* feat(schema): add workflow run tracking tables (LiteLLM_WorkflowRun, LiteLLM_WorkflowEvent, LiteLLM_WorkflowMessage)
* feat(proxy): add /v1/workflows/runs endpoints for durable agent workflow tracking
* feat(proxy): register workflow management router in proxy_server
* docs(workflows): add README for workflow run tracking API
* test(workflows): add unit tests for /v1/workflows/runs endpoints
* fix(workflows): atomic event+status update via tx(), run_id 404 guard, sequence retry on collision
* test(workflows): add tx mock, 404 on unknown run_id, retry-on-collision tests
* fix(workflows): constrain status to Literal enum, rename total→count in list responses
* add tenant isolation and bounded limits to workflow endpoints
* add created_by column and index to LiteLLM_WorkflowRun
* add ownership and bounded-limit tests for workflow endpoints
* Fix workflow run ownership for null owners
* guard prisma import in workflow_management_endpoints
* sync schema.prisma copies with workflow run models
* black: format workflow_management_endpoints.py
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Read user_id and team_id from the request's litellm_params metadata when
fabricating the UserAPIKeyAuth handed to the managed_files hook, so
batches created via passthrough are attributed to the real requester
instead of a hardcoded fallback. Adds parametrized regression coverage
for both the populated-metadata and empty-kwargs cases.
The previous commit removed the only top-level use of
``CommonProxyErrors`` (the enterprise-gate ``raise ValueError``).
Ruff F401 flagged the import as unused; the function-local import at
line 2601 in a separate handler is the only remaining caller.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pass-through endpoints configured in
``general_settings.pass_through_endpoints`` defaulted to ``auth: false``
and the safe ``auth: true`` setting was rejected at startup unless the
operator had a LiteLLM Enterprise license. Net result: OSS deployments
had **no safe configuration** — every pass-through admins added without
remembering ``auth: true`` shipped an unauthenticated forwarder, and
remembering ``auth: true`` raised a hard "enterprise-only" error.
Three changes:
* ``litellm/proxy/_types.py`` — flip
``PassThroughGenericEndpoint.auth`` default to ``True``. Operators
who add a pass-through with no explicit ``auth`` value now get a
safe, authenticated forwarder by default. Setting ``auth: false``
remains supported for genuine public-forwarder use cases (e.g.
webhook receivers).
* ``litellm/proxy/pass_through_endpoints/pass_through_endpoints.py``
— drop the ``premium_user`` gate around ``auth: true``. An
unauthenticated forwarder is a deployment choice operators should
be allowed to make explicitly, but the safe option must always be
free. The product-tier decision (which features sit behind the
enterprise license) is separate from "OSS users must always have a
safe option."
* ``litellm/proxy/auth/user_api_key_auth.py`` — the runtime dispatch
pulls pass-through endpoints from ``general_settings`` as raw
dicts, so the Pydantic default doesn't apply. Switched
``endpoint.get("auth")`` to ``endpoint.get("auth", True)`` so a
config dict without an explicit ``auth`` key still requires
authentication at request time.
Tests:
- ``test_passthrough_auth_defaults_to_true`` — Pydantic default is
now safe.
- ``test_passthrough_auth_can_still_be_explicitly_disabled``
— opt-in to ``auth=False`` still works for legitimate
public-forwarder use cases.
- ``test_register_passthrough_with_auth_true_works_for_oss``
— ``premium_user=False`` no longer rejects ``auth=true``.
- ``test_runtime_check_treats_missing_auth_key_as_authenticated``
— raw dict without an ``auth`` key now requires auth (the
previously-unauthenticated forwarder).
- ``test_runtime_check_explicit_auth_false_still_skips_validation``
— explicit opt-in still works.
Closes GHSA-7h34-mmrh-6g58.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
``Response`` is already imported from the top-level ``fastapi``
package via the multi-line ``from fastapi import (...)`` block at the
top of the file (along with ``Depends``, ``HTTPException``, etc.) —
``fastapi.Response`` is the same class that ``fastapi.responses``
re-exports. The earlier ``from fastapi.responses import Response``
addition triggered ruff F811 for redefinition.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Variant analysis on the unauthenticated /get_image SSRF surfaced one
related sink in an admin-only endpoint:
``test_hashicorp_vault_connection`` in
``config_override_endpoints.py:402`` calls
``async_client.get(f"{vault_addr}/v1/auth/token/lookup-self")`` with
no SSRF guard. ``vault_addr`` is admin-set, so the threat model is
"admin misconfig (or attacker with admin creds) pivots Vault calls
to cloud metadata or another internal IP."
Same fix shape as the unauthenticated endpoints: wrap in
``async_safe_get`` so each redirect hop is re-validated and private
networks are rejected. Admins running against a legitimate internal
Vault should add the host to ``litellm.user_url_allowed_hosts`` —
the existing escape hatch already used elsewhere in the codebase.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Drop prompt_variables and client_messages from the re-raised error so
callers cannot leak secrets, tokens, or PII embedded in those payloads
through HTTP error responses. Both sync and async variants.
Remove parameters that may contain credentials from the messages built
inside broad except handlers. These messages can surface in HTTP error
responses, so caller-supplied secrets and integration tokens shouldn't
be interpolated into them.
Two cleanups from the /simplify review pass:
* ``Response`` was imported inside the ``except OSError`` branch in
``/get_image`` and at the top of ``/get_favicon``. Per the project's
no-inline-imports rule (CLAUDE.md), hoisted to the existing
``from fastapi.responses import (...)`` block at the top of
``proxy_server.py``.
* The test class's ``_patches()`` helper returned a 2-element list of
patch context managers and tests indexed into them via
``self._patches(...)[0], self._patches()[1]`` — two distinct calls
with confusing aliasing semantics. Restructured to:
- module-level ``_patch_async_safe_get(...)`` that returns a single
patch context manager
- autouse fixture that patches ``get_async_httpx_client`` for every
test in the file (it's the same patch in every case)
- small ``_image_response(...)`` factory to deduplicate Mock setup
Tests now read as ``with _patch_async_safe_get(return_value=...):``
with no list-indexing or duplicate Mock construction.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three review items addressed:
* **Veria (Medium): SSRF via redirect.** ``fetch_validated_image_bytes``
was calling ``validate_url(url)`` once and then fetching with the
default httpx client, so a 3xx to an internal IP would have been
followed unvalidated. Switched to ``async_safe_get`` (the existing
SSRF primitive used elsewhere in the codebase) which walks each
redirect hop, re-validates, and rejects redirects to blocked
networks. Default ``litellm.user_url_validation`` is True so
protection is on out of the box.
* **Greptile (P2): SVG can embed JS.** Removed ``image/svg+xml`` from
the allowed-Content-Type set. The hardcoded response media type
(``image/jpeg`` / ``image/x-icon``) means a real SVG body wouldn't
render as SVG anyway in modern browsers — the allowlist entry was
giving up XSS surface for no actual SVG-rendering benefit. If real
SVG support is wanted later, that's a deliberate feature PR with CSP
/ nosniff bundled.
* **Greptile (P2): cache-write OSError drops validated bytes.** When
the upstream fetch succeeded but ``open(cache_path, "wb")`` raised
(read-only assets dir), the bytes were discarded and the default
logo was served — a silent regression for that deployment. Now
serve the validated bytes inline via ``Response(...)`` as a fallback
before falling back to default.
Tests:
- Replaced low-level mocks of ``validate_url`` with mocks of
``async_safe_get`` directly, exercising the helper's contract
rather than the SSRF primitive's internals.
- New ``test_rejects_svg_content_type`` confirms SVG is blocked.
- ``test_get_image_cache_logic`` fixture now sets
``mock_response.is_redirect = False`` so ``async_safe_get`` doesn't
treat the Mock's truthy attribute as a redirect.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Use key-in-dict membership instead of truthy value lookup so explicitly
supplied empty/falsy payloads still trigger the permission check.
Adds parametrized regression coverage across all gated keys.
Three CI failures from the previous push, all addressed:
* ``lint`` (mypy): ``async_client.get(url, **request_kwargs)`` confused
mypy because ``AsyncHTTPHandler.get``'s second positional arg is typed
``bool | None``. Switched to an explicit branch:
``await async_client.get(rewritten_url, headers={"host": host_header})``
for the HTTP-rewritten case, plain ``get(rewritten_url)`` otherwise.
* ``proxy-infra`` /
``test_get_image_custom_local_logo_bypasses_cache``: the existing
test set ``UI_LOGO_PATH=/app/custom_logo.jpg`` with no
``LITELLM_ASSETS_PATH``, asserting the path was served verbatim. That
was the LFI behaviour the new path-containment guard closes. Updated
the test to set ``LITELLM_ASSETS_PATH=/app`` so the path is inside an
allowed root, and patched the helper's ``realpath`` / ``isfile`` to
go along with the mocked filesystem. Test intent (bypass cache when
``UI_LOGO_PATH`` is local) is preserved.
* ``auth-and-jwt`` / ``test_get_image_cache_logic``: existing test
built a ``Mock`` response without ``headers``, so the new
Content-Type check tripped on ``Mock().split(";")[0]``. Two fixes:
1. Set ``mock_response.headers = {"content-type": "image/jpeg"}``
on the test (matches the real upstream contract — a logo CDN
always sets a Content-Type).
2. Make ``fetch_validated_image_bytes`` defensive: if the
Content-Type header is missing or non-string, treat as non-image
and fall back to default. Closes a subtle hole — pre-fix, an
upstream that omits Content-Type entirely would have served
arbitrary bytes under the ``image/jpeg`` wrapper.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves merge conflict in tests/test_litellm/llms/bedrock/chat/test_converse_transformation.py
by keeping both the new bedrock tool-result file/document tests and the
transform_response body-leak regression test.
Also addresses Greptile P2 comment: when BedrockImageProcessor returns a
block with neither 'image' nor 'document' keys on the tool-result path
(image_url and file content types), log a warning instead of silently
dropping the block.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Align ``/get_favicon``'s allowed-root list with ``/get_image``'s. Both
endpoints now accept paths under any of:
* ``LITELLM_ASSETS_PATH`` (or its default — ``/var/lib/litellm/assets``
for non-root, the package dir otherwise)
* the package's bundled-asset dir (``proxy/_experimental/out`` for the
default favicon, ``proxy/`` for the default logo)
* the proxy package dir (``current_dir``) as a final fallback
Without this, an admin who put a custom favicon under
``LITELLM_ASSETS_PATH`` (e.g. mounted into the container at
``/var/lib/litellm/assets/favicon.ico``) would have the favicon
endpoint silently fall back to the default after the previous commit's
path-containment guard. The logo endpoint already accepted this root.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The unauthenticated ``/get_logo_url`` endpoint returned the
``UI_LOGO_PATH`` env var verbatim. For HTTP(S) URLs this is intended —
the dashboard loads the logo directly from a public/internal CDN. For
local filesystem paths it was an information disclosure: any caller
could fetch ``/get_logo_url`` and read admin-only filesystem details
like ``UI_LOGO_PATH=/etc/litellm/secret-config.json``.
Now the endpoint returns the URL only when it begins with
``http://`` or ``https://``. For local paths (or unset) it returns an
empty string — the dashboard falls back to ``/get_image`` which
serves the file via the path-containment guard added in the previous
commit.
Tests parametrize the disclosure-blocked cases (``/etc/...``,
``/proc/self/environ``, relative paths) and confirm HTTP / HTTPS URLs
still pass through unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The unauthenticated ``/get_image`` and ``/get_favicon`` endpoints accept
the admin-set env vars ``UI_LOGO_PATH`` and ``LITELLM_FAVICON_URL`` and
return whatever bytes they resolve to, with a hard-coded ``image/jpeg``
or ``image/x-icon`` content-type. Two attack shapes:
* ``UI_LOGO_PATH=/etc/passwd`` (or any other readable file path) — any
unauthenticated caller exfiltrates the file via ``GET /get_image``.
The previous gate was ``os.path.exists(logo_path)`` which fires on
every readable file. Same shape for the favicon endpoint.
* ``UI_LOGO_PATH=http://169.254.169.254/iam`` (or any internal HTTP
service the admin pointed at) — the proxy fetches it server-side
and streams the response body to the unauthenticated caller. No
URL validation, no Content-Type validation; ``application/json``
AWS metadata gets tunneled out under the ``image/jpeg`` wrapper.
New helper module ``litellm/proxy/common_utils/static_asset_utils.py``:
* ``resolve_local_asset_path(candidate, allowed_roots)`` — returns the
resolved absolute path only if it lives within one of the allowed
asset roots. Uses ``realpath`` so symlinks pointing outside the roots
are caught.
* ``fetch_validated_image_bytes(url)`` — runs the URL through
``validate_url`` (rejecting private / cloud-metadata / loopback
targets) and only returns the response body if the upstream
Content-Type is in a small allowlist of image MIME types.
Both ``/get_image`` and ``/get_favicon`` are wired through the helpers.
The SSRF gate is enforced unconditionally — these endpoints are
unauthenticated, so the admin-facing ``litellm.user_url_validation``
toggle does not apply (an admin who opted out of URL validation for
LLM provider paths shouldn't also expose ``/get_image`` to SSRF).
Tests:
- ``TestResolveLocalAssetPath``: 10 cases covering legitimate paths,
``/etc/passwd``, ``/proc/self/environ``, symlink-out, ``..``
traversal, directories, missing files, and root list edge cases.
- ``TestFetchValidatedImageBytes``: 7 cases covering SSRF block, non-
image content-type rejection, valid image passthrough, non-200
response, fetch exception, empty URL, and parametrized coverage of
every allowed image MIME type.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Remove unused search_provider parameter from
SearchAPIRouter._resolve_search_provider_credentials. The function
only reads tool_litellm_params; the docstring already omitted
search_provider, confirming it was unintentional dead code.
- Drop redundant hasAgents/hasSearchTools conditions from the outer
object_permission guard in OldTeams.tsx. Both agent and search-tool
handling already run independently below this block with their own
object_permission initialization, so including them in the outer
guard caused an empty object_permission to be created prematurely
and never populated within that block.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
- Proxy decoded `model` from the encoded batch_id but never passed it
to `litellm.aretrieve_batch`.
- Without `model` in kwargs, litellm cannot load `BedrockBatchesConfig`
and falls into the legacy provider switch, which 400s for bedrock.
- Fix: set `data["model"] = model_from_id` before the litellm call in
the SCENARIO 1 (encoded batch_id) branch.
- Also corrects the error string in
`_handle_retrieve_batch_providers_without_provider_config` (said
`'create_batch'` despite being raised from the retrieve path).
- Adds tests covering retrieve + file_content round-trip for bedrock-
encoded IDs.
AWS Bedrock pricing publishes a separate 1-hour prompt-cache write rate for
Claude 4.5 / 4.6 / 4.7 (1.6x the 5-minute rate). Without
`cache_creation_input_token_cost_above_1hr`, cost tracking for 1-hour-TTL
prompt caching on Bedrock falls back to the 5-minute rate and undercounts
spend by ~60%.
Adds the field to the spot-checked Global and US-region entries:
- anthropic.claude-opus-4-7 (Global $10.00 / MTok)
- anthropic.claude-opus-4-6-v1 (Global $10.00 / MTok)
- anthropic.claude-opus-4-5-... (Global $10.00 / MTok)
- anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-6 (Global $6.00 / MTok)
- anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-... (Global $6.00 / MTok regular,
$12.00 / MTok long-context >200K)
- anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-... (Global $2.00 / MTok)
- global.anthropic.* mirrors of the above
- us.anthropic.* mirrors at the US +10% premium
Also updates the long-context (>200K) variants of Sonnet 4.5 with
`cache_creation_input_token_cost_above_1hr_above_200k_tokens`.
The mirrored entries in `litellm/model_prices_and_context_window_backup.json`
are updated in lockstep.
EU / AU / APAC / JP / us-gov regional variants are out of scope for this
change pending separate verification against AWS Bedrock pricing for those
regions.
Adds tests/test_litellm/test_bedrock_anthropic_1hr_cache_pricing.py to lock
in the expected values and the 1.6x ratio invariant.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Two issues from the previous push's review:
1. **Greptile P1**: ``get_vector_store_info`` had the same catch-all
``except Exception`` pattern as ``update_vector_store``, so the
HTTPException(403/404) raised by both the in-memory access check and
the new ``_fetch_and_authorize_vector_store`` helper was rewritten as
500. Mirror the ``except HTTPException: raise`` guard from
``update_vector_store``.
2. **code-quality CI** (``tests/code_coverage_tests/recursive_detector.py``)
flagged ``_redact_sensitive_litellm_params`` as an unallowlisted
recursive function. Match the convention of other allowlisted
helpers ("max depth set"): bound recursion at depth 10 (well above
any plausible nesting level for real ``litellm_params`` payloads),
return the redaction sentinel on overflow, and add the function
name to ``IGNORE_FUNCTIONS``.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three issues surfaced in review of the previous commit:
1. **Veria — Medium**: ``litellm_params`` carries a nested
``litellm_embedding_config`` dict (auto-resolved from the model
registry on create / update) which itself holds ``api_key`` /
``aws_*`` / ``vertex_credentials``. The previous redactor only
inspected top-level keys, so the nested values passed through
unredacted. Recurse into nested dicts.
2. **Greptile — P2**: when ``litellm_params`` is a JSON-serialized
string (the in-memory registry occasionally stores it that way), the
previous redactor silently no-op'd via the ``isinstance(..., dict)``
guard and echoed the raw payload back. Now: parse, redact, re-serialize.
If the string is not valid JSON, replace it with the redaction
sentinel rather than echo it.
3. **mypy** flagged ``_redact_sensitive_litellm_params``'s
``Optional[Dict[str, Any]]`` signature as incompatible with the
``object``-typed call site. Widened to ``Any -> Any`` to reflect the
actual contract (the function now handles dict / str / None / other).
Also fixes a related test regression in
``test_remove_sensitive_info_from_deployment_with_excluded_keys``: the
``"credentials"`` plural addition to ``SensitiveDataMasker`` defaults
caused the first call (without ``excluded_keys``) to mutate the input
dict's ``litellm_credentials_name`` to a masked value. The second call
(with ``excluded_keys``) then saw the already-masked value rather than
the original. Construct fresh input for each call.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
/simplify pass:
- ``update_vector_store`` (newly added) and ``get_vector_store_info``'s
DB-fallback path duplicated the same shape: ``find_unique`` →
``model_dump`` → ``LiteLLM_ManagedVectorStore(**)`` →
``_check_vector_store_access`` → raise 404/403. Extract into
``_fetch_and_authorize_vector_store`` so the pattern lives in one
place; future endpoints that need the same gate get it via one call.
- The ``except HTTPException: raise`` guard added in the prior commit is
retained — the helper raises HTTPException(403/404) and the catch-all
``except Exception`` would otherwise rewrite them as 500.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two architectural extensions to the credential-redaction in the previous
commit:
1. ``/vector_store/update`` had two gaps:
- No per-store access control. Any authenticated principal that
passed the premium-feature gate could mutate *any* vector store,
including stores belonging to other teams.
- The response returned the full DB row including ``litellm_params``,
so the caller could read another team's persisted provider
credentials by submitting a no-op metadata change.
Mirror the access-control check ``/vector_store/info`` already
performs (``_check_vector_store_access`` against the existing row),
redact ``litellm_params`` in the response, and add an
``except HTTPException: raise`` guard so the 403/404 responses don't
get rewritten as 500 by the catch-all.
2. ``SensitiveDataMasker``'s default ``sensitive_patterns`` set used
segment-exact matching, so ``credential`` matched ``vertex_credential``
but not ``vertex_credentials`` (the actual Vertex field name). The
previous commit worked around this with a per-call extension; this
commit puts the plural in the upstream defaults so every caller
(Redis config dump, MCP debug headers, cache routes, ...) gets the
correct behavior. The local override in
``vector_store_endpoints/management_endpoints.py`` is removed.
Also updates ``test_excluded_keys_exact_match`` which relied on
``credentials`` *not* being a sensitive pattern to demonstrate
case-sensitive ``excluded_keys`` matching. The intent of the test
(case-sensitive match) is preserved; the assertion now reflects that
when ``excluded_keys`` fails to apply (wrong case), the field falls
through to standard pattern-based masking instead of being passed
through unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
/simplify pass:
- Remove the single-call-site ``_redact_vector_store`` wrapper. Inline
the two-line redaction at its only caller in ``list_vector_stores``;
``get_vector_store_info`` was already calling the inner helper directly.
- Inherit ``SensitiveDataMasker``'s default sensitive-key set instead of
duplicating the 12-element list, then add only the plural
``credentials`` extension. Won't drift if upstream defaults change.
- Trim the over-explained docstring on ``_redact_sensitive_litellm_params``
to a one-paragraph summary; the WHY (credential-leakage class) belongs
in the commit message, not in every consumer's IDE tooltip.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
``LiteLLM_ManagedVectorStore.litellm_params`` carries the upstream provider
credential — OpenAI ``api_key``, AWS ``aws_access_key_id`` /
``aws_secret_access_key``, GCP ``vertex_credentials``, etc. ``GET
/vector_store/list`` and ``POST /vector_store/info`` return these
verbatim to any authenticated principal. Because both routes are in
``openai_routes``, ``RouteChecks.is_llm_api_route`` short-circuits the
standard role gate, so even read-only users and narrowly-scoped keys can
read every stored credential.
Replace credential-bearing values with the ``REDACTED_BY_LITELM``
sentinel in both responses while preserving non-secret keys
(``api_base``, ``region``, ``model``, ``api_version``) so callers can
still see *which* upstream is configured. Detection reuses
``SensitiveDataMasker.is_sensitive_key`` with the default heuristics
plus the plural ``credentials`` pattern (covers Vertex's
``vertex_credentials`` field, which the singular ``credential`` pattern
misses on segment-exact matching).
Applied at:
- ``list_vector_stores`` (``GET /vector_store/list``,
``GET /v1/vector_store/list``)
- ``get_vector_store_info`` (``POST /vector_store/info``), both the
in-memory-registry path and the prisma-DB fallback
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
CI surfaced two issues from the previous commit:
1. ``general_settings`` and ``master_key`` were still imported at the top
of ``get_logging_payload`` but had no remaining users after the
master-key hash-detection blocks were removed. Drop the import.
2. ``tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_user_api_key_auth.py::test_x_litellm_api_key``
and ``tests/proxy_unit_tests/test_key_generate_prisma.py::test_master_key_hashing``
asserted ``valid_token.token == hash_token(master_key)`` — the
pre-alias behavior. The new contract is
``valid_token.token == LITELLM_PROXY_MASTER_KEY_ALIAS`` (and !=
``hash_token(master_key)``), since the master key (and its hash)
must not propagate to the verification-token column or any other
downstream consumer.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two related changes to how the master-key auth path interacts with
downstream consumers of UserAPIKeyAuth.api_key:
1. The master-key auth branch in user_api_key_auth.py now sets
`valid_token.api_key` to a stable alias
(`LITELLM_PROXY_MASTER_KEY_ALIAS = "litellm_proxy_master_key"`) instead
of the raw master key. Downstream consumers — spend logging,
Prometheus metrics, audit trails, rate limiting, cost tracking — now
receive the alias instead of the master key (which they would
previously hash and propagate). Neither the raw master key nor its
hash flows past the auth layer.
2. `_is_master_key` in spend_tracking_utils.py is reduced to a strict
raw-only constant-time comparison. The hashed form is no longer
considered equivalent.
Side effects:
- The two hash-detection blocks in `get_logging_payload` are removed.
They were re-detecting the master key per spend-log write to swap in
the alias; that detection happens once at the auth layer now.
- The `disable_adding_master_key_hash_to_db` general setting becomes a
no-op. Operators can remove it from their config; existing config is
still accepted.
- Operator dashboards that filter Prometheus metrics by the master-key
hash will need to switch to the `api_key="litellm_proxy_master_key"`
label.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
