Commit graph

16 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Yassin Kortam
1d695a714b
fix(proxy): reset a stuck team member's budget (#37971)
* fix(proxy): reset a stuck team member's budget

A per-team-member budget check reads a cross-pod spend counter that
nothing ever invalidates. Once a member exceeds their per-member
budget, resetting the key's spend, raising the user's or the team's
own budget, or issuing a new key all leave the member stuck, because
none of them touch this counter or its cached membership object.

Add POST /team/{team_id}/member/{user_id}/reset_spend to reset a
member's tracked spend, and invalidate the same cached state from
/team/member_update when it raises a member's own budget, so that
path also takes effect immediately instead of waiting on the
membership cache's TTL. Name the entity in the check's error message
so a stuck member is diagnosable from the 429 body alone.

* fix(proxy): close reset-vs-floor-read race and surface double Redis write failure on member spend reset

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(proxy): broadcast spend reset as a SET so the handler's self-delivered message cannot erase the reset guard

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(proxy): omit null fields from the invalidation message so plain evictions keep the old wire format

Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-25 09:50:09 -07:00
ryan-crabbe-berri
9ec0145986
feat(proxy): add /team/daily/activity/aggregated and switch the Usage team tab to it (#36562)
* feat(proxy): add /team/daily/activity/aggregated and use it in the Usage UI

The Team Usage tab drained row-paginated pages client side, which painted
newest days first and drew duplicate bars when a day's rows straddled a
page boundary. Serve the whole range in one SQL GROUPING SETS pass instead:
the aggregated query gains optional per-entity rollup levels (entity as the
most-significant GROUPING bit) so breakdown.entities keeps per-team spend,
aliases, and per-key splits. The endpoint shares the paginated route's
scoping via _resolve_team_daily_activity_scope, accepts the timezone the UI
already sends, and the api_key filter now takes a list so non-admin member
scoping works. The dashboard tries the aggregated endpoint first and falls
back to page draining on failure.

* chore: ratchet B008 budget down by the endpoint converted to Annotated Depends

* chore: keep mutable-ok suppressions on their annotation lines after formatting

* fix(proxy): reject malformed or over-wide ranges on team aggregated activity

The aggregated endpoint has no pagination bounding its work, so validate
start_date and end_date as real dates and cap the span at 400 days. The
dashboard's widest presets fit well inside the cap, and an over-cap range
falls back to the paginated flow. Also trim implementation comments that
restated the grouping-set code.

* fix(proxy): parse aggregated range bounds as UTC to satisfy DTZ007

* refactor(proxy): fetch entity rollups with a companion query instead of extending the main one

The entity-as-extra-GROUPING-bit approach made the bitmask layout
mode-dependent: the same constant meant (date) for normal rows and
(date, entity) for entity rows, disambiguated by masking. Split it out:
the shared WHERE builder feeds both the untouched main query and a small
per-entity rollup query keyed by GROUPING(api_key), run concurrently, and
a fold writes breakdown.entities onto the built response.

* refactor(proxy): share the daily-activity error and entity-metadata shapes

The type-discipline ceiling for LIT002 ratcheted down on staging, so the new
aggregated endpoint had to stop hand-rolling collections the codebase already
builds elsewhere. Funnel the `{"error": ...}` detail through one construction
site, turn the range validator into an error-as-value, reuse a single
entity-metadata lookup for both breakdown paths, and widen
get_api_key_metadata to any set so callers stop copying frozensets.
2026-08-18 11:29:57 -07:00
Yuneng Jiang
0d7f7c689a
test: repair stale CircleCI contracts 2026-08-08 12:19:29 -07:00
tin-berri
3238ce8406
feat(auto-router): track turns per complexity tier (LIT-5302) (#36209)
* feat(auto-router): track turns per complexity tier (LIT-5302)

Stamps complexity tier at decision time (rollup never re-derives from routed
model, since tier->model mapping is mutable config). Records per-tier turn
counts in LiteLLM_AutoRouterSession.tier_turns (jsonb), rolls up per router
in benchmarks SQL via jsonb_object_agg, returns on AutoRouterBenchmarkGroup
for dashboard turns/share metrics.

Addresses Greptile/Bugbot findings:

- Missing _SessionAggRow.tier_turns field: added with field_validator to
  parse jsonb text cast and handle NULL. Would 500 every benchmarks read.

- Missing ::text cast on tier parameter: Postgres fails type inference on
  parameterized CASE/IS NULL without explicit cast. Added to all usages.

- Docstring false claim (only complexity routers produce tiers): quality
  router stamps numeric tier '1'/'2'/'3'. Per-type grouping in SQL prevents
  cross-contamination. Rewrote docstring to clarify isolation.

- Comment convention violations: stripped per CLAUDE.md rule.

- Test gaps: 8 unit tests for extraction/validation/aggregation, 7 behavior
  tests for SQL semantics against real Postgres. 12 mutations killed.
  Fixed fragile complexity_router test that broke on nested function calls.

No API change; extends existing GET /auto_router/benchmarks response only.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auto-router): address review findings on tier turns tracking

- Guard router_type update so a mid-session reconfigure can't pool
  foreign tier names into tier_turns
- Keep pinned turns attributed to the tier that actually serves them
- Drop stray -- AlterTable comment from hand-written migration
- Drop the now-unnecessary ::text/json.loads round-trip; prisma
  already returns tier_turns as a parsed dict

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(auto-router): satisfy type-discipline lint gate

- tier_turns fields: dict[str, int] -> Mapping[str, int] (LIT001,
  mutable collection in annotation); these are read-only after
  construction
- _summed_agg_row: {} -> MappingProxyType({}) (LIT002, mutable dict
  literal)
- default-fallback branch: replace the reassigned-without-Final
  fallback_tier with a Final default_model_first flag and a single
  ternary assignment (LIT010)

Verified locally: type_discipline_gate.py, ruff_strict_gate.py, and
type_check_gate.py all pass against the litellm_internal_staging
merge-base; full test_complexity_router.py (374), auto_router
management-endpoint tests (26), db-layer rollup tests (31), and the
live-Postgres proxy_behavior rollup suite (17) all pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-07 17:03:34 -07:00
tin-berri
32deaff015
feat(spend): rebuild the auto-router benchmarks backend as a per-session rollup (#35910)
Folds every successful auto-routed request into LiteLLM_AutoRouterSession with one
conditional upsert at spend-write time, classifying each turn (same model, first
visit, return to tier, out of order) against the row's own columns so nothing is
read before the write. The upsert's placeholders and argument tuple both derive
from the transaction dataclass's own field order, so the SQL and the call site
cannot drift apart. GET /auto_router/benchmarks aggregates the rollup, grouped
by the full (router, type) identity, and never scans LiteLLM_SpendLogs. A turn's
cache interaction is derived once from its usage record (savings.py owns the
extraction; compute_savings_spend derives cache reads from usage_object itself),
hits are counted order-independently so the overall hit rate matches its covered
denominator, caller-chosen session ids are bounded before entering the primary
key, and a poisoned statement drops only its own session's remaining turns.
Return misses inside the recorded TTL are named for what the telemetry shows
(within_ttl) rather than a presumed cause, since a provider can evict early.
Savings ride each router's derived baseline by default, so the response carries
no deployment-wide baseline label. Rollup retention has its own
maximum_autorouter_session_retention_period setting, pattern-identical to the
spend-logs knob and running in the same cleanup job on its own cutoff. Every
drain trigger sizes the queues through one owner and the enqueue honors
disable_spend_logs beside the tool-usage queue it mirrors.
2026-08-05 20:06:32 +00:00
Yuneng Jiang
b6557d2b14
test: repair three failing suites on litellm_internal_staging
The management route-coverage guard fires because /team/metadata_schema landed
in #33353 without a behavior-suite scenario, so this adds one covering the nine
seeded actors plus the unauthenticated 401

The prometheus budget-metric assertions read the log call's first positional
arg, which #35703 turned into an unrendered "%s" format string when it moved
logging to lazy args. They now render the message from the call args, which
also pins the arg order and the exception text that the old substring check
never reached

GitHub Models was fully retired on 2026-07-30, so test_completion_github_api
can no longer pass: the endpoint the github provider targets returns 404 and
models.github.ai answers 410 "github_models_retirement_brownout". The dead live
test is removed rather than skipped
2026-08-04 16:07:02 -07:00
ryan-crabbe-berri
46b6eae799
feat(teams): apply default organization to new teams from default team settings (#35540)
* feat(teams): apply default organization to new teams from default team settings

Adds organization_id to DefaultTeamSSOParams so proxy admins can pick a
default organization in Default Team Settings. new_team applies it before
org validation whenever a team is created without an explicit
organization_id, so API, Admin UI, SCIM, SSO, and team upsert creations
all inherit it and go through the same existence and org-limit checks.
Explicit organization selections win and existing teams are untouched.

The default is validated at save time (PATCH /update/default_team_settings
returns 400 for an unknown org) and at create time, where a missing org now
surfaces as a clean 400 instead of a 500 by routing OrganizationNotFoundError
into the previously dead org_table None guard.

The Admin UI Default Team Settings tab gets a Default Organization row
backed by the shared OrganizationDropdown.

* fix(teams): validate org limits against final team state including defaults

Applies default_team_params and the legacy max_budget fallback before the
organization validation block, so _check_org_team_limits sees the values the
team will actually be persisted with. Also loads the org's budget table in
the lookup; without include_budget_table every budget comparison in
_check_org_team_limits was skipped because litellm_budget_table was None.

* test(proxy_behavior): pin org team limits as enforced on /team/new

The dead-code pins existed to turn red when include_budget_table went
live; that happened, so the scenarios now assert the 400 rejections plus
within-cap acceptance, and the unknown-org pin asserts the handler's 400
instead of the surfaced 500.
2026-08-03 12:57:12 -07:00
Yuneng Jiang
ff4a50c768
test(proxy): separate the member_add permission gate from the provisioning gate
Adding a team member by a user_id with no user row is now proxy-admin-only,
so the /team/member_add authz matrix, which targeted a never-seeded user_id,
started 403ing every non-proxy-admin caller. Seed the member as a real user
row so the matrix reads _validate_team_member_add_permissions alone; leaving
it unseeded and relaxing the expectations to 403 would have left all 18 rows
green with that gate deleted outright.

Cover the new gate at the HTTP boundary, where only the helper was pinned
before: a team admin and an org admin both clear the permission check on the
same team and are still refused an unprovisioned user_id, with no user row
left behind. Pin the escape hatch that refusal names too, so closing the
email-invite path for non-proxy-admins cannot pass silently.

Promote the user seeder the member-info pins had kept private to conftest,
and reclaim invited users by their scratch-prefixed email, since an invite
allocates the user_id server-side.
2026-08-01 14:39:47 -07:00
Yuneng Jiang
637352735f
fix(proxy): resolve team org from team_id so org admins can update team budgets
An org admin updating a team budget from the Hub UI was rejected with 401, because the route gate only recognizes an org admin when the request body carries organization_id while the UI sends team_id. For /team/update, resolve the target team's organization_id from team_id before the gate runs, so an org admin of the team's own org clears the org-scoped branch without the client passing organization_id. Team admins and cross-org admins stay denied at the gate, and callers that already pass organization_id are unaffected, so the existing /team/update authorization matrix is unchanged
2026-07-08 19:10:35 -07:00
michelligabriele
d7654d07ab
feat(proxy): add AES-256-GCM at-rest credential encryption with versioned format and re-encryption migration (#31215)
Some checks are pending
GitHub Actions Security Analysis / zizmor (push) Waiting to run
* feat(proxy): add AES-256-GCM at-rest credential encryption with versioned format and re-encryption migration

* test(proxy): add behavior scenarios for credential migration endpoints

* fix(proxy): scan covered tables in encryption check, fix CI lint and route types

* fix(proxy): migrate callback_settings credentials, clear CI lint/recursion gates, add encryption endpoint+CLI tests

* fix(proxy): correct dry-run/real-run migrated vs residual-legacy counters in config and SSO walkers

* fix(proxy): make callback-vars residual detection gate-independent in encryption check
2026-06-29 20:14:22 +02:00
Sameer Kankute
4c25b7a13d
chore: litellm oss staging (#30745)
* fix(proxy): bump health-check max_tokens default to 16 for GPT-5 compatibility (#30708)

OpenAI GPT-5 models require max_completion_tokens >= 16.
Health checks were using 5 (proxy/health_check.py) and 10
(health_check_helpers.py), causing failures on GPT-5 models.

Fixes #23836

* fix: increase health check max_tokens from 5 to 16 (#23836) (#26610)

GPT-5 models enforce a minimum of 16 for max_output_tokens. The current
default of 5 still causes health checks to fail for these models. Bump
the non-wildcard default to 16 — the smallest value that satisfies all
known provider minimums while keeping health checks lightweight.

Also tightens the wildcard test assertion from a weak disjunctive check
to strict key-absence.

Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <sameer@berri.ai>

* fix: ensure checks show gemini-3-flash-preview supports responseJsonS… (#30696)

* fix: ensure checks show gemini-3-flash-preview supports responseJsonSchema.

* fix: remove async keyword from test.

* fix: make Bedrock Mantle Responses routing data-driven per model (#30700)

* Make Bedrock Mantle Responses routing data-driven per model

Route Bedrock Mantle models to the native Responses API based on each
model's price-map capability signal instead of a hardcoded model-name
heuristic, and derive the OpenAI-compatible base path segment per model.

Responses dispatch now selects the native config when the model advertises
responses support (/v1/responses in supported_endpoints, or mode=responses),
both overridable via register_model and proxy model_info. This enables
native Responses for gpt-oss-120b/20b and the gemma-4 family while keeping
chat-only models (gpt-oss safeguard, nvidia, mistral, ...) on the existing
chat-completions emulation. Capability is per-model, so gpt-oss-120b routes
natively while gpt-oss-safeguard-120b does not despite sharing the gpt-oss
substring.

The wire path is a separate concern, driven by the existing
use_openai_responses_path flag rather than a model-name match: gpt-5.x and
gemma-4-* on /openai/v1, everything else (incl. gpt-oss) on /v1. The chat
config now derives its base from the same flag, fixing gemma-4
chat-completions requests that previously went to /v1 instead of /openai/v1.

Cost maps: add supported_endpoints to the gpt-oss entries (responses for the
non-safeguard variants, chat-only for safeguard) and supported_endpoints +
use_openai_responses_path to all three gemma-4 entries.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Address review: move capability helper into bedrock_mantle package

Move the Responses capability check out of utils.py into
litellm/llms/bedrock_mantle/common_utils.py as mantle_supports_responses,
alongside its companion wire-path helper mantle_base_segment. Both are now
pure functions of (model, model_cost): the price-map mode/supported_endpoints
read replaces the get_model_info call, so the rules are unit-testable without
patching global state and the Bedrock Mantle package is self-contained.

Use str | None instead of Optional[str] on the new signatures to satisfy the
ruff UP045 strict-rule gate. Add direct unit tests for both helpers.

Fix test_register_model_restore_undoes_existing_key_overwrite: gpt-oss-120b
now legitimately supports Responses, so it can no longer be the
"None after restore" vehicle; use the chat-only safeguard variant, which
isolates the register/restore effect from the model's own capability.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Sameer Kankute <sameer@berri.ai>

* fix(proxy): fail fast on non-PostgreSQL DATABASE_URL instead of hanging on startup (#30366)

* fix(proxy): fail fast on non-PostgreSQL DATABASE_URL instead of hanging on startup

LiteLLM's Prisma datasource is pinned to provider = 'postgresql', so a sqlite:// or mysql:// DATABASE_URL can never connect.

Today that surfaces as an opaque startup stall where the port never binds, and a separate 'DB not connected' 500 on /key/generate when no DATABASE_URL is set at all leaves operators guessing what to configure.

Validate the DATABASE_URL / DIRECT_URL scheme in run_server before any Prisma call and exit with an actionable message naming the unsupported scheme.

Also reword CommonProxyErrors.db_not_connected_error to tell the operator to set DATABASE_URL to a postgresql:// connection string.

Add regression tests covering postgres acceptance and sqlite/mysql/mssql rejection.

* fix: resolve CI failures and proxy DB URL typing issue

* fix(dashscope): treat an explicit 0.0 tier cost as a real price, not missing (#30653)

The tiered cost calculator resolved a tier's per-token cost with
`tier.get(cost_key) or tier.get(fallback_cost_key, 0)`. Because `or`
short-circuits on any falsy value, a tier that legitimately prices a
component at 0.0 (e.g. a free-cache-read tier with
cache_read_input_token_cost: 0.0, or a free-reasoning tier) is treated
as missing and silently billed at the full fallback rate
(input_cost_per_token / output_cost_per_token).

The flat-pricing path in the same module already handles this correctly
with an `is None` guard. Resolve tier costs through a small helper that
mirrors it, so 0.0 is honored at both the in-range and overflow sites.

No shipped model currently has a 0.0 tier cost, so this is a latent
defect; the fix makes the tiered path consistent with the flat path and
prevents over-charging the first time such a tier appears. Adds unit
tests covering the in-range and overflow paths, and drops an unused
import flagged by ruff in the touched test file.

* feat(proxy): show session-aggregate cost and duration in request logs (#25708) (#30507)

* fix(anthropic): don't leak tool 'type' into OpenAI function parameters schema (#30618)

In the messages->chat/completions bridge, translate_anthropic_tools_to_openai
merged every non-mapped tool key into the function parameters dict. The
Anthropic tool 'type' (e.g. 'custom') thus overwrote parameters.type ('object'
-> 'custom'), and providers reject it ('custom' is not a valid JSON-Schema type).
Exclude 'type' from the passthrough. Fixes #30557.

* fix(proxy): stop IAM-refresh engine restart from cascading reconnects (#29176) (#30183)

An RDS IAM token refresh recreates the Prisma client, which SIGKILLs the
running query-engine and spawns a new one. That planned kill was
indistinguishable from a crash, and three reconnect paths used two
uncoordinated locks, so a single refresh triggered a cascade of engine
kill/respawn cycles:

  1. `_safe_refresh_token` (holds `_reconnection_lock`) -> recreate -> kill old
     engine, spawn new one.
  2. The engine-death watcher sees that kill, assumes a crash, and calls
     `attempt_db_reconnect(force=True)` (a different lock,
     `_db_reconnect_lock`) -> recreate again -> kills the fresh engine.
  3. In-flight queries failing during the swap are classified as transport
     errors and trigger their own `attempt_db_reconnect` -> recreate again.

Fix coordinates planned restarts across the wrapper and the watcher:

  - PrismaWrapper records the old engine PID in `_expected_engine_deaths`
    before killing it; all four watcher death-detectors (waitpid thread,
    pidfd, already-dead probe, os.kill poll) consume that PID and skip the
    reconnect instead of treating it as a crash.
  - `recreate_prisma_client` now serializes through `_reconnection_lock` and
    bumps a monotonic `_engine_generation`. Callers pass `expected_generation`
    as an optimistic-lock token, so racing/cascading recreates collapse into a
    single restart (losers no-op). This closes the two-lock gap.
  - The direct reconnect path probes the writer with SELECT 1 before
    recreating; a healthy connection (e.g. engine already replaced by a
    refresh) skips the recreate entirely.
  - `_safe_refresh_token` coalesces: it skips when the current token still has
    more than the refresh buffer of runway, so stacked triggers (proactive
    loop + __getattr__ fallback) don't each restart the engine. An
    `on_engine_replaced` hook re-arms the watcher on the new PID.

RoutingPrismaWrapper forwards `expected_generation` and skips recreating the
reader when the writer recreate was skipped.

* feat(bedrock): support file content retrieval for batch output files (#30595)

Implements transform_file_content_request and transform_file_content_response
in BedrockFilesConfig so GET /v1/files/{id}/content works for Bedrock batch
files. The request transform resolves the file id (direct s3:// URI or base64
unified id) to its S3 object, validates bucket and key prefix against the
server-configured bucket, and SigV4-signs an S3 GetObject using the same
credential and region resolution as the existing upload path. The credential
and region params are validated into a typed model at the boundary, so the only
untyped values left are the botocore signing primitives.

Also fixes the proxy managed-files path: CredentialLiteLLMParams now carries
s3_bucket_name (previously dropped when building deployment credentials) and
the managed-files hook passes the deployment credential snapshot when routing
afile_content, so unified-id content retrieval works with per-model bucket
config instead of only the AWS_S3_BUCKET_NAME env var.

Preserves managed-file access control: the proxy file-content endpoint now
rejects raw cloud-storage ids (s3://, gs://), which would otherwise skip the
owner/team check that only runs for unified ids and let a caller read another
tenant's batch output by its object key. Managed outputs are reachable only
through their unified file id. The afile_content "not found" error now reports
the caller's unified id rather than the resolved internal S3 URI.

Fixes #16186, #15563

* fix(oci): make Cohere {{trace}} judges work (tool param types + agentic tool-calling continuation) (#30646)

* fix(oci): map Cohere tool array/object params to lowercase builtins

OCI's Cohere backend returns HTTP 500 on a tool parameter typed as a bare
"List", which is what OCI_JSON_TO_PYTHON_TYPES produced for JSON-schema
arrays. MLflow {{trace}} judges trip this: their tools (get_root_span,
get_span) take an attributes_to_fetch array. The lowercase builtins list/dict
are accepted; only the bare "List" 500s ("Dict" happens to be tolerated, but
both are lowercased for consistency).

Verified live against us-chicago-1 (cohere.command-a-03-2025 and
command-latest). Adds a unit regression on the transformed parameterDefinitions
plus a gated integration test exercising an array-param tool end to end.

* fix(oci): make Cohere agentic tool-calling continuation work

Two bugs broke the OCI Cohere tool-calling loop that MLflow {{trace}} judges
drive once a tool has been executed and its result is fed back.

Request side: litellm pulled the last user message into the top-level `message`
and emitted the tool result as a TOOL entry in chatHistory. OCI rejects that
("cannot specify message if the last entry in chat history contains tool
results"), and an empty message alone is rejected too ("message must be at least
1 token long or tool results must be specified"). OCI carries the current turn's
results in a dedicated top-level `toolResults` field. The Cohere transform now
sends an empty message, keeps the user turn in chatHistory, and puts the results
in `toolResults`, matching the langchain-oracle reference. Tool results are no
longer represented as chatHistory entries.

Response side: tool-grounded answers come back with citations carrying
`documentIds` (camelCase) and no `document_ids`, which made the required
`CohereCitation.document_ids` field fail validation and sink the whole response
parse. Those citations are never surfaced, so the field (and CohereSearchQuery's
generation_id) is now optional.

Verified live against us-chicago-1 (cohere.command-a-03-2025 and command-latest),
single and multi-round tool loops. Adds unit regressions on the transformed
request shape and on citation parsing, plus gated integration tests for the
continuation.

* feat: integrate Repelloai Argus guardrail (#30673)

* feat(guardrails): add RepelloAI Argus guardrail integration (#1)

* feat(guardrails): add RepelloAI Argus guardrail integration

Add a new guardrail hook backed by RepelloAI Argus, with dashboard-managed
asset policies enforced via an asset_id and X-API-Key auth.

* fix(guardrails): harden RepelloAI Argus guardrail

- scan streaming responses on output (was bypassing the guardrail)
- log blocked verdicts as guardrail_intervened instead of success
- treat auth/config errors (401/403/404/422) as misconfiguration that
  always blocks, not a fail-open-able unreachable error
- default unreachable_fallback to fail_closed and read it directly;
  block on unknown/malformed verdicts so an API change can't silently
  disable enforcement
- type unreachable_fallback as a Literal, drop the duplicate config model,
  expose unreachable_fallback in the config schema, and stop leaking the
  raw provider response / exception strings to the client

* fix(guardrails): address RepelloAI Argus review feedback

- support ARGUS_API_KEY (with REPELLOAI_API_KEY fallback)
- make asset_id required in the config model
- normalize unreachable_fallback so only fail_open opens; block on 400 misconfig
- correct the shared unreachable_fallback field description

* docs(guardrails): add RepelloAI Argus docs page and dashboard listing

- add docs page covering config, env vars, modes, verdicts, failure semantics
- list RepelloAI Argus in the Guardrail Garden with provider/logo mappings
- add a regression test for the provider logo and display-name resolution

* fix(guardrails): keep RepelloAI asset_id optional in config model

A required asset_id leaked onto the shared LitellmParams (which inherits
RepelloAIGuardrailConfigModel), breaking validation for every other
guardrail. Keep it optional like sibling models; the guardrail __init__
still raises when asset_id is missing, which is the real enforcement.

* Add comment for last user turn scanning

* feat(guardrails): harden repelloai scanning

* feat(guardrails): expand repelloai scanning to include tool definitions

Add extraction of tool definitions and tool call arguments to the RepelloAI
guardrail scanning. Improves detection coverage by including function schemas
and parameters in the prompt sent to the guardrail service. Also captures
detailed error responses in logs and adds guardrail header to streaming responses.

* refactor(guardrails): fix and harden repelloai schema text extraction

- Fix duplicate text in _iter_schema_text: previously all dict values were
  re-queued onto the stack even after scalar/list keys were already extracted
  explicitly, causing names/descriptions to appear twice in the scanned prompt
- Extract schema key frozensets to module-level constants so they are not
  reconstructed on every call
- Change _iter_schema_text from @classmethod to @staticmethod (cls unused)
- Narrow _call_analyze stage param from str to Literal["prompt", "response"]
- Add HttpxResponse type annotation to _raise_for_config_error
- Add LLMResponseTypes annotation to async_post_call_success_hook response param

* fix(guardrails): resolve pyright type errors in repelloai guardrail

- Narrow async_handler.post return from Response|None to Response with
  explicit None guard before calling raise_for_status/json
- Fix list comprehension returning str|None by switching to explicit loop
  with isinstance guard so pyright tracks the narrowing
- Cast model_dump() result to Dict since hasattr does not narrow object
  type in pyright

* fix(guardrails/repello): include Responses API instructions field in prompt scan

The /v1/responses top-level `instructions` field was not included in
_extract_prompt_text, allowing a caller to bypass guardrail policy checks
by putting blocked content in `instructions` while keeping `input` benign.

* feat: add api_key to config model and read prompt from data dict

* fix(guardrails/repello): plug input_text and tool-call response bypass gaps

Responses API input content parts with type 'input_text' were silently
dropped by build_inspection_messages (which only handles type='text'),
allowing callers to send blocked content via that path without triggering
the pre-call scan. Fix: add _extract_input_text_parts to RepelloAIGuardrail
and call it when walking the Responses API input messages.

Post-call scanning skipped responses whose choices contained only tool_calls
or function_call (message.content=None), letting models put blocked output in
function arguments undetected. Fix: _extract_chat_completion_text now calls
_extract_tool_call_args_from_message on each choice message.

Also replace typing.Dict/List with builtin dict/list to clear TID251 strict
ruff violations introduced by this file.

* fix(guardrails/repello): scan Responses API function_call output arguments

Output items with type 'function_call' in a /v1/responses response were
skipped by _extract_responses_api_text; only 'message' items were walked.
A model could return blocked content in function_call.arguments undetected.
Now extract arguments from function_call output items before scanning.

* refactor(guardrails/repello): clean up typing and remove lint-any workarounds

- Replace Optional[X]/Union[X,Y] with X|None/X|Y union syntax throughout
- Use dict[str, object] instead of bare dict in all signatures
- Remove **kwargs from __init__; declare guardrail_name, event_hook, default_on explicitly
- Replace getattr(litellm_params, ...) with direct attribute access now that LitellmParams inherits RepelloAIGuardrailConfigModel
- Add _event_hook_from_mode() to convert str|list[str]|Mode to typed GuardrailEventHooks
- Use TypeAdapter.validate_json() instead of response.json() + manual dict construction
- Add _is_object_dict/_is_object_list TypeGuard helpers to narrow object types without Any
- Remove cast() workarounds and typed intermediate variables that existed only for the now-removed lint-any CI check
- Drop _AddLiteLLMCallback Protocol; budget has sufficient slack for the one reportUnknownMemberType
- Fix GuardrailConfigModel missing type arg: GuardrailConfigModel[BaseModel]

* fix(guardrails/repello): suppress LIT007 on TypeGuard helpers and add streaming scan-skip warning

- Add guard-ok suppressions to _is_object_dict and _is_object_list to satisfy the LIT007 hard-zero budget gate
- Emit verbose_proxy_logger.warning when the streaming hook finds no inspectable text after assembly, matching observability of pre/post hooks

* refactor: modifications for lint check

* feat: add Pinstripes as an OpenAI-compatible provider (#30567)

* feat: add Pinstripes as an OpenAI-compatible provider

Pinstripes (https://pinstripes.io) is an OpenAI-compatible inference
provider serving open-source models (GLM-4.5-Air, Qwen3, DeepSeek, etc.)
with per-token pricing and no subscriptions.

Changes:
- `litellm/llms/openai_like/providers.json`: register pinstripes with
  base_url, api_key_env, and max_completion_tokens→max_tokens mapping
- `litellm/types/utils.py`: add `PINSTRIPES = "pinstripes"` to LlmProviders
- `litellm/constants.py`: add to openai_compatible_providers and
  openai_compatible_endpoints lists
- `litellm/litellm_core_utils/get_llm_provider_logic.py`: auto-detect
  provider when api_base is "https://pinstripes.io/v1"
- `provider_endpoints_support.json`: document supported endpoints
- `tests/`: 7 unit tests covering provider registration, resolution,
  URL auto-detection, api_base override, and Router config

Usage:
    import litellm
    response = litellm.completion(
        model="pinstripes/ps/glm-4.5-air",
        messages=[{"role": "user", "content": "Hello"}],
        api_key=os.environ["PINSTRIPES_API_KEY"],
    )

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(pinstripes): resolve Greptile P1 review comments

- Add api_base_env: PINSTRIPES_API_BASE to providers.json so env var override works
- Set responses: false in provider_endpoints_support.json — not actually wired up
- Remove docs/my-website/docs/providers/pinstripes.md — belongs in litellm-docs repo

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(pinstripes): add api_base_env and correct responses capability

- Add api_base_env: PINSTRIPES_API_BASE to providers.json
- Set responses: false in provider_endpoints_support.json

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(pinstripes): wire up Responses API — add supported_endpoints

Adds supported_endpoints: ["/v1/chat/completions", "/v1/responses"] so
JSONProviderRegistry.supports_responses_api returns true correctly,
matching what provider_endpoints_support.json advertises.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(pinstripes): enable embeddings endpoint

Pinstripes serves nomic-embed-text-v1.5 and bge-m3 via /v1/embeddings.
Add /v1/embeddings to supported_endpoints and set embeddings: true.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(pinstripes): use 4-space indentation in model_prices_and_context_window.json

Matches the file's existing convention. Flagged by Greptile review.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(pinstripes): set a2a: false — A2A protocol not implemented

All comparable JSON-configured providers (tensormesh, parasail, empiriolabs,
libertai, neosantara) have a2a: false. Pinstripes does not implement the
Google A2A protocol, so this should be false to match.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: inference_provider <max@redactedlab.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(rag): attach existing OpenAI file ids (#30628)

* fix(rag): attach existing OpenAI file ids

* chore: use modern typing in rag ingest fix

* chore: retrigger ci

* fix(anthropic-messages): apply cache_control_injection_points on /v1/messages path (#30341)

cache_control_injection_points was only consumed by the chat/completions
prompt-management hook; on the native Anthropic /v1/messages path it was
forwarded unused, so deployment-level cache injection was silently dropped
(cache_creation_input_tokens stayed 0 for Anthropic-native clients).

Add AnthropicCacheControlHook.apply_to_anthropic_messages_request to inject
cache_control at block level for system / tools / message locations (the only
forms /v1/messages accepts), wire it into the native anthropic_messages
handler, and pop the param so it does not leak upstream as an unknown field.
A {location: message, role: system} config is redirected to the top-level
system prompt so the same YAML works on both endpoints.

Injection respects Anthropic's 4-block cache_control limit shared across
system, tools, and messages: client-supplied markers count toward the cap and
are never overwritten, a slot is reserved per Bedrock tool_config point, and
injection stops once the budget is exhausted. Locations this path cannot
represent (tool_config) are forwarded downstream instead of being silently
consumed, mirroring get_chat_completion_prompt's remaining_points pass-through.

Built on litellm_internal_staging. Refs BerriAI/litellm#30293

* fix(proxy): release budget reservation when a request is cancelled mid-flight (#30522)

* fix(proxy): release budget reservation on cancel when no chunk was delivered

The pre-call budget reservation increments the cross-pod spend counter by a
request's worst-case cost, then reconciles it on success (cost callback) or
error (failure hook). A client disconnect or timeout cancels the request and
surfaces as CancelledError / GeneratorExit, which neither path catches, so the
reservation leaks. Under a retry storm the leaked holds accumulate, pin the
counter above real spend, and return spurious 429 "Budget has been exceeded" to
keys whose spend is far below budget; the counter only recovers when its TTL
lapses, so the failure is intermittent and self-healing.

Release the reservation in async_streaming_data_generator (which the Anthropic
and Google SSE generators delegate to) on the (CancelledError, GeneratorExit)
path, alongside the existing max_parallel_requests release. release_budget_
reservation_on_cancel runs under asyncio.shield so it completes despite the
in-progress cancellation, is guarded by the reservation's finalized flag, and
swallows a failing release so it cannot replace the in-flight cancellation.

The refund is gated on whether a chunk reached the client. The flag is set
immediately before the yield, after the slow-path hook await: an async generator
suspends at the yield, so a GeneratorExit on disconnect after a delivered chunk
sees it True (keep the hold), while a cancellation during the slow-path await
leaves it False (refund, nothing sent). A non-streaming cancellation delivers
nothing and a completed non-streaming response is reconciled by the success
callback, so neither needs a release here.

Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(proxy): reconcile a cancelled reservation to input cost, not zero

A streaming request cancelled before the first chunk previously reconciled its
reservation to zero and finalized it. But by the time the generator is
consuming the response the provider call was already dispatched, so the input
tokens were billed even though no chunk reached the client, and the
success/failure cost callbacks are skipped on cancellation. Refunding to zero
let a caller send an expensive request and abort pre-token to dodge the input
charge.

Compute the request's input-token cost at reservation time and reconcile the
cancelled reservation to it instead of zero. The worst-case output portion of
the reservation is still released (so a legitimate mid-flight cancellation no
longer pins the counter and 429s the key), while the input the provider already
processed is charged.

---------

Co-authored-by: Bytechoreographer <Bytechoreographer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(caching): encode object name in GCS cache GET path (#30378)

GCS cache reads always missed when gcs_path was set. The GET methods
interpolated the object name directly into the URL path, while the GCS
JSON API requires it to be URL-encoded (a "/" must be sent as %2F).

With gcs_path configured the object name is "<prefix>/<sha256>", so the
raw slash produced a malformed object path and GCS returned 404. httpx
does not raise on 4xx, so the status_code == 200 check fell through and
get/async_get returned None, silently missing on every read. Without
gcs_path the key has no slash, which is why this went unnoticed.

Wrap the object name with urllib.parse.quote(..., safe="") in get_cache
and async_get_cache. Apply the same encoding to the name= query
parameter in set_cache and async_set_cache so the key written matches
the key read back.

Adds regression tests asserting the GET path and SET query are encoded
(%2F) when gcs_path is set, for both sync and async paths; these fail on
the unpatched code.

Fixes #30377

* chore: add soniox stt-async-v5 model (#30672)

* fix(proxy): include model group aliases in v1 model info (#30626)

* Include model group aliases in v1 model info

* Fix model info alias implementation

* removed extra blank line

* chore: rerun CI

* fix(lint): remove redundant noqa directive in proxy_cli.py

* fix: address greptile review - restore bedrock_mantle auth symbols, guard OCI empty message list, validate DIRECT_URL scheme

* Revert "fix: address greptile review - restore bedrock_mantle auth symbols, guard OCI empty message list, validate DIRECT_URL scheme"

This reverts commit 52c7a07777.

* Revert "fix(anthropic-messages): apply cache_control_injection_points on /v1/messages path (#30341)"

This reverts commit c9e8a177bd.

* Revert "fix(proxy): stop IAM-refresh engine restart from cascading reconnects (#29176) (#30183)"

This reverts commit 85828da695.

* fix(proxy): stop IAM-refresh engine restart from cascading reconnects (#29176) (#30183)

An RDS IAM token refresh recreates the Prisma client, which SIGKILLs the
running query-engine and spawns a new one. That planned kill was
indistinguishable from a crash, and three reconnect paths used two
uncoordinated locks, so a single refresh triggered a cascade of engine
kill/respawn cycles:

  1. `_safe_refresh_token` (holds `_reconnection_lock`) -> recreate -> kill old
     engine, spawn new one.
  2. The engine-death watcher sees that kill, assumes a crash, and calls
     `attempt_db_reconnect(force=True)` (a different lock,
     `_db_reconnect_lock`) -> recreate again -> kills the fresh engine.
  3. In-flight queries failing during the swap are classified as transport
     errors and trigger their own `attempt_db_reconnect` -> recreate again.

Fix coordinates planned restarts across the wrapper and the watcher:

  - PrismaWrapper records the old engine PID in `_expected_engine_deaths`
    before killing it; all four watcher death-detectors (waitpid thread,
    pidfd, already-dead probe, os.kill poll) consume that PID and skip the
    reconnect instead of treating it as a crash.
  - `recreate_prisma_client` now serializes through `_reconnection_lock` and
    bumps a monotonic `_engine_generation`. Callers pass `expected_generation`
    as an optimistic-lock token, so racing/cascading recreates collapse into a
    single restart (losers no-op). This closes the two-lock gap.
  - The direct reconnect path probes the writer with SELECT 1 before
    recreating; a healthy connection (e.g. engine already replaced by a
    refresh) skips the recreate entirely.
  - `_safe_refresh_token` coalesces: it skips when the current token still has
    more than the refresh buffer of runway, so stacked triggers (proactive
    loop + __getattr__ fallback) don't each restart the engine. An
    `on_engine_replaced` hook re-arms the watcher on the new PID.

RoutingPrismaWrapper forwards `expected_generation` and skips recreating the
reader when the writer recreate was skipped.

* fix(lint): modernize type annotations in IAM-refresh prisma client files (UP006/UP045)

* Revert "feat(proxy): show session-aggregate cost and duration in request logs (#25708) (#30507)"

This reverts commit f530b2237c.

* Revert "fix(dashscope): treat an explicit 0.0 tier cost as a real price, not missing (#30653)"

This reverts commit 4f58bd0df5.

* Revert "fix(oci): make Cohere {{trace}} judges work (tool param types + agentic tool-calling continuation) (#30646)"

This reverts commit 50f34e0b15.

* Revert "fix(proxy): fail fast on non-PostgreSQL DATABASE_URL instead of hanging on startup (#30366)"

This reverts commit 0544eed6ea.

* fix(bedrock_mantle): restore BedrockMantleAuthMixin and constants removed by routing rewrite

* fix(key management): restore exact /key/list user_id & key_alias matching by default (#30593)

Before substring search was added (commit 33bd570d5e), /key/list matched user_id
and key_alias exactly. That change made admin-authenticated calls substring-match
by default, breaking the prior contract: a caller passing an exact user_id as an
access filter (e.g. an integration scoping to one user with an admin key) then
received other users' keys -- user_id="alice" also returned "alice2",
"alice-test", etc. This is a cross-user key disclosure.

Make substring matching opt-in via a new admin-only substring_matching=true query
param; default to exact, restoring the prior behavior. The dashboard search box
(keyListCall) passes the flag so partial search still works. Non-admins remain
exact and scoped to their own keys.

Updates the proxy-behavior key_alias test to opt in and adds an exact-by-default
guard; adds list_keys unit coverage for the opt-in gate.

---------

Co-authored-by: perseus <51974392+tcconnally@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Hannah Smith <64043506+hannahmadison@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Charlie Patterson <Pattersoncharlesl@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Matthew Lapointe <mlapointe@alpha-sense.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: KRISH SONI <67964054+krishvsoni@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Yash Raj Pandey <55940078+devYRPauli@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Nitish Agarwal <1592163+nitishagar@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: hcl <chenglunhu@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: tushar8408 <32977767+tushar8408@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: AD Mohanraj <admohanraj@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Fede Kamelhar <federico.kamelhar@oracle.com>
Co-authored-by: Lavish Bansal <lavish.bansal619@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: max-amos <gruffulom@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: inference_provider <max@redactedlab.com>
Co-authored-by: NK <93352237+Nithish-Yenaganti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: 安妮的心动录 <74543653+anneheartrecord@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Rick <26716961+Bytechoreographer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Bytechoreographer <Bytechoreographer@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: greptile-apps[bot] <165735046+greptile-apps[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Burak Ömür <burak.omur.1998@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Dan Lemon <daniel.lemon@amazee.io>
Co-authored-by: Vanika Dangi <166420943+vanika02@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jay Gowdy <130084966+jgowdy-godaddy@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-06-18 13:55:35 -07:00
milan-berri
d84499e0f2
fix(team): reserve team budget raises for proxy admins on /team/update (#30030)
The caller's PERSONAL max_budget was the wrong yardstick for /team/update: a
team's spend ceiling has nothing to do with the admin's own key budget. That
comparison was an unintended side effect of reusing _check_user_team_limits()
(which exists for the /team/new path) and broke the UI, which re-sends the
unchanged budget on every save.

New behavior on /team/update for standalone teams:
- A team admin (already authorized via _verify_team_access) may freely KEEP or
  LOWER the team budget, and change models/tpm/rpm, without being gated by their
  personal limits.
- GROWING a team's spend ceiling is a budget-authority action reserved for proxy
  admins -> 403 for team admins. "Growing" covers both raising max_budget above
  the team's current finite value and removing the cap entirely (max_budget=null,
  detected via model_fields_set so an explicit null is distinguished from an
  omitted field). For a team that currently has no cap, setting a finite value is
  a restriction and is allowed.
- Org-scoped teams remain governed by _check_org_team_limits() (capped by the
  org budget).

Also reverts the #29525 existing_team_max_budget workaround in
_check_user_team_limits() back to the create-only form; /team/new still enforces
the creator's personal caps.

docs(access_control): resolve the contradiction in the team-admin section —
team admins can keep/lower the budget and manage rate limits/models, but cannot
raise the team budget (proxy-admin only).

tests: unit + behavior coverage for raise-blocked, cap-removal-blocked (team
admin), raise/removal allowed (proxy admin), uncapped-team restriction allowed,
keep/lower/resend allowed, and unchanged create-path guards.

Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
2026-06-09 09:19:15 -07:00
yuneng-jiang
5e16f20962
test(proxy): phase-4 payload behavior pinning for tier-2/3 key + team management endpoints (#28681)
* test(proxy): phase-4 payload behavior pinning for tier-2/3 key + team management endpoints

Extends the Phase 1–3 behavior-pin suite at tests/proxy_behavior/management/
with a second axis: payload-shape pinning. Phase 1–3 held payload minimal
and pinned (actor, target) → status across 37 routes; Phase 4 holds the
caller fixed at an authorized actor, varies the payload shape, and asserts
the observable DB effect (on accept) or the named guard / row-unchanged
(on reject). Faithfulness contract from Phase 1–3 is unchanged.

Six families + one gap-closer (59 new scenarios, 620 → 679 total):

  * F1 — key budget / rate-limit (test_key_budget_limits.py, 18)
  * F2 — key↔team reassignment   (test_key_team_change.py, 6)
  * F3 — team budget / rate-limit (test_team_budget_limits.py, 15)
  * F4 — member-info validation   (test_team_member_info_validation.py, 5)
  * F5 — permission batching      (test_team_permissions_bulk_update.py, 6)
  * F6 — org-scoped team access   (+2 detail-string pins in existing files)
  * F7 — coverage gap-closer      (test_f7_coverage_closeout.py, 7)

Harness extensions in conftest.py (additive only):
  * create_scratch_org() seeder with its own scratch-prefixed budget row
  * budget / limit fields on create_scratch_team()
  * scratch teardown also sweeps litellm_organizationtable

Coverage telemetry (behavior-suite-only):
  * key_management_endpoints.py  60 % → 65 % (+82 lines)
  * team_endpoints.py            62 % → 72 % (+137 lines, crosses 70 % stretch)

Key lands under 70 % per plan §7 escape hatch — the gap is dominated by
routes outside F1–F6 scope (key list/info v2 internals) and structurally
dead org-budget guards (call sites at lines 889 + 2310 + 985 + 1751 load
the org without include_budget_table=True, so org.litellm_budget_table is
None at guard time and the aggregate guard no-ops). Pinned as observed
no-op behavior so a future fix that flips the flag turns these into reds.

Zero source-code changes; pyproject.toml diff is empty;
test_route_coverage.py stays green untouched; G3 grep guards still green;
local wall-time 14 s for the full suite (no coverage), 22 s with coverage.

G4 regression-replay protocol executed against three representative
fix-PR parents (410ce761dc, 0bd49ecb8b, 8bbc61e03c): all Phase 4 tests
PASS at pre-fix SHAs — confirming the F1–F7 layer is a helper-body pin,
not a regression-replay layer for those specific historical bypass
shapes. Targeted RED-bait scenarios for each fix are left for a
follow-up PR.

* test(proxy): push key_management_endpoints.py past the 70% stretch (F7-extension)

Adds 24 more payload-pin scenarios in test_f7_key_coverage_push.py
following the same accepted-effect / rejected-guard pattern. Each
scenario cites the file:line range it pins; same anti-snapshot rules
apply.

Target ranges (all reachable via HTTP-boundary payload variation):
  * 5942-6063  /key/health with metadata.logging → test_key_logging body
  * 4565-4692  /key/reset_spend happy + 404 + non-admin gate + value validation
  * 4421-4533  /key/regenerate ghost-404 + happy + new_key + grace_period
  * 4168-4202  _insert_deprecated_key body via grace_period
  * 6118-6133  _enforce_unique_key_alias duplicate-alias rejection
  * 6148-6169  validate_model_max_budget malformed-payload rejection
  * 4708-4789  validate_key_list_check user/team/org/key_hash branches
  * 2622-2733  /key/bulk_update mixed success/failure + admin gate + size limits
  * 2797-2950  /team/key/bulk_update all-keys path + explicit-keys dedupe + 404
  * 5108-5207  /key/aliases admin + scoped + search-filter branches
  * 3253-3303  /key/info ghost + explicit-key + no-key-uses-auth-header
  * 3427-3436  generate_key_helper_fn budget_limits initialization
  * 1794-1815  prepare_key_update_data duration + budget_duration paths
  * 5280-5388  _build_filter_conditions across include_created_by_keys/team/sort/alias

Coverage telemetry — full PR4 dataset:

  key_management_endpoints.py: 60 % → 71 %  (+11 pts, +194 lines)
  team_endpoints.py:           62 % → 72 %  (+10 pts, +137 lines)

Both files now over the plan §7 PR4.M4 70 % stretch as a side effect of
pinning real payload behavior. 721 tests pass in 19 s local (full suite,
no coverage); 27 s with coverage. Zero source-code changes; pyproject.toml
diff still empty; test_route_coverage.py + G3 grep guards still green.

Honest finding (kept from the prior commit's body): four structurally-dead
org-budget guards remain pinned as observed no-op behavior — they fire
only when get_org_object is called with include_budget_table=True, which
none of the four management-endpoint call sites currently do. Pinned so
a future change that flips the flag turns these into reds.

Two helper guards are honest-ceiling: _validate_reset_spend_value's
isinstance check at line 4568 is unreachable from HTTP because Pydantic
422s non-float before the helper runs; same shape for /team/key/bulk_update's
missing team_id / no-selector pre-handler guards.

* test(proxy): address PR review — try/finally cleanup + loosen 500 envelope pins + Optional annotations

Greptile review feedback on PR #28681:

1. Wrap manual budget-row cleanup in try/finally so an assertion failure
   doesn't leave non-scratch-prefixed budget rows orphaned across CI re-runs
   (test_team_new_with_team_member_budget_creates_budget_row and
   test_team_update_team_member_budget_upserts).
2. Loosen the two 500-status pins to in (400, 422, 500) — the named-guard
   substring is the real pin; the outer ValueError-wrap envelope is an
   implementation detail that a future improvement should be free to fix
   to a proper 400/422 without flipping these tests red.
3. Add missing Optional annotations on _seed_token's max_budget / metadata
   / team_id keyword args (they default to None).

Greptile's typo flag on 'read-world' in the conftest comment is declined —
'read-world' is the project's established term for the immutable seeded
world fixture (see other usages in conftest.py and actors.py).

721 tests still pass in 17 s.
2026-05-23 12:16:29 -07:00
yuneng-jiang
f62ae93e13
test(proxy): behavior-pinning matrix for tier-2/3 key + team management endpoints (#28620)
* test(proxy): add create_scratch_actor harness helper

Adds create_scratch_actor() to the management behavior-suite conftest and
extends create_scratch_team() with team_member_permissions / models kwargs,
needed by the PR3 team-key-permission and team-model matrices. The new
helper mints a scratch-prefixed user + verification token (+ org
memberships), all reclaimed by the existing scratch-prefix teardown.

* test(proxy): pin /key block, unblock, health, aliases behavior

Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /key/block, POST /key/unblock,
POST /key/health, and GET /key/aliases. Pins that the management-route gate
401s ORG_ADMIN-role callers before _check_key_admin_access runs, the
block/unblock round-trip on the blocked column, missing-key 404, and the
_apply_non_admin_alias_scope visibility rules for /key/aliases.

* test(proxy): pin /key/bulk_update + /team/key/bulk_update behavior

Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /key/bulk_update (PROXY_ADMIN-only;
ORG_ADMIN stopped 401 at the route gate, INTERNAL_USER-role 403 at the
handler) and POST /team/key/bulk_update (team-member-permission gate keyed
on KEY_UPDATE). Pins batch semantics: empty/over-cap 400, per-key failure
isolation into failed_updates, all_keys_in_team broadcast, and no-keys 404.
Adds an optional key_alias arg to create_scratch_key for multi-key scenarios.

* test(proxy): pin /key SA-generate, v2-info, reset-spend behavior

Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /key/service-account/generate
(team-membership + team-member-permission gating; SA keys carry no user_id),
POST /v2/key/info (per-key _can_user_query_key_info silently drops invisible
keys), and POST /key/{key}/reset_spend (PROXY_ADMIN or team admin only;
missing key 404, reset-value 400). Pins that ORG_ADMIN-role callers are
stopped 401 at the management-route gate on the two non-info routes.

* test(proxy): close PR1/PR2 key-side deferred coverage gaps

Closes the four key-side gaps deferred from PR1/PR2:
- 404 on missing key for /key/update and /key/delete (not 401/403)
- denied /key/update leaves max_budget/tpm_limit/rpm_limit untouched
- /key/regenerate enforces litellm.upperbound_key_generate_params (#26340)
- /key/list key_alias substring vs exact (admin-only) + team_id filter,
  and a non-admin filtering a foreign team is 403

* test(proxy): pin /team block, unblock, available, filter/ui, members/me

Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /team/block + /team/unblock
(management-route gate fronts _verify_team_access; reachable only by
PROXY_ADMIN and an org admin of the team's own org), GET /team/available
(default empty path), GET /team/filter/ui (route-gated PROXY-ADMIN-only
despite the handler having no gate), and GET /team/{team_id}/members/me
(caller resolves its own membership; non-member 404, no-user_id key 400).

* test(proxy): pin /team model add/delete + permissions endpoints

Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /team/model/add + /team/model/delete
(route-gated PROXY-ADMIN-only; missing team 404), GET /team/permissions_list +
POST /team/permissions_update (self-managed; proxy/team/org admin pass), and
POST /team/permissions_bulk_update (PROXY_ADMIN-only). Pins the deliberate
divergence that the available-team self-join grants read access via
permissions_list but never write access via permissions_update.

* test(proxy): pin /team delete, bulk_member_add, v2/list, daily/activity

Adds behavior-pinning matrices for POST /team/delete (per-team
_verify_team_access; batch aborts whole on a missing id), POST
/team/bulk_member_add (route-gated PROXY-ADMIN-only; empty/over-cap 400),
GET /v2/team/list (_enforce_list_team_v2_access — bare query 401s regular
users, org-scoped for org admins) and GET /team/daily/activity (non-member
team_ids filter 404, the VERIA-43 fix).

* test(proxy): add route-coverage gate + close team org-relocation gap

Adds test_route_coverage.py (PR3.M1): parses every @router route literal
from the two management-endpoint source files and asserts each is exercised
by >=1 behavior-suite scenario — a permanent regression guard for future
routes. Closes the last PR1/PR2 deferred gap: the /team/update org-relocation
allowed branch, exercised by a dual-org-admin minted via create_scratch_actor.
test_team_model uses literal route URLs so the coverage parser resolves them.

* test(proxy): bound plain route params to one path segment in coverage gate

Plain path params ({team_id}) now compile to [^/?]+ instead of [^?]+, so a
parameter cannot span '/'. Starlette ':path' params still match across '/'.
Keeps the route-coverage guard from falsely reporting a future multi-segment
route as covered. All 37 routes remain covered.
2026-05-22 11:24:41 -07:00
yuneng-jiang
67e6e5e1df
test(proxy): behavior-pinning matrix for team management endpoints (#28441)
* test(proxy): behavior-pinning matrix for team management endpoints

PR2 (Team Tier-1) of the management-endpoint behavior-pinning effort.
Extends the tests/proxy_behavior/management/ harness PR1 built and adds
the actor x target-resource authz matrix for the 7 team endpoints:
/team/new, /team/info, /team/list, /team/update, /team/member_add,
/team/member_delete, /team/member_update.

Tests-only, no production code changes.

Harness extensions:
- actors.py: ORG_B_ADMIN actor (org admin of ORG_B) and TEAM_GAMMA (an
  ORG_A team with no actor members), so team-targeting endpoints get a
  clean own / same-org-other / cross-org target axis.
- conftest.py: create_scratch_team() raw-seeds target teams without
  /team/new side effects; the scratch teardown now also strips dangling
  scratch-team refs from LiteLLM_UserTable.teams.

156 new scenarios; status codes pinned to observed handler behavior.

* test(proxy): record mutmut run blockers in PR2 triage doc

Attempted a scoped local mutmut run for G5; it did not complete. Record
the three concrete blockers in mutmut_triage/pr2-team-tier1.md so the next
attempt has a head start:

1. mutmut's mutants/ sandbox is import-shadowed by the worktree source.
2. the legacy mock suite and the real-DB behavior suite cannot share a
   pytest session (mock suite globally patches prisma_client).
3. the CI mutation-test.yml workflow starts no Postgres, so its stats
   phase now aborts on the behavior-suite tests PR1 added to tests_dir.

mutmut stays a deferred follow-up (as in PR1); the binding pre-merge
signal remains the behavior matrix (G1) and the G4 regression-replay.

* test(proxy): drop suite README + triage doc, trim test comments

Remove the two prose docs from the behavior suite (README.md and
mutmut_triage/pr2-team-tier1.md) and tighten the comment blocks on the
team test files + harness down to the load-bearing parts (the gate each
matrix pins, plus genuinely surprising results). No behavior change —
all 286 scenarios still pass.

* test(proxy): remove mutmut tests_dir comment
2026-05-21 16:57:25 -07:00
yuneng-jiang
79a5a7abad
feat(tests): behavior-pinning harness + Key Tier-1 matrix (#28321)
* test(proxy_behavior): scaffold session-scoped async ASGI client + liveness smoke

Slice 2 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. New top-level dir
tests/proxy_behavior/management/ outside every existing pytest glob.

conftest.py initialises the proxy app once per session against the DATABASE_URL
the harness boots Postgres at, wraps it in httpx.AsyncClient via in-process
ASGITransport. The one smoke test asserts /health/liveliness returns 200, which
exercises the full FastAPI middleware stack against a real app — no mocks.

Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d

* test(proxy_behavior): connect prisma via real lifespan; key/generate de-risk

Slice 3 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. The fixture now
enters the real FastAPI lifespan (proxy_startup_event) instead of just calling
initialize() — that is where prisma_client is connected, password migration is
kicked off, and the rest of the startup wiring runs.

Tests pin the loop to the session scope so the AsyncClient created in the
session fixture and the prisma connection opened in the lifespan share the
same loop as the test bodies.

New de-risk smoke: POST /key/generate with the master key returns 200, the
returned sk- token resolves to a hashed row in LiteLLM_VerificationToken, and
the cleartext token is never stored. Proves auth + handler + helper + prisma
all wire together end-to-end against a real Postgres.

Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d

* test(proxy_behavior): seed 8-actor read-world for the authz matrix

Slice 4 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. New
``actors.py`` defines the actor enum + seeds an immutable world (2 orgs,
2 teams, 8 users, 8 verification tokens) under the ``behavior-pin-``
prefix so the rows are identifiable in psql and ``_wipe_world`` is
targeted.

Each actor key is created with its cleartext form generated locally and
its hashed form (via ``litellm.proxy.utils.hash_token``) stored in
``LiteLLM_VerificationToken`` — so the real ``user_api_key_auth`` accepts
the cleartext bearer token. Roles, ``team_id``, ``organization_id``, and
the service-account metadata flag are all set on the seeded rows so the
auth layer resolves the same scopes a real proxy would.

The session-scoped ``world`` fixture re-seeds at session start (idempotent
via wipe-then-create), and the smoke test confirms each of the 8 actor
keys can call ``/key/info`` on itself and receive its own row back.

Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d

* test(proxy_behavior): per-test scratch namespace + targeted delete_many teardown

Slice 5 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. Adds the
``scratch`` function-scoped fixture: each test gets a uuid4-derived
namespace prefix, tags writes with it (``key_alias``, ``team_alias``,
``user_id``, ``budget_id``), and the fixture teardown ``delete_many``-s
any row whose namespace column starts with that prefix.

Cleanup uses Prisma model methods only (no raw SQL, per CLAUDE.md) and
orders deletes children-before-parents to avoid FK conflicts. The Slice 3
de-risk smoke is migrated onto the same fixture so it stops accumulating
untagged tokens across repeated local runs.

Smoke proves both halves of the contract: one test writes a scratch-tagged
key and asserts it lands; a second test runs after the first's teardown
and asserts no rows in the scratch namespace survived.

Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d

* test(proxy_behavior): codify G3 (strict-import grep) as a pytest item

Slice 6 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. Two new tests
walk every .py file under tests/proxy_behavior/ and assert:

  * no ``from litellm.proxy.management_endpoints`` import — the suite is
    deliberately constrained to the HTTP boundary so it survives handler
    refactors;
  * no ``mock``/``patch`` on ``user_api_key_auth`` — mocking auth is the
    structural failure mode of the existing 11k-line mock suite, and the
    point of this harness is that the real auth layer runs.

Codifying G3 as a CI test removes the "did someone forget to check the
PR-description checklist" failure mode.

Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d

* style(proxy_behavior): apply black to G3 grep test

Follow-up to 6f588c753b — line-length fixes only, no behavior change.

* test(proxy_behavior): pin /key/generate authz matrix (18 scenarios)

Slice 7 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. Parametrized
matrix across two axes: actor (8 seeded) × target scope (self, team_alpha
in org_a, team_beta in org_b). 18 scenarios after dropping non-applicable
combos. Whole-suite wall-time stays at ~4.7s (well under the 10-min G2
budget for the eventual CI job).

While pinning, the test surfaced one seed gap: ``_get_user_in_team`` reads
``members_with_roles`` (a JSON list of ``{user_id, role}``), not the plain
``members`` String[]. Both columns are now populated in the seed to match
what the real ``/team/new`` handler would produce.

Expected status codes are intentionally heterogeneous (200, 400, 401)
because the current handler emits different statuses depending on which
check fails first (role gate, team-member-perm gate, "not assigned"
check). Pinning the *observed* codes — not what they "should" be — is
exactly the regression signal we want.

Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d

* test(proxy_behavior): pin /key/info authz matrix (24 scenarios)

Slice 8 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. 8 actors ×
3 target keys (own, OWNER's key in org_a, CROSS_ORG_USER's key in org_b)
covering self-read, same-team-peer read, and cross-org read.

Notable pinned behaviors (intentionally surfaced for review, not "fixed"):

  * ORG_ADMIN gets 403 on individual key info even within their own org
    — visibility is scoped to "your own keys" + "your team's keys", not
    "your org's keys".
  * Same-team peers (INTERNAL_USER, UNRELATED_SAME_ORG, SERVICE_ACCOUNT)
    DO see each other's keys. Whether that is desired is for the team
    to decide; this PR only pins the existing behavior so unintentional
    changes flip the matrix red.

Wall-time is unchanged (~4.3s for the slice on its own).

Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d

* test(proxy_behavior): pin /key/list default-visibility matrix (8 scenarios)

Slice 9 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. For /key/list
the response IS the matrix: each of the 8 seeded actors calls the endpoint
with default filters and the test asserts set-equality between the returned
visible-token set (filtered to seeded tokens only, so unrelated rows can't
flap the assertion) and a pinned expected actor-set.

Pinned default visibility:

  * PROXY_ADMIN sees all 8 actors' keys.
  * Every other actor sees only their own key — including ORG_ADMIN
    (which had broader expectations going in but currently behaves
    same-as-internal-user for /key/list defaults) and TEAM_ADMIN (no
    team-aggregation without include_team_keys=true).

Future changes that broaden or narrow any single actor's default
visibility will turn this matrix red — exactly the regression signal we
want. Parameter-driven views (include_team_keys, filters) are deferred to
Slice 13 / PR2 follow-up.

Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d

* test(proxy_behavior): pin /key/update authz matrix + mutation re-read (21 scenarios)

Slice 10 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. 8 actors ×
3 target shapes (self-owned, OWNER-scoped in org_a/team_alpha,
CROSS_ORG_USER-scoped in org_b/team_beta) = 21 applicable scenarios.

Each test:
  1. Master-key-seeds a fresh scratch key with the target's (user_id,
     team_id) scope (so the read-world stays untouched).
  2. Has the actor under test POST /key/update flipping ``models`` to
     a known marker list.
  3. Asserts the status code AND the DB row's ``models`` field — present
     when 200, unchanged otherwise — so a handler that silently mutates
     on a denied response surfaces red.

Observed gating (pinned, not endorsed):

  * PROXY_ADMIN bypasses every check.
  * ORG_ADMIN is blocked by an early role gate, always 401.
  * Every other (INTERNAL_USER-rolesed) actor hits one of three failure
    modes — 403 "user can only create keys for themselves", 403
    "only proxy admins, team admins, or org admins", or 401
    "team_member_permission_error" — depending on whether they own the
    target and whether they're a team admin / member of its team.

Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d

* test(proxy_behavior): pin /key/regenerate authz matrix + rotation contract (22 scenarios)

Slice 11 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. 21 matrix
scenarios (8 actors × 3 target shapes, minus the cross_org/owner combo
that exists in the seed but isn't applicable) plus one smoke for the
``/key/{key:path}/regenerate`` route registration.

On 200 outcomes the test verifies the full rotation contract:
  * the regenerate response key differs from the old cleartext,
  * the OLD cleartext returns 401 on a follow-up ``/key/info``,
  * the NEW cleartext returns 200 on a follow-up ``/key/info``.

On denied outcomes the test verifies the OLD cleartext still works —
catching any handler that mutates the token row on a failed call.

Pinned authz divergence vs /key/update: regenerate routes most denials
through the team-member-perm 401 path rather than the role-gate 403
path. The matrices for both endpoints are now in tree side-by-side, so
any future refactor that "harmonises" the codes will turn one of the two
red.

Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d

* test(proxy_behavior): pin /key/delete authz matrix + post-delete contract (21 scenarios)

Slice 12 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. Mirrors
slices 10/11. On success: cleartext can no longer authenticate
(handles both hard-delete and soft-delete to LiteLLM_DeletedVerificationToken).
On denial: row survives and cleartext still authenticates.

Notable behavior gap with /key/update: same-team peers (internal_user,
unrelated_same_org, etc.) get 403 on /key/delete for OWNER's key — i.e.
cannot delete each other's keys — whereas they CAN read each other's
keys (Slice 8). Delete is stricter than read. Pinned as-is.

Cumulative whole-suite wall-time is 5.9s for all 128 tests on the local
runner — well under the 10-min G2 budget for the CI job in Slice 13.

Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d

* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): add PR-triggered workflow for the behavior suite

Slice 13 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. New
workflow ``test-unit-proxy-mgmt-behavior.yml`` fires ``on: pull_request``
for the same branch set every other proxy unit-test workflow watches
(main, litellm_internal_staging, litellm_oss_branch, litellm_**).

It delegates to the existing reusable ``_test-unit-services-base.yml``
with ``enable-postgres: true``, which already provisions a postgres:14
service container and runs ``prisma db push`` against it before pytest
collects. ``reruns: 0`` because a behavior-pinning matrix that needs
reruns is itself a regression — flakes are signal.

``timeout-minutes: 15`` gives generous headroom over the local 5.9s
whole-suite wall-time; the binding G2 budget is 10 min.

Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d

* docs(proxy_behavior): G4 regression-replay table for Key Tier-1

Slice 14 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. Documents
the regression-replay verification methodology + a 12-row table mapping
recent fix-PRs touching key_management_endpoints.py to the catching
scenarios in the PR1 matrix.

One canonical RED→GREEN cycle is captured verbatim — c7c3df2b02
"extend /key/update admin check to non-budget fields". Under the
parent-of-fix code, 6 scenarios in test_key_update.py flip from 200 to
403; under HEAD code, all 21 pass. The handler swap is the only change
between the two runs, confirming the matrix catches the behavior shift
the fix introduced.

The table also calls out 4 genuine coverage gaps deferred to PR2/PR3:
404-on-missing-key, budget-limit counter assertions, /key/regenerate
upperbound enforcement, and /key/list filter-param views.

Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d

* chore(mutmut): include the behavior suite in tests_dir + G5 triage stub

Slice 15 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. Appends
``tests/proxy_behavior/management/`` to ``[tool.mutmut].tests_dir`` so
the existing mutation-test workflow runs against both the legacy mock
suite AND the new behavior suite — the latter is where the regression
signal will actually surface.

Adds a stub at ``tests/proxy_behavior/management/mutmut_triage/pr1.md``
documenting the G5 triage protocol (zero unreviewed survivors in the 6
Tier-1 handler functions) and a placeholder baseline-metrics table to
fill in after the first manually-triggered mutmut run completes — runs
take hours and run on a manual cadence, so PR1 ships with the wiring +
protocol, not the numbers. The actual baseline is recorded in a
follow-up once ``gh workflow run mutation-test.yml`` finishes.

The kill rate stays telemetry-only, never a gate. G5 (per-survivor
classification) is the binding mutation gate.

Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d

* docs(proxy_behavior): suite README with local-repro + conventions + gates

Slice 16 of the management-endpoints behavior-pinning effort. The README
documents:

  * The same three commands the CI workflow runs locally (BYO-DATABASE_URL,
    no new tooling).
  * Suite layout — what each test file covers, which slice it lands.
  * The asyncio loop_scope convention required for session fixtures
    (httpx AsyncClient + prisma connection) to share a loop with each
    test body.
  * G3 strict-import convention + the test that enforces it.
  * Read-world vs scratch-world fixture conventions.
  * Behavior-pinning philosophy: pin observed codes; flag, don't judge.
  * Where each G1–G5 + PR1.M1–M3 gate's evidence lives.

Plan: https://www.notion.so/36643b8acdab8128a581ced0f6a4744d

* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): drop xdist (workers=0) to fix seed race

First run on PR #28321 failed with UniqueViolation on
``behavior-pin-budget`` plus cascading missing-membership FK errors. Both
xdist workers entered ``seed_world()`` concurrently against the shared
Postgres service container; whichever lost the race left the world in a
half-seeded state and downstream tests ran against missing
team_membership rows.

Whole-suite wall-time is ~7s sequentially, so disabling xdist here costs
nothing — and the seed itself is the wrong place to add per-worker
isolation (the world is intentionally shared so set-equality assertions
in /key/list have a deterministic expected set).

* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): seed scratch keys via proxy_admin actor, not master

Second CI run failed: ``/key/generate`` with explicit ``user_id`` returned
403 "User can only create keys for themselves. Got user_id=X, Your ID=None"
in every test that called ``_create_scratch_key`` with a per-actor user_id.
The bare master key's auth path was producing ``user_id=None`` in the
fresh CI Postgres, which doesn't trigger the PROXY_ADMIN bypass in
``_user_can_only_create_keys_for_themselves`` reliably. Locally the same
master key path worked, masking the issue.

Fix: every ``_create_scratch_key`` helper now takes a seeder cleartext
and the test bodies pass ``world.keys[Actor.PROXY_ADMIN].cleartext``.
That actor was seeded with ``user_role=PROXY_ADMIN`` AND a concrete
``user_id``, so the bypass fires deterministically in both environments.

No behavior shift in the matrices themselves — all 128 scenarios still
pass locally; only the setup helper's auth identity changed.

The bare-master smoke (test_smoke + test_scratch_teardown) is intentionally
left on the master key path: those tests don't pass ``user_id`` in the
body so they don't hit the user_id-mismatch gate.

* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): diag — run world-seed test first + bump max-failures

Third CI run failed identically: seeded PROXY_ADMIN actor's auth resolves
to ``user_id=None`` even though the DB row has the right ``user_id``. The
suite was aborting at maxfail=10 inside test_key_delete, so test_world_seed
(which would tell us whether the seed itself is reachable) never ran in CI.

Two diagnostic moves on this push, no behavior change:

  * Rename ``test_world_seed.py`` → ``test_aaa_world_seed.py`` so it's
    the first collected file. If it passes in CI we know the seed is
    fine and the bug lives downstream; if it fails the same way the
    bug is in the auth resolution path.
  * Bump ``max-failures`` to 200 for this workflow so we see the full
    failure surface instead of stopping at the first cascading setup
    error. Will tighten back down once the suite is green.

Adds one new test ``test_proxy_admin_actor_can_create_keys_for_others``
that explicitly exercises the PROXY_ADMIN bypass via /key/generate with
an explicit user_id — the same shape the matrix setup helper uses but
without the matrix machinery muddying the diagnostic.

* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): await LiteLLM_VerificationTokenView creation in fixture

Fourth CI run still failed because the proxy's lifespan kicks off
``prisma_client.check_view_exists()`` as a fire-and-forget background
task — that task is what creates ``LiteLLM_VerificationTokenView``, the
SQL view ``user_api_key_auth`` queries to resolve a token to its
user_id / user_role / team.

On a fresh Postgres (CI), the first test races the background task. The
view doesn't exist when the first auth call runs, the resolver falls
through to a degraded path that returns ``user_id=None``, and every
matrix test that depends on the seeded actor's identity then fails
confusingly with "Got user_id=X, Your ID=None" 403s. Locally the view
persists across pytest runs so the race is invisible.

Fix: await ``prisma_client.check_view_exists()`` explicitly inside the
session ``proxy_app`` fixture, after the lifespan enters but before the
fixture yields. Deterministic regardless of whether the underlying DB is
fresh (CI) or warm (local).

* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): widen diagnostic to dump token / user / view shape

The fifth CI run isolated the failure to ``/key/generate`` with explicit
user_id while ``/key/info`` works for the same seeded PROXY_ADMIN actor.
The auth context's user_id is None even though the DB row has it set.

This commit widens the diagnostic test: on failure, dump the raw token
row's user_id, the user row's user_role, and what
``LiteLLM_VerificationTokenView`` actually returns for the seeded token.
If the view returns user_id=None we know the view shape is the problem;
if the view returns the right user_id we know it's a downstream code
path stripping it.

* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): unambiguous diagnostic view query

Previous diagnostic's raw SQL had an ambiguous user_id column from
joining the view with the user table, so the diagnostic itself crashed
before printing useful state. Simplified to query just the view's columns.

* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): add auth-resolver chain diagnostic

Six runs and the underlying data (token row, user row, view row) all
verified correct in CI, but auth still returns user_id=None. This
diagnostic calls the resolver primitives directly:

  1. ``prisma.get_data(table_name="combined_view")`` → raw view object
  2. ``get_key_object(...)`` → cached/DB UserAPIKeyAuth
  3. ``get_user_object(...)`` → LiteLLM_UserTable row
  4. ``_is_user_proxy_admin`` / ``_get_user_role``

and prints each intermediate via captured stdout (-s). Whichever step
returns None/False in CI is where the chain breaks. Imports come from
``litellm.proxy.auth`` (not management_endpoints), so G3 still passes.

* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): set LITELLM_MASTER_KEY env so lifespan doesn't wipe it

Real root cause of every CI run that returned ``Your ID=None`` for the
seeded actors:

  * In ``initialize()``, ``master_key`` is set from the config YAML's
    ``general_settings.master_key`` (load_config code path at
    proxy_server.py:4174).
  * Then the FastAPI lifespan (``proxy_startup_event``) runs and at line
    776 does ``master_key = get_secret_str("LITELLM_MASTER_KEY")``,
    which UNCONDITIONALLY overwrites the global.
  * In CI the env var is unset, so the post-lifespan ``master_key`` is
    None.

Downstream every auth path degrades: master-key requests don't bypass
because ``secrets.compare_digest(api_key, None)`` raises and is caught
to ``is_master_key_valid=False``; seeded-actor requests cache a
``UserAPIKeyAuth`` whose ``user_role`` never resolves through the
PROXY_ADMIN bypass; ``_is_allowed_to_make_key_request`` then hits the
``user_id`` mismatch path with ``Your ID=None``.

Locally my shell happened to have ``LITELLM_MASTER_KEY`` set from a prior
session, which is why every local run was green and CI red — exactly the
"don't generalize from your environment to CI" memory.

Fix: ``os.environ.setdefault("LITELLM_MASTER_KEY", MASTER_KEY)`` and
``os.environ.setdefault("CONFIG_FILE_PATH", config_path)`` before
entering the lifespan, so its re-read produces the same value as
``initialize()``.

Whole-suite still green locally (130 tests, ~6.4s).

* ci(proxy-mgmt-behavior): force premium_user=True so /key/regenerate isn't gated

Ninth CI run cleared every ``Your ID=None`` failure (the master_key env
fix worked end-to-end) and exposed the next thin layer of failures:
``/key/regenerate`` returns 500 "Regenerating Virtual Keys is an
Enterprise feature" in CI because the proxy can't see a
``LITELLM_LICENSE``. Locally my license is set, so the matrix passes.

The behavior matrix is supposed to pin authz, not licensing — so flip
``proxy_server.premium_user = True`` directly, both before and after the
lifespan (the lifespan re-runs ``_license_check.is_premium()`` and would
otherwise reset it). With premium gating disabled, the regenerate matrix
exercises the same authz path /key/update does.

Whole-suite still green locally (130 tests, ~6.3s).

* test(proxy_behavior): trim debug diagnostics, restore default max-failures

Followup to the CI-bring-up sequence: now that the suite is green in CI
(130 → 129 tests after this trim; 156s wall-time on ubuntu-latest), drop
the diagnostic noise left over from debugging the master_key wipe:

  * Rename ``test_aaa_world_seed.py`` back to ``test_world_seed.py`` —
    no longer needs to run first.
  * Remove ``test_auth_resolver_returns_correct_user_id_and_role`` —
    that test reached into private auth helpers to localize the bug
    between the DB and ``UserAPIKeyAuth``; it has served its purpose
    and isn't HTTP-boundary.
  * Keep ``test_proxy_admin_actor_can_create_keys_for_others`` (without
    the failure-time dump) — it's a real authz contract that pins the
    PROXY_ADMIN bypass on /key/generate, and would catch a regression
    of the same conftest interaction this sequence revealed.
  * Drop the workflow's ``max-failures: 200`` override — that was a
    debug aid for seeing the full failure surface in CI. Default of 10
    is right for a stable suite.

* chore(proxy_behavior): drop empty mutmut triage stub, fold protocol into README

The mutmut_triage/pr1.md file was a placeholder for numbers and
classifications that don't exist yet — the first mutmut run is a manual
follow-up. Empty stubs aren't evidence; deleting it.

The G5 protocol (run the workflow, triage survivors in the six Tier-1
handler functions, kill-or-accept-with-reason, zero unreviewed) moves
into the suite README's "Gate evidence" block. The real triage file
will land alongside the first mutmut follow-up.

pyproject.toml's [tool.mutmut].tests_dir entry stays — that's the
one-line wiring that makes the existing (manual-trigger) mutation-test
workflow include our suite next time someone runs it. Comment updated
to drop the dead file reference.

* chore(proxy_behavior): drop README + trim comments

Removes the suite README — its contents (local repro, layout, conventions)
were either restated by the file structure or already covered by the
workflow YAML and pyproject.toml. Trims docstrings and inline comments
across every test file to keep only non-obvious WHY (the masking
``_get_user_in_team`` reads, the LiteLLM_VerificationTokenView models-can't-
be-NULL gotcha, the org_admin/peer-visibility surprise, the rotation
contract).

Suite still 129 green locally.

* test(proxy_behavior): address Greptile review — env force, pagination, dedup

- conftest: force LITELLM_MASTER_KEY / CONFIG_FILE_PATH unconditionally
  instead of setdefault. An ambient LITELLM_MASTER_KEY with a different
  value would make the proxy authenticate on that key while the tests
  still send MASTER_KEY → silent 401s.
- test_key_list: paginate /key/list instead of a single size=100 request.
  size is capped at 100 by the endpoint, so on a non-fresh DB a single
  page could truncate PROXY_ADMIN's view and a seeded key could fall off
  the page. Walk total_pages.
- conftest: hoist the duplicated _create_scratch_key helper (copy-pasted
  and already diverged across test_key_{update,regenerate,delete}.py)
  into a single shared create_scratch_key.
- Delete regression_replay/README.md — G4 regression-replay evidence
  belongs in the PR description, not a committed doc file (repo docs
  policy + the effort's own plan both say so). Content moved to the PR.
2026-05-20 19:27:44 -07:00