10 commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
ryan-crabbe-berri	40a9b959a6	test(e2e): tag a2a, access_control, other, secret_manager and migrations tests with Subject metadata (#44965) ... * test(e2e): add enum values, auto-discovering label gates and secret hiding for e2e metadata * test(e2e): tag a2a, access_control, other, secret_manager and migrations tests with Subject metadata * docs(e2e): name every markerless harness test file that carries no Subject * test(e2e): keep the step discovery comprehensions to one for clause	2026-10-07 12:11:55 -07:00
devin-ai-integration[bot]	837c6a7481	fix(security): remove the publicly known master key from the repo (#44718) ... * fix(security): hash the publicly known master key Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * docs: replace weak master key examples and regenerate artifacts Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test: replace weak key fixtures with generated test keys Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * ci: generate master keys for proxy startup Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: preserve lens dev key entropy Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: restore proxy key compatibility in scrub examples Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix: scrub merged SSO fixture and refresh dashboard bundle Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(ci): stabilize test keys and metadata collection Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * chore: drop the rebuilt dashboard bundle Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: mateo <mateo@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-10-06 10:55:24 -07:00
devin-ai-integration[bot]	b21e44cbf9	feat(jwt): auto_register_map_existing_key maps JWT to the user's existing virtual key (#42375) ... * test(e2e): jwt auto_register map-existing-key repro Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * feat(jwt): auto_register_map_existing_key maps JWT to the user's existing virtual key Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(jwt): exclude blocked keys from auto_register_map_existing_key reuse Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(jwt): route existing-key lookup through VerificationTokenRepository Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): stop requiring LITELLM_SALT_KEY for the owned JWT gateway Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test(e2e): gate the owned JWT gateway tests behind E2E_OWNED_GATEWAY Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(jwt): only reuse keys that can call LLM routes in auto_register_map_existing_key Skip Admin UI session keys and keys whose allowed_routes restrict them to anything other than llm_api_routes (management, read_only, password-reset sessions). Mapping a JWT to one of those left the user with 401s or 403s on every LLM call, since the mapping persists. * fix(jwt): scope auto_register_map_existing_key reuse to the JWT-resolved team Only reuse a key whose team_id matches the team auth_builder resolved for the JWT (no team matches no team), so a personal key can no longer bypass the resolved team's model and budget limits. With the flag on, the first JWT request now falls through to the same virtual-key checks later mapped requests get, instead of returning early, so a reused key's own limits apply from request one rather than 200 then 403. Flag off keeps the early return unchanged. * fix(jwt): keep the early return when no master key is set Without a master key the generic virtual-key path returns a bare INTERNAL_USER object, so falling through on the first auto-registered request dropped the key's team, models and budgets. Only fall through when a master key is configured. Tests now assert the reused key per team rather than the query shape, and cover the flag-off early return and the no-master-key case. * test(jwt): assert on race-loser's returned key, not only mocks (TQ002) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(jwt): close the auto_register_map_existing_key race, shared-claim and expiry holes A key auto_register just minted is never adopted by a concurrent request, so the race loser's cleanup can no longer delete a key another request mapped and cascade its mapping away (503, user left with no key) Reuse only happens when the claim value is the JWT-resolved user_id. A shared claim such as azp or client_id falls back to minting, so one user can no longer land on another user's personal key and budget Only keys that never expire are reused, so an expiring key can no longer pin the claim to a permanent 401 Integration tests on a real proxy and Postgres cover all three. The race test holds the first mapping insert in a Postgres relay, so the interleaving is forced rather than timed. The where-clause shape unit tests are replaced by these, since only a real database proves the filter * test(e2e): create the reused key in the team the JWT resolves to The flag only reuses a key in the JWT-resolved team, and this identity's groups claim resolves to its team, so a teamless key was never eligible and the test could not pass * test(integration): match the held statement across TCP reads The relay looked for the trigger inside one read, so an insert split across two reads was never held and the race test would fail waiting for it. It now matches one exact trigger over a window that keeps the end of the previous read * fix(jwt): gate key reuse on the claim field, not on the claim value Requiring the claim value to equal the resolved user_id skipped reuse for users matched through the sso_user_id or case-insensitive email fallback, whose stored user_id differs from the JWT sub. That is the lookup LIT-5378 asks for. Reuse is now allowed when the virtual key claim is the user_id or user_email JWT field, globally or for the token's issuer, which still keeps shared claims such as azp or client_id on the mint path * fix(jwt): let an issuer's own user field replace the global one when gating key reuse An issuer that identifies users by uid no longer treats the global sub field as a user identity claim, so a shared sub under that issuer mints instead of reusing a personal key * test(jwt): make the flag-off test fail when the flag no longer gates key reuse The flag-off test used a config where sub was not a user identity claim, so deleting the flag check still passed. Configure user_id_jwt_field=sub so only the flag keeps the lookup off, and drop test docstrings * chore(lint): drop mutable-ok suppressions that LIT013 flags as no-ops --------- Co-authored-by: yuneng <yuneng@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: mrinal <mrinal@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Mrinal Chanshetty <mchanshetty@Mrinals-MacBook-Pro.local> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-10-02 12:11:33 -07:00
yuneng-jiang	d098b02ed9	fix(auth): give UI/CLI session tokens their own AES-GCM context and header-safe shape (#43790) ... * refactor(auth): bind UI/CLI session tokens to their own AES-GCM context UI and CLI session tokens are now always encrypted with AES-256-GCM and a fixed session associated-data value, and the session-token check only accepts AES-GCM values carrying that same value. Stored secrets keep their current encryption and decrypt unchanged, so nothing needs migrating. encrypt_value_helper and decrypt_value_helper take an optional aad. XSalsa20 cannot bind associated data, so an AAD-bound value is always written as AES-256-GCM, and an AAD-bound decrypt refuses the legacy format. Session tokens issued before the upgrade stop validating, so UI and CLI users sign in once more after upgrading. * test(e2e): cover real SSO login through the dashboard and the lite CLI Adds two specs under tests/e2e/ui/oidc, run by playwright.oidc.config.ts against a live Keycloak stack. The dashboard spec checks that the SSO session authorizes the Virtual Keys and Models data requests. The CLI spec runs a real lite login in an isolated HOME with the keyring disabled, then lists models and sends one chat completion with the stored session. The main Playwright config now ignores oidc/. * fix(auth): encode UI/CLI session tokens as unpadded base64url Session tokens carried the v2:gcm: storage prefix and base64 padding. Basic-auth parsers split on the first colon and browsers reject ':' and '=' in WebSocket subprotocols, so Langfuse pass-through and the realtime playground could not use them Tokens are now plain unpadded base64url, the same header-safe shape as any bearer token * fix(auth): prefix UI/CLI session tokens with litellm_login_ A prefix-less token starts with sk- about once in 262,144 logins and is then routed as a virtual key, so that login gets a 401. The prefix also makes session tokens easy to spot in logs The prefix doubles as the token's AES-GCM associated data, so the visible kind and the encrypted kind cannot disagree --------- Co-authored-by: ryan-crabbe-berri <ryan@berri.ai>	2026-09-29 18:42:24 -07:00
devin-ai-integration[bot]	8477fe4108	fix(proxy): list key and team model aliases in GET /v1/models (#42908) ... * fix(proxy): list key and team model aliases in GET /v1/models Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): keep alias listing helpers within the type discipline budget Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): cover alias rows on GET /v1/models and /v1/models/{id} Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): apply team then key aliases like chat completions and keep the alias as the retrieved id Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): apply key aliases twice like chat completions and skip only malformed alias entries Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): apply the global model_alias_map between the key alias passes like chat completions Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): list only the caller's own aliases and never rewrite a listed model id on retrieval Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * style(proxy): ruff format model_info alias lookup Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): hide undiscoverable names from model retrieval so an alias named like one resolves to its target Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(proxy): keep undiscoverable models retrievable by id while excluding them from the alias guard Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * refactor(proxy): pass an immutable name sequence into the model_info alias guard Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): type the model list alias test helpers Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * test(proxy): annotate the new alias listing test fixtures and helpers Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-24 06:41:13 -07:00
devin-ai-integration[bot]	071cb49d32	fix(jwt): accept a team alias in x-litellm-team-id (#42445) ... * fix(jwt): accept a team alias in x-litellm-team-id The header only matched canonical team ids, so a JWT caller selecting one of their teams by its alias got a 403 even though they belonged to it. The header value is now resolved through the existing alias lookup before the JWT allowed-team check and the DB membership fallback, while a value that is already a team id never costs an alias lookup and denials keep naming the value the caller sent Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(jwt): only alias a header team id the database provably lacks Under fallback_to_db_teams a header value whose team row read fails for any reason other than TeamNotFoundError now keeps the membership denial instead of falling through to the alias lookup, so a degraded read cannot select a different team that carries the value as an alias. Drops the HeaderTeam docstring that only restated its fields Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: ryan <ryan@berri.ai> Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-22 02:22:00 -07:00
Yuneng Jiang	9a80bf2ad4	test(e2e): harden JWT fixtures and cover management lifecycles	2026-09-11 16:36:12 -07:00
ryan-crabbe-berri	2085a37b82	test(e2e): issue the JWT suite's tokens from a real Keycloak realm ... The suite used to mint its own RS256 tokens from a stand-in issuer, which could only ever prove the proxy agreed with the tests: the claims were whatever the tests chose to sign. Every JWT bug worth catching lives in the shape of what an identity provider really emits, so the suite now runs against Keycloak (realm in idp_realm.json), provisions a group and a user per test through its admin API, and signs in through the direct-access grant. That changes what the tokens look like: sub is Keycloak's opaque user uuid rather than a friendly name, groups arrives from a protocol mapper, aud is the IdP's own audience, and the JWKS carries an encryption key beside the signing key so the proxy has to select on kid. The expiry case now takes a one-second token from a second client in the realm and waits for it to lapse instead of forging a stale exp. The proxy config the suite needs is unchanged. CI runs it against a Keycloak deployed beside the ephemeral stack, which lives in the releaser repo. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EX13mWex6RaBo9PYnkAtFW	2026-09-09 16:56:14 -07:00
ryan-crabbe-berri	90ac77e58e	test(e2e): add JWT issuer harness and first live JWT auth tests ... Add tests/e2e/jwt_issuer.py, a test-only RS256 issuer that serves a JWKS document and signs arbitrary claims over an open loopback-only /token endpoint, so e2e tests can mint tokens without ever holding a signing key. One key per process keeps the proxy's cached JWKS valid for the whole run. Add the first five live JWT auth tests in tests/e2e/other: a valid token for an existing team is accepted and its spend row carries the claimed team and user, a tampered signature and an expired token are refused with 401, a token naming a team that does not exist is refused with 403, and a plain sk- virtual key keeps working with enable_jwt_auth on. Harness unit tests cover the issuer itself. Team and user create/delete land on the shared ProxyClient (warn-only teardown, /user/delete typed as the int it returns) instead of a fourth per-suite copy. Document the issuer command, the E2E_JWT_ISSUER_PORT convention (default 4190), JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_URL and the litellm_jwtauth config block in tests/e2e/CONTRIBUTING.md, and register the new cells in other.yaml.	2026-09-05 17:44:02 -07:00
mubashir1osmani	ac5b51253a	test(e2e): add Other suite and Guardrails coverage incl. an MCP tool-call guardrail (#34149) ... * test(e2e): add other suite covering master-key auth and health lifecycle Covers the other.* holding-pen cells that were uncovered: master-key valid_allows/invalid_denied on the admin /user/list gate, and the lifecycle probes liveness.ping, readiness.public_probe, readiness.reports_db_status, and readiness_details.authenticated_diagnostics. New tests/e2e/other/ suite on the shared ProxyClient; the health probes send no auth header to prove the public routes need no credential, and the details route is asserted to reject an anonymous caller while exposing version/db diagnostics to the master key. * test(e2e): cover block_code_execution and openai_moderation guardrails Extends the guardrails suite with two built-in guardrails registered per request (default_on=False, opted in via the chat body's guardrails selector) so neither intercepts unrelated traffic on the shared proxy. block_code_execution.pre_call.blocks: a python code block plus a run-this request is intercepted with the canned content-blocked message and the model never runs, while the same code block asked about with don't-run-it reaches the model. Verified live. openai_moderations.pre_call.blocks: a flagged prompt is rejected 400 naming the moderation policy while a benign prompt passes. The guardrail calls OpenAI's moderation API; verifying it needs an OpenAI key with moderation quota (this account currently 429s the moderation endpoint). Adds a shared create_backend_model helper and a generic register() plus per-request guardrails/max_tokens on the client so more built-ins can reuse the same path. * test(e2e): cover presidio PII masking (pre_call + post_call) Registers a presidio guardrail per request (default_on=False) with the analyzer/anonymizer bases supplied in the registration params, so the test controls its own dependency and needs no proxy restart. presidio.pre_call.masks: a repeat-verbatim request comes back with the <EMAIL_ADDRESS> placeholder and never the raw email, proving the prompt was anonymized before the model saw it. presidio.post_call.masks: with apply_to_output the model's own emitted email is masked on the way out, so the caller never receives the raw value. Both verified live against real presidio analyzer + anonymizer containers. logging_only is intentionally not covered: /spend/logs exposes no prompt messages to read back the masked log, and a logging_only run also masked the response, contradicting its contract; noted in the module docstring for a follow-up. * test(e2e): cover presidio logging_only masking via OTEL read-back Adds the third presidio cell, guardrail.presidio.logging_only.masks. The logging_only contract (mask what is logged, do not block) is verified by reading the request's gen-AI span back from the real OTEL destination: the span's gen_ai.input.messages attribute carries the <EMAIL_ADDRESS> placeholder, never the raw email, and the call itself is not blocked. Reads the trace via the shared OtelReader, promoted from logging/ to the suite root so both suites use it. The masked prompt is polled to a deadline because logging_only masks the payload asynchronously and the span can briefly export before the mask lands. Drops the throwaway chat_send in favor of the existing transport.send for the call-id capture. * fix(e2e): tolerate cross-pod guardrail sync delay in team-opt-out test Stage runs multiple gateway pods behind the shared key. POST /guardrails registers a new default-on guardrail in-process immediately only on the pod that served the create call; every other pod picks it up on its next periodic DB sync (proxy_server.py, every 30s), so the very next chat call can race a pod that has not synced yet. Poll to a 40s deadline instead of asserting on the first response, matching the existing pattern in test_budget_reset_advances_e2e.py. * test(e2e): cover a guardrail on the MCP tool-call path (content_filter pre_mcp_call) Adds guardrail.litellm_content_filter.pre_mcp_call.blocks: against the real Datadog MCP server, a content_filter guardrail configured mode=pre_mcp_call blocks a banned keyword in an MCP tool call's arguments with HTTP 400 attributed to the pre_mcp_call hook, and lets a clean argument reach the upstream server. The guardrail attaches with default_on because per-key/request guardrail selection is dropped from the synthetic MCP request the hook sees; the banned keyword is unique per run so default_on only intercepts this test's own call. mode must be pre_mcp_call - a pre_call config silently no-ops on tools/call because the event type is rewritten for call_mcp_tool. Drives the tool directly via /mcp-rest/tools/call for a deterministic check of the same pre_mcp_call enforcement the OpenAI-SDK chat path hits when a model invokes an MCP tool. * fix(e2e): mid-conversation messages test uses client.proxy not client.gateway EndpointsClient exposes .proxy after the Gateway->ProxyClient rename; the mid-conversation system test still referenced .gateway, which fails the e2e basedpyright gate. Aligns it with the rest of the harness. * test(e2e): address review on the guardrail coverage MCP tool-call guardrail: poll the banned call until the guardrail is enforced instead of asserting on the first call, so the control-plane -> data-plane guardrail sync cannot race the check into a false pass-through; add a repeat banned call after enforcement to guard against a partial-propagation state. OpenAI moderation: distinguish a moderation-endpoint 429 (rate limit / no moderation quota) from a guardrail failure, so an account-capability gap reads as such rather than as "did not block". Runs green with a moderation-capable key. * test(e2e): close partial-propagation false-pass in MCP guardrail block test The single post-block repeat call could be load-balanced back to the same already-synced data-plane pod, so the test could pass while another pod still lacked the guardrail and let the banned MCP call reach Datadog. Anchor a wait to the guardrail create time (every pod is guaranteed to have DB-synced only after a full ~30s sync interval), then require the banned call to stay blocked across several attempts; a pass-through after that window is a real leak, not a race. * test(e2e): drop xfail-style rate-limit branch from openai_moderation test OpenAI's /v1/moderations is free and returns 200 with the env key (verified directly), so the RateLimitedError branch mislabeled the failure: a 429 there is insufficient_quota (no account billing), not throttling. The branch also only printed a softer message before failing anyway, an xfail-in-disguise the e2e rules forbid. A 429 now falls through and fails loudly with the full result.	2026-07-21 14:06:29 -07:00