stable/1.86.x enforces PLR0915 in the main ruff config; internal staging
moved it to a separate strict gate, so two functions that ship cleanly on
staging trip it here: _build_usage_only_response_from_chunks (#31035) and
the post-call cost callback (#30788). Exempt both files via the existing
per-file-ignores convention rather than editing the picked source. Also
black-normalize blank lines around the reconstructed TestInterruptedStream
class in the #30787 test file.
Streaming and pass-through requests could be logged with $0 cost or dropped from
SpendLogs entirely while the upstream provider still billed every token. This
closes the leak paths not already covered by #30160, #30787 and #30788.
- Catch a stream_chunk_builder raise in the core CustomStreamWrapper (sync and
async). Large agentic tool-use / thinking streams can make assembly re-raise
as APIError from inside the except-StopIteration handler, where the sibling
except does not catch it, so it escaped __next__/__anext__ and dropped the
request; recover best-effort usage from the raw chunks instead
- Add a usage-only fallback for Anthropic streaming pass-through: when
stream_chunk_builder returns None or raises, rebuild usage from the
message_start / message_delta SSE events via AnthropicConfig.calculate_usage so
cache, web-search and geo tokens are priced instead of left at $0
- Decode buffered pass-through bytes with errors="replace" so a stream cut
mid-multibyte-sequence still logs the usage events already received
- Record response_cost into model_call_details on the pass-through success path
(it is read from there, not from kwargs), matching the gemini/cohere/openai
handlers
- Name the key (alias + masked key) in the virtual-key BudgetExceededError so
operators don't have to reverse-map spend back to a key
(cherry picked from commit b24b964e04)
A streaming request that breaks mid-flight, for example on a mid-stream read
timeout, still bills the provider for the chunks already delivered, yet the proxy
recorded that interrupted request as a zero-spend failure. An earlier revision
logged the recovered partial usage through the success path, which mislabeled a
failed request as a success and produced a misleading spend row
This recovers the partial usage where the failure is actually logged. The
streaming handler assembles the usage from the chunks seen so far and stashes it,
with its cost, on the logging object before firing the failure handlers. The
proxy failure hook lifts that usage and cost onto request_data before the
non-serialisable logging object is popped, and the spend-log writer records the
real partial spend on the failure row instead of a hardcoded zero;
get_logging_payload honors the recovered usage for the token columns and
_failure_handler_helper_fn preserves the recovered cost so the non-DB failure
loggers stay consistent
A request that recovers via a successful fallback is unaffected: the failure hook
only fires when the whole request fails, so the fallback's combined-usage success
row stays the single source of truth and there is no double counting
Resolves LIT-3825
Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4847fa5dd5)
* feat(mcp): scope a key to zero MCP servers with no-mcp-servers sentinel
A key under a team that has MCP servers had no way to opt out of them;
an empty list has always meant "inherit the team". This adds a
no-mcp-servers sentinel (mirroring no-default-models for models) so a key
can declare an explicit zero that overrides team inheritance, additive
grants, and allow_all_keys servers, surfaced as an exclusive "No MCP
Servers" option in the key create/edit UI.
* refactor(ui): centralize no-mcp-servers sentinel in a shared constant
The sentinel string was defined under two different local names and
inlined in two more files; a single exported constant removes the drift
risk flagged in review.
* fix(mcp): enforce no-mcp-servers sentinel on toolset-scoped routes
Toolset scoping replaced a key's mcp_servers with the toolset's servers,
dropping the no-mcp-servers sentinel, so a key opted out of all MCP could
still execute a granted toolset's tools via /toolset/{name}/mcp. Deny
toolset access when the key carries the sentinel, checked before the admin
branch to match get_allowed_mcp_servers.
(cherry picked from commit 19a29e0579)
Targeted subset of staging commit cfcdf8714a (#30202): only the
anthropic_passthrough_logging_handler.py hardening hunks and their four
tests are taken; the rest of that staging batch is intentionally excluded.
(cherry picked from commit cfcdf8714a)
(cherry picked from commit 973c7eb8d6)
* feat(proxy): add disable_budget_reservation general setting (#27639)
* feat(proxy): register disable_budget_reservation in ConfigGeneralSettings (#27639)
* docs(proxy): document disable_budget_reservation concurrency tradeoff (#27639)
* ci: re-trigger flaky docker build (prisma generate ECONNRESET)
* fix(proxy): warn and document budget enforcement tradeoff when disable_budget_reservation is set (#27639)
Provenance: #29493 landed on litellm_internal_staging inside aggregator 32c88ca74f
(Litellm oss staging 080626, #29932). The granular squash 1032dd75 is no longer on
any ref; its diff is content-identical to the disable_budget_reservation hunks in the
aggregator, verified before this pick.
(cherry picked from commit 1032dd751f)
(cherry picked from commit 32c88ca74f within litellm_internal_staging)
* fix(proxy): expose Prisma idle/connect timeout + extra DB URL params
Operators have reported large numbers of idle Prisma connections that
never get closed. The proxy already forwards `connection_limit` and
`pool_timeout` to the DATABASE_URL, but had no knob for capping idle
or slow connections. Add three new `general_settings` keys that thread
through to the DATABASE_URL / DIRECT_URL query string:
- `database_connect_timeout` -> Prisma `connect_timeout`
- `database_socket_timeout` -> Prisma `socket_timeout` (the main
knob for closing idle connections from the LiteLLM side)
- `database_extra_connection_params` -> untyped passthrough dict for
any other Prisma URL param (`pgbouncer`, `statement_cache_size`,
`sslmode`, ...); keys here override LiteLLM defaults.
Refactors the duplicated DATABASE_URL/DIRECT_URL param dicts into a
single `_build_db_connection_url_params` helper.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Update litellm/proxy/proxy_cli.py
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassinkortam@g.ucla.edu>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2f9ac77b24)
* fix(proxy): authorize batch files using upload target_model_names (LIT-3593)
After replace_model_in_jsonl, body.model is a stripped provider id. Reverse-mapping it via resolve_model_name_from_model_id is first-match on model_list and caused false 403s when multiple deployments share the same stripped name. Use target_model_names from the unified file id instead.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(proxy): restore resolve_model_name_from_model_id for JSONL fallback path (LIT-3593)
Restores the reverse-lookup for the JSONL body.model fallback path so that
legacy/pre-target_model_names managed files still map stripped provider IDs
back to proxy aliases before auth. Also cleans up redundant `or None`.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Revert "fix(proxy): restore resolve_model_name_from_model_id for JSONL fallback path (LIT-3593)"
This reverts commit 30d2e96f77.
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2cd7e87485)
Capture user_id and extra_info from metadata or litellm_metadata. The single-bag read dropped identity whenever a request carried a present litellm_metadata field (null or a user-supplied dict), since /chat/completions routes the authenticated identity into metadata while the guardrail read litellm_metadata first
(cherry picked from commit 1bbaf1c39d)
Capture _requested_team_id before the default_key_generate_params loop runs and
key the UI/CLI session-token budget-ceiling exemption off it, instead of the
post-defaults data.team_id. On an install that sets
default_key_generate_params.team_id, a session token requesting a personal key
(no explicit team_id) would otherwise have data.team_id auto-filled, flipping
is_ui_session_team_key on and bypassing the delegated-authority ceiling -- the
exact escalation GHSA-q775 closed. Mirrors the existing pre-defaults capture of
_requested_max_budget. Adds a regression test.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01RT583b1khYC3wjLrQ5hT5h
(cherry picked from commit efeb101ec6)
Non-admin users creating a team key through the UI were rejected with
"max_budget cannot exceed the caller's own max_budget (0.25)". The request is
authenticated by a UI/CLI session token whose max_budget is the per-session chat
spend cap (max_ui_session_budget, default $0.25), and the delegated-authority
budget ceiling (GHSA-q775-qw9r-2r4g) treated that cap as a delegation limit.
Skip the ceiling only when a session token creates a team key (data.team_id set);
that key's spend is bounded by the team budget at request time. Personal keys and
every other non-admin caller keep the ceiling, so a session token cannot mint an
arbitrary-budget personal key.
(cherry picked from commit 97ba7e1a30)
* fix duplicate cost callbacks for anthropic streaming pass-through
Two bugs caused _PROXY_track_cost_callback to see stream=True +
complete_streaming_response=None on every streaming pass-through request,
making the dedup guard in dispatch_success_handlers permanently inactive:
1. pass_through_endpoints.py created the Logging object with stream=False
for all requests. _is_assembled_stream_success short-circuits on
self.stream is not True, so has_dispatched_final_stream_success was
never set and any second dispatch went through unchecked.
Fix: set logging_obj.stream = True after stream detection.
2. _create_anthropic_response_logging_payload set complete_streaming_response
inside the try block after litellm.completion_cost(), so a pricing error
caused an early return without setting it on model_call_details.
Fix: set complete_streaming_response before the try block.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix stream
* add stream to logging obj
* test(pass_through): give mock logging object a real model_call_details dict
The anthropic passthrough logging payload now records the assembled
response on model_call_details before cost calculation, which requires
model_call_details to support item assignment. In production it is always
a dict; the existing unit test stubbed the logging object with a bare Mock
whose attribute is not subscriptable, so the new assignment raised
TypeError. Use a real dict to match the production logging object.
* test(pass_through): cover streaming logging-obj stream flag
The streaming branch of pass_through_request that marks the logging object
as streaming (logging_obj.stream and model_call_details["stream"]) had no
unit coverage, so the patch coverage gate flagged it. Add a regression test
that drives a streaming pass-through request through pass_through_request and
asserts the logging object is flagged as a stream before dispatch.
* test(pass_through): cover SSE-response stream flag fallback branch
The auto-detected streaming branch of pass_through_request (when a request
that was not flagged as streaming returns a text/event-stream response) sets
logging_obj.stream and model_call_details["stream"] but had no unit coverage,
so the codecov patch gate failed at 60%. Drive a non-streaming pass-through
request whose upstream response is SSE through pass_through_request and assert
the logging object is flagged as a stream before dispatch.
* fix(pass_through): gate complete_streaming_response on stream flag
perform_redaction only scrubs complete_streaming_response when
model_call_details["stream"] is True. Setting it unconditionally for
non-streaming Anthropic pass-through responses left the assembled
response unredacted in model_call_details, which is handed to logging
callbacks as kwargs when message logging is disabled. Only record it for
actual streaming responses so redaction always applies.
---------
Co-authored-by: mubashir1osmani <mubashir.osmani777@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2bbdbfa5c3)
* fix(key_generate): allow team members to create keys on org-scoped teams
When a virtual key is created for a team, enterprise logic inherits the
team's organization_id onto the key (add_team_organization_id). Since the
VERIA-55 org-IDOR fix, /key/generate then required the caller to be an
explicit LiteLLM_OrganizationMembership member of that org, returning
403 "Caller is not a member of organization_id=<uuid>". Admins normally
only add users to teams (not orgs), so self-serve key creation regressed
for any user on an org-scoped team (regression since v1.84.0-rc.1).
Skip the org-membership check when organization_id was inherited from the
key's team (organization_id == team_table.organization_id). Team-level
authorization already gates this path, so team membership is sufficient.
The membership check still runs when a caller assigns an organization_id
that did not come from the key's team, preserving the IDOR protection.
Adds regression tests covering both the team-inherited (allowed) and
foreign-org (still blocked) cases.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* test(key_generate): cover mismatched team org IDOR path on generate
Add test_generate_key_foreign_org_with_mismatched_team_still_enforces_membership
for the case where a team is present but request organization_id differs from
team_table.organization_id. Enterprise inheritance is no-op'd in the test so
the guard is exercised directly; membership validation must still run.
Addresses Greptile review on #29310.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
(cherry picked from commit b11833c737)
* fix(proxy): map stripped batch body.model to proxy alias for auth
replace_model_in_jsonl rewrites JSONL body.model to the provider id before
upload; batch file access checks must resolve that id back to model_name
so keys granted the proxy alias are not rejected with 403.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(proxy): surface resolved proxy alias in batch file 403 detail
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 70d2748d80)
* fix(reset_budget): write only {spend, budget_reset_at} and stop pre-zeroing counter
ResetBudgetJob's batched update_data path shipped the full key/user/team
model on each reset. Prisma rejects object_permission_id and budget_limits
on the update input type, so any row carrying those fields detonated the
entire batch -- spend never reset, budget_reset_at never advanced. After
v1.84.0 started populating object_permission_id on UI-created keys, this
fires routinely.
_reset_budget_common also zeroed the cross-pod spend counter before the
DB write, so failed resets left enforcement reading 0 from the counter
while the DB still held the over-budget spend, admitting requests past
the cap until the counter naturally re-saturated from new reservations.
Switch the write to per-row narrow updates ({spend, budget_reset_at})
via db.batch_, and move the counter invalidation out of
_reset_budget_common so it only fires after the DB write commits. On
DB-write failure the counter is left untouched, enforcement continues
to block, and the next scheduler tick can retry without leaving a
bypass window.
Fixes#27730.
* fix(reset_budget): address Greptile review on #29358
- Strengthen the bypass-half regression test: replace the for-loop over
call_args_list (vacuously true when empty) with assert_not_called(),
so the test would actually flag a re-introduction of counter-zeroing
via any code path.
- Add the same explanatory docstring on _write_user_reset_updates and
_write_team_reset_updates that _write_key_reset_updates already has,
so all three helpers point future maintainers at #27730.
* test(reset_budget): update test_proxy_budget_reset for new batch-write path
Same shape as the previous test_reset_budget_job.py update: keys/users/teams
now write through prisma.db.batch_().<table>.update, not update_data, so the
tests need a batcher mock and updated assertions. Adds:
- _wire_batcher_for_test helper that returns a list which accumulates per-row
batch updates captured from prisma_client.db.batch_().
- _attrify helper that wraps dict fixtures so getattr(item, "token") works
alongside the dict item-access the fake_reset_* mocks rely on. The new
narrow-write helpers use getattr to pull out the row's id, and would
silently skip plain dicts otherwise.
- Updates 3 partial_failure tests to assert against the batch-call list
(rows by id, payload contains only {spend, budget_reset_at}) instead of
update_data.assert_awaited_once + data_list inspection.
- Updates test_reset_budget_continues_other_categories_on_failure: only
budget + enduser still flow through update_data; key/user/team go through
the batch path now.
- Wires the batcher mock into 3 service_logger_*_success tests so commit()
is actually awaitable and the success hook fires.
These tests were silently passing locally only because the editable install
in .venv pointed at the main repo, not the worktree — running pytest with
PYTHONPATH overridden to the worktree (matching CI) reproduces the failures.
(cherry picked from commit a06ec43b36)
* refactor(proxy/auth): normalize Bearer prefix in safe-hash helper
UserAPIKeyAuth._safe_hash_litellm_api_key now strips a leading
"Bearer "/"bearer " prefix before its existing sk-/JWT classification, so
the helper produces the same hashed output regardless of whether the
caller stripped the Authorization header prefix or passed the header
value through unchanged.
* refactor(proxy/auth): make Bearer-prefix strip case-insensitive
Per RFC 7235 the HTTP authorization scheme token is case-insensitive.
Replace the two-prefix loop with a single case-insensitive check so the
helper normalizes "Bearer ", "bearer ", "BEARER ", and any mixed-case
variant before classifying the remainder as sk- or JWT. The contract
test gains coverage of "BEARER " and "BeArEr ".
* test(mcp): align auth-handler test expectations with safe-hash helper
The two MCP auth tests asserted that UserAPIKeyAuth(api_key="Bearer ...")
retained the raw header bytes on the api_key field. _safe_hash_litellm_api_key
now normalizes that input — stripping the Bearer prefix and hashing the
resulting sk- key — so the expectations move to the normalized form:
the bare token in the parametrize case, and hash_token("sk-...") in the
backward-compat assertion. This matches what the real auth flow produces
(the builder strips Bearer and the DB stores the hashed token), so the
mocks now line up with production rather than with the un-normalized
validator output.
(cherry picked from commit 87b0e47485)
* fix(spend_counter): seed Redis counter via SET NX to prevent cross-pod double-seed
Symptom
-------
Customers on multi-pod deployments see team `spend` jump to ~2x (or N x
the pod count) shortly after a Redis cache miss / TTL expiry, triggering
spurious "Budget Crossed" alerts and blocked requests until the value is
manually reset.
Root cause
----------
`SpendCounterReseed.coalesced` warmed the primary spend counter by
calling `redis.async_increment(key, value=db_spend, refresh_ttl=True)`,
which lowers to Redis `INCRBYFLOAT`. That is additive, not idempotent.
The per-counter `asyncio.Lock` only coalesces seeders inside one
process. With N pods sharing one Redis, on a cold key (cold start, TTL
expiry, manual delete) every pod independently passes its lock + Redis
re-check, reads the same `db_spend`, and issues `INCRBYFLOAT db_spend`.
Final value: N x db_spend.
Fix
---
Use `redis.async_set_cache(key, value=db_spend, nx=True)` for the seed.
SET NX is atomic across pods: exactly one writer initializes the key;
losers read the winner's value via `async_get_cache`. This is the same
idiom already used by `coalesced_window` in the same file, so the two
seed paths are now consistent.
Per-request deltas continue to use `INCRBYFLOAT` (correct - additive
behaviour is what we want for increments, not for initial seed).
Verification
------------
Live two-process repro against the same Postgres + Redis (DB
spend = 506):
Unpatched: 4/4 runs -> Redis counter = ~1012 (~2 x db_spend)
Patched: 12/12 runs -> Redis counter = ~506
Unit tests (`test_proxy_server.py`):
- New `test_primary_spend_counter_redis_concurrent_seed_does_not_double_seed`
patches `_get_lock` to return a fresh lock per caller (otherwise the
per-process lock masks the race), races two `coalesced` calls, and
asserts final = 506 with exactly one of two SET NX attempts winning.
- 4 existing tests updated for the new seed contract (SET NX for the
seed, INCRBYFLOAT only for the per-request delta).
- Full `spend_counter or reseed or budget` slice: 22 passed.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* test(spend_counter): make SET NX mock atomic so loser branch is exercised
Greptile flagged that `redis_set_cache` in
test_primary_spend_counter_redis_concurrent_seed_does_not_double_seed
placed `await asyncio.sleep(0)` AFTER the NX membership check. Both
concurrent tasks observed an empty `redis_store`, passed the guard, and
both returned True - so the loser branch (else: read back winner's value)
was never exercised.
Fix the mock to model real atomic Redis SET NX:
- Yield BEFORE the membership check so two concurrent callers interleave
the way real SET NX does (first to resume runs check + write atomically
and wins; second resumes after the key exists and loses).
- Track set_cache return values; assert sorted([loser, winner]) so we
know exactly one task wins and one loses.
- Track async_get_cache calls that happen AFTER at least one SET NX has
completed; assert at least one such read - that is the loser-path
fallback (`current_value = float(cached)` when seeded is False).
Verified by temporarily reverting the mock to the old order: the test
now fails with `expected exactly one SET NX winner and one loser, got
[True, True]`, exactly the failure mode Greptile described.
No production code change.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* test(spend_counter): mock async_set_cache to populate redis_store in concurrent read+write test
`test_concurrent_read_and_write_paths_share_one_db_query` mocks
`async_increment` to populate the in-memory `redis_store`, but did not
mock `async_set_cache`. After the SET-NX seed change in `coalesced()`,
the seed step writes via `async_set_cache(nx=True)` (default AsyncMock,
no `redis_store` write), so the simulated Redis stays empty after the
first reseed. The second `get_current_spend` then sees a clean Redis
miss, re-enters the DB read path, and the test fails with
`expected 1 DB query, got 2`.
Fix: add a `redis_set_cache` side_effect that updates `redis_store` on
`nx=True` (and rejects when the key already exists), matching the
pattern used by the four sibling tests fixed in this branch's first
commit. Pre-existing assertions are unchanged.
Full `tests/test_litellm/proxy/test_proxy_server.py`: 158 passed.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0fb710400f)
(cherry picked from commit c621f58fff)
* bump: version 1.86.0 → 1.86.1
* chore: refresh uv.lock for 1.86.1
* fix(team): keep team_alias cache in sync on _cache_team_object writes (#28737)
* fix(team): keep team_alias cache in sync on _cache_team_object writes
_cache_team_object wrote only to the team_id:<id> cache key, but the
JWT auth path that uses team_alias_jwt_field reads from a separate
team_alias:<alias> key (get_team_object_by_alias caches under both
keys on miss, but reads only the alias-keyed one). After any
team-mutation endpoint (team_model_add, team_model_delete,
update_team, the two access-group writes) the team_id cache was
refreshed but the team_alias cache stayed stale until TTL — JWT
callers using team_alias_jwt_field kept seeing the pre-mutation
team for the full cache window.
Mirror the write under the alias key inside _cache_team_object so
every existing caller stays in sync without further changes. Skip
the alias write when team_alias is None/empty so we don't collide
across alias-less teams.
Surfaced testing the LIT-3244 cherry-pick on patch/1.86.0: the
LIT-3244 fix correctly invalidated the team_id cache but the
customer's JWT used team_alias_jwt_field, so they kept hitting the
stale alias-keyed entry.
* fix(team): delete (not overwrite) team_alias cache on _cache_team_object
The prior shape of this PR wrote both team_id:<id> AND team_alias:<alias>
from _cache_team_object. team_alias is NOT unique in the schema
(no @unique on LiteLLM_TeamTable.team_alias), and get_team_object_by_alias
enforces uniqueness on its own DB-fetch path (len(teams) > 1 raises).
Writing the alias-keyed cache from the generic refresh path bypassed
that check: a team admin renaming their team to collide with another
team's alias could silently overwrite the cached team for JWT-by-alias
auth, swapping the resolved team under that alias for the cache window.
Switch the alias-keyed operation from a write to a delete (mirroring
the dual-cache delete pattern in _delete_cache_key_object). After every
team write, the next JWT-by-alias reader cache-misses and falls through
to get_team_object_by_alias, which (a) re-fetches the fresh team from
DB, closing the LIT-3244 staleness gap that motivated this PR, and
(b) enforces alias uniqueness before populating either cache key.
team_id:<id> writes are unchanged — team_id is the table PK and is
guaranteed unique.
Surfaced in veria-ai review on #28739.
* fix(managed-files): anchor model_id regex so it doesn't match llm_output_file_model_id
extract_model_id_from_unified_id used `re.search(r"model_id,([^;]+)", ...)`
which substring-matches the `model_id,` inside the file-ID encoding's
`llm_output_file_model_id,<deployment_uuid>` field. parse_unified_id
then fed that deployment UUID back into the auth path as a model
candidate via _extract_models_from_managed_resource_id, and every
team-BYOK file attach 403'd with:
team not allowed to access model. This team can only access
models=['openai/*']. Tried to access <deployment-uuid>
The team's models list correctly contains the public name (`openai/*`)
that target_model_names matches, but the bogus UUID candidate fails
the wildcard check first.
Anchor the regex to a field boundary (`(?:^|;)model_id,`) so it
matches the legitimate top-level `model_id,<value>` field on
vector_store unified IDs and skips substring matches inside other
fields. File-IDs (which have no top-level `model_id` field) now
return None and contribute no spurious UUID candidate.
Surfaced reproducing LIT-3244 on patch/1.86.0 with the customer's
exact flow: team with openai/* BYOK deployment, JWT-scoped user,
POST /v1/vector_stores/{id}/files attaching a file uploaded with
target_model_names=openai/gpt-4o.
* fix(proxy): hydrate wildcard discovery credentials (#28284)
* fix(proxy): hydrate wildcard discovery credentials
* fix(proxy): constrain wildcard credential hydration
* chore(tests): migrate Bedrock CI to AWS account 941277531214 (#28728)
* chore(tests): migrate Bedrock CI from AWS account 888602223428 to 941277531214
The original account (888602223428) was put under a security restriction by
AWS after a root access key leaked in a PR comment. While that account works
its way through the AWS Support unlock process, Bedrock-touching CI tests have
been migrated to a fresh account (941277531214).
Changes:
- Replace 26 hardcoded references to 888602223428 with 941277531214 across
8 files (provisioned-model ARNs, imported-model ARNs, AgentCore runtime
ARNs, batch execution role ARN, and example proxy config).
- The provisioned-model and imported-model ARNs are referenced only from
mocked unit tests — no AWS resources to recreate.
- The batch execution IAM role has been recreated in the new account with
the same name and equivalent permissions.
- The two AgentCore runtimes (hosted_agent_r9jvp-3ySZuRHjLC,
hosted_agent_13sf6-cALnp38iZD) are being recreated in the new account
under the same names — see tools/agentcore-deploy/ in a follow-up.
CircleCI env vars AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID / AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY / AWS_REGION_NAME
were updated separately via the CircleCI API to point at the new account.
Smoke-tested locally against the new account:
aws bedrock-runtime converse --region us-west-2 \
--model-id us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929-v1:0 \
--messages '[{"role":"user","content":[{"text":"ping"}]}]'
→ 200, model returned 'pong'
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(tests): refresh AgentCore ARN suffixes to match newly-deployed runtimes
The first migration commit replaced just the account ID, but AgentCore
auto-assigns a random 10-char suffix to every runtime on creation — we
can't reuse the original suffixes (`3ySZuRHjLC`, `cALnp38iZD`) in the
new account. Updated the AgentCore-runtime ARNs in the three files that
reference real runtime IDs (not the mock-based unit-test ARNs).
Deployed runtimes:
arn:aws:bedrock-agentcore:us-west-2:941277531214:runtime/hosted_agent_r9jvp-Rq79QFC2fp
arn:aws:bedrock-agentcore:us-west-2:941277531214:runtime/hosted_agent_13sf6-4046UzHSwy
Both runtimes are status=READY and pass a smoke invoke:
$ aws bedrock-agentcore invoke-agent-runtime --agent-runtime-arn ... --payload '{"prompt":"ping"}'
→ 200, {"result": "echo: ping"}
The agent is a minimal echo (see /tmp/agentcore_deploy/agent.py for the
deploy artifacts). Tests that only verify the SDK wiring will pass; if any
test asserts on agent output content, swap the echo for the real agent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(tests): point Bedrock batch tests at new-account S3 bucket
The account migration (888602223428 -> 941277531214) was a flat
account-ID swap, which only rewrites ARNs that embed the account
number. S3 bucket names carry no account ID, so the live Bedrock
batch tests still uploaded to `litellm-proxy` — a bucket that lives
in the old account. S3 names are globally unique, and the old account
still holds that name, so it can't be recreated in the new account.
Rename to `litellm-proxy-941277531214` (account-ID suffix guarantees
global uniqueness). The bucket must be created in 941277531214 and the
batch execution role granted s3:GetObject/PutObject/ListBucket on it
before this job is run in CI.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(tests): point live S3 logging test at new-account bucket
Same account-ID-free blind spot as the batch bucket: `load-testing-oct`
lives in the old account and its name can't be reused globally. The
`logging_testing` CI job is wired into the workflow and runs
test_basic_s3_logging, which uploads to this bucket with the CI env
creds, then lists and deletes objects — a live dependency.
Rename to `load-testing-oct-941277531214`. The bucket must exist in the
new account with the CI IAM principal granted
s3:PutObject/GetObject/ListBucket/DeleteObject before this job runs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* chore(tests): repoint Bedrock guardrail IDs to new-account guardrails
The migration left guardrail IDs untouched (no account ID in them), so
all live guardrail tests failed with "guardrail identifier or version
does not exist" against 941277531214. Recreated both guardrails in the
new account and updated the hardcoded IDs:
- wf0hkdb5x07f -> zgkmukebruil (PII mask: PHONE + CREDIT_DEBIT_CARD,
with explicit inputAction=ANONYMIZE so masking applies to INPUT,
which is the source litellm's moderation hook sends)
- ff6ujrregl1q -> 4w3d1di3snt5 (blocks "coffee"; blocked message set
to the exact string the tests assert on)
Updated test_bedrock_guardrails.py, otel_test_config.yaml, and the
guardrailConfig in test_bedrock_completion.py. Verified locally: the 5
previously-failing guardrail tests now pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(bedrock): migrate legacy models to current inference profiles
The new CI account (941277531214) cannot invoke legacy Bedrock models
(AWS gates them: "marked by provider as Legacy... not actively using in
the last 30 days"). Migrated the live-call tests:
- anthropic.claude-3-sonnet-20240229 -> us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929-v1:0
- anthropic.claude-3-haiku-20240307 -> us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-20251001-v1:0
Current Claude models on Bedrock require the us. inference-profile prefix
(bare on-demand ids are rejected).
cohere.command-r-plus has no working replacement (all Cohere is legacy-
gated in the new account): swapped to claude-haiku-4-5 in provider-
agnostic param lists. amazon.titan-image-generator skipped (no working
replacement). Mocked/transformation/cost tests that reference the legacy
strings are intentionally left unchanged. Verified live against the new
account.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(bedrock): repoint SageMaker + Knowledge Base to new-account resources
These referenced account-scoped resources by hardcoded id that only
existed in the old account, so the migration's account-ID swap missed
them. Recreated in 941277531214 and repointed:
- SageMaker endpoint jumpstart-dft-hf-textgeneration1-mp-20240815-185614
-> litellm-ci-textgen (gpt2 on a TGI container, ml.g5.xlarge)
- Bedrock Knowledge Base T37J8R4WTM -> LCYXFBR2TU (OpenSearch Serverless
vector store + titan-embed-text-v2, seeded with a LiteLLM doc)
Verified live: test_sagemaker.py (12 passed) and
test_bedrock_knowledgebase_hook.py (12 passed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(reasoning_effort_grid): skip bedrock claude-opus-4-7 cells (not entitled on 941277531214)
claude-opus-4-7 is listed in the new Bedrock CI account's foundation
models but invoke is denied (AccessDeniedException: "not available for
this account"). Bedrock access to the flagship Opus requires an AWS
Sales request, not the self-serve model-access toggle, so it can't be
enabled inline with the rest of the account migration.
Add an optional `skip_reason` to ModelEntry and set it on the
bedrock-claude-opus-4-7 entry; the grid test honors it via pytest.skip.
Cell count (231) and route coverage are unchanged, so the structural
asserts still pass. Restore coverage by deleting the one skip_reason
line once access is granted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(bedrock): swap/skip legacy-gated models unavailable on new CI account
The migrated AWS account (941277531214) cannot access several models that
the old account could, so the remaining red CI jobs were hitting real
Bedrock "Access denied / Legacy" and "account not authorized" errors:
- image_gen: skip both Nova Canvas test classes (amazon.nova-canvas-v1:0 is
legacy-gated), matching the existing titan skip.
- batches: skip test_async_file_and_batch (Bedrock batch inference is not
authorized on the new account; requires an AWS support case).
- litellm_overhead: swap legacy claude-3-5-haiku for the active
us.anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5 inference profile.
- test_completion_claude_3_function_call: swap legacy claude-3-sonnet for the
active us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5 inference profile.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y7zgHYu9GX29YRwV4yiWAa
* test(bedrock): fix remaining e2e legacy-model + batch failures on new CI account
- e2e_openai_endpoints: skip test_bedrock_batches_api (Bedrock batch inference
is not authorized on account 941277531214) and migrate the missed
s3_bucket_name in oai_misc_config.yaml to litellm-proxy-941277531214.
- build_and_test: swap legacy bedrock claude-3-sonnet for the active
us.anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5 inference profile in the proxy structured
output e2e test.
https://claude.ai/code/session_01Y7zgHYu9GX29YRwV4yiWAa
* test(bedrock): make opus-4-7 + batch cells fail loudly and mock image-gen (#28791)
Replace the silent skips added for the new CI account with noisier behavior:
- reasoning-effort grid: opus-4-7 cells now fail (when AWS creds are present)
instead of skipping, so the missing entitlement stays visible in CI; they
still skip when AWS creds are absent (local dev)
- Bedrock batch inference tests: drop the skip so they run and fail until
batch access is granted
- Titan + Nova Canvas image-gen tests: mock the Bedrock HTTP call so the
transform + cost-tracking path stays under test without live model access
https://claude.ai/code/session_01MT7SWDnXUjv6e6EPG7BDjT
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(bedrock): use pytest.xfail for known-failing opus-4-7 cells
Replace pytest.fail with pytest.xfail when a model has a fail_reason,
so known-broken cells stay visible as XFAIL without keeping CI red.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
---------
Co-authored-by: Mateo <mateo@Mateos-MacBook-Pro.local>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
---------
Co-authored-by: Dibyo Mukherjee <dibyo@adobe.com>
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Mateo <mateo@Mateos-MacBook-Pro.local>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(mcp-oauth): add PROXY_BASE_URL escape hatch + diagnostic logging for invalid_request
Customers hitting "{"detail":"invalid_request"}" on the MCP /authorize
endpoint had no way to recover when their ingress mangles X-Forwarded-*
headers (the same-origin check in validate_trusted_redirect_uri compares
the browser-supplied redirect_uri against get_request_base_url, which is
reconstructed from those headers).
Two contained changes:
1. get_request_base_url now honours PROXY_BASE_URL as the canonical
public origin when set, bypassing the X-Forwarded-* trust gate
entirely. Operators who know their public URL can set it once
instead of debugging ingress header rewrites.
2. The rejection path in validate_trusted_redirect_uri emits a WARN
log carrying the redirect_uri, computed proxy base, and the
X-Forwarded-* / Host headers seen. A bare 400 was undiagnosable;
this turns it into a one-line root-cause.
* test(mcp-oauth): capture warnings from correct logger ("LiteLLM")
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(mcp-oauth): reject malformed PROXY_BASE_URL with one-shot diagnostic
A scheme-less PROXY_BASE_URL (e.g. "litellm.example.com" instead of
"https://litellm.example.com") would sail through urlparse with empty
scheme + netloc, silently breaking every same-origin compare in
validate_trusted_redirect_uri and leaving the operator staring at the
same opaque 400 the env var was meant to fix.
Validate it once at read time: only honour values that parse as
http(s) URLs with a non-empty netloc; otherwise log a one-shot WARN
naming the bad value and fall through to the request-derived origin
so the proxy still serves traffic.
* fix(mcp/oauth): normalize PROXY_BASE_URL to strip query/fragment
Match the X-Forwarded-* path's normalization so a configured
PROXY_BASE_URL containing a query string or fragment does not break
downstream f-string concatenation like f"{base_url}/callback".
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* refactor(mcp-oauth): drop non-essential comments from PROXY_BASE_URL changes
Strip narrative comments and verbose docstrings added in this PR; the
code is intuitive enough on its own and the log messages already carry
their own diagnostic context. Pre-existing comments are left untouched.
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
* fix(proxy): sort BYOK models by team_public_model_name in /v2/model/info
Team BYOK rows persist an internal `model_name` like
`model_name_{team_id}_{uuid}` and expose the user-facing name via
`model_info.team_public_model_name`. The UI's `getDisplayModelName`
and the search filter already fall back to that field, but
`_sort_models` was keying off the raw `model_name` — so BYOK rows
ranked by their opaque IDs and clumped at the end of the alphabetized
list instead of interleaving with non-BYOK rows.
Match the UI/search behavior: prefer `team_public_model_name` when
present, fall back to `model_name` otherwise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(proxy): case-insensitive DB-side search for BYOK models
`_apply_search_filter_to_models` used Prisma's JSON path
`string_contains` to match the BYOK `team_public_model_name` field, but
that operator is case-sensitive in Postgres (no `mode: insensitive`
flag like column-level string filters have). So a search for "claude"
missed a stored "Claude Sonnet" via the DB branch even though the
router-side path matched it case-insensitively.
Widen the JSON branch to "row has a team_public_model_name set" and
filter case-insensitively in Python so DB-only BYOK rows match the
same terms users see in the UI. This also drops the now-unused
DB-level page-size optimization and `sort_by` knob — the in-Python
filter is the source of truth for `db_models_total_count` now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(proxy): scope BYOK search results to caller's accessible teams
`_apply_search_filter_to_models` was widened to fetch every row with a
`team_public_model_name` set so case-insensitive search could match
mixed-case stored names. `/v2/model/info` is reachable by non-admin
keys though, and the helper ran before `include_team_models` / `teamId`
filtering — so a non-admin caller could search a common substring like
"claude" and see BYOK rows belonging to teams they're not a member of.
Resolve the caller's team membership once (admin → no scoping, else
their `user_row.teams`) and drop BYOK rows (those with
`model_info.team_id` set) outside that scope on both the router-side
matches and the over-broad DB query, before display-name matching.
Non-team rows are unaffected and remain gated by the existing
`include_team_models` / `direct_access` paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(proxy): search by team_public_model_name and scope teamId queries
- /v2/model/info search now matches both `model_name` and
`model_info.team_public_model_name`, so team BYOK rows (which persist
an internal `model_name_{team_id}_{uuid}`) are findable by the public
name shown in the UI. DB query OR-includes a JSON-path match on
`team_public_model_name` for rows that exist only in the DB.
- `_filter_models_by_team_id` no longer short-circuits on the viewer's
`direct_access` flag — that describes the admin viewer's own
permissions and would leak every public model into a team-scoped view.
Models are kept only when they belong to the team (own BYOK, in
access_via_team_ids, or reachable via team.models / access groups).
- Added `_authorize_team_id_query`: the untrusted `teamId` query
parameter now requires the caller to be a proxy admin or a member of
the requested team, otherwise returns 403. Without this, any
authenticated user could enumerate another team's BYOK metadata by
guessing the team id.
- `_get_caller_byok_team_scope` now treats `PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY` the
same as `PROXY_ADMIN` (both are admin roles); previously VIEW_ONLY
admins fell through to a user-id team lookup and saw only their own
teams' BYOK rows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(proxy): bound BYOK search DB fetch in /v2/model/info
Previously the DB-side search OR'd a JSON-path predicate
`{model_info: {path: [team_public_model_name], string_contains: ""}}`
to compensate for Prisma's case-sensitive JSON `string_contains` on
Postgres. That predicate matches every row that has any
`team_public_model_name` set, so any authenticated caller could force a
full BYOK-table read with `/v2/model/info?search=x` regardless of page
size.
Drop the JSON-path branch. The DB query now does a bounded
`model_name contains <search>` lookup. BYOK rows that are loaded into
the router are still searchable by their `team_public_model_name` via
the router-side filter; only the rare edge case of a BYOK row that
exists only in the DB (router sync failed) loses display-name search,
which is an acceptable trade-off given the DoS surface.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(proxy): bound DB find_many in /v2/model/info search
The previous bounding patch dropped the page-aware `take=N` on
`find_many`, so a broad `?search=model` would load and decrypt every
matching DB row on each request even though the response only returns
one page.
Restore bounded fetches in `_apply_search_filter_to_models`:
* Unsorted searches use `take = max(0, page * size - router_count)`,
i.e. exactly one page worth of remaining DB rows.
* Sorted searches need ordering across the full match set, so they cap
at `_SORTED_SEARCH_DB_FETCH_CAP = 500` instead of fetching everything.
* Total count comes from a cheap `count(...)` query so pagination stays
accurate without materializing every row.
Wired `page`, `size`, and `sortBy` through from the endpoint and added
a regression test covering both `take` values.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(proxy): extract DB-fetch helper to satisfy PLR0915
_apply_search_filter_to_models tripped Ruff's "too many statements"
(51 > 50) after the bounded-fetch fix. Move the DB-side block into
`_fetch_db_models_for_search`, which keeps the same behavior:
* Bounded `take` via page math (unsorted) or `_SORTED_SEARCH_DB_FETCH_CAP`
(sorted)
* Cheap `count(...)` for accurate pagination totals
* Caller-team scope applied to fetched rows before decrypt
Pure refactor; no behavior change. All 8 BYOK/team tests still pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style: apply black formatting to _fetch_db_models_for_search
CI's "Check Black formatting" step flagged one line in the helper added
in d55eecf6af. No behavior change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(otel): expose http.response.status_code on failure spans
Set the OTel-standard http.response.status_code (integer) on failure
spans alongside the existing OpenInference error.code (kept for
back-compat). error.type is already emitted via ERROR_TYPE.
Crucially, also record structured error attributes on the proxy SERVER
span ('Received Proxy Server Request') from async_post_call_failure_hook
- the only place the SERVER span is in hand. _handle_failure records on
the litellm_request child span (the parent span is not propagated into
its kwargs), so prior to this change the SERVER span that dashboards
query carried only span status, never error.code/error.type. Reuses
_record_exception_on_span + StandardLoggingPayloadSetup.get_error_information
so values match the child span.
Tests: recorder unit coverage + a hook-driven test asserting the SERVER
span is stamped (the gap recorder-only tests missed). Full
test_opentelemetry.py suite: 197 passed.
* feat(otel): set http.route + url.path on the proxy SERVER span
Add the OTel-standard http.route (low-cardinality route template, e.g.
/v1/threads/{thread_id}/runs) and url.path (literal path) to the SERVER
span ('Received Proxy Server Request') so dashboards can group traffic
by endpoint instead of seeing every path param as a unique value.
Same architectural gap as the status-code commit: the success/failure
logging handlers write the litellm_request CHILD span, and
_handle_success explicitly refuses to copy to the SERVER span. Verified
with a console-exporter run that the SERVER span was bare on success.
Unlike error info, route/path are known at request time, so set them
directly on the freshly-created SERVER span in user_api_key_auth (one
edit point, works for success and failure, no hook-ordering risk):
- http.route from the matched FastAPI route (scope['route'].path),
empirically confirmed populated at auth-dependency time.
- url.path from the existing literal-path variable.
New get_request_route_template helper + set_proxy_request_route_attributes
(no-op on None span, so the Langfuse override stays safe).
Tests: route-attribute setter + route-template helper edges. Full
test_opentelemetry.py and test_auth_utils.py green.
* feat(otel): set litellm.preprocessing.duration_ms on the proxy SERVER span
Expose the total time LiteLLM spends before the upstream provider
request begins (auth + parsing + pre-call hooks) as a single number on
the SERVER span ('Received Proxy Server Request'). Window:
proxy-receive -> FIRST provider handoff.
Retry semantics: first attempt only (pure preprocessing, excludes
retry loops + backoff). api_call_start_time is overwritten on every
attempt, so a set-once first_api_call_start_time pins the first handoff.
Same architectural gap as the prior two commits: the success/failure
logging handlers write the litellm_request CHILD span, not the SERVER
span. Set it instead from the post-call hooks on
user_api_key_dict.parent_otel_span.
Failure-path subtlety: request_data.pop('litellm_logging_obj') runs
before the failure-hook loop, so the failure hook can't read the
logging object. litellm_received_at is propagated via the existing
request->metadata channel, and first_api_call_start_time is mirrored
onto litellm_params.metadata, so both anchors survive into request_data
and the OTel helper reads them uniformly for success and failure.
Edits: user_api_key_auth (stash receive instant), litellm_pre_call_utils
(propagate it), litellm_logging (set-once first handoff + metadata
mirror), opentelemetry (constant + set_preprocessing_duration_attribute,
called from both post-call hooks).
Tests: duration helper (both container shapes, missing/negative/None
edges) + set-once invariant (retry doesn't overwrite, metadata mirror).
test_opentelemetry.py + test_auth_utils.py + test_litellm_logging.py:
447 passed. Verified live: SERVER span carries the attribute on success
and failure, coexisting with the status-code and route attributes.
* fix(otel): MyPy type-narrowing for status-code + preprocessing-duration
No behavior change. MyPy (CI lint) flagged:
- error_information["error_code"] is str|None: narrow via a None-checked
local before int().
- _to_timestamp returns Optional[float]: resolve both anchors and return
early if either is None instead of subtracting possibly-None floats.
* fix(otel): stop polluting user request metadata with first_api_call_start_time
The PR3 set-once preprocessing anchor was mirrored into
litellm_params["metadata"] from core litellm_logging.py. That dict is
the caller's request metadata, mutated in place and shared across every
call path including pure SDK (litellm.acreate_batch). It got echoed into
LiteLLMBatch(metadata=...), which the OpenAI batch schema types as
Dict[str, str] -> pydantic ValidationError on a datetime value.
- litellm_logging.py: set first_api_call_start_time only on
model_call_details (success path reads it there directly).
- proxy/utils.py: post_call_failure_hook lifts it off the logging object
into request_data (internal top-level key, same convention as the
other proxy-internal request_data keys) right before the existing
litellm_logging_obj pop. Never touches user metadata.
- opentelemetry.py: read the anchor from the container top level
(model_call_details on success, request_data on failure).
- Tests updated; add TestPostCallFailureHookLiftsFirstApiCallStartTime.
Fixes the batches_testing regression introduced on this branch.
* chore(otel): trim verbose comments to concise rationale
Collapse multi-line why-blocks to one or two lines and drop process/plan references (PR-numbering, "the plan") from test comments. No behavior change.
Split the monolithic LiteLLM proxy into independently scalable Kubernetes components to allow separate horizontal scaling of the LLM data plane and management API surfaces
- Add DatabaseURLSettings pydantic-settings model that assembles DATABASE_URL (and optional DATABASE_URL_READ_REPLICA) from discrete DATABASE_* env vars before Prisma initializes, supporting both IAM token auth (minting short-lived RDS tokens) and password auth; replaces the CLI-only path that componentized entrypoints bypass
- Add gateway component (port 4000) that trims the proxy route table to the LLM data-plane surface (chat, embeddings, completions, audio, realtime, provider passthroughs, health/metrics) via an allowlist applied inside the lifespan context so plugin-registered routes are captured
- Add backend component (port 4001) that exposes the management/admin surface (keys, users, teams, orgs, spend analytics, model management, SSO, audit logs) with a complementary allowlist
- Add ui component — Next.js static export served by nginx (port 3000) with RSC payload routing, asset prefix aliasing, and SPA fallback for dashboard routes
- Add migrations component with dedicated Dockerfile that runs prisma migrate deploy via a Helm pre-install/pre-upgrade Job, eliminating per-pod schema contention on the Prisma advisory lock
- Add Helm chart (helm/litellm) with separate Deployments, Services, HPAs, and ConfigMap for each component; shared _helpers.tpl emits DATABASE_*, IAM_TOKEN_DB_AUTH, REDIS_*, and DISABLE_SCHEMA_UPDATE env vars from chart values; ingress template routes traffic to the correct component by path prefix
- Add comprehensive tests for DatabaseURLSettings covering IAM auth, password auth, read replica fallbacks, operator-pinned URL preservation, and percent-encoding; add coverage test asserting gateway + backend allowlist union equals the full proxy route set
- Add pydantic-settings>=2.14.1 as a proxy extra dependency and update liccheck allowlist
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassinkortam@g.ucla.edu>
test_keepalive_timeout_flag and test_timeout_worker_healthcheck_flag
were the only run_server tests in test_proxy_cli.py that neither
stripped DATABASE_URL/DIRECT_URL nor mocked the prisma DB path. When a
DATABASE_URL is present (CI/env leak), run_server --local enters the DB
block and blocks in the un-timeout'd subprocess.run(["prisma"]) at
proxy_cli.py:987 plus the ProxyExtrasDBManager migrate-deploy retry
loops, ~370s per test on the CI runner. --dist=loadscope pins both to
one xdist worker, so the proxy-infra job appears stuck at 99% and hits
the 20-min timeout.
Apply the same isolation every other run_server test in this file
already uses: mock PrismaManager.setup_database +
should_update_prisma_schema and strip DATABASE_URL/DIRECT_URL. Full
module drops from 31.7s to 2.9s locally; both tests fall off the slow
list.
Adds test_update_config_env_var_round_trip_not_double_encrypted, which
drives the real /config/update handler: first write plaintext, then
re-POST the stored ciphertext (the Admin UI round-trip) and assert the
value is not stacked with a second encryption layer and untouched keys
stay byte-identical. Verified to fail against the pre-fix handler and
pass after. Also tightens the unit test to exactly three ciphertext
re-feeds.
A single decrypt-then-encrypt chokepoint (_encrypt_env_variables_for_db)
now backs both update_config and save_config. Re-submitting a value the
Admin UI read back from /get/config/callbacks as ciphertext no longer
stacks a second encryption layer, which previously decrypted to garbage
and silently broke the callback. The chokepoint decrypts with the pure
_decrypt_db_variables (no os.environ mutation on the write path) and
encrypts exactly once; update_config merges only the sent keys so
untouched env vars keep their stored ciphertext byte-for-byte.
* fix(vertex-ai): fix zero cost/usage on completed Vertex AI batch jobs
Vertex batch jobs recorded 0 spend and 0 tokens after PR #25627 added
automatic transformation of GCS predictions.jsonl to OpenAI format.
Two bugs fixed:
1. batch_utils.py: the Vertex-specific cost/usage reader
(calculate_vertex_ai_batch_cost_and_usage) was always invoked and
reads raw usageMetadata fields that no longer exist in the
OpenAI-shaped output. Now the reader is only used when
disable_vertex_batch_output_transformation=True; otherwise the
generic path handles the already-transformed OpenAI-shaped content.
2. cost_calculator.py: batch_cost_calculator skipped the global
litellm.get_model_info() lookup when a model_info dict was passed
in, even when that dict had no pricing fields (e.g. deployment
metadata with only id/db_model). It now falls back to the global
pricing table when the provided model_info has no pricing data.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* Update litellm/cost_calculator.py
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(cost-calculator): use not-any guard for pricing fallback in batch_cost_calculator
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(cost-calculator): treat explicit zero batch pricing as set in model_info
The fallback to litellm.get_model_info() used truthy checks on pricing
fields, so 0.0 was treated as missing and replaced by global rates.
Use `is not None` like elsewhere in cost calculation. Add regression test.
Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <Sameerlite@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(proxy): fix vector store retrieve/list/update/delete routing without model
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(proxy): remove unchecked query-param injection in vector store management endpoints
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* test(proxy): use subset assertion for vector store route test to allow extra kwargs like shared_session
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
_build_mcp_server_table omitted delegate_auth_to_upstream, so GET /v1/mcp/server always returned the default false while the registry kept the DB value.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Log verbose_logger.warning when loading oauth2 interactive servers with
available_on_public_internet=false and delegate_auth_to_upstream=true
(config + DB). Dashboard Alert for the same combo. CLAUDE note for
operators. Tests for log and M2M skip.
Remove available_on_public_internet gating from delegate-auth-to-upstream
paths so oauth2 + delegate_auth_to_upstream interactive servers behave
the same when marked internal. Keeps M2M exclusion. Updates tests.
* fix(rate-limit): stop v3 limiter from leaking internal stash to provider body
PR #27001 (atomic TPM rate limit) introduced a reservation flow that
writes four LiteLLM-internal keys onto the request data dict:
_litellm_rate_limit_descriptors
_litellm_tpm_reserved_tokens
_litellm_tpm_reserved_model
_litellm_tpm_reserved_scopes
_litellm_tpm_reservation_released
These keys are forwarded as request body params to the upstream provider,
which rejects them as unknown fields:
OpenAI -> 400 'Unknown parameter: _litellm_rate_limit_descriptors'
(mapped by litellm to RateLimitError / 429, hiding the bug
behind a misleading 'throttling_error' code)
Anthropic -> 400 '_litellm_rate_limit_descriptors: Extra inputs are
not permitted'
Net effect: every chat completion against any real provider fails the
moment a virtual key has any tpm_limit / rpm_limit set — i.e. v3-enforced
key-level TPM/RPM limits are broken end-to-end. The v3 RPM/TPM check
itself still runs (raises 429 on over-limit), but the success path
poisons the upstream body.
Reproduced on litellm_internal_staging HEAD (410ce761dc) against
gpt-4o-mini and claude-haiku-4-5 with a 1-RPM/1-TPM key — first request
fails with the provider's unknown-field error.
Fix: the stash is metadata only.
- Add RATE_LIMIT_DESCRIPTORS_KEY constant and a _LITELLM_STASH_KEYS
registry so we have a single source of truth for stash keys.
- New helper _stash_value_in_metadata_channels writes to
data['metadata'] / data['litellm_metadata'] without touching the
top level.
- _stash_reservation_in_data and the descriptor stash now route
through that helper. _mark_reservation_released stops writing
top-level.
- _lookup_stashed_value also checks kwargs['metadata'] /
kwargs['litellm_metadata'] (raw request_data shape) in addition to
kwargs['litellm_params']['metadata'] (completion kwargs shape).
- async_post_call_failure_hook now reads descriptors via the unified
metadata lookup instead of request_data.get(top-level).
- Defense in depth: async_pre_call_hook strips any stash key that
somehow surfaced at the top level (stale cache, future refactor,
test fixture) before returning.
Tests:
- New regression test asserts no _litellm_* stash key is present at
the top level of data after async_pre_call_hook, and that the
metadata channel still carries the reservation + descriptors so
success / failure reconciliation works.
- Existing test_tpm_concurrent.py tests that asserted top-level
presence are updated to read from data['metadata'] — the location
is an implementation detail; the spec is that post-call callbacks
can resolve the stash.
Verified end-to-end against OpenAI gpt-4o-mini and Anthropic
claude-haiku-4-5 via /v1/chat/completions on a low-rpm key:
- With limits not exceeded: HTTP 200, valid completion response,
no leaked fields in body.
- With RPM exceeded: HTTP 429 from v3 enforcement
('Rate limit exceeded ... Limit type: requests').
- With TPM exceeded: HTTP 429 from v3 enforcement
('Rate limit exceeded ... Limit type: tokens').
Full v3 hook test suite passes (171 tests).
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(rate-limit): use RATE_LIMIT_DESCRIPTORS_KEY constant in test, trim noisy comments
Address greptile P2: test fixture now uses the imported constant.
Drop comments that re-explain what well-named identifiers already convey.
* fix(rate-limit): reject caller-supplied stash values to prevent TPM-refund abuse
Strip _LITELLM_STASH_KEYS from data top-level and both metadata channels at
the start of async_pre_call_hook. Without this, an authenticated caller can
inject _litellm_rate_limit_descriptors plus _litellm_tpm_reserved_tokens in
body metadata, trigger a proxy-side rejection, and cause
async_post_call_failure_hook to refund TPM counters against attacker-named
scopes (e.g. another tenant's api_key).
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
- Introduce `_CallbackCapabilities` dataclass and `ProxyLogging._callback_capabilities()` static method that inspects `litellm.callbacks` once and caches capability flags keyed on (list length, member ids); invalidates automatically when the callback list mutates without per-request iteration overhead
- Replace O(n) `litellm.callbacks` walks in `async_pre_call_hook`, `during_call_hook`, `async_post_call_streaming_iterator_hook`, `async_post_call_streaming_hook`, and `post_call_response_headers_hook` with fast-path exits when no relevant callbacks are registered
- Add `needs_iterator_wrap()` and `needs_per_chunk_streaming_hook()` instance methods to decouple iterator-level wrapping from per-chunk hook execution; avoids `get_response_string` materialization per chunk when no guardrail or chunk-hook callback is active
- Introduce `_fast_serialize_simple_model_response_stream()` using `orjson` for common single-choice text streaming chunks, bypassing the full Pydantic serializer; falls back to `model_dump_json` for tool calls, logprobs, usage, and provider-specific fields
- Add early-return in `_restamp_streaming_chunk_model` when downstream model already matches the requested model, avoiding unnecessary string comparisons on every chunk
- Fix stale zero-cost cache bug in `_is_model_cost_zero`: move the per-router `_zero_cost_cache` dict onto the `Router` instance and clear it in `_invalidate_model_group_info_cache` so in-place pricing updates via `upsert_deployment` immediately resume budget enforcement
- Add `scripts/benchmark_chat_completions_perf.py`: standalone async benchmarking tool with a mock OpenAI provider, LiteLLM proxy process management, non-streaming RPS, streaming TTFT, and full-stream latency measurements with repeat/median run support
- Add comprehensive unit tests covering capability detection, cache invalidation, fast-path correctness, zero-cost cache regression, and the no-callback streaming fast path
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassinkortam@g.ucla.edu>
* feat(lasso): extend LassoGuardrail to support tool calling (RND-5748)
* fix(lasso): PR review followups for tool-calling guardrail (RND-5748)
* fix(lasso): handle object-style tool_calls in _update_tool_calls_from_masked (RND-5748)
* fix(lasso): use model role for tool_use blocks (RND-5748)
* test(lasso): add round-trip tests for message transformation (RND-5748)
* fix(lasso): remove unused imports, handle Responses-API input masking, flatten multimodal content (RND-5748)
* fix(lasso): inspect Responses-API input field (RND-5748)
* fix(lasso): guard text-cursor remap against Lasso count mismatch (RND-5748)
* fix(lasso): flatten list content in tool_result.content (RND-5748)
* fix(lasso): remap multimodal list content during masking (RND-5748)
Bug: _map_masked_messages_back counted list-content messages in
original_text_count but the remap loop only handled isinstance(str).
The positional text_cursor never advanced for list messages, causing
all subsequent masked texts to be written onto the wrong messages.
Fix: added elif isinstance(content, list) branch that replaces the
list with the masked text string and advances the cursor — mirrors
the existing string-content branch. Also handles the assistant +
tool_calls combo for list-content messages.
Test: test_map_masked_messages_back_list_content verifies a user
message with [text + image_url] followed by an assistant message
gets correct masked content on both (cursor stays aligned).
* refactor(lasso): extract _get_field and _extract_tool_call_fields helpers (RND-5748)
The dict-vs-object access pattern (x.get('y') if isinstance(x, dict)
else getattr(x, 'y', None)) was duplicated 14 times across 5 methods.
_get_field(obj, field) — single-point dict/Pydantic field access.
_extract_tool_call_fields(call) — returns (call_id, name, parsed_input)
with JSON argument parsing, replacing ~30 duplicate lines in both
async_post_call_success_hook and _expand_messages_for_classification.
Also simplified _update_tool_calls_from_masked, _prepare_payload tool
mapping, and _apply_masking_to_model_response call_id extraction.
Net ~60 lines removed. No behavior change — all 32 tests pass.
* fix(lasso): add count guard to _apply_masking_to_model_response (RND-5748)
_apply_masking_to_model_response used a bare text_cursor without
verifying 1:1 correspondence between text-bearing choices and masked
text entries. If Lasso returned a different number of text messages
than choices with content, masked text would be applied to the wrong
choice or silently skip choices.
Added the same count-mismatch guard pattern already used in
_map_masked_messages_back: count original text-bearing choices,
compare to masked_text length, skip text remap on mismatch with a
warning log. Tool_call masking via id-based lookup is unaffected.
Tests:
- test_apply_masking_to_model_response_multiple_choices: verifies
correct per-choice masked text with 2 choices
- test_apply_masking_to_model_response_count_mismatch: verifies
content is left unchanged when counts disagree
* fix(lasso): close two guardrail-bypass paths flagged in review (RND-5748)
* tool-call args: when function.arguments is malformed JSON or parses
to a non-object, preserve the raw string as {"arguments": <raw>} so
Lasso still inspects it instead of receiving input=None. Covers both
pre-call and post-call extraction (shared helper). Also resolves the
CodeQL empty-except warning since the except body now assigns parsed=None.
* Responses-API input: when a request carries both "messages" and
"input", inspect both. Previously a benign messages array let the
guardrail skip data["input"] entirely. The masking write-back is
split via a count boundary so masked messages flow back to
data["messages"] and masked input flows back to data["input"]
without cross-contamination.
Tests: malformed/non-object args round-trip, dual-field classification,
dual-field masking write-back split.
* chore(lasso): black formatting + comment on expand skip branch (RND-5748)
* black: wrap two long expressions in lasso.py and reformat dict
literals in test_lasso.py to satisfy CI lint.
* add a short comment in _expand_messages_for_classification
explaining why empty string and None content are intentionally
skipped (None is the OpenAI shape for a pure tool-call turn).
* fix(lasso): satisfy mypy in _handle_masking, _update_tool_calls_from_masked, _apply_masking_to_model_response (RND-5748)
* Narrow `response.get("messages")` into a local before slicing so
mypy doesn't see `Optional[List[Dict[str, str]]]` as non-indexable.
* Rename the two write-side `func` bindings in
`_update_tool_calls_from_masked` to `func_dict` / `func_obj` so
mypy doesn't unify the dict and Any|None branches.
* Rename the inner loop variable in `_apply_masking_to_model_response`
from `msg` to `masked_msg` to avoid clashing with the
`msg = choice.message` rebinding below.
No behavior change; resolves the 7 mypy errors from the CI lint job.
* fix: block NaN/Inf budget bypass and add missing non-admin guards
Addresses three security issues:
GHSA-wvg4-6222-3q4r: /user/update exposes max_budget, soft_budget, spend
to self-editing non-admin users with no server-side guard. Non-admin callers
now receive HTTP 403 if any of those fields appear in the update payload.
GHSA-q775-qw9r-2r4g: _enforce_upperbound_key_params returned early (no-op)
when upperbound_key_generate_params was absent from config, letting any
authenticated user generate a key with unlimited max_budget. Fix adds a
delegated-authority ceiling in _common_key_generation_helper: non-admins
cannot grant a key more budget than their own key carries.
GHSA-2rv4-xv66-fpjg: float('nan') passes every `value < 0` guard because
nan < 0 is False in Python, and spend >= nan is always False, permanently
disabling budget enforcement for any entity carrying a NaN max_budget.
All write-time budget guards now use `not math.isfinite(v) or v < 0`.
_enforce_upperbound_key_params validates finiteness unconditionally (before
the early-return). All spend-enforcement comparisons in auth_checks.py are
now guarded with math.isfinite(max_budget) as defense-in-depth.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: close budget ceiling bypass for callers with no max_budget (GHSA-q775)
Non-admin callers whose API key has no explicit max_budget (None) could
bypass the delegated-authority ceiling and create keys with arbitrary
budgets. Now blocks budget assignment when caller has no budget configured.
Also removes redundant inline import of LitellmUserRoles.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: only apply budget ceiling to explicitly requested max_budget
Capture the caller-supplied max_budget before _enforce_upperbound_key_params
can fill it with a default, so auto-filled defaults don't trigger the
ceiling guard for non-admin users with no budget on their own key.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: capture requested max_budget before any defaults are applied
Move _requested_max_budget capture before both default_key_generate_params
and upperbound_key_generate_params mutations, so auto-filled values don't
trigger the ceiling check for non-admin users.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: allow unlimited-budget callers to delegate any budget
Callers with max_budget=None (unlimited) can legitimately create
budget-capped keys. Only block when caller has an explicit budget
and the requested budget exceeds it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: ryan-crabbe-berri <ryan@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Provider validation errors (e.g. OpenAI RateLimitError carrying 178
pydantic errors each with their own 'input': [...]) were stored verbatim
in LiteLLM_SpendLogs.metadata.error_information.error_message via
str(original_exception), producing rows >12 MB.
Sanitize before metadata is serialized:
- redact 'input'/'messages' values in both error_message and traceback
when store_prompts_in_spend_logs is False (back-door leak paths)
- always apply the MAX_STRING_LENGTH_PROMPT_IN_DB size cap to
error_message and traceback (DB-storage safeguard)
Value scanning uses a parser-based balanced-bracket walk that respects
string quoting, so multi-modal payloads ('messages': [{'content': [...]}])
and user text containing literal brackets ("secret[123") are handled
correctly instead of leaking past a depth-1 regex.
Scoped to the spend-log path so OTEL/Datadog/etc. callbacks still
receive the untruncated error per LITELLM_TRUNCATION_DB_SAFEGUARD_NOTE.
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassinkortam@g.ucla.edu>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: patch Host-header auth bypass in get_request_route
Starlette reconstructs request.url from the Host header. A malformed
Host like `localhost/?x=1` causes Starlette to build the full URL as
`http://localhost/?x=1/health`, which url-parses to path="/". Since "/"
is in LiteLLMRoutes.public_routes, all protected routes became reachable
without authentication.
Fix: read scope["path"] (set by uvicorn from the HTTP request line,
not derivable from headers) instead of request.url.path. Sub-path
deployments are handled via scope["app_root_path"] / scope["root_path"],
mirroring Starlette's own base_url construction logic.
Affected variants confirmed fixed:
Host: localhost/?x=1
Host: localhost:4000/?x=1
Host: localhost/#test
Host: localhost:4000/#test
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style: reduce comments in route fix
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: block credential fields in RAG ingest vector_store options
Credential fields (vertex_credentials, aws_access_key_id, api_key, etc.)
in ingest_options.vector_store are now rejected at the API boundary with
a 400 error. Credentials must be configured server-side.
Previously any authenticated user could supply a vertex_credentials dict
with type=external_account pointing credential_source.file at an
arbitrary path (e.g. /proc/1/environ) and token_url at an
attacker-controlled server. google-auth's identity_pool.Credentials
refresh() would read the file and POST its contents to the attacker.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: block /key/update self-escalation by assigned users
Non-admin users who were assigned a key (created_by != caller) could
update any non-budget field — models, rpm_limit, guardrails, etc. —
without admin authorization, allowing privilege self-escalation.
Gate: only the key creator (created_by == caller) may edit their own
key without admin check; budget changes always require admin regardless
of creator status. All other callers must pass _check_key_admin_access.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: block user-controlled api_base in RAG ingest vector_store options
A user-supplied api_base in ingest_options.vector_store caused the server
to forward its configured provider credentials (Gemini, OpenAI) to an
attacker-controlled endpoint via SSRF.
Add api_base to the blocked credential params set alongside api_key and
the existing credential fields.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: restrict /utils/transform_request to PROXY_ADMIN and apply body safety check
Any authenticated internal_user could POST arbitrary provider config
(aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, etc.) to /utils/transform_request and have
the server forward its credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint.
- Gate the endpoint on PROXY_ADMIN role (403 for all other roles)
- Call is_request_body_safe() to reject banned params even for admins
- Convert ValueError from safety check to HTTP 400
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: apply banned-param check to /utils/transform_request
Without is_request_body_safe(), any authenticated user could pass
aws_sts_endpoint, api_base, or aws_web_identity_token to
/utils/transform_request and have the server forward its configured
provider credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint during SDK
credential resolution.
Applies the same banned-param blocklist already used by LLM endpoints.
Endpoint remains accessible to all authenticated users.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: block SSRF via api_base in /prompts/test dotprompt YAML frontmatter
Any frontmatter key not in ["model","input","output"] flowed into
optional_params and was merged into the LLM call data dict, bypassing
is_request_body_safe. An attacker with any bearer key could set
api_base in YAML to redirect the outbound LLM request — including the
provider API key — to an attacker-controlled host.
Fix: call is_request_body_safe on the constructed data dict after
optional_params are merged, before invoking ProxyBaseLLMRequestProcessing.
ValueError from the banned-param check is surfaced as HTTP 400.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Update litellm/proxy/rag_endpoints/endpoints.py
Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix: coerce nested config strings before banned-param check
_NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS descent used isinstance(nested, dict) which silently
skipped litellm_embedding_config when delivered as a JSON string via
multipart/form-data. Banned params (api_base, aws_sts_endpoint, etc.)
nested inside the stringified value were invisible to is_request_body_safe.
_NESTED_METADATA_KEYS already used _coerce_metadata_to_dict which parses
JSON strings before checking. Apply the same coercion to _NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: replace substring match with prefix match in is_llm_api_route
mapped_pass_through_routes used `_llm_passthrough_route in route` (substring)
so any admin-only path whose URL contained a provider name (openai, anthropic,
azure, bedrock, etc.) was misclassified as an LLM API route and bypassed the
admin gate in non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check.
Confirmed live: non-admin key could GET /credentials/by_name/openai (read
masked provider API key) and DELETE /credentials/openai (delete credential).
Fix: use exact match or startswith(prefix + "/") — the same pattern used
everywhere else in RouteChecks — so only routes that actually start with a
passthrough prefix are allowed through.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: stabilize PR #27878 test failures
- key_management_endpoints: extend can_skip_admin_check to team keys so
team members with /key/update permission can update non-budget fields.
can_team_member_execute_key_management_endpoint already validates team
membership + permission and raises if unauthorized; reaching the admin
check on a team key means the caller was authorized.
- test: set created_by on mock key in
test_update_key_non_budget_fields_allowed_for_internal_user so
caller_is_creator resolves correctly (MagicMock default ≠ user_id).
- auth_utils.get_request_route: guard against non-dict request.scope
(e.g. MagicMock in unit tests) to prevent a MagicMock leaking into
UserAPIKeyAuth.request_route and failing Pydantic validation.
- ci: assign test_multipart_bypass_repro.py to the proxy-runtime shard
in test-unit-proxy-db.yml to satisfy the shard-coverage check.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(lint): add explicit str() cast in get_request_route for MyPy
scope.get() returns Any|None which MyPy cannot coerce to str implicitly.
Wrap both scope.get() calls in str() to satisfy the type checker.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: guard bare-/ root_path strip + make total_spend migration idempotent
auth_utils.get_request_route: when Starlette sets scope["app_root_path"]
to "/" (e.g. behind some middleware), the old stripping logic would
remove the leading slash from every path ("/team/new" → "team/new"),
breaking route matching and causing auth to misclassify protected routes.
Skip stripping when root_path is bare "/".
migration: add IF NOT EXISTS to total_spend ALTER TABLE so the migration
is safe to replay when a prior partial run already created the column.
Without this guard, prisma migrate deploy fails on CI DBs that were
partially migrated, causing all subsequent DB operations (including
/team/new) to 500.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: require creator still owns key for personal-key bypass in /key/update
caller_is_creator now requires both created_by == caller AND user_id ==
caller. Previously checking only created_by let a demoted admin who
originally created a key for another user continue editing non-budget
fields on it after reassignment, bypassing _check_key_admin_access.
Adds regression test: creator whose key was reassigned is blocked (403).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: extract auth checks to fix PLR0915 + broaden max_budget assertion
internal_user_endpoints._update_single_user_helper exceeded 50 statements
(PLR0915). Extract authorization checks into _check_user_update_authz helper
to bring statement count under the limit.
test_validate_max_budget: assert "negative" (substring of both the local
"cannot be negative" and the CI "non-negative finite number" messages) so
the test is stable regardless of which exact wording the function uses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: veria-ai[bot] <224490171+veria-ai[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
``test_azure_ad_token_is_in_banned_list`` only asserted tuple
membership of a name the parametrized test already exercises end-to-end
through ``is_request_body_safe``. Removed.
Tightened the admin-opt-in test comment.
``_NESTED_CONFIG_KEYS`` descent used ``isinstance(nested, dict)``, so a
caller sending ``extra_body`` as a JSON-encoded string instead of an
object (the same shape multipart/form-data clients use for
``litellm_metadata``) skipped the banned-key check entirely. Switched to
``_coerce_metadata_to_dict`` so the JSON-string path is parsed before
descent — mirrors the existing handling on ``_NESTED_METADATA_KEYS``.
