* test: drop the cwd-relative sys.path.insert calls from the test suite
TQ003 stands at 1,077 across 1,058 files, and 1,015 of them are the same shape:
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath("../..")) and its deeper siblings. The
argument resolves against the working directory rather than the file, so from
the repo root, where every job runs pytest, it inserts the directory two levels
above the checkout. It has never pointed at litellm. The package is installed
into the environment anyway, which is what actually makes the import work, and
what the rule's message has said all along.
Removing them leaves 1,634 imports of sys and os with no remaining reference,
and those go too, except where another test module imports the name back out of
the file. The rest of TQ003 is 62 call sites that resolve against __file__ or a
variable, which are a different question and are left alone.
Collection is identical either way: 45,871 tests and the same 51 pre-existing
collection errors before and after, and ruff reports no new undefined name.
* test: drop the duplicate imports the sys.path sweep exposed to F811
* test(pre-call-utils): restore the os import the new bedrock tests need
Agent registry CRUD (/v1/agents*) sat in agent_routes, which feeds
llm_api_routes, so DISABLE_LLM_API_ENDPOINTS returned "LLM API routes are
disabled for this instance." for every Admin UI Agents tab call. Split the
group the same way MCP is split: agent_inference_routes stays on the data
plane, agent_management_routes joins management_routes, and agent_routes
remains their union for keys configured with allowed_routes=["agent_routes"].
Non-admin callers reached agent CRUD through llm_api_routes before, so the
management paths also join self_managed_routes and the llm_api_routes virtual
key carve-out; the handlers already scope reads by role and 403 non-admin
writes.
Both new groups are tuples, so check_route_access now takes a Sequence and
matches wildcards through a generator instead of materializing an
intermediate list on every call.
Introduce a single, typed caller identity that is resolved once at the auth
boundary and read by reference downstream, instead of being re-derived from a
50-field key object or rebuilt from request metadata.
What this adds (litellm/proxy/auth/resolvers/), organized by responsibility:
- Principal: a small, frozen, identity-only value type (user / organization /
teams / project / end-user / roles / scopes / network), with its sub-models
and the role mapping. No budget or policy state; those stay on the key object.
- DbIdentityStore: the auth flow's resolver, owning both halves of resolving a
caller. resolve_key does the one combined_view lookup (cache, then DB via the
shared lower-level helpers, then write-back) and returns the key object, which
still flows for budget / rate-limit / policy unchanged. principal_from_key
projects the identity slice of that key object into a Principal, issuing no
lookup. user_api_key_auth resolves every key through the store rather than
calling get_key_object directly; auth_checks.get_key_object stays as the legacy
entrypoint for its other callers until they migrate.
- network: the X-Forwarded-For / trusted-proxy CIDR primitives live here in one
place. trusted_proxy_utils now imports them rather than keeping a second copy.
At the seam, user_api_key_auth projects one per-request Principal off the
resolved key object and stamps the request network context onto it once
(X-Forwarded-For is trusted only when trusted_proxy_ranges is configured). It is
attached to request.state.principal for the downstream consumers later phases
add. The projection is additive and defensive: a failure never rejects an
already-authenticated request, and a missing principal must be treated as deny
by any future reader. The Principal is always identifiable (credential_ref and a
stable subject off the token), never anonymous.
This is additive and changes no behavior today; it is the identity foundation
the spend-attribution and authorization phases build on.
MCP server CRUD endpoints (/v1/mcp/server*) were bundled with MCP
tool-call / passthrough endpoints under llm_api_routes, so setting
DISABLE_LLM_API_ENDPOINTS=true on admin-only nodes also blocked the
Admin UI from listing, adding, or attaching MCP servers.
Separate mcp_inference_routes (data-plane, gated by
DISABLE_LLM_API_ENDPOINTS) from mcp_management_routes (control-plane,
gated by DISABLE_ADMIN_ENDPOINTS). Keep mcp_routes as a union for
backward compat with allowed_routes=["mcp_routes"] virtual key configs.
Upgrade is_management_route to pattern-aware matching so
/v1/mcp/server/{path:path} resolves for concrete IDs.
The error message for DISABLE_ADMIN_ENDPOINTS incorrectly said
"DISABLING LLM API ENDPOINTS is an Enterprise feature" instead of
"DISABLING ADMIN ENDPOINTS is an Enterprise feature".
This was a copy-paste bug from the is_llm_api_route_disabled() function.
Added regression tests to verify both error messages are correct.
* feat(route_checks.py): allow admin to disable proxy management endpoints on instance
useful for preventing multiple instances from doing admin actions
* docs(scaling_multiple_instances.md): add architecture doc on scaling multiple litellm instances
provide guidance on scaling proxy
* docs(scaling_multiple_instances.md): add doc on scaling across multiple regions for litellm
* fix(route_checks.py): allow disabling llm api endpoints on an instance
allows pure admin instance to exist
* refactor(enterprise/route_checks.py): refactor env var checks
* refactor: finish refactoring
* docs(control_plane_and_data_plane.md): refactor docs
* test: update tests
