* fix(mcp): OAuth2 chat connect - tools fetch, auth flow, and status fixes
- schema.prisma: add missing MCP table fields (approval_status, submitted_by, submitted_at, reviewed_at, review_notes) to prevent destructive migrations
- rest_endpoints.py: inject user OAuth token via extra_headers for OAuth2 servers so tools list is populated; add server name->UUID resolution so MCPConnectPicker name lookups work
- mcp_registry.json: fix Atlassian defaults (transport: http, url: .../v1/mcp)
- ChatPage.tsx: read mcpOauthReturn param to init sidebarView="apps" on OAuth return, clean up param after mount
- MCPAppsPanel.tsx: auto-add OAuth2 servers to selectedServers when credential detected; onConnect also enables server for chat; disconnect removes from selectedServers
- mcp_servers.tsx: sort servers by created_at DESC
- useUserMcpOAuthFlow.tsx: append mcpOauthReturn=apps to return URL so Apps panel is mounted on return
* address greptile review feedback (greploop iteration 1)
* fix(mcp): inject stored OAuth2 token when fetching tools via /responses API
When a user has connected an OAuth2 MCP server (e.g. Atlassian) and then
uses the /responses endpoint with that server, tool listing was failing
because the stored per-user OAuth token was never injected.
Two fixes:
1. server.py: add _get_user_oauth_extra_headers_from_db() helper; call it
in _get_tools_from_mcp_servers when oauth2_headers is None for an OAuth2
server, falling back to the user's stored token in LiteLLM_MCPUserCredentials
2. litellm_proxy_mcp_handler.py: also intercept MCP tools whose server_url
matches */mcp/<server_name> (e.g. http://localhost:4000/mcp/atlassian_test)
by rewriting them to litellm_proxy/mcp/<server_name> so they go through
the internal handler (and get the OAuth token injected) instead of being
forwarded to OpenAI raw where localhost is unreachable
* address greptile review feedback (greploop iteration 2)
* test(mcp): add unit test for OAuth2 token injection in _get_tools_from_mcp_servers
Verifies that when _get_tools_from_mcp_servers is called for an OAuth2 MCP
server without oauth2_headers in the request, the implementation:
- calls _prefetch_oauth_creds_for_user once (not per-server) to avoid N+1 queries
- passes the stored token as extra_headers={"Authorization": "Bearer ..."} to
_get_tools_from_server so the upstream OAuth2 MCP server authenticates correctly
* address greptile review feedback (greploop iteration 3)
* address greptile review feedback (greploop iteration 4)
* address greptile review feedback (greploop iteration 5)
* redesign credentials table to use Tremor table layout matching Keys page
* fix: /server/oauth authorize 422 - make client_id optional, fall back to real DB server
* fix: mcp_token client_id optional, resolve from server record
* fix: look up real server by UUID (get_mcp_server_by_id) before falling back to name
* Update litellm/responses/mcp/litellm_proxy_mcp_handler.py
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: address greptile feedback - client_id guards, dict spread, helper refactor, tests
- mcp_management_endpoints: raise 400 when resolved_client_id is empty in
mcp_authorize and mcp_token instead of forwarding "" to upstream
- litellm_proxy_mcp_handler: use {**tool, "server_url": ...} spread instead
of dict(tool) + mutation for shallow copy safety
- rest_endpoints: extract _oauth2_server_ids set comprehension to a named
_get_oauth2_server_ids() helper for clarity; add Set to typing imports
- test_rest_endpoints: add tests for name→UUID resolution path,
access-denied when resolved UUID not in allowed list, and OAuth2 user
token injection for single-server requests; fix fake_get_tools signature
to accept extra_headers kwarg
---------
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
- Mock litellm.completion_cost in test_pass_through_success_handler_gemini_routing
to decouple it from model_prices_and_context_window.json; prevents the same
breakage if gemini-2.0-flash is ever removed from the pricing map
- Revert _create_passthrough_logging_payload URL back to gemini-1.5-flash to
eliminate inconsistency with the other tests that use gemini-1.5-flash explicitly
* fix(test): null AWS SigV4 fields on MagicMock in test_inherit_credentials_from_existing_server
* fix(test): null AWS SigV4 fields on MagicMock in test_add_session_mcp_server_caches_and_redacts_credentials
* fixed mcp api
* added non-admin test
* resolved greptile comemnt
* fix: add IP filtering to get_mcp_server_by_id path in fetch_mcp_server
Apply _is_server_accessible_from_ip check after get_mcp_server_by_id lookup
to prevent external callers from accessing MCP servers configured with
available_on_public_internet=False when they know the server_id.
Made-with: Cursor
* fix(mcp): fix OpenAPI OAuth flow — transport mapping, error messages, and discovery bypass
Three bugs fixed to make the end-to-end OAuth flow work for OpenAPI MCP servers:
1. **Transport mapping in getTemporaryPayload**: `TRANSPORT.OPENAPI` is a UI-only concept;
the backend only accepts `"http"`, `"sse"`, or `"stdio"`. The pre-OAuth temp-session
call was sending `transport: "openapi"` and getting a 422. Fixed by mapping to `"http"`.
2. **deriveErrorMessage handles FastAPI 422 arrays**: FastAPI validation errors return
`detail` as an array of `{loc, msg, type}` objects. The shared error extractor was
returning the array directly, causing `Error: [object Object]`. Fixed to map each
item to its `.msg` field.
3. **Skip OAuth discovery when authorization_url already provided**: `build_mcp_server_from_table`
was unconditionally calling `_descovery_metadata(server_url)` for OAuth servers. For
OpenAPI servers the url is the spec JSON file, not the API base — this caused a timeout
fetching e.g. the GitHub spec (2 MB). Fixed by skipping discovery when `authorization_url`
is already set.
Also: collapsible auth section in MCP server form, "Create OAuth App →" link next to
Client ID when a docs URL is available (e.g. GitHub OAuth App creation page), and
`extractErrorMessage` helper in `useMcpOAuthFlow` for cleaner error display.
* refactor(mcp): extract needs_discovery flag and reduceStaticHeaders helper
* feat(mcp): user OAuth connect flow — OAuthConnectModal, MCPCredentialsTab, useUserMcpOAuthFlow
Adds the user-facing MCP OAuth2 PKCE connect flow:
- OAuthConnectModal: modal that launches the PKCE flow for a user to connect to an MCP server
- MCPCredentialsTab: credentials management tab in the MCP apps panel
- useUserMcpOAuthFlow: hook that handles the full PKCE auth code exchange for user-level connections
- MCPAppsPanel: wires up the new credentials tab and connect modal
- ChatPage: further cleanup after responses-API revert
- db.py / mcp_management_endpoints.py / _types.py: backend support for storing user MCP credentials
* fix(mcp): make client_id optional in /authorize — use server's stored client_id when not provided
* address greptile review feedback
* fix(mcp): narrow bare except to RecordNotFoundError in BYOK credential delete
* refactor(mcp): move inline imports to module level in db.py
* docs(claude): add MCP OAuth, transport mapping, and browser storage patterns
* fix(security): remove accessToken from sessionStorage in OAuth flow state
The LiteLLM API key was being serialised into sessionStorage as part of
StoredFlowState. After the OAuth redirect the component re-mounts with the
same accessToken prop, so it never needed to be stored. Read it from props
in resumeOAuthFlow instead.
* fix(ui): remove duplicate extractErrorMessage, sessionStorage-only in admin OAuth hook, call delete API on disconnect
* fix(ui): guard resumeOAuthFlow against wrong hook instance consuming OAuth result
* fix(ui): separate OAuth result keys per flow, sessionStorage-only, surface revoke errors
* fix(ui): remove dead OAuthConnectModal, revert tsconfig jsx mode to preserve
* fix(mcp): guard BYOK overwrite in oauth credential store, raise clear error when client_id absent
* fix: forward OAuth error params in callback, fix BYOK guard exception handling in db.py
Previously this setting was only honored via the AUTO_REDIRECT_UI_LOGIN_TO_SSO
environment variable. Now it can also be set in config.yaml under general_settings,
matching the pattern used by other proxy settings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When a request arrives without an API key, auth fails and the failure
hook triggers spend tracking. _is_master_key was called with api_key=None,
causing secrets.compare_digest to raise TypeError. Add a None guard for
api_key matching the existing guard for _master_key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes issue where multipart file uploads through passthrough endpoints failed with RequestValidationError. The proxy was consuming the request body stream and FastAPI was trying to parse multipart bodies as JSON dicts.
Changes:
- Try JSON parsing first for multipart content-type (handles misconfigured clients)
- Skip multipart parsing if JSON succeeds to avoid stream consumption
- Remove custom_body parameter from endpoint_func to prevent FastAPI auto-parsing
- Check for parsed body before using multipart handler
- Add regression test for multipart boundary preservation
Handles both actual multipart uploads and JSON bodies with incorrect multipart content-type headers.
Made-with: Cursor
The GET /v1/mcp/server endpoint allowed any authenticated user to pass
an arbitrary team_id and enumerate another team's MCP server config.
Restricted virtual keys could also use the team_id param to bypass
their access limitations. Add team membership check for non-admins
and block restricted keys from using the team_id filter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When creating a key, the MCP server list now filters by the selected team's
allowed servers. Also fixes UnboundLocalError on `is_restricted_virtual_key`
when `team_id` query param was provided to GET /v1/mcp/server.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(mcp): add BYOM (Bring Your Own MCPs) submission + admin review workflow
Non-admins can now submit MCP servers for review via POST /v1/mcp/server/register.
Admins get a Submissions tab in the UI to approve or reject pending servers.
Approved servers enter the active runtime; rejected ones stay out with notes.
- DB: add approval_status, submitted_by, submitted_at, reviewed_at, review_notes
to LiteLLM_MCPServerTable with migration
- Backend: new endpoints register, submissions, approve, reject
- reload_servers_from_database now only loads approval_status=active servers
- UI: Submissions tab with stat cards, card list, confirm dialogs; non-admin
"Submit MCP Server" button wired to /register endpoint
- Fix get_mcp_submissions to filter by submitted_at IS NOT NULL (not submitted_by,
which can be null for team-scoped keys without an associated user)
* feat(mcp): rename nav item to Team MCPs + add New badge
* fix(mcp): revert nav label, rename Submissions tab to Team MCPs + New badge
* feat(mcp): add MCP Standards — required fields config + CI-style checks on submissions
Adds a "Standards" tab (admin-only) to MCP Servers where admins define which
server fields are required for a submission to pass. Each submission card in
Team MCPs then shows a green ✓ or red ✗ for each required field, with a
summary "N/M checks" badge in the header — like GitHub CI status rows.
Also adds a `source_url` field (GitHub / Source URL) to the MCP server schema
so non-admins can link to the source repo when submitting a server.
- schema.prisma: add `source_url String?` to LiteLLM_MCPServerTable
- migration: 20260309000001_add_mcp_source_url
- _types.py: source_url on NewMCPServerRequest, UpdateMCPServerRequest, LiteLLM_MCPServerTable
- types.tsx: source_url on MCPServer interface
- create_mcp_server.tsx: GitHub/Source URL form field
- MCPStandardsSettings.tsx: new — toggle which fields are required (stored in general settings as mcp_required_fields)
- mcp_servers.tsx: Standards tab (admin-only)
- MCPSubmissionsTab.tsx: load required fields + CI-style check pills on each card
* refactor(mcp): move submission rules into Team MCPs tab, grouped free-form UI
Folds the Standards tab into Team MCPs. Submission Rules panel now lives at the
top of the Team MCPs tab — collapsible, shows active rules as chips when closed,
expands to a grouped checkbox editor (Documentation / Source / Connection /
Security). Removes the separate Standards tab from the nav.
MCPStandardsSettings.tsx is now constants-only (FIELD_GROUPS, MCP_REQUIRED_FIELD_DEFS,
SETTINGS_KEY) — the UI lives in MCPSubmissionsTab.
* feat(mcp): add mcp_required_fields to ConfigGeneralSettings + config/list endpoint
Registers mcp_required_fields as a proper general_settings field so the UI
can read/write it via /config/list and /config/field/update without the
"Invalid field" error. Also fixes a pre-existing pyright None-check issue
in _sync_ui_settings_to_general_settings.
* ui(mcp): GitHub-style PR checks panel on submission cards
* ui: rename Team MCPs -> Submitted Tools, Team Guardrails -> Submitted Guardrails
* address greptile review feedback (greploop iteration 1)
* fix: inline import, add approval workflow tests, rename Submitted MCPs
* fix(mcp): allow re-approval of rejected MCP server submissions
* fix(mcp): evict rejected servers from runtime; enforce mcp_required_fields on /register
* fix(mcp): sort submissions newest-first; force active status on admin-created servers
* fix(mcp): add missing mock in test, show Approve for rejected, clear submission metadata, drop spurious Content-Type
* fix(mcp/ui): show Reject for active servers; show submit form to non-admins with team-key note
* fix(mcp): conditional reload on reject; view-only admin for submissions; block admin from /register
* fix(mcp): match auth_type required-field validation to UI compliance check (reject 'none')
* fix(mcp): block view-only admin from /register; log settings failure; warn on active server reject
* fix(mcp): allow view-only admin to use /register; add _validate_mcp_required_fields tests
* fix(mcp): validate field names in mcp_required_fields; surface backend error in submit UI
* fix(mcp): fix falsy field check; add field-name validation; add take limit; document server-managed fields; close dialog on error
* fix(mcp): add AWS SigV4 auth for Bedrock AgentCore MCP servers
Add aws_sigv4 auth type to MCP client via httpx.Auth subclass that
signs each request with SigV4 using botocore. Enables mcp_servers
config to connect to AgentCore-hosted MCP servers.
* docs(mcp): add AWS SigV4 auth documentation for Bedrock AgentCore
Add dedicated docs page for configuring MCP servers with AWS SigV4
authentication, update MCP overview with aws_sigv4 auth type and
config example, and link from Bedrock AgentCore provider docs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): address Greptile review — requires_request_body, full header signing, health check
- Add requires_request_body = True to MCPSigV4Auth so httpx buffers the
request body before calling auth_flow (prevents empty body hash for
streaming requests)
- Pass all request headers to AWSRequest for canonical SigV4 signing
instead of only Content-Type
- Exclude aws_sigv4 from health check skip logic since it has its own
credential fields (not authentication_token)
- Fix docs: mark aws_access_key_id/aws_secret_access_key as optional
(falls back to boto3 credential chain)
- Add test for requires_request_body flag
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Krish Dholakia <krrishdholakia@gmail.com>
