The hooks gated on ``call_type == "completion"`` but the proxy ingress
passes ``route_type`` straight through as ``call_type`` —
``"acompletion"`` for /v1/chat/completions and ``"aresponses"`` for
/v1/responses. Tests passed because they used the literal sync
``"completion"`` value, masking the gap.
Switch both hooks to ``is_text_content_call_type`` (matches the
canonical runtime values: completion / acompletion / aresponses) and
update existing tests to assert against runtime values, plus parametrize
a regression test that pins the gate.
Hold the resolved config in a process-memory TTL cache so the
request-handling path doesn't run litellm_proxymodeltable.find_first
on every vector-store call.
The vector store create/update path previously called
``_resolve_embedding_config`` against the admin-configured router/DB
model and persisted the resolved ``litellm_embedding_config`` dict
(``api_key`` / ``api_base`` / ``api_version``) into the
``litellm_managedvectorstorestable.litellm_params`` column. Because the
resolver expanded ``os.environ/...`` references via ``get_secret``, the
DB row carried cleartext provider credentials, and the
``/vector_store/{new,info,update,list}`` responses returned them to any
authenticated caller who could supply a known admin model name.
Move the auto-resolve out of ``create_vector_store_in_db`` and out of
the update path. Persist only the user-supplied ``litellm_embedding_model``
reference. Resolve at request-handling time inside
``_update_request_data_with_litellm_managed_vector_store_registry`` so
the resolved config lives in the per-request ``data`` dict and is
garbage-collected after the response. Legacy rows that were created by
an earlier proxy version and already carry a resolved
``litellm_embedding_config`` skip the re-resolution and pass through
unchanged so embedding calls keep working.
The ``new_vector_store`` response now also runs the existing
``_redact_sensitive_litellm_params`` masker (already used by ``info``,
``update``, and ``list``), defending against caller-supplied cleartext
on the create path and against legacy rows whose persisted credentials
are still in the database.
Existing tests that asserted the old write-time-resolve behaviour are
updated to assert the new persistence shape (no embedding config
stored, just the model reference). Two new tests cover the use-time
path: one asserting fresh resolution happens when a row carries only
the model reference, the other asserting legacy rows with persisted
config skip re-resolution and continue to work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A pre-existing logic bug in ``_check_banned_params``: when the
deployment-level ``configurable_clientside_auth_params`` permitted one
banned field, the loop ``return``-ed on the first match instead of
``continue``-ing, so any other banned param later in the same body or
metadata dict was never checked. This PR's metadata walk multiplies the
surface where that bypass matters — a body pairing an allowed
``api_base`` with an observability credential like ``langfuse_host``
would silently pass.
Proxy-wide ``allow_client_side_credentials`` keeps ``return`` (it's a
global opt-in for every banned param). The per-param branch becomes
``continue`` so only the one explicitly-permitted field is skipped.
Adds a regression test that exercises the api_base + langfuse_host pair.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two related gaps in the proxy's request bouncer:
1. ``is_request_body_safe`` (auth_utils.py) walked the request-body root
and the ``litellm_embedding_config`` nested dict, but not ``metadata``
or ``litellm_metadata``. The same fields it bans at root — Langfuse /
Langsmith / Arize / PostHog / Braintrust / Phoenix / W&B Weave / GCS /
Humanloop / Lunary credentials and routing — were silently accepted
when the caller put them inside metadata, retargeting observability
callbacks to a caller-controlled host with caller-supplied creds.
Walk both metadata containers (and parse the JSON-string form sent via
multipart / ``extra_body``) through the same banned-params helper, so
the existing ``allow_client_side_credentials`` opt-in covers both
paths consistently.
2. The banned-params list was hand-maintained and lagged the canonical
``_supported_callback_params`` allow-list in
``initialize_dynamic_callback_params``. Derive the observability bans
from that allow-list (minus a small ``_SAFE_CLIENT_CALLBACK_PARAMS``
set for informational fields like ``langfuse_prompt_version`` and
``langsmith_sampling_rate``) so future integrations are covered
automatically; ``_EXTRA_BANNED_OBSERVABILITY_PARAMS`` carries the
handful of fields integrations read but the allow-list hasn't caught
up to. A guard test fails CI if a new entry is added to
``_supported_callback_params`` without an explicit safe-list decision.
Separately in ``litellm_pre_call_utils.py``: add ``callbacks``,
``service_callback``, ``logger_fn``, and ``litellm_disabled_callbacks``
to ``_UNTRUSTED_ROOT_CONTROL_FIELDS``. The first three are appended to
worker-wide ``litellm.{input,success,failure,_async_*,service}_callback``
lists / ``litellm.user_logger_fn`` from inside ``function_setup`` — one
request poisons every subsequent caller in that worker. The last is the
inverse primitive: the legitimate path reads it from key/team metadata,
the request-body version silently disables admin-configured audit /
observability for the call.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The strip ran before the proxy parses ``litellm_metadata`` from a JSON
string into a dict (a path used by multipart/form-data and ``extra_body``
callers), so ``isinstance(metadata, dict)`` was False and ``model_info``
survived the strip. Move the call to the same post-parse position the
``user_api_key_*`` strip already uses for the same reason. Adds a
regression test exercising the JSON-string ``litellm_metadata`` path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operators upgrading would otherwise see client-supplied pricing overrides
silently stop applying with no diagnostic. Emit a debug-level line listing
the dropped fields and pointing at the opt-in flag when any are stripped;
stay silent on the no-op path so the log isn't filled with noise.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The proxy currently forwards request-body pricing parameters (the fields
on `CustomPricingLiteLLMParams`, plus `metadata.model_info`) into the
core call path. Those fields belong to deployment configuration, not to
per-request input — sending them from a client mutates the request's
recorded cost and, via `litellm.completion` → `register_model`, the
process-wide `litellm.model_cost` map for every later caller in the
worker. Strip them at the boundary.
The strip set is built from `CustomPricingLiteLLMParams.model_fields` so
pricing fields added later are covered automatically. Operators who do
want clients to supply per-request pricing can opt back in per key or
team via `metadata.allow_client_pricing_override = true`, mirroring the
existing `allow_client_mock_response` and
`allow_client_message_redaction_opt_out` flags.
Tests cover the strip set's coverage, root and metadata strips, the
opt-in skip on both key and team metadata, and a regression check that
the global `litellm.model_cost` map is unmutated after a stripped
request.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A SCIM PUT may legally omit `active` (full-replace with the field
absent). Pydantic fills the SCIMUser.active default of True, so the PUT
handler was overwriting metadata.scim_active with True even when the
client never sent it — silently reactivating a previously SCIM-blocked
user and unblocking their keys.
Use model_fields_set to detect whether the client actually sent
`active`. If omitted, preserve the prior scim_active value and skip
the cascade to virtual keys.
Also drop comments added in this PR that just narrate what the code
does; keep only the docstrings and the SQL-NULL pitfall note that
explain non-obvious behaviour.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
SCIM DELETE /Users/{id} previously called litellm_usertable.delete without
clearing rows that FK back to the user, so Postgres rejected the delete with
LiteLLM_InvitationLink_user_id_fkey and the SCIM caller saw a 500. Add a
helper to drop invitation_link, organization_membership, and team_membership
rows before the user delete (mirrors /user/delete in internal_user_endpoints).
Also add a Status column to the Virtual Keys and Internal Users tables so
admins can see at a glance which keys are blocked and which users SCIM has
deactivated. SCIM-blocked keys carry a tooltip explaining the origin.
Pin the dashboard's Node version to 20 via .nvmrc to match CI.
The previous per-provider guards in HuggingFace, Oobabooga, and Gemini
files lived in the SDK layer, breaking SDK callers who legitimately pass
URL-valued model identifiers. Move the check to the proxy boundary in
add_litellm_data_to_request so SDK users keep working while proxy users
default-deny URL-valued model and file_id, with admin opt-in via
litellm.provider_url_destination_allowed_hosts.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Conflict resolution for #26968 dropped the `Iterator` typing import
(NameError at module load), left a dead `fallback_models = cast(...)`
block, and the new tests called `_enforce_key_and_fallback_model_access`
without the now-required `request` kwarg.
Extend LITELLM_SUPPRESS_SPEND_LOG_TRACEBACKS to the failure callback so the
per-row Metadata pane in the UI no longer shows the stack trace when the
opt-in env var is set, matching the existing console-side suppression.
https://claude.ai/code/session_014dztoRbRnRvq54HL9EyHx6
Adds LITELLM_SUPPRESS_SPEND_LOG_TRACEBACKS env var. When set to true and the
proxy log level is INFO or above, spend-tracking error paths emit a single
ERROR line without the full traceback. Stack traces are preserved at DEBUG
and the Sentry / proxy_logging_obj.failure_handler path is unchanged.
The new spend_log_error helper is wired through the spend write hot path:
- DBSpendUpdateWriter (update_database, _update_*_db, batch upsert,
redis-commit fallbacks)
- _ProxyDBLogger._PROXY_track_cost_callback
- get_logging_payload exception path
- update_spend / update_daily_tag_spend / spend logs queue monitor
Resolves LIT-2704.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): re-validate user_id ownership after /user/info re-parses query
The route-level access check in `RouteChecks.non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check`
reads `request.query_params.get("user_id")`, which decodes literal `+` to
spaces. The endpoint then re-parses the raw query string with `urllib.unquote`
in `get_user_id_from_request` to preserve `+` characters (so plus-addressed
emails work as user_ids). Those two paths produce different ids: a caller
who registered a user_id containing a literal space could pass the route
check and then read another user's row by sending the encoded `+` form.
Add `_enforce_user_info_access` and call it after `_normalize_user_info_user_id`
returns the final id. Proxy admin / view-only admin still bypass; everyone
else must match the resolved user_id (or have no user_id, which falls back
to the caller's own id later in the handler).
Tests cover the admin bypass, owner-match path, and the cross-user lookup
that this change blocks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(proxy): apply user_info ownership check to PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY
`_enforce_user_info_access` was bypassing both PROXY_ADMIN and
PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY, but the upstream route check in
`RouteChecks.non_proxy_admin_allowed_routes_check` only treats
PROXY_ADMIN as a true admin for the `/user/info` route — view-only
admins go through the `user_id == valid_token.user_id` enforcement
along with regular users. Mirroring that asymmetry left the same
encoded-`+` bypass open for view-only admins whose user_id contains a
literal space.
Drop the PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY exemption so the post-decode re-check
matches the upstream rule. Update tests: a view-only admin must now
be blocked from cross-user lookups but still allowed to read their
own row.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
