* fix(model_armor): add skip_unscannable_attachments to allow reference-only attachments through
* fix(model_armor): wire skip_unscannable_attachments through guardrail config
* fix(model_armor): make max_file_attachments configurable and scan overflow instead of dropping
* fix(model_armor): remove the per-request attachment count cap and scan all attachments
---------
Co-authored-by: yucheng <yucheng@berri.ai>
(cherry picked from commit 0d7b0f708b)
* fix(anthropic/passthrough): drop temperature and cap thinking budget when downgrading adaptive thinking for pre-4.6 models
* test(anthropic/passthrough): use sufficient max_tokens for reasoning_effort thinking mapping
* fix(anthropic/passthrough): drop incompatible temperature when downgrading adaptive thinking for pre-4.6 models
Narrow the fix to the temperature reconciliation; the reasoning_effort
budget cap is reverted because the live translation grid relies on
budget_tokens >= max_tokens to reject unsupported effort tiers
(xhigh/max) on budget-mode models, so capping turned those 400s into
200s.
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 71dffc1e9a)
* fix(utils): resolve bedrock regional inference profiles to regional pricing in get_model_info (LIT-4056) (#32389)
* fix(utils): resolve bedrock regional inference profiles to regional pricing in get_model_info (LIT-4056)
* test(register_model): use a triple provider prefix as the unresolvable-key fixture
get_model_info now resolves bedrock/bedrock/... like a routing prefix, so the
double-prefix fixture stopped exercising the register_model fallback path.
Lock the new double-prefix resolution in as a model-info regression test
(cherry picked from commit 734fd29e00)
* fix(guardrails): walk Responses-API text taxonomy in shared content helpers (#32542)
* fix(guardrails): walk Responses-API text taxonomy in shared content helpers
Every guardrail sharing litellm/proxy/guardrails/_content_utils.py silently
drops all text on the /v1/responses path. AIM turns it into a loud 422 (
{"error":"No messages in the request"}); every other guardrail (Lakera v2,
Cato, Lasso, Repello, IBM, Azure Content Safety, enterprise secret
detection) scans an empty payload and lets the request through unscanned.
Three defects, all in _content_utils.py:
1. _iter_text_parts_in_content recognised only part.type == "text", but the
Responses API uses input_text (request) and output_text (assistant).
2. _coerce_input_to_messages gated on "every item has a role key"; any
Responses input list containing a function_call or function_call_output
item failed the check and was wrapped as one opaque blob.
3. build_inspection_messages forwarded any role through, including a bare
tool role missing tool_call_id, which validators like AIM's /fw/v1/analyze
reject with a schema error.
Fix walks the actual Responses item taxonomy (message, function_call,
function_call_output, bare content parts and strings), recognises
{text, input_text, output_text} everywhere, and coerces any role outside
{system, user, assistant} to user in the outbound inspection payload.
* style: ruff-format changed guardrail files
* test(guardrails): cover function_call_output string form; drop em-dash in new docstring
* fix(guardrails): map function_call_output straight to user role
Avoids ever materialising a schema-invalid bare tool message. The
downstream role-safety coercion in build_inspection_messages still
guards genuinely caller-supplied non-standard roles (developer,
function, custom values); add a regression test covering that path
so the coercion has real coverage after this simplification.
* test(guardrails): pin chat-completions tool-role coercion in build_inspection_messages
* docs(test): soften AIM-specific claims in LIT-4294 test docstrings
Ryan's review flagged that several test docstrings assert AIM's
/fw/v1/analyze validates + rejects specific schema violations. That
behavior is customer-reported in the LIT-4294 writeup, not directly
verified by us. Rephrase to attribute the AIM 422 to the customer's
writeup and describe the underlying constraint as the OpenAI chat
schema; any downstream API that validates against that schema rejects
the same shape.
* refactor(guardrails): move unsupported-role coercion into AIM only
The generic coercion in build_inspection_messages collapsed any role
outside {system, user, assistant} to user for every caller of the
helper. Combined with the pre-existing apply_redacted_messages_back
write-back behavior in Lakera/AIM/Cato, that turned a loud OpenAI 400
on chat-completions tool-message masking into a silent semantic
corruption of the outbound request (role tool with tool_call_id got
rewritten to bare role user, dropping the assistant + tool_calls
sibling).
AIM specifically requires the coercion because its /fw/v1/analyze
validates the payload against the OpenAI chat schema; other guardrails
either do not validate roles or do their own reconstruction. Move the
coercion to AimGuardrail._build_aim_inspection_messages so the shared
helper keeps caller roles intact and no new cross-guardrail role
corruption is introduced. The pre-existing apply_redacted_messages_back
structural flatten remains as separate follow-up work.
function_call_output items still synthesise role user in the shared
helper because they have no natural role field, which is a different
concern from coercing a caller-supplied role.
* refactor(guardrails): preserve role fidelity in shared _content_utils
Shared inspection helpers should extract text and preserve semantic
role signals; role coercion for third-party schema safety stays inside
the guardrail that needs it (AIM).
Three shared-helper changes:
- Bare content-part dicts (input_text/output_text) with an explicit role
keep it; only role-less parts default to user.
- Responses message items already had their role preserved; the
behavior is now covered by an explicit test.
- function_call_output items default to role tool (semantic equivalent
of the chat-completions tool message shape) instead of role user, so
Responses and chat completions produce symmetric inspection payloads.
A caller-supplied role on the item is still preserved.
AIM's schema-safe coercion in _build_aim_inspection_messages already
handles the resulting role tool: it collapses to user before the POST
to /fw/v1/analyze so AIM's OpenAI-schema validator does not reject the
bare tool message (no tool_call_id can survive the flatten). Added a
regression test in test_aim.py covering that path.
(cherry picked from commit e84a19acd5)
* feat: add Meta Model API provider and muse-spark-1.1 (day-0) (#32701)
(cherry picked from commit d82645d163)
* fix(bedrock): keep mid-conversation system messages in place for Claude Invoke (#32578)
Hoisting every role system entry into the top-level system field mutates
the cache prefix whenever a client such as Claude Code appends a new
mid-conversation system message, invalidating the prompt cache for the
entire message history on Bedrock Invoke. Bedrock only rejects a system
entry at messages.0, so hoist just the leading run and forward the rest
in place
(cherry picked from commit cc36d5469c)
* feat(otel): emit the gen_ai.client.operation.exception event on failed LLM calls (#32655)
* feat(otel): emit the gen_ai.client.operation.exception event on failed LLM calls
The GenAI semantic conventions record failures of a GenAI client operation as
a log-based event named gen_ai.client.operation.exception, carrying the
exception.type / exception.message / exception.stacktrace trio at severity
WARN and correlated to the failed span. OTel v2 never emitted it: a failed LLM
call produced only the deprecated error.* span attributes, a generic exception
span event without a stacktrace, and the stacktrace under the vendor key
litellm.provider.error.stack_trace.
Build the logs pipeline (LoggerProvider + console/OTLP log exporters mirroring
the metrics plumbing) and record the event behind the enable_events flag, which
until now was defined but consumed nowhere. An operator-configured LoggerProvider
global is reused so the events ride their existing logs pipeline; an explicit
NoOpLoggerProvider global is honored as an opt-out and builds no recorder at all.
The existing span-side error surface (error.type, error.message, the exception
span event, and the litellm.provider.error.* detail keys) is untouched for
backwards compatibility.
* fix(otel): always ride the semconv-required exception pair on the GenAI event
Filtering the event attributes on truthiness conflated "absent" with "empty",
so an empty exception.type or exception.message would have been dropped, leaving
an event with neither semconv-required field. Build the attributes so the pair is
unconditional and only the recommended stacktrace is omitted when the payload
carries none.
* docs(otel): document the events plumbing module in the package README
* test(otel): cover the log exporter selection and logs endpoint normalization
The new logs plumbing had no coverage for exporter-kind selection, the
console fallback for an unrecognized kind, the /v1/logs signal-path rewriting
that lets one OTEL_ENDPOINT serve every signal, or the simple-vs-batch
processor split.
(cherry picked from commit 99b4c5ed3e)
* fix(bedrock): gate in-place system role messages on model support for Claude Invoke (#32831)
* fix(bedrock): gate in-place system role messages on model support for Claude Invoke
* feat(bedrock): default unmapped Claude 4.8+ to in-place system role handling via fallback rule
(cherry picked from commit 5e23a5ab05)
* fix(anthropic): translate adaptive thinking/effort to pre-4.6 model support (#32867)
* fix(anthropic): translate adaptive thinking/effort to pre-4.6 model support
AnthropicMessagesConfig now reshapes the 4.6+ adaptive-thinking interface
(thinking:{type:adaptive} + output_config:{effort:...}) to whatever the routed
model supports. Thinking-capable non-adaptive models (e.g. Haiku 4.5, Sonnet 4.5)
get the effort translated to a legacy thinking budget_tokens. Models with no
reasoning support have thinking/effort dropped under drop_params. And because
adaptive thinking carries no budget while the legacy form must satisfy Anthropic's
max_tokens > budget_tokens rule, the translated budget is capped below max_tokens,
dropping thinking when max_tokens can't fit the minimum budget. 4.6+ models pass
through untouched.
This matters because clients like Claude Code speak native Anthropic /v1/messages
and send the adaptive interface unconditionally, regardless of the routed model.
The native passthrough previously only capability-gated the OpenAI-style
reasoning_effort alias and forwarded native output_config/adaptive thinking raw, so
a pre-4.6 model rejected it with "This model does not support the effort parameter"
and the request failed. Claude Code already gets drop_params auto-set, so its
requests now succeed.
* test(anthropic): gate undersized-max_tokens thinking drop on drop_params; add edge tests
Addresses review feedback on the max_tokens-too-small branch. Previously a
thinking-capable model whose max_tokens could not fit the minimum thinking budget
had thinking silently dropped regardless of drop_params, while a residual
output_config field in the same call still raised when drop_params was off. Gate
both consistently on drop_params: raise a clear error (naming max_tokens for the
undersized case) when drop_params is off, drop otherwise. Claude Code gets
drop_params auto-set, so it still succeeds.
Adds tests for the undersized-max_tokens raise, the residual output_config raise,
and the no-adaptive-interface passthrough on a non-adaptive model.
* fix(anthropic): make adaptive-effort translation silent to avoid breaking provider strip contracts
The previous raise-when-not-drop_params behavior broke existing bedrock and vertex
messages tests: those providers already silently strip unsupported output_config
for pre-4.6 models (issue #22797) with no drop_params required, and the shared
parent transform raising pre-empted that. It also conflicted with the goal of
keeping requests working rather than failing them.
Make the reshape silent: translate effort to legacy thinking for thinking-capable
models, drop thinking for non-reasoning models, and remove only the consumed effort
key from output_config, leaving any residual (e.g. format) for provider subclasses
(bedrock/vertex) to handle. No raise, no drop_params gating. This also resolves the
review note about inconsistent drop_params handling by making every path uniform.
Updates the tests to assert the silent behavior and residual output_config
preservation.
* fix(anthropic): handle output_config-capable but non-adaptive models (Opus 4.5)
Greptile caught a real bug: the early-return guard treated supports_output_config
as equivalent to supporting adaptive thinking. Claude Opus 4.5 advertises
supports_output_config (it accepts output_config.effort) but is not adaptive, so it
rejects thinking:{type:adaptive} with "adaptive thinking is not supported on this
model". The guard early-returned for Opus 4.5 and forwarded the adaptive thinking
block raw, reproducing the exact failure the fix is meant to prevent.
thinking:{type:adaptive} and output_config.effort are independent capabilities.
Only early-return for adaptive-thinking models. For a model that supports
output_config.effort but is not adaptive, keep the native effort and drop only the
unsupported adaptive thinking block. Verified live against Opus 4.5: the Claude Code
payload now returns 200 instead of 400.
Adds regression tests for Opus 4.5 with and without adaptive thinking.
* fix(anthropic): translate adaptive thinking for effort-capable pre-4.6 models
Claude Opus 4.5 advertises supports_output_config but not adaptive thinking,
so the early-return guard forwarded thinking.type=adaptive raw and Anthropic
rejected it. The guard now only skips true adaptive models; effort-only
requests on effort-capable models still pass through untouched. The
_map_reasoning_effort call is wrapped to surface unrecognized effort values
as a clean 400, matching _translate_reasoning_effort_to_anthropic
* fix(anthropic): fall back to legacy thinking when effort level unsupported
Opus 4.5 accepts output_config.effort but only low/medium/high; Claude Code
defaults to xhigh on newer models, so preserving that level raw gets rejected
by Anthropic. Gate the native-effort passthrough on _validate_effort_for_model
and fall through to the budget translation for unsupported levels
* fix(anthropic): keep effort-only requests untouched for provider normalization
The xhigh fall-through consumed effort-only requests on effort-capable
models, breaking bedrock invoke's own normalization which clamps xhigh to
the model's ceiling after the base transform runs
(test_bedrock_messages_normalizes_output_config_effort_for_opus). Restrict
the fall-through to requests that carry adaptive thinking; effort-only
requests pass through so provider subclasses keep owning level clamping
---------
Co-authored-by: Abhimanyu Kapur <38531241+akapur99@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3a62e5428f)
* fix(bedrock): flag mapped Claude 4.8+ entries with supports_mid_conversation_system (#32882)
Exact cost-map hits resolve before fallback-generalization rules, so the
mapped Sonnet 5, Fable 5 and jp Opus 4.8 Bedrock entries bypassed the
bedrock-anthropic-claude-mid-conversation-system rule and hoisted
mid-conversation system messages, invalidating the prompt cache.
(cherry picked from commit c15891fc98)
* Merge pull request #32873 from BerriAI/litellm_fallback_rules_routing_split
refactor(fallback-generalizations): split rules into routing and provider-neutral capability kinds
(cherry picked from commit 45d3644408)
* Merge pull request #32874 from BerriAI/litellm_thread_provider_capability_probes
fix(anthropic): thread real provider through capability probes instead of pinning anthropic
(cherry picked from commit ead7ad3804)
* test: add /v1/messages to supported_endpoints schema enum (#32739)
(cherry picked from commit bf02a4a47f)
---------
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: yucheng-berri <yucheng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: devin-ai-integration[bot] <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Yassin Kortam <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Abhimanyu Kapur <38531241+akapur99@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: tin-berri <tin@berri.ai>
The v2 emitter has never stamped error.message / error.code /
error.stack_trace / error.llm_provider as span attributes; only error.type
reached the wire. Backends that flatten span attributes into label
indexes (Elastic APM labels.error_*, Datadog span tags) lost these
four fields when v2 became the active integration on v1.90+ for
otel_v2-flagged deployments. The pre-existing exception span event
carrying the full message (LIT-3758) is unchanged; the message now
rides both places at once, matching v1s shape.
SpanError grows three optional detail fields; _parse_error threads
them from StandardLoggingPayloadErrorInformation; the emitters error
branch stamps them via a new module-level helper, guarded per field so
guardrail-shape errors are not polluted with empty attributes. New
semconv constants mirror open_inference.ErrorAttributes byte-for-byte,
so v1 and v2 consumers read the same keys.
Regression tests extend the mapped test files under
tests/test_litellm/integrations/otel/. pytest reports 243 passed.
(cherry picked from commit 85d1fe6e2a)
* feat(prometheus): add api_provider label to token, latency, request and cache metrics
The token (input/output/total), latency (llm_api, time_to_first_token,
request_total, request_queue_time), proxy request (total/failed) and cache
metrics were emitted from the same call sites as litellm_spend_metric and
litellm_requests_metric, which already carry api_provider, yet these were
missing it. That left no way to break tokens, latency, request counts or cache
hits down by upstream provider even though the provider is already on the
payload as custom_llm_provider.
Add api_provider to each metric's label allow-list. The success path already
populates enum_values.api_provider from standard_logging_payload, so those
metrics emit it with no further plumbing. The cache label is added to the
shared _cache_metric_labels list, so alongside litellm_cache_hits_metric and
litellm_cache_misses_metric it also covers litellm_cached_tokens_metric and the
provider prompt-cache read/creation token metrics; the label-presence test
asserts all of them. For the client-side failure path, where a deployment may
not have been resolved, derive it best-effort from
litellm_params.custom_llm_provider, a partial standard_logging_object, or
inference from the requested model name via litellm.get_llm_provider, falling
back to empty rather than guessing.
Resolves LIT-4178
* fix(prometheus): satisfy ruff BLE001 budget and update enterprise label assertions
- Suppress the strict-rule BLE001 budget breach with a justified noqa;
the broad except in the failure-path provider extraction is
intentional defense-in-depth (covered by
test_extract_api_provider_swallows_unknown_model_but_logs_unexpected_errors),
not dead code to delete
- Update tests/enterprise assertions for litellm_tokens_metric,
litellm_input_tokens_metric, litellm_output_tokens_metric, the three
latency metrics, and the proxy request counters to expect the new
api_provider label, matching what litellm_mapped_enterprise_tests
caught in CI
---------
Co-authored-by: Shivi Jain <mobile.350017@gmail.com>
chunk_processor now reads response.status_code to gate end-of-stream
success logging. These mocks used AsyncMock(spec=httpx.Response), which
spec's against the class and doesn't expose status_code since it's an
instance attribute, not a class attribute, so accessing it raised
AttributeError. Sets status_code=200 explicitly on the success-path mocks.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(proxy): keep serving reads from the read replica when the primary DB is down at startup
RoutingPrismaWrapper.connect() connected the writer first and let a writer
failure propagate, so a proxy that started during a primary outage ended up
with no Prisma client at all (startup swallows the error under
allow_requests_on_db_unavailable): DB-stored models never loaded and every
inference request failed with 400 Invalid model name, even with a healthy
DATABASE_URL_READ_REPLICA. Workers recycled via MAX_REQUESTS_BEFORE_RESTART
hit this mid-outage and stayed broken for the rest of the outage.
connect() now degrades on a writer-only failure: reads (key auth, DB-stored
model loads) are served by the reader, writes fail at call time, and the DB
health watchdog keeps retrying the writer reconnect, which clears the
degraded flag once the primary recovers. A full outage (both sides down)
still raises as before.
Resolves LIT-4159
* fix(proxy): clear degraded-writer flag when the reconnect probe finds the writer already healthy
The direct-reconnect path returns early when the writer probe succeeds
(engine already reconnected by another path, e.g. an IAM token refresh),
skipping recreate_prisma_client, which was the only runtime path clearing
_writer_unavailable. The stale flag made the watchdog fire reconnect
attempts against a healthy writer on every cooldown cycle until restart.
Clear the flag in the early-return branch and cover it with a regression
test that fails without the change
Two bugs from the upstream-error fixes: the success handler has no
status-code awareness, so removing raise_for_status() left it firing for
every upstream 4xx/5xx too, meaning the new failure hook and the existing
success handler both logged the same request (corrupting SpendLogs/cost
tracking). Separately, the failure hook was passed the raw
httpx.HTTPStatusError, which ProxyLogging's alerting only excludes
HTTPException/ProxyException from, so a normal upstream 403 would trigger a
"High" severity llm_exceptions alert. Gates the success handler (both
non-streaming and end-of-stream) to status_code < 400, and reports upstream
failures to post_call_failure_hook as an HTTPException instead of the raw
httpx error, matching how auth/rate-limit errors are already excluded from
alerting.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Pass transcription_cost through additional_costs so cost_breakdown's
input_cost + output_cost + additional_costs sums to total_cost instead
of silently folding it into total_cost only.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(anthropic): require caller api_key and SSRF-validate api_base in advisor tool
The advisor_20260301 interceptor honored a caller-supplied api_base once
allow_client_side_credentials was enabled, even without a caller-supplied
api_key. AnthropicModelInfo.get_auth_header() then fell back to the proxy's
own ANTHROPIC_API_KEY/ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN, so the server's real credentials
plus the conversation history got sent to a caller-chosen destination
_resolve_advisor_credentials() now only honors api_base alongside a
non-empty caller-supplied api_key, requires the https scheme, and validates
api_base via validate_url() before use, mirroring check_complete_credentials
in auth_utils.py. https is required because validate_url only DNS-pins the
connection for http; for https with TLS verification on it returns the URL
unchanged and relies on certificate validation to block DNS rebinding
* fix(anthropic): also reject advisor api_base when ssl_verify is disabled
validate_url only DNS-pins the connection for http, or for https with
litellm.ssl_verify disabled; the previous https-only check missed the
ssl_verify=False case, where validate_url's rewritten URL was still being
discarded, per Greptile's review of this PR. Reject api_base outright when
ssl_verify is False so the discarded rewrite can no longer matter
* fix(policies): reject non-existent team/key/model scope entries on attachment create
Creating a policy attachment accepted arbitrary team, key, and model values with
no validation, so a typo'd or non-existent team was silently persisted (LIT-4199).
The create endpoint now rejects a concrete (non-wildcard) team, key, or model that
does not resolve to a real entity, wiring the previously-dead PolicyValidator
existence checks and reusing RouteChecks._is_wildcard_pattern so validation agrees
with request-time matching, where only a trailing "*" is a wildcard. Wildcard
patterns are still allowed through since they may match zero entities today and
more later, and tags stay free-form. The Admin UI's Teams field validates the same
rule for immediate feedback when its team list has loaded, deferring to the backend
otherwise.
* style(policies): use builtin list generics and | None in scope validator
Keeps the new find_invalid_scope_entries signature off the UP006/UP045 strict
ruff budgets instead of copying the surrounding legacy typing.List/Optional idiom.
* fix(policies): separate multiple attachment scope errors with ' | '
Addresses Greptile review: joining per-entry validation messages with a bare
space read as one run-on sentence; ' | ' makes the multi-error 400 detail easier
to parse for users and programmatically.
Follow-up to 8c9878025e: returning upstream 4xx/5xx bodies unchanged also
skipped post_call_failure_hook entirely, so spend-tracking and alerting
callbacks never fired for upstream errors, and response_body was hardcoded
to None in the log payload so the actual upstream error body never reached
logging integrations. Adds a small helper that calls post_call_failure_hook
for upstream errors without altering the client-facing response, and parses
response_body unconditionally for logging while still scoping guardrails
and managed-id rewriting to status_code < 400.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Generic pass-through endpoints called raise_for_status() on upstream 4xx/5xx
responses and re-raised as HTTPException, which the outer handler reshaped
into a ProxyException with the upstream body stringified into error.message.
Success responses were already forwarded as-is, so failures were the only
case where passthrough wasn't actually transparent. Removes the
raise_for_status() calls for both streaming and non-streaming passthrough so
upstream status, body, and headers reach the client unchanged, while keeping
guardrails/managed-id rewriting scoped to successful responses and leaving
internal proxy failures (auth, config, network errors before any upstream
response) on the existing ProxyException path.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
MCPEnhancedStreamingIterator only auto-executed one round of MCP tool calls.
When a model retried a tool (e.g. after an error) in its follow-up turn, that
second tool call was streamed but never executed, and the response ended with
no final text. Route follow-up calls back through the same completion-check
phase as the initial response, so further tool-call rounds are handled the
same way, capped at MAX_MCP_TOOL_CALL_ROUNDS to avoid an unbounded loop.
* feat(mcp): discover the OBO token endpoint via RFC 9728 to RFC 8414 (no IdP guessing)
An oauth2_token_exchange server can now have its token endpoint discovered the
same way the oauth2 (authorization_code) flow already does, instead of always
requiring token_exchange_endpoint/token_url to be configured by hand. The
existing _descovery_metadata chain (RFC 9728 protected-resource metadata ->
RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata -> token_endpoint, SSRF-guarded via
async_safe_get) is reused; both the config-load and DB-build paths gate on a new
_obo_needs_endpoint_discovery so discovery runs only when no endpoint is
configured, and an explicitly configured endpoint still wins and skips the
round-trip. The discovered token endpoint lands on token_url, which
_token_exchange_spec already reads, so no resolver change is needed.
_resolve_oauth2_flow returns None for any non-oauth2 auth_type, so a discovered
token_url on an OBO server is never mis-inferred as the M2M client_credentials
flow.
Discovery for OBO is authoritative only: the resolution order is explicitly
configured endpoint, then RFC 9728 -> RFC 8414 advertisement, then fail closed
(412, on the parent commit). The gateway never guesses the IdP. _descovery_metadata
grows an allow_origin_fallback flag, kept True for the browser oauth2 flow (a
human sees the redirect) but set False for token_exchange so the last-resort
guess that treats the resource server's own origin as its authorization server
is skipped; a subject token is never exchanged against an inferred endpoint.
* fix(mcp): surface a failed OBO exchange at connect instead of an empty tool list
A token_exchange server whose exchange fails with a subject present used to open the MCP
session anyway and mask the failure as an empty tools/list. Single-server routes now run
the exchange preemptively at the transport edge, where a rejected subject raises the RFC
9728 challenge and a gateway fault its public status; the multi-server aggregate keeps
absorbing per-server auth failures. The exchanger caches the preflight result, so the
session's list/call reuses it with no extra IdP round-trip. Discovery now also debug-logs
the authorization server's advertised issuer, grant types, and client auth methods
* fix(mcp): persist the discovered OBO token endpoint to the DB row
A DB-backed oauth2_token_exchange server with no configured endpoint had its token_url
resolved via RFC 9728 -> RFC 8414 only on the in-memory object returned from
build_mcp_server_from_table; the row kept token_url=None, so every rebuild re-ran discovery
and a transient upstream outage during a rebuild left the server with no endpoint until the
next successful discovery. Write the discovered token_url back onto the row so the guard sees
it on the next build. Best-effort and scoped to DB servers: config servers already persist
in-memory, and the write-back never fires from a user connect (only from add/update/reload,
all admin or system driven). Adds DB-path coverage for discovery firing when unset, skipping
when the credentials endpoint is configured, the write-back, and its negative guards
* Revert "fix(auth): deny model access for teamless keys with all-team-models (#32022)"
This reverts commit dfbbda4f19.
* revert: undo teamless all-team-models denial from PR #29746
Reverts the team_id guard in _resolve_key_models_for_auth_check and
get_key_models so teamless keys with all-team-models resolve to []
(unrestricted = all proxy models) rather than being denied.
Adds hardened regression tests across listing (get_key_models), inference
(_enforce_key_and_fallback_model_access, can_key_call_model,
can_key_call_resolved_model), and batch (_enforce_batch_file_model_access)
paths that enforce teamless all-team-models == all-proxy-models and will
fail if anyone re-introduces a team_id guard
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore: retrigger checks
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: mateo <mateo@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
The Router's async fallback orchestrator appended fallback structures
(fallback_model_group, fallbacks, context_window_fallbacks,
content_policy_fallbacks) and the inner fallback exception onto
original_exception.message before re-raising. That message is forwarded
verbatim by the proxy as ProxyException.message. When fallbacks are
configured as inline deployment dicts, the raw provider api_key /
aws_secret_access_key inside those dicts reached any authenticated
caller in the response body.
Route the fallback structures through a new mask_sensitive_structure
helper (reuses the existing SensitiveDataMasker), and wrap the inner
fallback exception string in the existing redact_string. Topology names
still render for debugging under the existing expose_router_debug_in_errors
opt-in; only credential values inside inline-dict fallbacks are masked.
The router's own verbose_router_logger calls that embedded the same
structures are updated alongside, so log output stays consistent with the
exception message.
Verified end-to-end against a real proxy hitting OpenAI: before, the
client response body contained the raw fallback api_key; after, with the
flag on, the api_key value is masked to a 4-char prefix while topology
names are still visible for the operator
* fix(anthropic): preserve 1h cache-creation TTL breakdown across streaming usage chunks
Anthropic emits the cache-creation TTL breakdown (ephemeral 5m/1h split) only on
the message_start SSE event; the later message_delta carries the flat
cache_creation_input_tokens count but drops the nested cache_creation object.
ChunkProcessor aggregates prompt_tokens_details last-wins, so message_delta's
details (with cache_creation_token_details=None) clobbered the breakdown captured
from message_start. Cost calc then fell into the flat-rate branch of
calculate_cache_writing_cost and billed 1-hour cache writes at the 5-minute rate,
undercounting the cache-creation cost component by ~37.5% on streaming requests.
Track cache_creation_token_details with the same non-null-wins semantics already
used for the flat cache counts and stitch it back onto the final
prompt_tokens_details when the last chunk lacks it. Non-streaming was unaffected
because its usage is parsed once from the full response body.
* refactor(streaming): extract cache-creation breakdown helpers to stay within strict complexity budget
* test(streaming): cover final-chunk cache-creation breakdown path
---------
Co-authored-by: Richard Warburton <Richard.Warburton@theaccessgroup.com>
* feat(mcp): thread the caller token into tools/list discovery for token_exchange
A token_exchange (OBO) server's tools could not be discovered through the aggregator: the list path
never threaded the caller's token, so every tools/list hit the no-subject branch. v1 masked this with
its client_credentials fallback (discovery used a service token); v2 dropped that fallback, so listing
had no credential and the OBO server's tools never appeared - and an MCP client lists before it calls.
Thread the inbound subject_token into the list path the same way the call path does, gated on
auth_type oauth2_token_exchange so the caller's bearer never leaks into other modes:
_get_tools_from_server takes an oauth2_headers param, extracts the token via _extract_bearer_token, and
passes it to _create_mcp_client; server.py forwards oauth2_headers at the list call site.
authorization_code (resolves off identity plus stored token), the static/config modes, and the
background registry refresh are unaffected, and the list path's existing graceful degradation
(catch -> empty list) is preserved.
* fix(mcp): harden token_exchange OBO from the audit (strip, TTL/expires_in, subject_token_type)
- _should_strip_caller_authorization returns True for oauth2_token_exchange, so the inbound subject
token is never forwarded upstream raw - only the IdP-exchanged token is (matches authorization_code).
- _parse_expires_in accepts a JSON float / numeric-string expires_in, and _ttl_seconds caps the cache
TTL at the token's real remaining lifetime so a short-lived exchanged token is never served stale.
- to_server_spec normalizes a falsy subject_token_type to the default URN, parity with v1.
The subject/key disambiguation (never exchange the LiteLLM key; Authorization: Bearer <litellm-key>
support for /mcp) is intentionally a separate cross-cutting PR off staging, not part of this OBO work.
* fix(mcp): stop caller header bypassing OBO exchange; thread subject into prompts/resources
The per-server x-mcp-* override guard in _create_mcp_client only kept the v2 spec
for authorization_code, so a caller-supplied header silently disabled the RFC 8693
exchange on a token_exchange server and forwarded the raw bearer upstream. Extend
the guard to token_exchange so the exchange always runs and the caller cannot
substitute an arbitrary upstream credential.
prompts/list+get, resources/list+read, and resource-templates/list never threaded
the OBO subject token, so those operations failed closed (401 / empty) on a
token_exchange server. Thread the caller's bearer as the subject for those paths
too, gated on the token_exchange mode via a shared _obo_subject_token helper.
* fix(mcp): keep the OBO/authz_code resolver credential authoritative; centralize OpenAPI strip
A guardrail (e.g. MCPJWTSigner), static_headers, or any other injected Authorization could
shadow the resolver-owned credential for token_exchange / authorization_code servers, so the
upstream would receive e.g. the signer's JWT instead of the exchanged token and reject it. In
_create_mcp_client the resolver-owned credential now wins: a conflicting header is dropped and
the minted/stored token reaches upstream. No behavior change for none/passthrough/static modes,
where an injected Authorization still wins as before.
The OpenAPI/local _request_extra_headers forwarder gated its Authorization strip on
has_client_credentials only, so an OpenAPI-backed token_exchange server with
extra_headers:[Authorization] forwarded the raw subject token upstream and never exchanged. It
now uses the centralized _should_strip_caller_authorization so it matches the managed paths.
* feat(mcp): RFC 9728 challenge for token_exchange (OBO) unauthorized
OBO previously returned an opaque 401 (Bearer error="invalid_request") with no discovery
info, and any IdP exchange failure collapsed to a retryable 503. Now an OBO server behaves like
a standards-compliant OAuth resource server:
- A missing/rejected subject token returns the RFC 9728 / RFC 6750 challenge: 401 +
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="...", error="invalid_token", so a spec-compliant
MCP client can discover the IdP, SSO, and retry with a fresh subject token.
- The protected-resource metadata for a token_exchange server advertises the JWT-auth issuer(s)
(JWT_ISSUER / litellm_jwtauth.issuers) as authorization_servers -- the IdP that issues and
validates the subject -- instead of the gateway.
- An IdP 4xx (subject rejected) is now a non-retryable 401 (the challenge) instead of a 503, so a
caller with a dead token re-authenticates rather than looping; 5xx/transport stays retryable 503.
* fix(mcp): emit the OBO RFC 9728 challenge preemptively so a no-subject client can discover the IdP
A token_exchange server's tools are not discoverable without a subject token (list is lenient ->
empty), and a tool-call-time 401 is wrapped into a JSON-RPC error so the WWW-Authenticate header is
lost. So a cold-start client never saw the challenge and could not start discovery. Add a
token_exchange branch to the preemptive-401: a no-subject connect to an OBO server now returns
401 + WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata=..., error="invalid_token" at the transport level,
so a spec-compliant client discovers the IdP (the PRM advertises the JWT-auth issuer), SSOs, and
retries with a subject token. Verified live on the per-server endpoint; the with-subject connect
still proceeds (no challenge).
(Also formats two lines from earlier commits in this stack.)
* refactor(mcp): inject root_path into the OBO/OAuth challenge edge
The adapter's raise_user_oauth_challenge and raise_token_exchange_challenge
reached into os.getenv("SERVER_ROOT_PATH") via get_server_root_path(), a
hidden ambient read in a module that is meant to be a pure edge. That coupling
made the preemptive-challenge test order-dependent under xdist: a sibling test
sets SERVER_ROOT_PATH at import without cleanup, leaking the prefix into the
challenge URL and failing the exact-match assertion.
Resolve the root path at the imperative-shell call sites and pass it in
keyword-only, so both challenge builders become pure functions of their inputs.
Extract the shared resource_metadata path construction into a single
oauth_protected_resource_path helper, collapsing the duplicated prefix/name
logic the two functions carried.
Also reduce _create_mcp_client below the strict complexity ceiling by extracting
the v2 credential resolution into _resolve_v2_auth, and extract the OBO
protected-resource-metadata branch into _obo_protected_resource_response (which
shipped without coverage) so discovery can be unit-tested directly.
Tests are now hermetic: the adapter tests pass root_path as a real input rather
than monkeypatching the environment, the stale-session preemptive test asserts
structural invariants instead of the exact prefixed URL, and five new tests
cover the OBO PRM issuer branch end to end.
* feat(mcp): OBO cache-key tenant isolation, reactive 401 retry, v1-parity logs
From a pass over the OBO behavior contract. Three changes to the
token_exchange arm, none of which alters any other auth mode.
The exchanged-token cache key now folds in the caller's tenant alongside
the subject token and exchange config, so two tenants presenting the same
opaque token can never share a cache entry; cross-tenant isolation is
structural rather than incidental to subject-token uniqueness. tenant_id is
threaded from the resolver's Subject; it is keyword-only with an empty
default so the no-tenant case and the existing call sites are unchanged.
The tool-call path gains one reactive retry. When an upstream rejects the
injected token with a 401/403, the gateway invalidates the cached exchange,
re-mints once through the IdP by rebuilding the client, and retries the call
exactly once before surfacing the upstream error, so a token revoked or
rotated upstream mid-TTL self-heals without an infinite loop. It is gated
strictly to oauth2_token_exchange; passthrough, authorization_code,
client_credentials, api_key, and none keep their single-call behavior.
MCPClient.call_tool gains a raise_on_error flag (mirroring list_tools) so
the path can tell an upstream 401 apart from an ordinary tool error and
avoid re-running a non-idempotent tool on a non-auth failure.
The exchanger also emits the v1-parity log lines it had dropped (attempt
with server, endpoint and audience; success; cache hit), while never
logging the form, subject token, secret, or minted token.
* fix(mcp): fail closed with 412 when a token_exchange server has no endpoint
A true token_exchange (OBO) server must use only an explicitly configured
token endpoint; it must never guess an IdP or silently fall back to a weaker
source. Previously an OBO server with client credentials but no
token_exchange_endpoint/token_url deferred to v1, which no-op'd and let the
request connect to the upstream with no credential (an upstream 401 rather
than a clear gateway error).
Now such a server is owned by the v2 arm: _token_exchange_spec builds the spec
even when the endpoint is absent, and the exchanger fails closed with a
precondition_required error that maps to HTTP 412 before any upstream or IdP
call, with the caller's subject token never sent anywhere. A missing
client_id/secret still maps to misconfigured (500); a present-but-rejected
subject still maps to 401; an unreachable IdP still maps to 503. The no-subject
case keeps its existing 401 RFC 9728 challenge.
* feat(mcp): log a refused non-Bearer token_type in the OBO exchange
* fix(mcp): surface OBO/authorization_code list-time 401 as a challenge instead of masking it
* feat(mcp): classify RFC 6749 gateway-fault token-exchange errors as 500, not a caller 401
* test(mcp): absorb fixture uses 500 now that 401/403 are challenge-class at list time
* style(mcp): PEP 604 union in the OBO retry signature to keep the UP007 budget flat
* feat(mcp): v2-native RFC 8693 token exchanger for the token_exchange mode
Adds the pure Rfc8693TokenExchanger plus its composition root: the OBO exchange POSTs the
RFC 8693 grant through an injected HTTP edge and returns the upstream-bound token as a typed
Result, caching and single-flighting per (subject_token, server) so a repeated caller token
skips the IdP round-trip. The audience is carried on TokenExchangeConfig and sent only when the
operator set one, matching the spec default behavior. Errors are values: a missing endpoint or
client credential is misconfigured, an IdP that returns no usable token is upstream_unavailable.
* feat(mcp): migrate the token_exchange arm to the v2 resolve_credentials
Routes RFC 8693 OBO servers through the v2 resolver: the resolver arm reads the caller's
inbound token and swaps it via the injected TokenExchanger, to_server_spec maps a complete
oauth2_token_exchange server (endpoint plus client credentials) to TokenExchangeConfig, and the
egress wires the LazyTokenExchanger in. A token_exchange server with no caller token fails closed
with a plain 401 rather than v1's fall-through to client_credentials, so the call site now scopes
the per-server browser-OAuth challenge to authorization_code and lets other modes raise their own.
* fix(mcp): bind the token-exchange cache key to the exchange config
The exchanged-token cache was keyed only by (subject_token, server_id), so rotating a server's
audience, scope, endpoint, client_id, or secret kept serving a token minted for the old config
until TTL. The key now hashes the caller token together with the config that minted it, so a config
change forces a fresh exchange. Everything is hashed, so no secret is held in the key.
* refactor(mcp): build the token exchanger eagerly, dropping the lazy wrapper
The token exchanger reads no runtime global at build time (its httpx client is acquired per call),
unlike the per-user store, so it does not need lazy first-use construction. Building it once at
egress construction removes the first-use init path entirely and keeps the process-lifetime cache.
* fix(mcp): map non-object token-exchange JSON to a miss instead of a 500
The post adapter annotated the parsed body as a dict without checking it, so a valid-but-non-object
JSON response (list/string/number) was returned as-is and crashed the field parsing with an
AttributeError. It now validates the shape at the boundary and returns None for a non-object body,
so a malformed IdP response surfaces as a typed upstream_unavailable rather than a server error.
* fix(mcp): fail closed on a non-Bearer token_type in the OBO exchange
* feat(mcp): honor token_endpoint_auth_method (client_secret_basic) in the v2 OBO exchange
* feat(mcp): reject a non-access issued_token_type in the OBO exchange
* fix: include token endpoint auth method in exchange cache key
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix: prevent duplicate budget alert emails on concurrent threshold crossings
Budget alert emails were sent more than once for a single threshold crossing. The email dedup guard read the "already sent" marker, awaited the send, then wrote the marker, so concurrent requests crossing the same threshold within the send window all saw no marker and each sent. This affected the multi-threshold path (default_key_max_budget_alert_emails), the legacy single-threshold path (EMAIL_BUDGET_ALERT_MAX_SPEND_ALERT_PERCENTAGE), and the soft budget path, all in EmailBaseCallback.budget_alerts
All three branches now claim the send slot atomically before sending via async_increment_cache, which is atomic per event loop for the in-memory cache and across workers via Redis INCR; only the caller that observes a count of 1 sends. On send failure the marker is released with async_delete_cache so a transient failure does not suppress the alert for the full 24h TTL
* fix: harden budget alert claim release and skip-path event allocation
Addresses review feedback on the claim-before-send change. The claim release in each send-failure handler now logs the send error first and releases the claim best-effort through a shared helper, so a transient cache error during async_delete_cache cannot propagate out of the fire-and-forget budget_alerts task, drop the send-failure log, and leave the claim stuck for the full 24h TTL. In the multi-threshold branch the increment claim now runs before the WebhookEvent is built, so skipped concurrent crossings no longer construct and discard the event, matching the single-threshold and soft budget branches
_with_resolved_session_model was overwriting the nested
input_audio_transcription.model and audio.input.transcription.model with the
realtime conversation model, silently replacing a caller's transcription model
(e.g. whisper-1) since those are a different model than the realtime deployment.
It now only resolves the top-level session model.
Also restores session.model taking precedence over the top-level model in
acreate_realtime_client_secret, matching the proxy's own
_prepare_client_secret_session ordering and avoiding a backwards-incompatible flip.
Adds routing coverage for arealtime_calls (api_base resolution) and
acreate_realtime_transcription_session (api_key resolution) so all three realtime
HTTP endpoints have router credential-resolution tests, plus regression tests for
the two fixes above.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* fix(anthropic): keep context_management working when drop_params is enabled
drop_params (proxy-wide or per-request) silently disabled the in-gateway
context_management polyfill on the /v1/messages -> chat completions adapter
path, even though context_management is a LiteLLM-supported param (native on
Anthropic, polyfilled elsewhere). Gate the polyfill on an explicit
additional_drop_params: ["context_management"] opt-out instead, which also
makes that escape hatch actually work on the adapter path.
* test(anthropic): cover sync adapter polyfill gate for global drop_params and additional_drop_params
* feat(mcp): add all-proxy-mcpservers sentinel to grant every MCP server
Teams can now be scoped to the all-proxy-mcpservers sentinel so they gain
access to every MCP server on the proxy without listing each id. The
sentinel expands to the live registry at request time, so a server added
later is picked up with no change to the team's stored permission. The team
ceiling that validates a key's MCP scope expands the sentinel too, so a key
can be scoped to any server (including one registered after the team) and
still pass subset validation
Expose the option in the team create and edit forms via a new exclusive
"All Proxy MCP Servers" choice in MCPServerSelector, mirroring the existing
"No MCP Servers" sentinel
* Update litellm/proxy/management_helpers/object_permission_utils.py
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(mcp): honor all-proxy-mcpservers only on the team path, never per-key
The sentinel was expanded inside the shared expand_permission_list, which
also feeds the key, org, end_user and agent resolvers. A key whose stored
object_permission ever held all-proxy-mcpservers (a stale write, a
configured default, or a bug) would silently resolve to every MCP server at
runtime, and a teamless key had nothing to cap it, so all servers got
injected. Only write-time validation stripping the value stood between that
value and a full grant
Move the expansion out of expand_permission_list and into
_get_allowed_mcp_servers_for_team so the sentinel is honored only where it is
settable (a team). Anywhere else it now passes through as an inert literal
that matches no registered server and is denied downstream. Reserved-id
protection already blocks a real server from taking that id
* fix(mcp): require proxy admin to grant a team the all-proxy MCP sentinel
Granting a team every MCP server on the proxy is a proxy-wide authorization
decision, but team create/update let any caller who can manage a team set
object_permission.mcp_servers, with no ceiling check. Org admins reach
/team/update by default (org_admin_allowed_routes) and _verify_team_access
also admits team admins, so a non-proxy-admin could set all-proxy-mcpservers
and self-grant their team access to every MCP server on the proxy, including
servers never assigned to that team
Gate the grant in new_team and update_team: a non-proxy-admin cannot add the
all-proxy-mcpservers sentinel. The check is scoped to newly adding it, so a
team a proxy admin already scoped to all-proxy can still be edited by a team
admin without being forced to strip the sentinel. The UI only offers the
"All Proxy MCP Servers" option to proxy admins in the team create and edit
forms
* fix(ui): render friendly all-proxy MCP label for non-admins editing an all-proxy team
A team scoped to the all-proxy-mcpservers sentinel could be opened in the team
edit form by a team admin or org admin (canEditTeam admits them), but the
"All Proxy MCP Servers" option in MCPServerSelector was rendered only behind the
proxy-admin-gated allowAllProxyMcpServers flag. For a non-proxy-admin the stored
sentinel was hydrated into the selected value with no matching Select.Option, so
antd showed the raw all-proxy-mcpservers literal as a chip, and adding another
server could persist a mixed [all-proxy-mcpservers, <id>] value.
Render the option whenever the sentinel is present in the value, not only when
the caller may grant it, and drive the real-option disabling off presence too so
the selection stays exclusive. A non-proxy-admin now sees the friendly label
read-only and cannot build a mixed state; only a proxy admin can newly add it,
which the backend already enforces.
Adds regression tests: the selector shows the friendly option (not the raw
literal) when the sentinel is stored but the grant flag is off, plus exclusive
emit and disabled-real-options coverage, and MCPServerPermissions renders the
green "All" state instead of the raw sentinel string.
* fix(ui): drop redundant "All servers" hint from the all-proxy MCP chip
antd renders a Select option's children inside the selected tag, so the
all-proxy option showed both "All Proxy MCP Servers" and the green "All servers"
type-hint in the chip, which say the same thing. Collapse the option to a single
green "All Proxy MCP Servers" label so the dropdown row and the chip read cleanly
without the duplication.
* fix(ui): color the all-proxy MCP label blue to match server chips
Use the same blue (#1890ff) as regular MCP server entries for the
"All Proxy MCP Servers" option/chip instead of green.
* fix(ui): make the all-proxy MCP permissions display blue, not green
Match the blue used by the selector chip and regular server entries so the
"All Proxy MCP Servers" badge and row in MCPServerPermissions are consistent
across the team/key/org detail views. The red "Blocked" state for
no-mcp-servers is unchanged.
---------
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Realtime client_secrets, calls, and transcription_sessions were bypassing
the router and falling back to an empty OPENAI_API_KEY for wildcard, team-scoped,
and credential-name deployments.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
decrypt_value_helper logged `Unable to decrypt value={value}` at DEBUG, which
printed the raw secret whenever decryption failed (for example after a salt or
master key change). This is the same environment_variables config path the
db-config redaction covers, so a DATABASE_URL connection string could still
leak here when the module regex scrubber is bypassed. Drop the value; the key
already identifies the failing pair.
Regression forces a decrypt failure with the redaction filter disabled and
asserts the raw value never reaches a log record while the key stays visible.
Reuse the existing recursive `_redact_secret_values_in_obj` for the worker
config log instead of a hand-rolled top-level pass, so a credential nested
under general_settings is masked at any depth and depth overrun fails closed.
Route the `_update_config_from_db` param_value log (the store_model_in_db
path) and the litellm_settings apply-loop log through the same redactors, so
master_key, database_url, and secret-named settings such as api_key stop
leaking at DEBUG when the module regex scrubber is bypassed. A plain setting
like num_retries still logs its real value.
Regression tests disable _ENABLE_SECRET_REDACTION and cover the nested worker
config shape, the db-config path, and the litellm_settings loop in both
directions.
Three startup log statements in litellm/proxy/proxy_server.py dumped
secret-bearing values in cleartext when the last-line-of-defense regex
scrubber was bypassed (LITELLM_DISABLE_REDACT_SECRETS=true, older versions
that predated the SecretRedactionFilter, or any downstream handler that
snapshots log records before the module filter runs)
ProxyConfig._load_alerting_settings logged the whole general_settings
dict under a label that only referred to the alerting callbacks; a
copy-paste bug that happened to leak master_key, database_url, and every
other secret sitting in general_settings. Now logs only the alerting
callback list
ProxyConfig.load_config logged the resolved DB URL after secret-manager
resolution. The line's stated purpose was to confirm the retrieval ran,
which does not need the value. Now logs a value-less breadcrumb
proxy_startup_event logged the raw WORKER_CONFIG blob, which docker/K8s
deployments hand the proxy as a JSON string containing master_key,
database_url, and provider API keys. Now routes through
_redact_worker_config_for_logging, which combines the segment-matching
SensitiveDataMasker (catches master_key, api_key, *_token) with an
explicit pass over _EXTRA_SECRET_GENERAL_SETTINGS_FIELDS (catches
database_url and other credential-URL fields the segment masker misses)
Regression tests disable the module-level SecretRedactionFilter so
assertions see the raw record; without the fix they would trip on the
secret substring, so a future refactor cannot silently reconstruct the
leaky string
- Prevent fail-open from registering user-supplied hashes as valid for
CCR retrieval; _call_compress now returns (messages, compressed_ok)
so apply_guardrail skips hash extraction and tool injection when
compression did not succeed
- Remove Optional wrapper from HeadroomGuardrailConfigModel.unreachable_fallback
to match BaseLitellmParams typing
- Add fail_open tests for non-JSON response, missing messages key, and
empty message list paths
- Add regression test verifying fail_open does not authorize attacker-planted
hashes
- Regenerate dashboard API types
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
async_handler.post catches httpx.TimeoutException and re-raises it as
litellm.Timeout (a subclass of openai.APITimeoutError). The except
blocks in _call_compress and _call_retrieve only listed httpx exception
types, so litellm.Timeout propagated uncaught and bypassed the
unreachable_fallback=fail_open path.
Add litellm.Timeout to both except clauses and add regression tests for
the fail_closed and fail_open timeout paths.
When AzureSentinelLogger is resolved from the string callback name
"azure_sentinel", it is constructed with no arguments, so audit_stream_name is
always None and resolved_audit_stream_name fell back to the standard
resolved_stream_name. Audit logs then ingested into the access-log DCR stream
whose schema is built from StandardLoggingPayload, so Azure Monitor Logs
Ingestion silently dropped the audit-specific columns and audit rows arrived
effectively empty.
Add an AZURE_SENTINEL_AUDIT_STREAM_NAME env var fallback in __init__, mirroring
the AZURE_SENTINEL_STREAM_NAME idiom already used for the standard stream, so
audit logs can target a separate DCR stream without a custom callbacks file.
* fix(mcp): persist DCR client_id so interactive OAuth token refresh works
Interactive authorization_code MCP servers register an OAuth client via Dynamic
Client Registration (RFC 7591) during the authorize flow, but the minted
client_id and the discovered token_url were returned to the caller and never
written to the server row. The autonomous refresh_token grant reads client_id,
client_secret and token_url off the server, so an expired access token could not
be refreshed; the user was bounced back to re-authorize and tools/list returned
zero tools
Persist the DCR client_id (plus client_secret and token_endpoint_auth_method when
the registration returns them) and the discovered token_url onto the server row,
reusing the encrypt_credentials write that client_credentials and token exchange
already use, then refresh the in-memory registry so the value is live at refresh
time. Both the v1 refresher and the v2 AuthorizationCodeRefresher read those same
fields, so egress needs no change
* fix: reuse persisted MCP DCR clients
* fix: reuse persisted MCP DCR clients
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* feat(tinyfish): make search provider permissive, attribute errors
Reshapes the TinyFish search provider so LiteLLM mirrors the TinyFish
Search API surface instead of maintaining a parallel cherry-pick.
Request side:
- Drop misleading request TypedDict
- Stop sending max_results on wire (TinyFish ignores it); clamp to [1,10]
client-side via self-threaded state
- Guard non-numeric max_results from bare ValueError
- Auto-JSON-encode dict params; lowercase bool serialization for ux-labs
Response side:
- Drop both Pydantic response models; parse directly into SearchResponse
so per-result extras flow through via extra="allow"
- Default missing title/url/snippet to "" instead of failing the call
- Read top-level parameter_warnings and re-fire as verbose_logger.warning
(pre-wired for upcoming TinyFish-side rollout; no-op today)
Error handling:
- Attributed _wrap_error helper at 3 call sites in transform_search_response
("TinyFish Search: <msg>. See https://docs.tinyfish.ai/search-api for
details.")
- Dispatch non-2xx responses through _wrap_error (fixes pre-existing bug
where 4xx/5xx silently returned empty SearchResponse)
- Wrap json.JSONDecodeError on 200 bodies
- Wrap pydantic.ValidationError for envelope-shape mismatches
Bug fix worth flagging: 4xx/5xx responses now raise an attributed
BaseLLMException instead of silently returning SearchResponse(results=[]).
Follow-up to #30634.
* fix(tinyfish): apply ruff format; guard OverflowError in max_results clamp
- Run ruff format on the touched files (CI lint job rejected the prior
commit's formatting).
- Add OverflowError to the except clause in the max_results clamp so
callers passing math.inf (or other non-finite floats) get the same
warn-and-ignore behavior as other malformed values. Greptile spotted
this in the first-pass review.
- Add test_max_results_infinity_float_warns_and_skips covering the
inf case.
* fix(tinyfish): apply --line-length 88 ruff format to match CI
CI uses 'ruff format --check --line-length 88'; my prior format pass
used the default line length, leaving several lines unwrapped. No
behavior change — purely whitespace.
* fix(tinyfish): reduce transform_search_response complexity; sort imports
CI's ruff strict-rule budget rejected the prior commit with:
- C901: transform_search_response complexity 16 > 10 (cap exceeded by 1)
- I001: import sort violation (cap exceeded by 1)
Extract two module-level helpers from transform_search_response to drop
its cyclomatic complexity:
- _default_missing_result_fields: in-place title/url/snippet defaulting
- _emit_parameter_warnings: defensive parameter_warnings reader
Auto-fix the import sort via ruff --fix.
No behavior change; the 59 existing tests still pass.
* test(tinyfish): cover defensive branches in _default_missing_result_fields
Codecov flagged 97.61% patch coverage (2 lines missing). The uncovered
lines were the non-dict raw_json and non-dict per-result item early-exits
in _default_missing_result_fields. Add two unit tests on the helper
directly to bring patch coverage to 100%.
* chore(tinyfish): apply ruff format to fix lint after staging merge
---------
Co-authored-by: Chenlu Ji <jichenlulu@gmail.com>
* fix(azure_ai): preserve content, tables, and keyValuePairs in doc-intelligence /v1/ocr
Azure Document Intelligence analyzeResult.content, .tables, and
.keyValuePairs were dropped when normalizing to the Mistral OCR schema.
They are now passed through verbatim as top-level response fields, and
the duplicated sync/async response parsing is consolidated into one
pydantic-validated helper.
Also adds the Azure DI features query param (list[str] or
comma-separated string, e.g. features=keyValuePairs) which Azure
requires for keyValuePairs extraction.
* test(azure_ai): replace fastapi jsonable_encoder with model_dump in ocr unit tests
litellm's async httpx client already calls raise_for_status() internally, so a
non-2xx /v1/compress response surfaced as an uncaught httpx.HTTPStatusError
instead of going through the guardrail's status_code check. Caught live by
running the guardrail against a mock headroom endpoint that returns 500:
unreachable_fallback=fail_open silently failed to forward the request until
this fix.
