix misleading credential-passing examples in GET/DELETE docstrings (#28293) The four GET/DELETE endpoint docstrings (list_gemini_agents, get_gemini_agent, delete_gemini_agent, list_gemini_agent_versions) documented passing per-request credentials as flat query parameters (e.g. ?api_key=AIza...). However, _merge_query_params_into_data only reads the JSON-encoded litellm_params_template query parameter and intentionally ignores flat params (URL query strings appear verbatim in access logs, browser history, and Referer headers). Callers following the documented curl examples would have their credentials silently dropped and hit auth failures against Gemini. Update the examples to use the supported JSON-encoded litellm_params_template query parameter, matching _merge_query_params_into_data's own docstring. Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(agents): rename provider-agnostic agent response types Move GeminiAgent{ListResponse,DeleteResult,VersionsResponse} to provider-neutral names (AgentListResponse, AgentDeleteResult, AgentVersionsResponse) so the BaseAgentsAPIConfig interface no longer references Gemini-specific type names. * fix(gemini-agents): close veria-flagged credential-escalation gaps Two high-severity findings from the veria-ai PR review are addressed: 1. **api_base override could leak the shared Gemini key** GeminiAgentsConfig.validate_environment falls back to GOOGLE_API_KEY / GEMINI_API_KEY when no api_key is supplied. Combined with caller-controlled api_base on the proxy CRUD endpoints, an authenticated user could redirect the outbound request to an attacker-controlled host and capture the operator's shared Gemini key from the x-goog-api-key header. The config now refuses env-fallback whenever api_base is explicitly overridden. 2. **Managed-agent CRUD exposed to ordinary LLM keys** The new /v1beta/agents routes live in google_routes (i.e. llm_api_routes), so any non-admin LLM key can reach them. Unlike /v1beta/models/...: generateContent these endpoints are NOT model-routed and have no model_list-supplied credentials, so env-fallback would let any LLM key list / create / delete agents inside the operator's Gemini project. Each endpoint now calls _enforce_caller_supplied_provider_key, which requires non-admin callers to supply their own Gemini api_key via litellm_params_template. Proxy admins keep the env-fallback convenience. Tests cover non-admin rejection, admin allow-through, the api_base override guard, and SDK env-fallback when api_base is not overridden. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * test(router): restore strict assert_called_once_with on interactions default-provider test --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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gym-cmd
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8ca2f14f81 | fix(mcp): address oauth passthrough review findings | ||
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gym-cmd
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dee5d55a0b | test(mcp): align trusted proxy fixtures | ||
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gym-cmd
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1d731af5df | feat(proxy): support issuer-scoped JWT auth | ||
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gym-cmd
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da24c8983a | feat(proxy): support issuer-scoped JWT auth | ||
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Sameer Kankute
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cbdc70d544
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fix(managed_batches): convert raw output_file_id to managed ID in CheckBatchCost poller (#27984)
* fix(managed_batches): convert raw output_file_id to managed ID in CheckBatchCost poller
CheckBatchCost bypasses async_post_call_success_hook, causing raw provider
output_file_ids to be persisted in LiteLLM_ManagedObjectTable. This fix converts
output_file_id and error_file_id to managed base64 IDs before the DB write.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(check_batch_cost): persist managed file before mutating response and propagate team_id
- Move setattr after store_unified_file_id so the response only receives the
managed ID once the DB record is successfully written. Avoids serializing
an orphaned managed ID into file_object when the store call fails.
- Populate team_id on the minimal UserAPIKeyAuth from job.team_id so the
managed file record is created with the correct team ownership, allowing
other team members to access the batch output file via /files/{id}/content.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* test(managed_batches): extend test to cover error_file_id conversion
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix managed file test
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
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Krrish Dholakia
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d35d2a70f4 |
fix: harden /key/update authorization checks (#27878)
* fix: patch Host-header auth bypass in get_request_route Starlette reconstructs request.url from the Host header. A malformed Host like `localhost/?x=1` causes Starlette to build the full URL as `http://localhost/?x=1/health`, which url-parses to path="/". Since "/" is in LiteLLMRoutes.public_routes, all protected routes became reachable without authentication. Fix: read scope["path"] (set by uvicorn from the HTTP request line, not derivable from headers) instead of request.url.path. Sub-path deployments are handled via scope["app_root_path"] / scope["root_path"], mirroring Starlette's own base_url construction logic. Affected variants confirmed fixed: Host: localhost/?x=1 Host: localhost:4000/?x=1 Host: localhost/#test Host: localhost:4000/#test Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: reduce comments in route fix Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block credential fields in RAG ingest vector_store options Credential fields (vertex_credentials, aws_access_key_id, api_key, etc.) in ingest_options.vector_store are now rejected at the API boundary with a 400 error. Credentials must be configured server-side. Previously any authenticated user could supply a vertex_credentials dict with type=external_account pointing credential_source.file at an arbitrary path (e.g. /proc/1/environ) and token_url at an attacker-controlled server. google-auth's identity_pool.Credentials refresh() would read the file and POST its contents to the attacker. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block /key/update self-escalation by assigned users Non-admin users who were assigned a key (created_by != caller) could update any non-budget field — models, rpm_limit, guardrails, etc. — without admin authorization, allowing privilege self-escalation. Gate: only the key creator (created_by == caller) may edit their own key without admin check; budget changes always require admin regardless of creator status. All other callers must pass _check_key_admin_access. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block user-controlled api_base in RAG ingest vector_store options A user-supplied api_base in ingest_options.vector_store caused the server to forward its configured provider credentials (Gemini, OpenAI) to an attacker-controlled endpoint via SSRF. Add api_base to the blocked credential params set alongside api_key and the existing credential fields. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: restrict /utils/transform_request to PROXY_ADMIN and apply body safety check Any authenticated internal_user could POST arbitrary provider config (aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, etc.) to /utils/transform_request and have the server forward its credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint. - Gate the endpoint on PROXY_ADMIN role (403 for all other roles) - Call is_request_body_safe() to reject banned params even for admins - Convert ValueError from safety check to HTTP 400 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: apply banned-param check to /utils/transform_request Without is_request_body_safe(), any authenticated user could pass aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, or aws_web_identity_token to /utils/transform_request and have the server forward its configured provider credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint during SDK credential resolution. Applies the same banned-param blocklist already used by LLM endpoints. Endpoint remains accessible to all authenticated users. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block SSRF via api_base in /prompts/test dotprompt YAML frontmatter Any frontmatter key not in ["model","input","output"] flowed into optional_params and was merged into the LLM call data dict, bypassing is_request_body_safe. An attacker with any bearer key could set api_base in YAML to redirect the outbound LLM request — including the provider API key — to an attacker-controlled host. Fix: call is_request_body_safe on the constructed data dict after optional_params are merged, before invoking ProxyBaseLLMRequestProcessing. ValueError from the banned-param check is surfaced as HTTP 400. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Update litellm/proxy/rag_endpoints/endpoints.py Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: coerce nested config strings before banned-param check _NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS descent used isinstance(nested, dict) which silently skipped litellm_embedding_config when delivered as a JSON string via multipart/form-data. Banned params (api_base, aws_sts_endpoint, etc.) nested inside the stringified value were invisible to is_request_body_safe. _NESTED_METADATA_KEYS already used _coerce_metadata_to_dict which parses JSON strings before checking. Apply the same coercion to _NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: replace substring match with prefix match in is_llm_api_route mapped_pass_through_routes used `_llm_passthrough_route in route` (substring) so any admin-only path whose URL contained a provider name (openai, anthropic, azure, bedrock, etc.) was misclassified as an LLM API route and bypassed the admin gate in non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check. Confirmed live: non-admin key could GET /credentials/by_name/openai (read masked provider API key) and DELETE /credentials/openai (delete credential). Fix: use exact match or startswith(prefix + "/") — the same pattern used everywhere else in RouteChecks — so only routes that actually start with a passthrough prefix are allowed through. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stabilize PR #27878 test failures - key_management_endpoints: extend can_skip_admin_check to team keys so team members with /key/update permission can update non-budget fields. can_team_member_execute_key_management_endpoint already validates team membership + permission and raises if unauthorized; reaching the admin check on a team key means the caller was authorized. - test: set created_by on mock key in test_update_key_non_budget_fields_allowed_for_internal_user so caller_is_creator resolves correctly (MagicMock default ≠ user_id). - auth_utils.get_request_route: guard against non-dict request.scope (e.g. MagicMock in unit tests) to prevent a MagicMock leaking into UserAPIKeyAuth.request_route and failing Pydantic validation. - ci: assign test_multipart_bypass_repro.py to the proxy-runtime shard in test-unit-proxy-db.yml to satisfy the shard-coverage check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(lint): add explicit str() cast in get_request_route for MyPy scope.get() returns Any|None which MyPy cannot coerce to str implicitly. Wrap both scope.get() calls in str() to satisfy the type checker. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: guard bare-/ root_path strip + make total_spend migration idempotent auth_utils.get_request_route: when Starlette sets scope["app_root_path"] to "/" (e.g. behind some middleware), the old stripping logic would remove the leading slash from every path ("/team/new" → "team/new"), breaking route matching and causing auth to misclassify protected routes. Skip stripping when root_path is bare "/". migration: add IF NOT EXISTS to total_spend ALTER TABLE so the migration is safe to replay when a prior partial run already created the column. Without this guard, prisma migrate deploy fails on CI DBs that were partially migrated, causing all subsequent DB operations (including /team/new) to 500. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: require creator still owns key for personal-key bypass in /key/update caller_is_creator now requires both created_by == caller AND user_id == caller. Previously checking only created_by let a demoted admin who originally created a key for another user continue editing non-budget fields on it after reassignment, bypassing _check_key_admin_access. Adds regression test: creator whose key was reassigned is blocked (403). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: extract auth checks to fix PLR0915 + broaden max_budget assertion internal_user_endpoints._update_single_user_helper exceeded 50 statements (PLR0915). Extract authorization checks into _check_user_update_authz helper to bring statement count under the limit. test_validate_max_budget: assert "negative" (substring of both the local "cannot be negative" and the CI "non-negative finite number" messages) so the test is stable regardless of which exact wording the function uses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Krrish Dholakia
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8bbc61e03c
|
fix: harden /key/update authorization checks (#27878)
* fix: patch Host-header auth bypass in get_request_route Starlette reconstructs request.url from the Host header. A malformed Host like `localhost/?x=1` causes Starlette to build the full URL as `http://localhost/?x=1/health`, which url-parses to path="/". Since "/" is in LiteLLMRoutes.public_routes, all protected routes became reachable without authentication. Fix: read scope["path"] (set by uvicorn from the HTTP request line, not derivable from headers) instead of request.url.path. Sub-path deployments are handled via scope["app_root_path"] / scope["root_path"], mirroring Starlette's own base_url construction logic. Affected variants confirmed fixed: Host: localhost/?x=1 Host: localhost:4000/?x=1 Host: localhost/#test Host: localhost:4000/#test Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: reduce comments in route fix Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block credential fields in RAG ingest vector_store options Credential fields (vertex_credentials, aws_access_key_id, api_key, etc.) in ingest_options.vector_store are now rejected at the API boundary with a 400 error. Credentials must be configured server-side. Previously any authenticated user could supply a vertex_credentials dict with type=external_account pointing credential_source.file at an arbitrary path (e.g. /proc/1/environ) and token_url at an attacker-controlled server. google-auth's identity_pool.Credentials refresh() would read the file and POST its contents to the attacker. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block /key/update self-escalation by assigned users Non-admin users who were assigned a key (created_by != caller) could update any non-budget field — models, rpm_limit, guardrails, etc. — without admin authorization, allowing privilege self-escalation. Gate: only the key creator (created_by == caller) may edit their own key without admin check; budget changes always require admin regardless of creator status. All other callers must pass _check_key_admin_access. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block user-controlled api_base in RAG ingest vector_store options A user-supplied api_base in ingest_options.vector_store caused the server to forward its configured provider credentials (Gemini, OpenAI) to an attacker-controlled endpoint via SSRF. Add api_base to the blocked credential params set alongside api_key and the existing credential fields. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: restrict /utils/transform_request to PROXY_ADMIN and apply body safety check Any authenticated internal_user could POST arbitrary provider config (aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, etc.) to /utils/transform_request and have the server forward its credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint. - Gate the endpoint on PROXY_ADMIN role (403 for all other roles) - Call is_request_body_safe() to reject banned params even for admins - Convert ValueError from safety check to HTTP 400 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: apply banned-param check to /utils/transform_request Without is_request_body_safe(), any authenticated user could pass aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, or aws_web_identity_token to /utils/transform_request and have the server forward its configured provider credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint during SDK credential resolution. Applies the same banned-param blocklist already used by LLM endpoints. Endpoint remains accessible to all authenticated users. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: block SSRF via api_base in /prompts/test dotprompt YAML frontmatter Any frontmatter key not in ["model","input","output"] flowed into optional_params and was merged into the LLM call data dict, bypassing is_request_body_safe. An attacker with any bearer key could set api_base in YAML to redirect the outbound LLM request — including the provider API key — to an attacker-controlled host. Fix: call is_request_body_safe on the constructed data dict after optional_params are merged, before invoking ProxyBaseLLMRequestProcessing. ValueError from the banned-param check is surfaced as HTTP 400. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Update litellm/proxy/rag_endpoints/endpoints.py Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: coerce nested config strings before banned-param check _NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS descent used isinstance(nested, dict) which silently skipped litellm_embedding_config when delivered as a JSON string via multipart/form-data. Banned params (api_base, aws_sts_endpoint, etc.) nested inside the stringified value were invisible to is_request_body_safe. _NESTED_METADATA_KEYS already used _coerce_metadata_to_dict which parses JSON strings before checking. Apply the same coercion to _NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: replace substring match with prefix match in is_llm_api_route mapped_pass_through_routes used `_llm_passthrough_route in route` (substring) so any admin-only path whose URL contained a provider name (openai, anthropic, azure, bedrock, etc.) was misclassified as an LLM API route and bypassed the admin gate in non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check. Confirmed live: non-admin key could GET /credentials/by_name/openai (read masked provider API key) and DELETE /credentials/openai (delete credential). Fix: use exact match or startswith(prefix + "/") — the same pattern used everywhere else in RouteChecks — so only routes that actually start with a passthrough prefix are allowed through. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: stabilize PR #27878 test failures - key_management_endpoints: extend can_skip_admin_check to team keys so team members with /key/update permission can update non-budget fields. can_team_member_execute_key_management_endpoint already validates team membership + permission and raises if unauthorized; reaching the admin check on a team key means the caller was authorized. - test: set created_by on mock key in test_update_key_non_budget_fields_allowed_for_internal_user so caller_is_creator resolves correctly (MagicMock default ≠ user_id). - auth_utils.get_request_route: guard against non-dict request.scope (e.g. MagicMock in unit tests) to prevent a MagicMock leaking into UserAPIKeyAuth.request_route and failing Pydantic validation. - ci: assign test_multipart_bypass_repro.py to the proxy-runtime shard in test-unit-proxy-db.yml to satisfy the shard-coverage check. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(lint): add explicit str() cast in get_request_route for MyPy scope.get() returns Any|None which MyPy cannot coerce to str implicitly. Wrap both scope.get() calls in str() to satisfy the type checker. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: guard bare-/ root_path strip + make total_spend migration idempotent auth_utils.get_request_route: when Starlette sets scope["app_root_path"] to "/" (e.g. behind some middleware), the old stripping logic would remove the leading slash from every path ("/team/new" → "team/new"), breaking route matching and causing auth to misclassify protected routes. Skip stripping when root_path is bare "/". migration: add IF NOT EXISTS to total_spend ALTER TABLE so the migration is safe to replay when a prior partial run already created the column. Without this guard, prisma migrate deploy fails on CI DBs that were partially migrated, causing all subsequent DB operations (including /team/new) to 500. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: require creator still owns key for personal-key bypass in /key/update caller_is_creator now requires both created_by == caller AND user_id == caller. Previously checking only created_by let a demoted admin who originally created a key for another user continue editing non-budget fields on it after reassignment, bypassing _check_key_admin_access. Adds regression test: creator whose key was reassigned is blocked (403). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: extract auth checks to fix PLR0915 + broaden max_budget assertion internal_user_endpoints._update_single_user_helper exceeded 50 statements (PLR0915). Extract authorization checks into _check_user_update_authz helper to bring statement count under the limit. test_validate_max_budget: assert "negative" (substring of both the local "cannot be negative" and the CI "non-negative finite number" messages) so the test is stable regardless of which exact wording the function uses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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yuneng-jiang
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3dd763d710
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Merge pull request #27801 from stuxf/chore/get-instance-fn-runtime-s3-gate
chore(proxy): refuse remote-URL instance-fn loads outside config-file path
(cherry picked from commit
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yuneng-jiang
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e3e5209f51
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Merge pull request #27801 from stuxf/chore/get-instance-fn-runtime-s3-gate
chore(proxy): refuse remote-URL instance-fn loads outside config-file path |
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Sameer Kankute
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38709ba9bb
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feat(proxy): skip disable_background_health_check models on GET /health when flag set (#27716)
* feat(proxy): skip disable_background_health_check models on GET /health when flag set Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix comment * fix greptile comments * Fix health check fallback kwargs * Format health endpoint * Harden direct health check kwargs compatibility for monkeypatched perform_health_check Replace substring-based TypeError detection with unexpected-keyword checks and a short retry chain (full kwargs, instrumentation only, filter only, minimal) so partial stubs work regardless of which optional kwarg fails first. Add proxy unit tests for legacy three-arg stubs and single-kwarg variants. Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com> * fix black --------- Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com> |
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user
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d853d3dcd4
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chore(tests): thread config_file_path through s3/gcs custom-logger tests
The pre-existing s3:// / gcs:// custom-logger tests called ``get_instance_fn`` without ``config_file_path``, which means the new runtime gate (refuse remote URLs unless invoked from a config-file load) now raises ``ValueError`` before reaching the mocked download paths. Each test was exercising the documented startup config-file load scenario; pass ``config_file_path="/any/path"`` to make that intent explicit and route past the gate. Affected: test_s3_download_success, test_gcs_download_success, test_invalid_url_format, test_download_failure_handling, test_file_cleanup. |
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harish-berri
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8f25942ecf
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Litellm key rotation bug (#27756)
* fix(proxy): resolve cache handling issues in _lookup_deprecated_key - Updated the in-memory cache for deprecated key lookups to store a 3-tuple (active_token_id, cache_expires_at_ts, revoke_at_ts) instead of a 2-tuple, ensuring proper unpacking and backward compatibility. - Removed duplicate cache reads and added logic to handle legacy cache entries gracefully. - Enhanced unit tests to cover scenarios for cache hits, DB misses, and respect for revoke_at timestamps, ensuring robust handling of the grace-period key-rotation feature. * refactor(proxy): streamline cache handling in _lookup_deprecated_key - Simplified the cache retrieval logic by directly unpacking the 3-tuple cache entries, removing the need for backward compatibility checks for 2-tuple entries. - Updated unit tests to ensure that pre-warmed 3-tuple cache entries are served correctly without unnecessary database lookups. * chore(ci): add new unit test for deprecated key grace period - Included `test_deprecated_key_grace_period.py` in the CI workflow to enhance coverage for deprecated key handling scenarios. * fix(proxy): remove unnecessary check for revoke_at in _lookup_deprecated_key - Eliminated the redundant check for None on revoke_at, streamlining the logic for handling deprecated keys in the cache. This change enhances the efficiency of the key lookup process. * test(proxy): add end-to-end tests for deprecated key lookup behavior - Introduced a new test class `TestDeprecatedKeyLookupDbE2E` to validate the behavior of deprecated key lookups against a real Prisma-backed database. - The test ensures that old key hashes resolve correctly and that repeated lookups utilize the in-memory cache without errors. - Cleaned up the `_lookup_deprecated_key` function by removing an unnecessary check for `revoke_at`, enhancing the efficiency of the key lookup process. |
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Yuneng Jiang
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111ee52f23
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fix(proxy): always merge caller-supplied tags into request metadata
Caller-supplied tags (`x-litellm-tags` header, body `tags`, `metadata.tags`) were silently dropped unless the key/team had `metadata.allow_client_tags: true` set. Restore the documented behavior: tags from the request always flow into `metadata.tags` and union with any admin-configured static tags from key/team/project metadata. Removes the `allow_client_tags` opt-in flag from the pre-call pipeline. The flag was only ever read here; it has no schema or endpoint footprint, so leftover values in existing key metadata are inert. Test cleanup mirrors the simplification: drop the three tests that verified the strip-when-not-opted-in path, drop the `allow_client_tags` fixture lines from the merge/union tests. |
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Yuneng Jiang
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4a78bfcd28
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fix(proxy): always merge caller-supplied tags into request metadata
Caller-supplied tags (`x-litellm-tags` header, body `tags`, `metadata.tags`) were silently dropped unless the key/team had `metadata.allow_client_tags: true` set. Restore the documented behavior: tags from the request always flow into `metadata.tags` and union with any admin-configured static tags from key/team/project metadata. Removes the `allow_client_tags` opt-in flag from the pre-call pipeline. The flag was only ever read here; it has no schema or endpoint footprint, so leftover values in existing key metadata are inert. Test cleanup mirrors the simplification: drop the three tests that verified the strip-when-not-opted-in path, drop the `allow_client_tags` fixture lines from the merge/union tests. |
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Tai An
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80445299b8
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fix(proxy): coerce non-str x-litellm-* header values to avoid httpx TypeError (#27458) (#27504)
Squash-merged by litellm-agent from Anai-Guo's PR. |
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Milan
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fa4c7a2ac6
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Add unit tests for virtual-key model max budget Redis flush.
Assert _push_in_memory_increments_to_redis runs after async_log_success_event when dual_cache.redis_cache is set, and is skipped when Redis is not configured. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
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oss-agent-shin
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c8e47dcb43
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Fix early proxy request size enforcement (#27311)
* Add early proxy request size guard Co-authored-by: ishaan-berri <ishaan-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * Address request size review feedback Co-authored-by: ishaan-berri <ishaan-berri@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: oss-agent-shin <279349115+oss-agent-shin@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: ishaan-berri <ishaan-berri@users.noreply.github.com> |
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yuneng-jiang
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9a338e1b6b
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[Test] Tests: Stop parametrizing API keys into pytest test IDs (#27249)
Several tests parametrized over (model, api_key, ...) tuples or raw token strings, causing pytest to embed those values in the test ID and print them in CI logs. Refactored each affected test to keep the same coverage without putting key material into parametrize. - audio_tests/test_audio_speech.py: split env-var keys into separate azure/openai test functions sharing a helper; sync_mode parametrize preserved. - audio_tests/test_whisper.py: split into openai_whisper / azure_whisper functions sharing a helper; response_format parametrize preserved. - local_testing/test_embedding.py: single-case parametrize inlined. - proxy_unit_tests/test_user_api_key_auth.py: 5 header parametrize cases split into 5 named tests sharing an _assert helper. - proxy_unit_tests/test_proxy_utils.py: 4 api_key_value cases split into 4 named tests. - test_litellm/proxy/auth/test_user_api_key_auth.py: 5 key-prefix cases (Bearer / Basic / lowercase bearer / raw / AWS SigV4) split into 5 named tests. Verified: black clean; 14 refactored unit tests pass; pytest collects audio/embedding tests with safe IDs (no key material in test IDs). |
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yuneng-jiang
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6ff668c7aa
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[Infra] Promote internal staging to main (#27245)
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* default requested_model to empty string on litellm-side rejects * Update litellm/router.py Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: scope key access_group_ids override by team's assigned groups A team member could set any access_group_ids on their key (e.g. a group assigned only to a different team) and override the team's model restriction. Intersect the key's access_group_ids with team_object.access_group_ids in _key_access_group_grants_model so foreign groups are dropped before model expansion. Adds a regression test that asserts expansion is never called for foreign groups. * [Fix] Proxy: Skip Personal Budget Hook When Reservation Covers Counter The reservation path (PR #26845) atomically pre-fills `spend:user:{user_id}` and admits at the strict-`<` boundary. The legacy `_PROXY_MaxBudgetLimiter` pre-call hook re-reads the same counter with `>=`, so a reservation that fills the counter to exactly `max_budget` (e.g. a request without a `max_tokens` cap that falls back to reserving the smallest remaining headroom) is rejected by the hook even though the reservation already admitted it. Skip the hook when the request's active `budget_reservation` covers `spend:user:{user_id}`. The reservation is the source of truth for that counter cross-pod; the legacy `>=` path remains in place for requests without a reservation (e.g. paths that bypass the reservation entirely). Reproduces as `tests/otel_tests/test_prometheus.py::test_user_budget_metrics` on a fresh user with `max_budget=10` calling `fake-openai-endpoint` without `max_tokens`. Adds focused unit coverage in `tests/test_litellm/proxy/hooks/test_max_budget_limiter.py`. * harden bedrock file bucket validation * Fix syntax errors from botched merge in router.py * Fix Vertex batch output edge cases * [Fix] RBAC: Drop management_routes Write Fallback for Admin Viewer Greptile P1: the unsafe-method branch of `_check_proxy_admin_viewer_access` ended with a blanket `if route in management_routes: return`. That set is a mix of reads (info/list — handled via the safe-method GET branch above) and writes. The fallback let Admin Viewer POST to write endpoints not enumerated in `_ADMIN_VIEWER_BLOCKED_WRITE_ROUTES`, including: - /team/block, /team/unblock, /team/permissions_update - /jwt/key/mapping/{new,update,delete} - /key/bulk_update - /key/{key_id}/reset_spend Remove the fallback. The two remaining allow sets (admin_viewer_routes and global_spend_tracking_routes) are both read-only, so removal does not affect the legitimate POST-as-read cases (e.g. /spend/calculate, which is in spend_tracking_routes ⊂ admin_viewer_routes). Tests: - 8 new parametrized cases pinning each previously-leaking management write endpoint to 403 on POST for PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY. * fix(tests): anchor VCR redis cassette key to repo root `os.path.relpath` with no `start` arg uses the current working directory, so running pytest from a subdirectory produced a different Redis key than running from the repo root. CI-recorded cassettes and locally-replayed runs would silently miss each other's cache. Anchor the path to the repo root (derived from `__file__`) so the key is stable regardless of CWD. https://claude.ai/code/session_018uCx7pcrkdUJZrCVMaTdPx * fix: gate key access_group override on group's own assignment Replaces the previous intersect-with-team.access_group_ids check, which made the override unreachable in practice (the team-gate fallback already covered every case the intersection allowed). The override now resolves each of the key's access_group_ids via get_access_object and accepts the group only if its assigned_team_ids includes the key's team_id, or its assigned_key_ids includes the key's token. This fulfills the original ask (a key can extend a team's allow-list via a group the admin granted to that team or that specific key) while still rejecting foreign groups referenced by team members of other teams. * [Fix] Proxy/Key Management: Honor team_member_permissions /key/list In /key/list Endpoint When a team grants /key/list via team_member_permissions, non-admin members should see all keys for that team — same as a team admin. Previously the classification in list_keys() only checked admin status, so permitted members fell into the service-account-only path and could not see other members' personal keys. Routes those members into the full-visibility set. * Fix access-group bypass via litellm-model fallback path When _get_all_deployments returns 0 candidates and the litellm-model fallback branch (_get_deployment_by_litellm_model) finds deployments that the access-group filter then empties, _access_group_filter_emptied_candidates remained False (it was captured before that branch ran). The router would then proceed to default fallbacks; the fallback model could have no access_groups and short-circuit the filter, silently serving a caller blocked by access-group restrictions. Update the flag inside the litellm-model branch when filtering empties a non-empty candidate set so the default-fallback guard still triggers. * fix(proxy): redact MCP server URL and headers for non-admin viewers (VERIA-8) Many MCP integrations (Zapier, etc.) embed an upstream API key directly in the server URL, e.g. ``https://actions.zapier.com/mcp/<api-key>/sse``. The list and single-server endpoints were returning the full URL to any authenticated user — `_redact_mcp_credentials` only stripped the explicit ``credentials`` field, and `_sanitize_mcp_server_for_virtual_key` only ran for restricted virtual keys. Non-admin internal users could read the dashboard, click the unmask toggle, and exfiltrate the raw token. Add `_sanitize_mcp_server_for_non_admin` that runs on top of the existing credential redaction and clears the credential-bearing fields: - ``url`` (the primary leak vector) - ``spec_path`` (OpenAPI spec URLs that may carry tokens) - ``static_headers`` / ``extra_headers`` (Authorization) - ``env`` (arbitrary secrets) - ``authorization_url`` / ``token_url`` / ``registration_url`` Identity fields (``server_id``, ``alias``, ``mcp_info``, etc.) are preserved so the UI can still list servers a non-admin's team has access to. Apply the new sanitizer in `fetch_all_mcp_servers` and the per-server fetch path right after the existing virtual-key branch. Update the existing `test_list_mcp_servers_non_admin_user_filtered` assertions that previously checked URL visibility. Frontend defense-in-depth: hide the URL unmask toggle on `mcp_server_view.tsx` unless the viewer is a proxy admin. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix runtime policy attachment initialization Mark runtime-created policies and attachments initialized so global policy attachments created from the policy builder apply immediately without requiring a restart. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * test(router): cover _try_early_resolve_deployments_for_model_not_in_names The router_code_coverage CI check requires every function in router.py to be referenced by at least one test under tests/{local_testing, router_unit_tests,test_litellm} in a file with "router" in its name. The recently-extracted helper had no direct test, so the check failed with "0.45% of functions in router.py are not tested". Add a focused test that exercises the four return paths: model already in self.model_names, no fallback applies, pattern-router match, and default_deployment substitution (also asserting the stored default isn't mutated). https://claude.ai/code/session_019AVp1XL7RT9RxRe4qRLkay * Fix policy registry teardown in tests Reset the policy ID index during policy engine test cleanup so stale policy versions cannot leak between tests. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(batches): count non-chat tokens, validate batch-file model access (VERIA-39) (#27015) * fix(batches): count non-chat tokens and validate every model in batch file Two security control bypasses on POST /v1/batches: 1. `_get_batch_job_input_file_usage` only summed tokens for `body.messages` (chat completions). Embedding (`input`) and text completion (`prompt`) batches reported zero, letting massive non-chat workloads slip past TPM rate limits. Extend the counter to handle string and list shapes for both fields. 2. The batch input file was forwarded to the upstream provider without inspecting the models named inside the JSONL — only the outer `model` query parameter was checked against the caller's allowlist. A caller restricted to gpt-3.5 could submit a batch targeting gpt-4o and the upstream would execute it under the proxy's shared API key. Add `_get_models_from_batch_input_file_content` (returns the distinct `body.model` values) and call it from `_enforce_batch_file_model_access` in the pre-call hook, which runs each model through `can_key_call_model` so the same allowlist semantics (wildcards, access groups, all-proxy-models, team aliases) the proxy enforces on `/chat/completions` apply here too. Any unauthorized model raises a 403 before the file is forwarded. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(batches): count pre-tokenized prompt/input shapes, classify 403 logs Two follow-ups from the Greptile review on the batch validation PR: 1. P1 TPM bypass via integer token arrays. The OpenAI batch schema accepts ``prompt`` and ``input`` as ``list[int]`` (a single pre-tokenized prompt) or ``list[list[int]]`` (multiple) in addition to the string and ``list[str]`` shapes. Pre-fix only the string shapes were counted, so a caller could submit a batch with hundreds of millions of pre-tokenized tokens and the rate limiter would record zero. Extract the per-field logic into ``_count_prompt_or_input_tokens`` and count each int as one token. 2. P2 access-denial logs were indistinguishable from I/O failures. ``count_input_file_usage`` caught every exception under a generic "Error counting input file usage" message, so an intentional 403 from ``_enforce_batch_file_model_access`` looked the same in the logs as a missing file or a Prisma timeout. Catch ``HTTPException`` separately and log 403s at WARNING level with a security-relevant message before re-raising. Tests cover the new shapes: single ``list[int]``, ``list[list[int]]`` (the worst-case bypass vector), and embeddings ``input`` with pre-tokenized arrays. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(proxy): re-validate user_id after /user/info re-parses query (#27009) * fix(proxy): re-validate user_id ownership after /user/info re-parses query The route-level access check in `RouteChecks.non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check` reads `request.query_params.get("user_id")`, which decodes literal `+` to spaces. The endpoint then re-parses the raw query string with `urllib.unquote` in `get_user_id_from_request` to preserve `+` characters (so plus-addressed emails work as user_ids). Those two paths produce different ids: a caller who registered a user_id containing a literal space could pass the route check and then read another user's row by sending the encoded `+` form. Add `_enforce_user_info_access` and call it after `_normalize_user_info_user_id` returns the final id. Proxy admin / view-only admin still bypass; everyone else must match the resolved user_id (or have no user_id, which falls back to the caller's own id later in the handler). Tests cover the admin bypass, owner-match path, and the cross-user lookup that this change blocks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(proxy): apply user_info ownership check to PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY `_enforce_user_info_access` was bypassing both PROXY_ADMIN and PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY, but the upstream route check in `RouteChecks.non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check` only treats PROXY_ADMIN as a true admin for the `/user/info` route — view-only admins go through the `user_id == valid_token.user_id` enforcement along with regular users. Mirroring that asymmetry left the same encoded-`+` bypass open for view-only admins whose user_id contains a literal space. Drop the PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY exemption so the post-decode re-check matches the upstream rule. Update tests: a view-only admin must now be blocked from cross-user lookups but still allowed to read their own row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(spend-logs): opt-in suppression of stack traces in spend-tracking error logs Adds LITELLM_SUPPRESS_SPEND_LOG_TRACEBACKS env var. When set to true and the proxy log level is INFO or above, spend-tracking error paths emit a single ERROR line without the full traceback. Stack traces are preserved at DEBUG and the Sentry / proxy_logging_obj.failure_handler path is unchanged. The new spend_log_error helper is wired through the spend write hot path: - DBSpendUpdateWriter (update_database, _update_*_db, batch upsert, redis-commit fallbacks) - _ProxyDBLogger._PROXY_track_cost_callback - get_logging_payload exception path - update_spend / update_daily_tag_spend / spend logs queue monitor Resolves LIT-2704. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(spend-logs): preserve no-traceback behavior for update_daily_tag_spend This call site previously logged a single-line error via verbose_proxy_logger.error() with no traceback. Switching it to spend_log_error(..., exc=e) caused a full stack trace to render by default (when LITELLM_SUPPRESS_SPEND_LOG_TRACEBACKS is unset), which contradicts the PR goal of leaving default behavior unchanged. Revert this specific site to the original error log call. * fix(spend-logs): preserve no-traceback behavior for update_daily_tag_spend Bugbot caught a regression: the previous error log here was a single-line verbose_proxy_logger.error(...) with no traceback. spend_log_error attaches the active exception's traceback by default (when the suppression env var is unset), so swapping it in changed default behavior. Revert this one site to its original .error() call to keep the PR strictly opt-in. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(spend-logs): suppress traceback in SpendLogs error_information row Extend LITELLM_SUPPRESS_SPEND_LOG_TRACEBACKS to the failure callback so the per-row Metadata pane in the UI no longer shows the stack trace when the opt-in env var is set, matching the existing console-side suppression. https://claude.ai/code/session_014dztoRbRnRvq54HL9EyHx6 * [Fix] Proxy: Repair Merge Fallout In Router-Override Fallback Auth Conflict resolution for #26968 dropped the `Iterator` typing import (NameError at module load), left a dead `fallback_models = cast(...)` block, and the new tests called `_enforce_key_and_fallback_model_access` without the now-required `request` kwarg. * isolate dual OTEL handlers * harden cloud file compatibility path * harden cloud file compatibility path * [Fix] Proxy/Key Management: Align Key-Org Membership Checks On Generate And Regenerate Mirrors the membership rule on /key/update so that /key/generate and /key/{key}/regenerate apply the same `_validate_caller_can_assign_key_org` gate when the caller specifies an `organization_id`. Proxy admins bypass. The check no-ops when `organization_id` is not being set. * thread trusted params through vertex file content * trust only server legacy file flag * chore(proxy): keep public AI hub unauthenticated * fix(proxy): preserve low-detail readiness status * [Test] Anthropic: Replace Legacy Claude-4-Sonnet Alias With Haiku 4.5 Three live-API tests pinned to claude-4-sonnet-20250514, which is a non-canonical alias of claude-sonnet-4-20250514. Anthropic's main API no longer resolves the legacy form under freshly issued keys, so the tests fail with not_found_error. The token counter test pinned to claude-sonnet-4-20250514 itself (deprecation_date 2026-05-14, two weeks out) was on borrowed time too. Bump all four to claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 — capability superset for what these tests exercise (streaming, parallel tool calling, extended thinking, token counting), no upcoming deprecation, cheaper per-token. * chore(proxy): move URL-valued model/file_id guard from SDK to proxy The previous per-provider guards in HuggingFace, Oobabooga, and Gemini files lived in the SDK layer, breaking SDK callers who legitimately pass URL-valued model identifiers. Move the check to the proxy boundary in add_litellm_data_to_request so SDK users keep working while proxy users default-deny URL-valued model and file_id, with admin opt-in via litellm.provider_url_destination_allowed_hosts. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * [Chore] Proxy/UI: Drop stray _experimental/out/chat/index.html This file is a regenerable UI build artifact that should not be tracked in source. Removing so the merge into litellm_internal_staging stays clean. * [Test] Anthropic Passthrough: Bump Streaming Cost-Injection Test To Haiku 4.5 test_anthropic_messages_streaming_cost_injection hits the proxy's /v1/messages route, which routes via the anthropic/* wildcard to api.anthropic.com. The 404 surfaced in the test was Anthropic's own not_found_error propagated back through the proxy (visible from the x-litellm-model-id hash on the response — the proxy did route). Same root cause as the prior commit: the legacy claude-4-sonnet-20250514 alias is no longer recognized by Anthropic's main API under the new key. Swap to claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 — same routing path, canonical model. * fix(proxy): handle ownership-recording failures after upstream create If record_container_owner raises after the upstream container is created, the user previously got a 500 with no usable container — they were billed for an unreachable resource. Move ownership recording into the create path's exception handling and split the two failure modes: - HTTPException from the recorder (auth conflicts) propagates verbatim so the client sees the real status code, not a generic LLM error. - Unexpected exceptions are logged and swallowed; the response is returned to the caller so they aren't billed for a container they can't address. The DB row stays untracked until an operator reconciles. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(guardrails): close post-call coverage gaps * fix(types): add /team/permissions_bulk_update to management_routes The blocklist check in _check_proxy_admin_viewer_access only fires for routes that match LiteLLMRoutes.management_routes — the bulk-update endpoint was missing from that list, so the test for view-only admins on /team/permissions_bulk_update fell through to "allow." Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * [Test] Anthropic Passthrough: Bump Thinking Tests Off Legacy Sonnet 4 Alias base_anthropic_messages_test.test_anthropic_messages_with_thinking and test_anthropic_streaming_with_thinking still pinned to claude-4-sonnet-20250514 — the same legacy alias Anthropic no longer recognizes under freshly issued keys. The other four tests in this base class already use claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929; these two were missed. Bump to claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 (supports_reasoning=true, no upcoming deprecation). Subclasses including TestAnthropicPassthroughBasic inherit these methods. * fix(guardrails): cover multi-choice output variants * fix(proxy): preserve public ai hub ui setting * fix(scim): cascade FK cleanup on user delete and surface block status in UI SCIM DELETE /Users/{id} previously called litellm_usertable.delete without clearing rows that FK back to the user, so Postgres rejected the delete with LiteLLM_InvitationLink_user_id_fkey and the SCIM caller saw a 500. Add a helper to drop invitation_link, organization_membership, and team_membership rows before the user delete (mirrors /user/delete in internal_user_endpoints). Also add a Status column to the Virtual Keys and Internal Users tables so admins can see at a glance which keys are blocked and which users SCIM has deactivated. SCIM-blocked keys carry a tooltip explaining the origin. Pin the dashboard's Node version to 20 via .nvmrc to match CI. * chore: update Next.js build artifacts (2026-05-02 03:21 UTC, node v20.20.2) * perf(proxy): cache container/skill ownership reads on the hot path Container ownership and skill rows are looked up on every retrieve / delete / list / file-content / chat-completion-with-skill call. The new stores wrapped raw Prisma queries with no cache, putting one DB round-trip on each request. Add an in-process TTL'd cache mirroring the _byok_cred_cache pattern in mcp_server/server.py: per-key (value, monotonic_timestamp), 60s TTL, 10000-entry cap with full-clear on overflow, invalidated by every write. Negative results (`None`) are cached too so untracked-resource checks also skip the DB. Tests cover: cache-after-first-hit, negative caching, write invalidation, no-caching-on-DB-error, TTL expiry, capacity eviction. 56 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: update Next.js build artifacts (2026-05-02 03:39 UTC, node v20.20.2) * fix: remove traceback key instead of it being "" * fix: linting error * fix(scim): preserve scim_active on PUT when client omits the field A SCIM PUT may legally omit `active` (full-replace with the field absent). Pydantic fills the SCIMUser.active default of True, so the PUT handler was overwriting metadata.scim_active with True even when the client never sent it — silently reactivating a previously SCIM-blocked user and unblocking their keys. Use model_fields_set to detect whether the client actually sent `active`. If omitted, preserve the prior scim_active value and skip the cascade to virtual keys. Also drop comments added in this PR that just narrate what the code does; keep only the docstrings and the SQL-NULL pitfall note that explain non-obvious behaviour. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): use set lookup for permitted agent filters * fix(mcp): redact command fields for non-admin server views * fix(proxy): forward decoded container ids after ownership checks * fix(caching): handle stale isolated Redis semantic index * fix(cloudflare): support response_text in streaming chunk parser Newer Cloudflare Workers AI models (e.g. Nemotron) emit 'response_text' instead of 'response' on streamed chunks. The non-streaming path was already updated to fall back to 'response_text' (#26385), but the streaming chunk parser still only read 'response', which caused streaming requests against those models to silently produce empty content. Mirror the non-streaming fallback in CloudflareChatResponseIterator.chunk_parser and add a streaming test for the response_text shape. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * Fix code qa * Address bugbot: drop dead encode/decode helpers; preserve empty custom_id - Remove unused _encode_gcp_label_value / _decode_gcp_label_value singular helpers; only the _chunks variants are actually called. - Use 'is not None' check for custom_id so empty-string custom_ids are still labeled and round-trip through batch outputs. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * Forward Vertex file content logging context * test vertex file content logging forwarding Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com> * Fix Vertex batch output logging mutation * fix: don't mutate caller's logging_obj in _try_transform_vertex_batch_output_to_openai The method was overwriting logging_obj.optional_params, logging_obj.model, and logging_obj.start_time on the caller's Logging instance. When invoked from llm_http_handler.py's generic framework path, the framework's own logging_obj (which already went through pre_call) had its properties clobbered, causing model and start_time to reflect the last batch line's values rather than the original call context. Fix: create a fresh local Logging instance for the per-line transformation instead of mutating the incoming logging_obj. The caller's object is now left entirely untouched regardless of whether a logging_obj was passed in or not. Regression tests added to verify model, start_time, and optional_params are not mutated on the caller's logging_obj. Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com> * feat: add opt-out flag for Vertex batch output transformation Adds litellm.disable_vertex_batch_output_transformation (default False). When True, afile_content returns raw Vertex predictions.jsonl untouched so users that parse candidates/modelVersion directly are not broken. * fix(anthropic,bedrock): omit thinking/output_config when reasoning_effort="none" Setting reasoning_effort="none" on Anthropic chat models (direct, Bedrock Invoke, Bedrock Converse, Vertex AI Anthropic, Azure AI Anthropic) crashed LiteLLM with: litellm.APIConnectionError: 'NoneType' object has no attribute 'get' Both the Anthropic chat transformation and Bedrock Converse called ``AnthropicConfig._map_reasoning_effort`` and assigned the ``None`` it returns for ``"none"`` directly to ``optional_params["thinking"]``. Downstream ``is_thinking_enabled`` then did ``optional_params["thinking"].get("type")`` and crashed. Pop ``thinking`` (and on Claude 4.6/4.7, ``output_config``) instead of assigning ``None``, restoring the documented contract that ``reasoning_effort="none"`` means "do not enable thinking". This also prevents downstream Anthropic 400s ("thinking: Input should be an object", "output_config.effort: Input should be ...") if the bug were ever masked. Verified end-to-end against the live Anthropic API and Bedrock Converse on claude-opus-4-{5,6,7} and claude-sonnet-4-6, plus Bedrock Invoke for Claude 4.5/4.6. Vertex AI Anthropic and Azure AI Anthropic inherit the fixed ``map_openai_params`` from ``AnthropicConfig`` and need no further changes. * fix(vertex-ai): set response=null on batch error entries per OpenAI spec The Vertex batch output transformer was emitting both a populated 'response' and 'error' for failed batch entries. The OpenAI Batch output spec defines them as mutually exclusive: on error 'response' MUST be null. This broke any consumer using 'result["response"] is None' to detect failures. * test(vertex-ai): cover transformation_error path emits response=null * fix(security): sandbox jinja2 in gitlab/arize/bitbucket prompt managers DotpromptManager was hardened to render through ImmutableSandboxedEnvironment. The three sibling managers (gitlab, arize, bitbucket) were missed and still instantiate plain jinja2.Environment(), leaving the same attribute-traversal SSTI primitive open: a template fetched from a GitLab/BitBucket repo or Arize Phoenix workspace can reach __class__.__init__.__globals__ and execute arbitrary Python on the proxy host. Match the dotprompt pattern by switching all three to ImmutableSandboxedEnvironment. The sandbox blocks the dunder-traversal chain while leaving normal {{ var }} substitution intact, so the template surface is unchanged for legitimate use. Adds tests/test_litellm/integrations/test_prompt_manager_ssti.py (18 cases) verifying each manager's jinja_env is a sandbox, that classic SSTI payloads raise SecurityError, and that ordinary variable rendering still works. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(proxy): drop client-supplied pricing fields from request bodies The proxy currently forwards request-body pricing parameters (the fields on `CustomPricingLiteLLMParams`, plus `metadata.model_info`) into the core call path. Those fields belong to deployment configuration, not to per-request input — sending them from a client mutates the request's recorded cost and, via `litellm.completion` → `register_model`, the process-wide `litellm.model_cost` map for every later caller in the worker. Strip them at the boundary. The strip set is built from `CustomPricingLiteLLMParams.model_fields` so pricing fields added later are covered automatically. Operators who do want clients to supply per-request pricing can opt back in per key or team via `metadata.allow_client_pricing_override = true`, mirroring the existing `allow_client_mock_response` and `allow_client_message_redaction_opt_out` flags. Tests cover the strip set's coverage, root and metadata strips, the opt-in skip on both key and team metadata, and a regression check that the global `litellm.model_cost` map is unmutated after a stripped request. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(proxy): log stripped pricing fields at debug for operator visibility Operators upgrading would otherwise see client-supplied pricing overrides silently stop applying with no diagnostic. Emit a debug-level line listing the dropped fields and pointing at the opt-in flag when any are stripped; stay silent on the no-op path so the log isn't filled with noise. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(proxy): move pricing strip below the litellm_metadata JSON-string parse The strip ran before the proxy parses ``litellm_metadata`` from a JSON string into a dict (a path used by multipart/form-data and ``extra_body`` callers), so ``isinstance(metadata, dict)`` was False and ``model_info`` survived the strip. Move the call to the same post-parse position the ``user_api_key_*`` strip already uses for the same reason. Adds a regression test exercising the JSON-string ``litellm_metadata`` path. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(responses): replace legacy claude-4-sonnet alias in multiturn tool-call test Anthropic's main API no longer resolves the non-canonical 'claude-4-sonnet-20250514' alias for freshly issued keys, returning 404 not_found_error. PR #27031 already swept three other live tests pinned to this alias to claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 but missed test_multiturn_tool_calls in the responses API suite, which is now failing reliably on PR CI runs (e.g. PR #27074, job 1603363). Bump the two model references in test_multiturn_tool_calls to the same claude-haiku-4-5-20251001 snapshot used by PR #27031 -- it covers everything this test exercises (tool calling, multi-turn) and isn't on a deprecation schedule. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * chore(proxy): close callback-config and observability-credential side channels Two related gaps in the proxy's request bouncer: 1. ``is_request_body_safe`` (auth_utils.py) walked the request-body root and the ``litellm_embedding_config`` nested dict, but not ``metadata`` or ``litellm_metadata``. The same fields it bans at root — Langfuse / Langsmith / Arize / PostHog / Braintrust / Phoenix / W&B Weave / GCS / Humanloop / Lunary credentials and routing — were silently accepted when the caller put them inside metadata, retargeting observability callbacks to a caller-controlled host with caller-supplied creds. Walk both metadata containers (and parse the JSON-string form sent via multipart / ``extra_body``) through the same banned-params helper, so the existing ``allow_client_side_credentials`` opt-in covers both paths consistently. 2. The banned-params list was hand-maintained and lagged the canonical ``_supported_callback_params`` allow-list in ``initialize_dynamic_callback_params``. Derive the observability bans from that allow-list (minus a small ``_SAFE_CLIENT_CALLBACK_PARAMS`` set for informational fields like ``langfuse_prompt_version`` and ``langsmith_sampling_rate``) so future integrations are covered automatically; ``_EXTRA_BANNED_OBSERVABILITY_PARAMS`` carries the handful of fields integrations read but the allow-list hasn't caught up to. A guard test fails CI if a new entry is added to ``_supported_callback_params`` without an explicit safe-list decision. Separately in ``litellm_pre_call_utils.py``: add ``callbacks``, ``service_callback``, ``logger_fn``, and ``litellm_disabled_callbacks`` to ``_UNTRUSTED_ROOT_CONTROL_FIELDS``. The first three are appended to worker-wide ``litellm.{input,success,failure,_async_*,service}_callback`` lists / ``litellm.user_logger_fn`` from inside ``function_setup`` — one request poisons every subsequent caller in that worker. The last is the inverse primitive: the legitimate path reads it from key/team metadata, the request-body version silently disables admin-configured audit / observability for the call. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): per-param allow must continue, not return early A pre-existing logic bug in ``_check_banned_params``: when the deployment-level ``configurable_clientside_auth_params`` permitted one banned field, the loop ``return``-ed on the first match instead of ``continue``-ing, so any other banned param later in the same body or metadata dict was never checked. This PR's metadata walk multiplies the surface where that bypass matters — a body pairing an allowed ``api_base`` with an observability credential like ``langfuse_host`` would silently pass. Proxy-wide ``allow_client_side_credentials`` keeps ``return`` (it's a global opt-in for every banned param). The per-param branch becomes ``continue`` so only the one explicitly-permitted field is skipped. Adds a regression test that exercises the api_base + langfuse_host pair. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(vector_store): resolve embedding config at request time, never persist creds The vector store create/update path previously called ``_resolve_embedding_config`` against the admin-configured router/DB model and persisted the resolved ``litellm_embedding_config`` dict (``api_key`` / ``api_base`` / ``api_version``) into the ``litellm_managedvectorstorestable.litellm_params`` column. Because the resolver expanded ``os.environ/...`` references via ``get_secret``, the DB row carried cleartext provider credentials, and the ``/vector_store/{new,info,update,list}`` responses returned them to any authenticated caller who could supply a known admin model name. Move the auto-resolve out of ``create_vector_store_in_db`` and out of the update path. Persist only the user-supplied ``litellm_embedding_model`` reference. Resolve at request-handling time inside ``_update_request_data_with_litellm_managed_vector_store_registry`` so the resolved config lives in the per-request ``data`` dict and is garbage-collected after the response. Legacy rows that were created by an earlier proxy version and already carry a resolved ``litellm_embedding_config`` skip the re-resolution and pass through unchanged so embedding calls keep working. The ``new_vector_store`` response now also runs the existing ``_redact_sensitive_litellm_params`` masker (already used by ``info``, ``update``, and ``list``), defending against caller-supplied cleartext on the create path and against legacy rows whose persisted credentials are still in the database. Existing tests that asserted the old write-time-resolve behaviour are updated to assert the new persistence shape (no embedding config stored, just the model reference). Two new tests cover the use-time path: one asserting fresh resolution happens when a row carries only the model reference, the other asserting legacy rows with persisted config skip re-resolution and continue to work. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(vector_store): tighten registry-mutation comment and dedupe test helpers * fix(vector_store): cache use-time embedding-config resolution Hold the resolved config in a process-memory TTL cache so the request-handling path doesn't run litellm_proxymodeltable.find_first on every vector-store call. * fix(anthropic,bedrock,vertex): forward output_config.effort + 400 on garbage reasoning_effort Follow-up bugs surfaced by the QA sweep on PR #27039 (https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/pull/27039#issuecomment-4363363610). 1. Stop stripping output_config.effort on Bedrock + Vertex adaptive routes. - Vertex AI Claude 4.6/4.7 accepts output_config.effort on rawPredict (verified end-to-end against us-east5 / global). The strip helper now no-ops for effort. - Bedrock Converse routes output_config into additionalModelRequestFields for anthropic base models so the requested adaptive tier (low/medium/ high/xhigh/max) actually reaches the wire instead of all collapsing to identical thinking. - Bedrock Invoke chat transformation (AmazonAnthropicClaudeConfig) stops popping output_config from the post-AnthropicConfig request body. - Bedrock Invoke /v1/messages allowlist (BedrockInvokeAnthropicMessagesRequest) now lists output_config so the runtime allowlist filter forwards it. 2. Validate effort across Bedrock Converse so 'disabled' / 'invalid' / '' / unsupported tiers (xhigh/max on Sonnet 4.6 or budget-mode 4.5 models) surface as a clean 400 BadRequestError instead of 500. 3. ValueError -> BadRequestError throughout (AnthropicConfig.map_openai_params, _apply_output_config, AmazonConverseConfig._handle_reasoning_effort_parameter). Empty-string effort is now rejected (was silently passing the 'if effort and ...' short-circuit). 4. Floor reasoning_effort='minimal' at the Anthropic provider minimum (1024 budget_tokens) via new ANTHROPIC_MIN_THINKING_BUDGET_TOKENS so it's a usable tier on direct Anthropic / Azure AI Anthropic / Vertex AI Anthropic / Bedrock Invoke (all of which 400 below 1024). 5. model_prices: dedupe duplicate supports_max_reasoning_effort key on claude-opus-4-7 / claude-opus-4-7-20260416. Adds regression tests across all five affected paths; existing tests asserting the silent-strip behavior were updated to reflect the new pass-through and clean 400 surfaces. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(constants): make ANTHROPIC_MIN_THINKING_BUDGET_TOKENS a plain constant The documentation CI test (tests/documentation_tests/test_env_keys.py) asserts every os.getenv() key in the source has a matching entry in the litellm-docs config_settings.md table. ANTHROPIC_MIN_THINKING_BUDGET_TOKENS tracks Anthropic's published wire-protocol minimum (1024) — it's not a user-tunable, so making it env-overridable was wrong anyway. Drop the os.getenv() wrapper; the value is now a plain literal. Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(anthropic,bedrock): correct effort error message and dedupe effort_map - Remove 'none' from the Bedrock _validate_anthropic_adaptive_effort error message; it was listed as a valid value but rejected by the membership check, leaving users in a feedback loop if they tried 'none'. - Hoist the duplicated reasoning_effort -> output_config.effort mapping out of AnthropicConfig.map_openai_params and AmazonConverseConfig._handle_reasoning_effort_parameter into a single AnthropicConfig.REASONING_EFFORT_TO_OUTPUT_CONFIG_EFFORT class constant so the two routes cannot drift. * fix(anthropic): translate reasoning_effort on /v1/messages route Closes the remaining QA-sweep gap on PR #27074: Bedrock Invoke /v1/messages was silently ignoring ``reasoning_effort`` because the shared param filter only kept native Anthropic keys, so every effort tier collapsed to the same behavior on the wire (27/231 cells failing across opus-4-5 / opus-4-6 / sonnet-4-6). Map ``reasoning_effort`` to native Anthropic ``thinking`` / ``output_config.effort`` at the ``AnthropicMessagesConfig`` layer so all four /v1/messages routes (direct Anthropic, Azure AI, Vertex AI, Bedrock Invoke) inherit the same translation: - Add ``reasoning_effort`` to ``AnthropicMessagesRequestOptionalParams`` so the param filter in ``AnthropicMessagesRequestUtils.get_requested_anthropic_messages_optional_param`` no longer drops it before the transformation runs. - Add ``_translate_reasoning_effort_to_anthropic`` and call it from ``transform_anthropic_messages_request``. Mirrors ``AnthropicConfig.map_openai_params`` on the chat completion path (re-uses ``_map_reasoning_effort`` and ``REASONING_EFFORT_TO_OUTPUT_CONFIG_EFFORT``) so the two routes cannot drift. Pops ``reasoning_effort`` so it never reaches the wire. - Caller-supplied native ``thinking`` / ``output_config.effort`` always win — same precedence as ``_translate_legacy_thinking_for_adaptive_model``. - Garbage values (``""``, ``"disabled"``, ``"invalid"``) raise ``AnthropicError(status_code=400)`` instead of falling through and surfacing as 500s from the provider. - ``"none"`` clears thinking + output_config so callers can opt out per request. Also restores the non-adaptive-model test coverage on Bedrock Invoke /v1/messages that the previous commit lost when ``test_bedrock_messages_strips_output_config`` was renamed to the ``forwards`` variant on Opus 4.7. Adds a new test file ``test_reasoning_effort_translation.py`` covering the translation at the shared config level (adaptive + non-adaptive models, none, garbage, caller precedence) so all four /v1/messages routes are exercised by a single suite. Adds parametrized + behavioral tests on the Bedrock Invoke /v1/messages suite covering: minimal/low/medium/high/xhigh/max mapping for adaptive models, thinking-budget mapping for non-adaptive Opus 4.5, ``none`` clears both, garbage raises 400, explicit ``output_config`` wins. Refs: https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/pull/27074 * fix(anthropic,bedrock): reject unmapped reasoning_effort at mapping site Both the chat completion path (AnthropicConfig.map_openai_params) and the Bedrock Converse path (_handle_reasoning_effort_parameter) used REASONING_EFFORT_TO_OUTPUT_CONFIG_EFFORT.get(value, value) which falls back to the raw input on unmapped keys. Combined with _map_reasoning_effort returning type='adaptive' for any string on Claude 4.6/4.7, garbage values (e.g. 'disabled') could leak into optional_params['output_config']['effort'] unvalidated if map_openai_params ran without the downstream transform_request or _validate_anthropic_adaptive_effort check. Mirror the /v1/messages pattern: use .get(value) (no fallback) and raise BadRequestError immediately when the value is unmapped, co-locating validation with the mapping for defense in depth. * style: black formatting Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(anthropic): stop class-attr leak; gate xhigh/max on every route The reasoning-effort mapping dict was a public class attribute on AnthropicConfig, so BaseConfig.get_config returned it as a request parameter and every Anthropic-backed call (Anthropic / Azure / Vertex / Bedrock Invoke) hit a 400 'REASONING_EFFORT_TO_OUTPUT_CONFIG_EFFORT: Extra inputs are not permitted' from the provider. Move the mapping to a module-level constant. _supports_effort_level only looked the model up under custom_llm_provider='anthropic', so bedrock-prefixed model ids (e.g. bedrock/invoke/us.anthropic.claude-opus-4-7) returned False for both 'max' and 'xhigh' even when the underlying model entry has the flag set. Strip known provider prefixes and retry the lookup against litellm.model_cost directly so per-model gating works on every route. Mirror the per-model xhigh/max gate from AnthropicConfig._apply_output_config in AnthropicMessagesConfig._translate_reasoning_effort_to_anthropic so the /v1/messages route also raises a clean 400 instead of forwarding the unsupported tier. * feat(anthropic,bedrock): strip output_config under drop_params for non-effort models When a proxy fronts Claude Code (which always sends `output_config.effort`) at a pre-4.5 Anthropic model — haiku-3, sonnet-3.5, opus-3, sonnet-4 — the forwarded knob causes a forced 400 the client can't fix. Gating a strip behind the existing `drop_params` flag lets operators opt into silent fixup once and stop worrying about per-model param hygiene. Default (`drop_params=False`) still forwards and surfaces the provider's error, preserving the strict, debuggable contract from #27074. Per https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/build-with-claude/effort the supporting set is Opus 4.5+, Sonnet 4.6+, and Mythos Preview; everything else is dropped (with a verbose_logger warning so the strip is visible). Recognition uses model-name patterns plus a fallback to any `supports_*_reasoning_effort` flag in the model map for forward compatibility with new entries. https://claude.ai/code/session_01WjHq31rvXT6xYNdVmSJvRp (cherry picked from commit |
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Ryan Crabbe
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01ef723c3f
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/litellm_internal_staging' into litellm_fix-ag-not-resolved | ||
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Ryan Crabbe
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bf4c250d86
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fix: gate key access_group override on group's own assignment
Replaces the previous intersect-with-team.access_group_ids check, which made the override unreachable in practice (the team-gate fallback already covered every case the intersection allowed). The override now resolves each of the key's access_group_ids via get_access_object and accepts the group only if its assigned_team_ids includes the key's team_id, or its assigned_key_ids includes the key's token. This fulfills the original ask (a key can extend a team's allow-list via a group the admin granted to that team or that specific key) while still rejecting foreign groups referenced by team members of other teams. |
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Ryan Crabbe
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f17d779666
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fix: scope key access_group_ids override by team's assigned groups
A team member could set any access_group_ids on their key (e.g. a group assigned only to a different team) and override the team's model restriction. Intersect the key's access_group_ids with team_object.access_group_ids in _key_access_group_grants_model so foreign groups are dropped before model expansion. Adds a regression test that asserts expansion is never called for foreign groups. |
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Yuneng Jiang
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650821b538
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Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/litellm_internal_staging' into litellm_fix-config-update-targeted-upserts
# Conflicts: # tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_proxy_server.py |
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harish-berri
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7c8fe86fd9
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Merge branch 'litellm_internal_staging' into litellm_token_verification_query_opt | ||
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yuneng-jiang
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15b7386859
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Merge pull request #26815 from stuxf/fix/get-image-lfi-ssrf
chore(proxy): contain UI_LOGO_PATH / LITELLM_FAVICON_URL on unauthenticated asset endpoints |
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yuneng-jiang
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4ff8f0e901
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Merge pull request #26851 from stuxf/codex/fix-callback-env-secret-resolution
chore(proxy): block env callback refs in key metadata |
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yuneng-jiang
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aa76ab2df7
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Merge pull request #26862 from stuxf/codex/control-field-sanitization
chore(proxy): harden request control fields |
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Michael-RZ-Berri
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9637d8c17b
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Merge pull request #26802 from BerriAI/litellm_lazyLoadedFrontPage
[Feat / Fix] Lazy loaded imports, lazy loaded front page |
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harish-berri
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8df24b5413
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Merge branch 'litellm_internal_staging' into litellm_token_verification_query_opt | ||
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user
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b67a81da47 | test(proxy): align favicon remote asset expectations | ||
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user
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215f538d4f | fix(static-assets): browser-load remote branding assets | ||
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user
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f48dfdbdd9 | fix(proxy): require opt in for audit header fallback | ||
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user
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db00e674e2 | test(proxy): cover control field hardening branches | ||
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user
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119c70b576 | fix(proxy): gate delegated audit attribution | ||
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user
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842eea0131 | chore(proxy): harden request control fields | ||
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user
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22c01adeb2 | chore(proxy): ignore invalid callback metadata rows | ||
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user
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f2f1e3a0ba | chore(proxy): block env callback refs in key metadata | ||
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Michael Riad Zaky
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de75cd777e | test_proxy_routes: dedupe lazy force-load to match vector_store test pattern | ||
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Michael Riad Zaky
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0f8dd28542 | lazy-load optional feature routers on first request | ||
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user
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75d1a0116e
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fix(static-assets): use async_safe_get; drop SVG; serve bytes inline on cache miss
Three review items addressed: * **Veria (Medium): SSRF via redirect.** ``fetch_validated_image_bytes`` was calling ``validate_url(url)`` once and then fetching with the default httpx client, so a 3xx to an internal IP would have been followed unvalidated. Switched to ``async_safe_get`` (the existing SSRF primitive used elsewhere in the codebase) which walks each redirect hop, re-validates, and rejects redirects to blocked networks. Default ``litellm.user_url_validation`` is True so protection is on out of the box. * **Greptile (P2): SVG can embed JS.** Removed ``image/svg+xml`` from the allowed-Content-Type set. The hardcoded response media type (``image/jpeg`` / ``image/x-icon``) means a real SVG body wouldn't render as SVG anyway in modern browsers — the allowlist entry was giving up XSS surface for no actual SVG-rendering benefit. If real SVG support is wanted later, that's a deliberate feature PR with CSP / nosniff bundled. * **Greptile (P2): cache-write OSError drops validated bytes.** When the upstream fetch succeeded but ``open(cache_path, "wb")`` raised (read-only assets dir), the bytes were discarded and the default logo was served — a silent regression for that deployment. Now serve the validated bytes inline via ``Response(...)`` as a fallback before falling back to default. Tests: - Replaced low-level mocks of ``validate_url`` with mocks of ``async_safe_get`` directly, exercising the helper's contract rather than the SSRF primitive's internals. - New ``test_rejects_svg_content_type`` confirms SVG is blocked. - ``test_get_image_cache_logic`` fixture now sets ``mock_response.is_redirect = False`` so ``async_safe_get`` doesn't treat the Mock's truthy attribute as a redirect. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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user
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55d393d77d
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fix(static-assets): unblock CI — pass headers explicitly + harden + update legacy tests
Three CI failures from the previous push, all addressed:
* ``lint`` (mypy): ``async_client.get(url, **request_kwargs)`` confused
mypy because ``AsyncHTTPHandler.get``'s second positional arg is typed
``bool | None``. Switched to an explicit branch:
``await async_client.get(rewritten_url, headers={"host": host_header})``
for the HTTP-rewritten case, plain ``get(rewritten_url)`` otherwise.
* ``proxy-infra`` /
``test_get_image_custom_local_logo_bypasses_cache``: the existing
test set ``UI_LOGO_PATH=/app/custom_logo.jpg`` with no
``LITELLM_ASSETS_PATH``, asserting the path was served verbatim. That
was the LFI behaviour the new path-containment guard closes. Updated
the test to set ``LITELLM_ASSETS_PATH=/app`` so the path is inside an
allowed root, and patched the helper's ``realpath`` / ``isfile`` to
go along with the mocked filesystem. Test intent (bypass cache when
``UI_LOGO_PATH`` is local) is preserved.
* ``auth-and-jwt`` / ``test_get_image_cache_logic``: existing test
built a ``Mock`` response without ``headers``, so the new
Content-Type check tripped on ``Mock().split(";")[0]``. Two fixes:
1. Set ``mock_response.headers = {"content-type": "image/jpeg"}``
on the test (matches the real upstream contract — a logo CDN
always sets a Content-Type).
2. Make ``fetch_validated_image_bytes`` defensive: if the
Content-Type header is missing or non-string, treat as non-image
and fall back to default. Closes a subtle hole — pre-fix, an
upstream that omits Content-Type entirely would have served
arbitrary bytes under the ``image/jpeg`` wrapper.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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