mcp_allowed_clients entries become {alias, value} objects: the value is what the JWT claim or header must equal, the alias is the name the dashboard and logs show. The Network Settings section is renamed Allowed Clients with one alias/value row per client
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds an admin-only DELETE /v1/mcp/sessions that terminates stateful MCP gateway sessions on the current worker by session id prefix and/or by the LiteLLM user that opened them, tombstones the terminated ids so a client reusing one gets 404 instead of a silently recreated stateless session, and lets PROXY_ADMIN name a user_id on the BYOK and OAuth credential delete routes. Full and view-only admins can list every user's stored credential metadata for a server (never the secret). The dashboard gains Disconnect controls on the Live Connections tab and a User Credentials tab with Revoke controls, both hidden from read-only admins.
Resolves LIT-8001
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
A permanent database fault (a missing or version-skewed query engine)
in the subject_token check was answered with the same "retry" wording
as a transient outage. The status stays 503 temporarily_unavailable,
the only OAuth error a client reads as the server's fault and what the
mint path already answers to the same fault, but the description now
says retrying will not help until the deployment is repaired, using
PrismaDBExceptionHandler.is_permanent_database_fault the way the mint
path does.
A subject token JWT auth could not check, because the IdP's JWKS was unreachable with no cached copy or the auth database was down, came back as 400 invalid_request with the same fixed message a bad token gets, so clients re-logged in instead of retrying the way they already do for a mint-time 503. Those checks now answer 503 temporarily_unavailable and log the reason, while real rejections stay 400 invalid_request.
With mcp_allowed_clients set the gateway used to read the whole POST body to
find clientInfo.name, so an authenticated client could make the proxy buffer an
arbitrarily large payload. Inspection is now capped at MCP_ALLOWLIST_PEEK_MAX_BYTES
and a sessionless POST that exceeds the cap is rejected with 403 before routing,
while posts on an admitted session stream through unchanged
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The proxy stores both fields with a whole-row read-modify-write of
general_settings, so two concurrent writes from one save can drop one
of them. Also drops docstrings and suppressions the diff did not need
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds the mcp_allowed_clients general setting, enforced against the
clientInfo.name each MCP client sends in its initialize request. A client
not on the list, or one that does not identify itself, is rejected with
403 before any stateful session is created. The setting is configurable
from config.yaml and from the Admin UI MCP network settings page
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
An api_key server whose key lives in static_headers, the documented
shape for upstreams that expect a custom header name, dispatched fine
before the fail-closed check and was rejected as misconfigured after
it. The check now treats every static header the admin configured as a
credential slot for api_key mode, on both the MCP client path and the
OpenAPI tool path, with regression tests at all three layers.
JWT auth caches the user row before it adds the user to the JWT's team, and admission checks the credential's team against the cached row on whichever worker takes the next request. On a two-worker gateway the credential minted for a newly joined team answered 403 "not in your team memberships" until the management-object TTL ran out, because /team/member_add only evicted the membership spend sentinel. The add now evicts the added members' cached user rows and broadcasts the eviction to the other workers, the way /team/member_delete already did
The mint test now also covers a user SCIM deactivated after the cache last saw them active: the database read refuses the mint while the cached row still says active
The token exchange mint keeps reading the user row from the database, since JWT auth caches the user it creates before adding it to the JWT's team and a mint off that cached row refused the first exchange for a new user. Introspection and the refresh revalidation go back to the cache read, so a resource server calling /introspect per request pays no database read.
JWT auth caches the user it creates before it adds that user to the JWT's
team, and adding a team member never evicts the cached user row, so the mint
read a row with no teams and refused the very first token exchange for a
never-seen user as not a member. The loader now reads the row from the
database and leaves the fresh row in the cache for the requests the
credential makes next
The exchange refused the very user JWT auth upserts (its row has no
user_role) as "no longer active". The credential now carries the role the
proxy already enforces for that user on every request, internal_user when
the row has none, the same rule _get_user_role applies on the data plane.
A rejected subject_token no longer echoes JWT auth's wording on the public
/token endpoint: the response is a fixed invalid_request and the reason
goes to the proxy log, since that wording can name the JWKS URL or relay
the IdP's reply.
The exchange grant is listed on /register, /.well-known/litellm-cli-auth,
and the aggregate authorization-server metadata only when JWT auth is on,
backed by a database, and licensed, so a client never selects a grant the
gateway would then refuse.
A registered gateway DCR client can now POST /token with
grant_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:token-exchange and an IdP
JWT as subject_token. The gateway proves the JWT the way its JWT auth
does, resolves the user and team, and answers with the proxy-API
credential and a refresh token, so a fresh laptop with only an IdP login
gets a gateway key without a browser round trip.
"/token" joins mcp_inference_routes so the default JWT team allowlist
reaches the exchange, and the JWT auth builder accepts any header
mapping so the request headers pass through unchanged.
