* feat(anthropic): workload identity federation and pluggable identity sources
Backend half of #38818 (internal copy of the fork PR #38013), rebuilt as one
commit on top of litellm_internal_staging without the dashboard changes.
Deployments on anthropic/ without a static api_key can exchange an OIDC
workload assertion for a short-lived sk-ant-oat01 token through a shared
RFC 7523 JWT-bearer engine. The assertion comes from a mounted token file,
an env token, a LiteLLM-signed issuer, or Keycloak, chosen per deployment,
per named credential, or through ANTHROPIC_IDENTITY_SOURCE. The federation
fields are server-owned: refused inline in request bodies and on
POST /model/new, proxy-admin only on credentials, and the token exchange
is pinned to api.anthropic.com unless LITELLM_ANTHROPIC_WIF_ALLOWED_HOSTS
adds a host. GET /credentials/{name}/jwks exports the public key set of a
LiteLLM-signed credential for the Claude Console.
The OpenAI federation trio from #39613 rides along on the backend side with
the same server-owned handling.
Fixes#28607
Resolves LIT-6107
Co-authored-by: derhornspieler <15236687+derhornspieler@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(anthropic): let batch-result downloads mint from deployment params and accept host:port allowlist entries
The files handler enabled workload identity on batch-result downloads but never received the
deployment's litellm_params, so a deployment authenticating through a named credential could only
mint from process-wide env vars. It now threads litellm_params through to the auth header the way
the batch retrieve path already does.
LITELLM_ANTHROPIC_WIF_ALLOWED_HOSTS entries written as host:port were read by urlsplit as a scheme,
so the allowlist kept the raw entry while the exchange compared bare hostnames and refused the
gateway. Entries are now parsed as network locations whether or not they carry a scheme.
* fix(types): move the WIF kwargs key sets to a leaf module so the kwargs funnel imports without a cycle
* test(anthropic): pin case-insensitive matching of WIF exchange-host allowlist entries
* fix(anthropic): end workload identity federation errors without a period so the router suffix reads cleanly
* fix(proxy): decrypt stored litellm_params before the WIF write gate
* fix(proxy): hide WIF secret references from /health output
* fix(proxy): keep the proxy error shape on credential endpoint refusals
* fix(proxy): hide identity token file paths from /health output
* fix(anthropic): rename the federation workspace param so Bedrock's anthropic_workspace_id keeps working
The Bedrock Claude Platform route already reads anthropic_workspace_id from
optional_params, so banning that spelling as a server-owned federation
parameter broke a pre-existing client capability. The federation field is now
anthropic_federation_workspace_id (env ANTHROPIC_FEDERATION_WORKSPACE_ID),
which restores the base branch's behavior for Bedrock callers, drops the
Bedrock-specific hint from the refusal message, and deletes the unconditional
ban constant that no longer had a reader
* fix(auth): share one exchanged token across workers reading the same assertion
Anthropic accepts each identity assertion exactly once, so two uvicorn
workers reading the same token file both minting from it means the second
exchange is denied with jti_reused. Minted tokens now land in a per-user
0700 cache directory guarded by a file lock, so workers on the same host
reuse one exchange until the token expires or the assertion rotates. A 401
is only retried when the re-read assertion actually differs, and the denial
hint explains jti_reused. LITELLM_TOKEN_EXCHANGE_CACHE_DIR moves the cache
and an empty value disables it
* fix: keep anthropic federation from being shadowed or leaked
An empty or whitespace-only ANTHROPIC_API_KEY counted as set, so a federated
deployment sent an empty x-api-key on every call instead of minting a token.
Blank values now read as unset, and a real static key on a federated deployment
logs once that it outranks federation and nothing is being federated.
The exchange-host allowlist matched hostnames only, so a second process on
another port of an allowed host was trusted with the workload's identity token.
An entry that names a port now trusts that port alone, while a bare host still
trusts every port.
The shared token store exists so the workers reading one projected token file do
not each spend its single-use jti. A source that mints its own assertion per
exchange shares nothing with another worker, so it no longer writes a live token
to disk for a lookup that can never hit.
* fix: unlink a staged token file a failed write leaves behind
The 401 denial hint now also says federation ignores ANTHROPIC_WORKSPACE_ID, which the Bedrock Claude platform provider already reads.
* refactor: move anthropic jwks derivation behind a provider-owned tagged union
* fix: unlink the staged token file when its write fails at close
A buffered write only reaches the disk when the handle closes, so a full disk surfaces at close and left the staging file behind holding a usable token.
* fix(anthropic): close the staging descriptor before writing the shared token file
* fix(wif): judge federation writes by what they set, not what is stored
The admin gate read the stored deployment, so a team admin lost edit, delete
and Test Connection on any deployment carrying federation params. It now
returns early unless the submitted fields touch the federation surface, and a
Test Connection probe that points the deployment at its own api_base is still
refused, with the 403 no longer wrapped into a 500
The rest of the same review pass: POST /model/new refuses only a blocking
value of `blocked`, so a client that always sends `blocked: false` is not
turned away; a request body can no longer pick which federated identity to
mint as by naming a stored credential; an advisory refresh the executor
refuses disarms the entry instead of wedging the identity until the follower
timeout; the static-key shadow warning resolves its env fallback inside the
cache instead of once per request; credential writes drop nulls before
storing them; the token exchange validates the endpoint URL before reading an
assertion and keeps refusing redirects across a client heal; /health hides
every server-owned federation field from non-admins; and the async create_file
and create_batch paths say which setting is missing when the provider resolves
no URL
* fix(proxy): let a deployment write name a federated credential
reject_federated_credential_reference runs from is_request_body_safe, which
pre_db_read_auth_checks calls on every route, so it also fired on POST
/model/new, /model/update, /model/{id}/update and /health/test_connection. A
proxy admin could no longer attach a federated credential to a deployment over
the API or the Admin UI, leaving a static config.yaml entry as the only way to
configure the feature the rejection told the caller to go configure, and
_reject_non_admin_wif_write never got to make the call it exists to make.
is_request_body_safe now takes the route and skips only the credential-reference
check on the routes that reach can_user_make_model_call. Federation fields typed
inline into a body stay refused everywhere, and a call naming a federated
credential still cannot pick the identity it mints as.
* refactor(proxy): derive health display policy from the federation key sets
The health check module hand-copied the five workload identity fields whose
value is a credential, so a shared proxy surface named provider-specific
parameters and a newly added secret-bearing field would have gone on being
displayed until someone remembered both places
WIF_SECRET_BEARING_KEYS now sits beside the key sets it splits out of,
types/utils derives secret_bearing_wif_litellm_params from it, and the health
layer splats that tuple the same way it already splats the admin-only one
* fix(anthropic_wif): treat blank identity-source fields as unset
* test(proxy): classify the federation params in the credential slot registry
main's registry test (#43298) now fails the build for any credential-named
deployment param without a classification. The five federation fields that
carry a token, a token file path, or a signing or client secret reference are
Unplanted, matching WIF_SECRET_BEARING_KEYS; the four remaining Keycloak
settings name a URL, a client id, an auth method, or a scope and are NotSecret
* fix(anthropic_wif): declare federation params as owned connection leaves and chart their metrics
Register the 18 Anthropic and 3 OpenAI federation params as frozen
ConnectionSettings leaves so the owned-kwarg registry, the kwargs funnel
and the request-body ban list read one declaration. Pass the deployment
api_base through to the count-tokens handler instead of a pre-suffixed
URL, which doubled the /count_tokens path on main's prompt-cache
predictor. Add the five litellm_anthropic_wif_* families to the
all-metrics Grafana dashboard.
* fix(credentials): gate PATCH on WIF fields resolved from model_id
The credential PATCH handler checked server-owned workload identity
federation fields only on the values the caller sent, while a body that
named a deployment through model_id had its credential values resolved
after that check. A non-admin could therefore copy a federated
deployment's WIF fields onto an ordinary credential. Resolve the incoming
values first and run the non-admin gate on them, matching the POST path
* fix(anthropic): count tokens with ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN through the shared auth header
Count-tokens walked its own credential ladder: a static key, else skip minting when
ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN is set, else mint a federated token. With only the auth token set it
forwarded nothing and the proxy silently fell back to its local tokenizer while chat on the
same deployment authenticated with that token. The handler now takes the auth header that
AnthropicModelInfo.aget_auth_header resolves, the same ladder chat, files, batches and skills
use, and merges the oauth beta a minted or consumer token carries with the token-counting beta
---------
Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <277851410+mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: derhornspieler <15236687+derhornspieler@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: mateo-berri <happymvw@gmail.com>
* feat(terraform): add display_name to litellm_model resource and model data sources
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(terraform): persist display_name on update and read /model/info data envelope
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(terraform): drop PATCH /model/{model_id}/update from endpoint audit allowlist
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(terraform): surface external display_name removal as drift on refresh
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* ci(terraform): rerun after uv download timeout
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(proxy): add uncapped server-side team usage export route
GET /team/daily/activity/export answers the same scoping as
/team/daily/activity/aggregated with one unbounded rollup query, so keys
past USAGE_TOP_API_KEYS_LIMIT are included. Supports daily,
daily_with_keys, daily_with_users and daily_with_models export types as
CSV (default) or JSON. The PTU flat-cost sentinel stays in the plain
daily rollup and is excluded from the keyed and per-model exports
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(ui): export team usage server-side when the key list was truncated
When the aggregated spend response reports api_key truncation, EntityUsage
passes a serverExport into the export modal that downloads CSV or JSON
from GET /team/daily/activity/export instead of building the file from
the truncated on-screen data. apiClient gains a responseType option so
the download can arrive as a Blob, and truncation no longer blocks the
export button
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): cover team usage export types, sentinel handling and scope
Unit tests pin the uncapped key rollup past USAGE_TOP_API_KEYS_LIMIT,
PTU sentinel inclusion in the daily rollup and exclusion elsewhere, the
per-user fold, and the CSV column layout. Integration tests exercise the
route against a live proxy, including member scope denial
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(proxy): tidy team usage export route
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): use membership test for export type branch (PLR1714)
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* style(ui): format exportBlockedReason test with prettier
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): satisfy type-discipline gate in team usage export
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): pass export rows as a sequence to the response model
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy-behavior): cover team usage export in the daily activity scope matrix
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(proxy): carry PTU flat cost and escape formulas in team usage export
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ui): keep the truncation export block on surfaces without a server export
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* chore(ui): drop redundant comments in team export call and modal test
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(integration): audit cells for team usage export
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(integration): tighten team usage export audit cells
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): type the export params tuple and fold user keys in one pass
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* style(ui): bring entity usage export helpers under eslint budgets
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* style(ui): prettier-format UsagePageView after merge
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Cherry-pick of merge commit b3882d8e43 (PRs #39321, #39562, #40107), which landed on litellm_internal_staging instead of main.
Co-authored-by: ojensen-berri <ojensen@berri.ai>
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Derive budget_source from the budget row /team/info actually loaded, so a
metadata id whose row was removed via /budget/delete reads as none instead
of team_default. Share the /team/info test scaffolding so the added patch
calls stay within the TQ008 budget, and allowlist the imperative
reset_budget route in the provider endpoint audit
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(team): report per-user spend within a team for JWT traffic
Add GET /team/spend/by_user, which groups raw spend logs by (team_id, user)
so JWT/SSO requests with no virtual key are attributed to the user inside
each selected team. Team admins see every member, plain members see only
their own row. The Team Usage page gets a Spend Per User Within Team card
with CSV export backed by the same endpoint.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(team): cover /team/spend/by_user in behavior suite, tf audit allowlist and EntityUsage unit test
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(team): drop explanatory docstrings from /team/spend/by_user and regen schema.d.ts
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: yassin <yassin@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(terraform): vendor terraform-provider-litellm as source of truth with endpoint drift CI
* fix(terraform): address review feedback on vendored provider
Replace deprecated io/ioutil with io. Remove the unused org/team CRUD
client methods so the endpoint audit only tracks live call sites
(54 -> 46). Redact request/response logs by parsing the JSON and
recursively masking sensitive fields, which fixes the nested-object
leak in the old credential_values regex, with a regex fallback for
non-JSON payloads; covered by new unit tests. Docs: stop showing
api_key inside vector store litellm_params and document that Sensitive
attributes still persist in plaintext state, recommending
litellm_credential_name and an encrypted state backend.
* fix(terraform): stop persisting server-returned litellm_params into vector store state
The vector store Read wrote litellm_params straight back from the API
response into state. The proxy redacts secrets in those responses, so
the readback overwrote user config with redaction sentinels and caused
perpetual diffs, and against a server that returns raw values it would
persist secrets into a non-Sensitive attribute. Read now preserves the
config value like the credential and model resources do, litellm_params
is marked Sensitive, and a regression test pins that a server-returned
api_key never lands in state
* fix(terraform): send role on team member update and stop persisting server env into MCP state
The team member update payload omitted role, and the proxy leaves role
unchanged when the field is absent, so a role downgrade reported as
applied by Terraform never took effect on the proxy. The update now
always sends the configured role (the attribute is Required).
The MCP server resource wrote env straight back from API responses
into a non-Sensitive attribute, pulling admin-visible secrets into
state and, for sanitized responses, blanking user config. Read now
preserves the config value, env is marked Sensitive, and the docs warn
against passing secrets via args. Regression tests cover both fixes
and fail against the previous behavior.
