* test: drop the cwd-relative sys.path.insert calls from the test suite
TQ003 stands at 1,077 across 1,058 files, and 1,015 of them are the same shape:
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath("../..")) and its deeper siblings. The
argument resolves against the working directory rather than the file, so from
the repo root, where every job runs pytest, it inserts the directory two levels
above the checkout. It has never pointed at litellm. The package is installed
into the environment anyway, which is what actually makes the import work, and
what the rule's message has said all along.
Removing them leaves 1,634 imports of sys and os with no remaining reference,
and those go too, except where another test module imports the name back out of
the file. The rest of TQ003 is 62 call sites that resolve against __file__ or a
variable, which are a different question and are left alone.
Collection is identical either way: 45,871 tests and the same 51 pre-existing
collection errors before and after, and ruff reports no new undefined name.
* test: drop the duplicate imports the sys.path sweep exposed to F811
* test(pre-call-utils): restore the os import the new bedrock tests need
A name bound twice keeps only the second binding. In `tests/` that is nearly
always a repeated import, harmless but misleading, and the same rule is what
catches the cases that are not harmless: a local that shadows an import the
module still calls, and a second `def test_x` that quietly replaces the first.
311 of the 344 sites were repeated imports and came out with ruff's own fix.
The remaining 33 needed a decision. Four modules imported a name they never
used because a local definition below already shadowed it. Two comprehensions
bound `call` over `unittest.mock.call`, which those modules import and use.
One test rebound the two module handles its nested reload closure had captured.
One class attribute shadowed an unused `status` import.
The load-test fixtures move to a conftest, which is how pytest is meant to share
them, so the test module no longer imports three fixture names it never calls.
The nine `prisma_client` parameters keep a narrow `noqa`: pytest resolves that
fixture by name before the body runs, so the parameter never shadows anything.
`pytest.raises(Exception)` with no `match=` passes on any error that broad. A
TypeError from a refactor, a botched fixture, an import that moved: all of them
read as the rejection the test claims to police, so the test goes green for the
wrong reason and stays green after the behaviour it guards is gone.
PT011 closes that gap for the 317 sites B017 could not reach, because B017 only
fires on a single-statement body with no `as e` binding. Each pattern here is the
message the code actually raised, recorded by running the sites under a plugin
that logged the concrete type and text per call site, so the assertions describe
observed behaviour rather than a guess. Where a site raises more than one message
across its parametrize cases, the pattern is an alternation of what was seen;
where the exception carries an empty `str()` and puts the text on `.message`, the
site keeps a narrow `noqa` with the reason.
PT014 removes four parametrize cases that were listed twice. The duplicate re-runs
an assertion that already passed, and it usually marks a case someone meant to
vary and forgot to edit.
Base landed the native CLI OAuth + PKCE login, which added its own token
storage and a silent refresh that wrote the key straight to token.json.
This branch had already moved that secret into the OS keychain, so the two
had to be joined rather than picked between.
auth.py now keeps one pair of record helpers, load_token and save_token,
that read and write through the vault and hand the PKCE layer the plain
mapping it works with. fresh_api_key and revoke_stored_credential get
vault-bound save and reload callables, so a renewed key is stored in the
keychain like any other and a sibling process's rotation is still seen.
login goes through _replace_stored_token on both paths, so the credential
it replaces is revoked on the proxy and the user is still told where the
new one landed. logout revokes first, then reports what the clear actually
managed to do.
A 503 from POST /revoke means the proxy could not write the single-use record, so clearing the local record left a live refresh token nobody could revoke and a hint to retry with nothing left to retry. lite logout now keeps the record, exits 1, and asks to be run again shortly. A refused or unreachable revocation still clears the record and warns as before, and a re-login that replaces a record keeps its existing warning because the new record already stands
The lite group resolves the stored key once for every command and renews a --pkce key on the way in. lite up then asked the token file again, so every start sent a second refresh to the proxy, and once the refresh token was burned the refusal printed twice. _ensure_fresh_login now reuses the key the group resolved when the group read it from the token file, and only re-reads the file after the interactive login it starts itself. Also covers print-token through the group with a renewing session in the tests
The cli group already resolves the stored key for the server it was pointed
at, so print-token re-ran the renewal and, when the refresh token had been
revoked, posted to /token twice and printed the reason twice. print-token now
reuses the group's result whenever the stored record was issued for that
server and no --api-key or LITELLM_PROXY_API_KEY took precedence, and only
resolves the key itself when invoked bare for a different server.
A PKCE credential whose renewal is refused (for example after lite logout ran
on another copy of it) used to fail lite auth print-token with the classic
'Token expired. Run lite login again' hint and no reason, while lite whoami
already named lite login --pkce. fresh_api_key now reports why a renewal
failed through a warn callback whenever no sibling rotation rescued it, the
CLI prints that reason on stderr, and the expiry hint names the command that
produced the credential. Both READMEs document the admin revocation semantics
and the Redis precondition for refresh single use on several workers.
Discovery checks that every endpoint sits on the proxy origin, but the CLI's
requests.Session followed redirects, and requests replays a POST body on
307 and 308, so a token or revocation endpoint answering with one of those
would have sent the code and verifier, or the refresh token, wherever
Location pointed. Every POST now goes out with allow_redirects=False and a
3xx answer fails the command with a message naming where it pointed
FakeSecretVault could only stand in for a discarding backend by passing
KeyringDiscardsWrites as its `failure`, which also made read() and erase()
hand it back. Neither SecretRead nor SecretErase admits that outcome and the
real KeyringVault never produces it there, so the login path's match was
falling through on a value it can never see. Give the double a `discards`
flag that reports it from write() alone, which is what the null backend does.
Also widen lint-format-check-changed's pathspec. Git wildmatch runs without
FNM_PATHNAME here, so 'litellm/**/*.py' still requires an intermediate
directory and silently skipped all 21 top-level modules, litellm/__init__.py
and litellm/main.py among them. All 21 already pass ruff format.
The discovery document is accepted only when its issuer is the --base-url the user
typed and every endpoint and the resource share that origin (RFC 8414 section 3.3),
so a tampered or redirected document can no longer point the code, verifier, or
refresh token at another host. After a failed refresh the re-read token record is
used only when it continues the same credential (same proxy, token endpoint, and
resource) and has not expired, so a concurrent login against a different proxy can
never hand this one its key
The proxy's OAuth authorization server (dynamic registration, PKCE S256,
loopback redirects, single-use codes, refresh rotation) gains a proxy-API
audience: /authorize?resource=<proxy origin> renders a consent page with
team selection and /token mints the same per-user credential lite login
mints, so a native CLI can sign a user in through the system browser and
call /v1/* with user and team attribution. Adds GET /.well-known/litellm-cli-auth
as the versioned discovery contract for non-Python clients, POST /revoke
(RFC 7009) for logout, and lite login --pkce, lite logout, and
lite auth print-token on the CLI side. Proxy-API grants only ever redirect
to a loopback address and the server never picks a team on the user's behalf.
Fixes#37332
`lite up` treats a token record whose key the keychain would not hand over as no
login at all, and that clause had no test: every existing freshness test passed a
record carrying a real key, so deleting the clause left the whole suite green
The base install smoke check now also asserts keyring is absent, which is what
makes the lazy import in cli_keyring meaningful. keyring ships in the cli extra
only, so a plain `pip install litellm` must not be able to reach it
`lite whoami` led with "Authenticated" whenever a token file was on disk, even when the
keychain holding the credential would not give it up. The notice about that sat below the
account lines, so the session read as a working one and sent the user looking for the
problem anywhere but the keychain
Taking the secret out of ~/.litellm/token.json stages a replacement and moves it into
place, which needs room for a second file and a directory that will accept a new entry.
A full disk refuses the first and a read-only ~/.litellm the second, and logout gave up
there: it removed the file when it could, dropping the record that the keychain had never
been confirmed clear, so the logout after it reported a clean keychain it never checked
Shortening the file already in place needs neither, so the logout scrub and the legacy
migration now fall back to overwriting it where it lies. On a read-only ~/.litellm the
logout the user asked for now happens, instead of coming back with instructions to delete
the file by hand
A ~/.litellm that has gone read-only, or one left root-owned by a sudo login,
refuses both the scrubbed rewrite and the removal. The removal was unguarded,
so 'lite logout' ended in a PermissionError traceback with the credential still
readable in the file. It now comes back as an outcome the command reports,
naming the file and what to do about it, and a file that holds no secret is
still not worth alarming anyone over.
A logout run from an install without the keyring package treated a token file
holding its own secret as proof that no keychain entry could exist. That only
holds for the login which wrote the file. A login before it may have had the
package and put its credential in the keychain, where it outlives both the
uninstall and the file that replaced it, so logout reported a clean sweep over
a live credential. Every keychain that cannot be reached is now treated the
same way, and the message says the keychain went unchecked rather than
asserting what is in it.
A logout that could not reach the keychain deleted the token file whenever it
still held its own secret, and the next logout read that missing file as proof
the keychain was clean. It answered the warning the first run had just issued
with "Logged out successfully" while the entry an earlier login left behind was
still live. The file is the only record that something may still be in there,
which is what `_nothing_left_behind` already says it relies on, so keep it and
take only the secret out.
A keychain that did answer is a different case. `SecretStranded` means the entry
is confirmed there and would not delete, and that needs no note in the file,
while keeping one lets every later command read the credential straight back out
of the keychain, which makes "Logged out locally" untrue. That one drops the
file, as it did before.
The secret still goes first either way: a copy that cannot be replaced with a
secret-free one is removed rather than kept.
Three ways the credential commands could mislead or hang.
`lite logout` on a machine that never logged in warned that a credential may
be stranded in a keychain it could not check, and told the user to install
keyring to go clear it. There was nothing there. A missing token file is now
read as the evidence it is, because logout keeps a secret-free file behind
whenever the keychain is left unconfirmed, so a later run can tell a machine
with a credential it cannot reach apart from one that never had a login. That
holds on the LITELLM_CLI_DISABLE_KEYRING path too.
`KeyringDiscardsWrites` was handled on the read and erase paths, which cannot
produce it: the null backend returns None from `get_password` rather than
raising, so only a write ever detects it. It now lives on `SecretWrite` alone
and the unreachable arms are gone.
`keyring.set_password` blocks forever under a HOME with no usable login
keychain, which is what containers, CI images, `sudo -H`, and service accounts
run with, and reads answer normally there so nothing cheaper tells them apart.
`lite login` never touched a keychain before this, so a sign-in that simply
never returns would be a new way for it to fail. Writes are pre-flighted with
a throwaway value on a bounded wait, and a keychain that stays silent falls
back to the token file. The real credential is never the thing handed to a
call that might land long after we stopped waiting.
Saving also stages the token file before the keychain is given anything, since
the file is the half a read-only or full directory refuses. A save that cannot
land now leaves both stores as it found them, which matters most when the
login it failed to replace still works.
A keyring backend can accept a write and keep nothing. That is exactly what
`keyring --disable` and PYTHON_KEYRING_BACKEND=keyring.backends.null.Keyring
select, and it raises nothing to distinguish itself, so `lite login` was
handing the credential to a black hole, scrubbing its own copy from
token.json, and printing a success message over a login that no longer
worked. Reading the value back is the only way to tell that backend apart
from a keychain that really stored the secret.
The same rule closes the rest of the gaps. A credential the token file will
not record is taken back out of the keychain instead of being left live on a
machine with no record of it, and is reported rather than raised. The
migration stages its scrubbed file before the keychain is handed anything,
so a directory that will not accept the rewrite stops the move rather than
leaving the secret in two places. Logout no longer reads a key in the file
as proof that the keychain is clear, which was never sound across two
separate runs, and only draws that conclusion when the `keyring` package is
missing outright, where nothing could have reached a keychain at all.
Migration moved the secret into the keychain and then suppressed any OSError from
rewriting token.json, so a file that could not be rewritten kept the credential in
cleartext while every command reported success. That file is now removed instead:
signing in again costs one command, a stranded live credential costs the credential
`lite logout` also reported a clean logout whenever the keyring package was missing,
on the reasoning that an install without it could never have stored anything. The
entry belongs to the OS, so a keychain-backed login survives a logout run from a venv
without the cli extra. erase() now reports which keychain state applies, and logout
warns with the advice that fixes each one, staying quiet for file-backed logins whose
token file still carries its own secret
Also pins the migration path's tightening of a world-readable legacy token.json, and
moves the logout tests off patch() onto the injected vault
lite ships with every install of litellm, but the keyring package it needs
for keychain storage only ships with the cli extra. Such a user on a Mac was
told 'No OS keychain available' about a machine that plainly has one, with
nothing pointing at the missing package.
The vault now reports which of the three unusable states it is in, so login
can point at the install, name the kill switch, or report a genuinely absent
keychain.
lite login used to write the minted cli-session key in cleartext to
~/.litellm/token.json. The secret material (key plus any JWT) now goes
to the OS keychain through the optional keyring package, with the 0600
file kept for non-secret metadata and as the fallback on headless boxes.
Legacy plaintext files keep authenticating and are migrated into the
keychain, then scrubbed, on first read. A secret still on disk always
outranks the keychain entry, so a failed keychain write can never
resurrect a stale key. LITELLM_PROXY_API_KEY and --api-key precedence
is unchanged, lite logout clears both stores and warns when the
keychain will not release the entry, and ~/.litellm is created 0700
(tightened from 0755 where an older CLI left it broader).
LITELLM_CLI_DISABLE_KEYRING=1 forces the file fallback.
`lite up` already patches ~/.claude/settings.json, but only for as long as it
runs in the foreground, and it restores the original file on exit. Users
proxying Claude Code through LiteLLM therefore have to re-wire it by hand after
every login.
--config-claude makes that write persistent. It reuses the settings shape
`lite up` writes (env.ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL plus an apiKeyHelper invocation),
preserves every unrelated key, creates the file when missing, and writes it
atomically with owner-only permissions. Plain `lite login` is unchanged.
Reaching the credential through apiKeyHelper rather than copying it into the
file means a later login refreshes it with no further action, and keeps the
short-lived CLI token out of settings.json entirely.
The shared parts of the settings-file handling move from up.py into a new
claude_settings.py, since up.py imports auth.py and so auth.py cannot import
up.py back. That module now also owns the registry of commands that can be
temporarily managing the file, so the persistent write refuses while either
`lite up` or `lite autoroute up` holds a backup it would later restore over
this write.
Because this write has no backup and no `lite down`, it is stricter than
`lite up` about the user's file: it writes through a symlinked settings.json
rather than replacing the link with a regular file, and it refuses rather than
silently discarding a non-object `env` value.
Also fixes the apiKeyHelper command itself: --base-url belongs to the
top-level `lite` group, so `lite auth print-token --base-url X` is rejected by
click with "No such option". Every settings file `lite up` has written carries
that malformed command, which makes the helper return nothing and every Claude
Code request lose its token. The existing tests only string-matched the
generated command, so the new tests parse it through the real CLI instead.
The trailing-slash normalization test used gateway.litellm-sandbox.ai as
its base URL. Swap it for gateway.example.com so the test file does not
reference a real-looking hostname. The test is fully mocked, so the host
value has no effect on what is exercised.
Co-authored-by: yuneng-jiang <yuneng@berri.ai>
* fix(cli): hide codex and opencode from the lite command listings
They stay registered and invokable, so existing `lite codex` users keep
working; they just no longer show up in `lite --help` or the interactive
shell's command list.
* feat(cli): make the hidden lite command list configurable
codex and opencode are supported, so hardcoding them as hidden was wrong. Let deployments curate their own listing with `lite config set hidden_commands codex,opencode` instead; nothing is hidden by default and hidden commands stay invokable.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
os.exec* has no process-replacement semantics on Windows, so `lite claude`
printed its routing line and returned to the prompt while Claude Code was left
detached without a usable console. Windows now spawns the agent, waits for it,
and exits with the child's status. Batch shims such as the npm-installed
claude.cmd go through cmd.exe because CreateProcess cannot run them directly,
and that command line is emitted verbatim with every token quoted so a spaced
path or an argument holding a shell metacharacter cannot be re-parsed by the
command processor. POSIX keeps using os.execvpe unchanged.
Python keeps only the last binding for a name, so when a file defines the same
test twice the earlier one is unreachable. pytest cannot collect a function that
no longer exists, so nothing reports it and the file still looks like it covers
the scenario.
These ten are cases where the two definitions have different bodies, meaning a
real test was replaced rather than duplicated. Each is renamed to say what it
actually covers, which makes it reachable again:
- test_gemini_frequency_penalty: the dead copy checks the parameter is listed in
get_supported_openai_params for vertex_ai; the survivor checks get_optional_params
maps a value for gemini. Different function and different provider.
- test_async_log_success_event_adds_to_queue and the failure variant: the dead
copies run without mocking asyncio.create_task, so they exercise the real task
path the survivors mock out.
- test_async_send_batch_triggers_tasks: the dead copy asserts send is not awaited
directly; the survivor asserts create_task was called.
- test_model_id_in_required_metrics: the dead copy checks the model_id label on
twelve further metrics the survivor dropped.
- test_anthropic_messages_pt_file_block_preserves_cache_control: the dead copy
passes model and llm_provider explicitly and uses real base64 PDF content.
- test_translate_streaming_openai_chunk_to_anthropic_with_thinking: the dead copy
covers thinking_delta; the survivor covers signature_delta.
- test_client_initialization and test_client_without_api_key: the dead copies
assert the resource clients are wired with the right base URL and key; the
survivors only construct the object.
- test_client_initialization_strips_trailing_slash: the dead copy constructs
ModelsManagementClient directly rather than going through Client.
Verification: collecting the seven touched files gives 401 node IDs before and
411 after, the ten new names and nothing else, with nothing lost. All ten pass.
Running the touched files in full gives 299 passed, and test_optional_params.py
goes from 111 passed to 112.
Two further shadowed definitions were left alone rather than renamed: the dead
copies of test_prompt_caching and test_cost_calculator_with_base_model_with_router
have no assertions at all, one being a bare pass and the other a lone import, so
restoring them would add tests that cannot fail.
* feat(cli): read base_url from persistent config file
Adds a lite config command group (set/get/unset) backed by
~/.litellm/config.json so users no longer need to export
LITELLM_PROXY_URL in every shell session. Resolution order is
--base-url flag, then LITELLM_PROXY_URL, then the config file,
then the localhost default. A config-file base_url counts as an
explicit server choice for lite auth print-token, matching the
env var semantics it replaces.
* fix(cli): harden config persistence after review feedback
Rejects base_url values containing a query string or fragment,
including bare trailing ? or # which parse as empty but still
corrupt every joined request URL. Writes config.json and token.json
atomically through a shared write_private_json helper (0600 at
creation, fsync, os.replace) so an interrupted save can no longer
truncate the file or leave it world-readable. Warns on stderr when
an existing config file is invalid instead of silently ignoring it,
including invalid UTF-8. Resolves the eager --version flag through
the same env, config file, default chain as every other command,
and reads the config file once per invocation so base_url and
base_url_explicit always come from the same snapshot.
* fix(cli): resolve --version after option parsing
The eager --version callback ran before --base-url and --api-key were
parsed, so it could not see an explicitly named server. Combined with
the env fallback added for config-file support, that sent the resolved
API key to whichever server the config file pointed at even when the
user named a different one on the command line. Making the flag a
normal option and handling it in the group callback gives the version
request the same flag, env, config, default precedence as every other
command, and lets the stored-token lookup stay origin-checked.
_load_persisted_master_key documents leniency on any unreadable prior
state but only caught parse errors; a permissions failure or non-UTF-8
bytes in config.yaml crashed configure instead of skipping the
carry-forward. Catch OSError and UnicodeDecodeError too and pin the
undecodable-file case with a regression test.
lite autoroute up minted a fresh master key and picked a fresh OS-ephemeral
port on every run, so any client configured against one session (an
already-open Claude Code session, a hand-configured script) broke on the
next run. The port is now a stable default (5483, overridable with --port)
that refuses loudly when busy or when 4000 is requested, since proxy_cli
silently rebinds a busy 4000 to a random port. The master key is minted
once, persisted in the generated config.yaml, reused by every later up,
and carried forward when configure regenerates the config.
* fix(cli): force UTF-8 output so emoji don't crash the CLI on Windows
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(cli): drop dead flush calls flagged by review
* fix(cli): replace non-ASCII CLI output with ASCII so legacy Windows consoles don't crash
---------
Co-authored-by: ryan <ryan@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(cli): add `lite up`/`lite down` to ambiently route Claude Code through the proxy
Patches ~/.claude/settings.json in place (env.ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL + apiKeyHelper
via `lite auth print-token`) so any `claude` session started afterward, from
any terminal, routes through the local LiteLLM proxy with no wrapper command
needed, unlike the existing `lite claude` subprocess-exec approach. Backs up
the original file first and restores it on Ctrl-C/SIGTERM, or via `lite down`
after an unclean exit. Cursor is not supported: no equivalent file-based config
to patch.
* feat(cli): add lite autoroute to QA complexity-based auto-routing against a real proxy (#33249)
* feat(cli): add lite autoroute to QA complexity-based auto-routing against a real proxy
Lets a customer try litellm's complexity_router against models they already
have on their existing, unmodified production proxy, with no config.yaml
edits and no new infra. lite autoroute configure discovers accessible
models via /model_group/info and walks through tier assignment (plus
optional LLM classifier / semantic matching / adaptive selection); every
referenced model becomes its own litellm_proxy/<name> deployment forwarding
back to the real proxy with the real key, so every actual call, routed
completions, classifier calls, embedding calls, still lands on their real
proxy. lite autoroute up launches that generated config as an ephemeral
local proxy, patches ~/.claude/settings.json to point Claude Code at it, and
streams routing decisions live; Ctrl-C/SIGTERM (or lite autoroute down
after an unclean exit) restores everything.
Also adds lite model-groups list (a thin CLI wrapper over the existing
ModelGroupsManagementClient), and generalizes up.py's settings-backup/restore
helpers to take explicit paths so this feature can reuse them instead of
duplicating the logic.
Depends on litellm_lite_up_down (#33231) for that generalization.
* feat(cli): allow multiple models per autoroute tier
complexity_router already supports a pool of models per tier (randomly
picked per request; adaptive mode specifically needs a pool to choose
within), but the configure wizard only ever let you assign one. Tiers are
now a tuple of model names; the wizard prompt accepts comma-separated
indices to pick more than one per tier.
* feat(cli): fuzzy model picker and auto-route Claude Code to autorouter
Numbered-index selection didn't scale past a handful of models, so switch
the tier picker to InquirerPy's fzf-style fuzzy search. Also set
ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_{SONNET,HAIKU,OPUS}_MODEL to "autorouter" in Claude
Code's settings, since Router resolves auto-router deployments by literal
model name with no wildcard support, so a "*" catch-all model_name would
never match real traffic.
* feat(cli): allow installing lite CLI from source via LITELLM_CLI_REF
Lets testers try an unreleased branch's CLI changes with the same
curl-piped installer, instead of waiting for a PyPI release.
* fix(ci): modernize type hints to clear ruff strict-rule budget
* fix(ci): bump httplib2 and setuptools to patched versions
Clears osv-scan findings for PYSEC-2026-3444 and PYSEC-2026-3447.
* fix(cli): write autoroute's secret-bearing files with mode 0600
commands.py wrote config.yaml (embeds the real proxy key) and Claude
Code's settings.json (embeds the ephemeral proxy's master key) with
plain open(), landing at the umask-derived default (commonly 0644)
until a later chmod call caught up. That window, and the missed case
where settings.json already exists (chmod never ran at all there),
left a credential-bearing file readable by another local account.
secure_create() fixes the mode via fchmod on the fd before any
content is written, covering both the brand-new-file and
already-exists cases, and commands.py/wizard.py now route their
sensitive writes through it.
* docs(cli): warn that a stale Claude Code session can leak to a squatted port
lite autoroute up's master key is embedded statically (unlike lite up's
apiKeyHelper, resolved per request), so a Claude Code session still
running after teardown keeps sending it, along with prompt content, to
a now-unbound loopback port that another local account can bind. This
is the same one-time-patch tradeoff lite up already accepts, just with
a static secret instead of a re-resolved one -- document it in the
README's Caveats section and surface it in the teardown message itself.
* fix(cli): address greptile review feedback on autoroute PR
- terminate the ephemeral proxy child process when its health check
fails, instead of leaking an orphaned, unrecoverable process bound
to the port
- replace bare assert isinstance checks (no-ops under python -O) with
click.ClickException in the model-groups list and configure wizard
code paths
- close launch_proxy's log file handle once the child process has
inherited its fd, instead of leaking it
- add build_generated_proxy_config to config.py's __all__
* fix(cli): close TOCTOU window in lite up's settings backup write
write_backup wrote the backup (which can embed the original
apiKeyHelper/settings content) with plain open() + a chmod call after
the fact -- the same permissive-until-corrected window already fixed
for autoroute's config.yaml and Claude settings writes, and missed
entirely when the backup file already exists with broader permissions.
Moves secure_create (atomic-enough 0600 via fchmod before any content
is written) to up.py, the module both lite up and lite autoroute
share, and has autoroute/process.py import it from there instead of
keeping its own copy.
* fix(cli): refuse autoroute up when a stale backup exists from a crash
The pid-record check only catches a still-live duplicate process; a
SIGKILL'd `up` leaves no live pid but does leave AUTOROUTE_BACKUP_PATH
behind. Without this guard, a fresh `up` overwrote that backup with
the currently-patched Claude settings instead of the true originals,
so `down`/Ctrl-C would restore the wrong content permanently. up.py's
`lite up` already guards the analogous case; mirror it here.
* fix(cli): bind the ephemeral autoroute proxy to loopback only
proxy_cli.py defaults --host to 0.0.0.0 when not passed explicitly.
launch_proxy never passed it, so the ephemeral proxy -- despite every
base_url in this module being built from 127.0.0.1 -- was actually
reachable from other hosts on the network, including its
unauthenticated-until-config-lands routes before the master key is
wired in.
* docs(cli): show curl install for the autoroute QA flow
Points readers at scripts/install-cli.sh's curl one-liner instead of
assuming uv/pip is already set up, and documents the LITELLM_CLI_REF
override for trying an unreleased branch or commit.
* fix(cli): surface a clean error on an empty or corrupt autoroute config
A configure run killed between secure_create's O_TRUNC and the write
completing leaves an empty config.yaml on disk. The next up read that
via yaml.safe_load (None) into the generated-config TypeAdapter
uncaught, surfacing a raw pydantic.ValidationError instead of pointing
the user back at `lite autoroute configure`.
* fix(cli): bind lite up's apiKeyHelper to the proxy it was started against
_ensure_fresh_login only checked token freshness, not which proxy the
cached token belonged to, and resolve_api_key_helper built a bare
`lite auth print-token` command with no --base-url. A user logged into
proxy A who ran `up --base-url proxy-b` (or LITELLM_PROXY_URL=proxy-b)
would silently get proxy A's real token wired into Claude Code's
apiKeyHelper; since apiKeyHelper is invoked bare, print-token's
existing origin check never engaged, so proxy B -- attacker-controlled
or not -- received every subsequent request's Authorization header
carrying proxy A's credential.
_ensure_fresh_login now requires the cached token's base_url to match
before treating it as usable, forcing a fresh login for the selected
proxy otherwise. resolve_api_key_helper now takes that base_url and
threads it through as an explicit --base-url, so print-token's
existing (but previously unreachable in the apiKeyHelper flow)
base_url_explicit check actually enforces the match at request time
too.
* fix(cli): surface clean errors instead of raw tracebacks in lite up/down
load_json_or_empty and read_backup both delegate to pydantic's
validate_json, which raises ValidationError on invalid JSON or a
non-object root -- neither up() nor down() caught it, so a corrupt
settings or backup file surfaced an unformatted Python traceback
instead of a clean CLI error. Both now convert to UpError, and down()
(previously uncaught entirely) and up()'s teardown path now handle it.
restore_claude_settings also gained a parent.mkdir guard before
rewriting CLAUDE_SETTINGS_PATH: if ~/.claude/ was removed while `lite
up` was running, the restore would crash before deleting the backup
file, permanently stranding it and breaking every future `lite down`.
* docs(cli): call out env-var auth for autoroute commands
* fix(cli): clean up leaked proxy and surface clean errors in autoroute
Three related gaps, all following an UpError getting raised somewhere
that wasn't catching it yet:
- up() left the just-launched ephemeral proxy running with no pid
record if load_json_or_empty/write_backup/secure_create raised after
the health check passed, mirroring the existing ProcessLaunchError
cleanup for the health-check-failure branch.
- _teardown() didn't catch restore_claude_settings raising UpError
(e.g. a corrupt backup at stop time), which would otherwise escape
to Click as an unhandled error in the normal-exit path, or print
"Error in atexit" in the atexit path. up.py's own _restore_once
handles the identical case the same way.
- read_pid_record let a corrupt PID file surface a raw
pydantic.ValidationError instead of a clean message, and did so in
down(), the command specifically meant for crash recovery. down()
now clears an unreadable pid record and continues cleanup instead of
aborting, since a corrupt pid file must never block the one command
meant to recover from exactly this kind of crash.
* docs(cli): warn against running lite up and lite autoroute up together
* fix(proxy): tell outdated litellm CLIs to upgrade when CLI SSO login id is legacy sk- format
* fix(cli): surface server error detail when SSO login polling fails and stop on permanent 4xx
* fix(cli): exhaustive, actionable error handling across the CLI SSO login flow
* feat: add silent CLI token refresh for apiKeyHelper support
lite auth print-token prints a valid proxy credential for use as Claude
Code's apiKeyHelper, transparently refreshing it first if the cached JWT
is stale. This unblocks MDM-managed apiKeyHelper deployments (managed
via `lite auth print-token`) that need silent mid-session credential
rotation without restarting the client.
Refresh capability is backed by a virtual key minted with an empty model
list and cli_refresh metadata, kept strictly separate from the actual
(short-lived, real-model-scoped) call credential -- so a leak of the
credential that flows through every LLM request and subprocess env var
can't also self-renew. The refresh flow is single-use: /sso/cli/refresh
mints a fresh JWT + refresh token pair and blocks the presented refresh
token immediately, so a replay can't mint a second pair from it.
Server: /sso/cli/refresh (rotate) and /sso/cli/logout (revoke) endpoints.
lite login now also stores a refresh token; lite logout revokes it
server-side instead of only clearing the local file.
* fix: allow non-admin users to hit CLI refresh routes; resolve apiKeyHelper base_url from token.json
Found via a live end-to-end test against a real proxy + real Claude Code
session: /sso/cli/refresh and /sso/cli/logout were unreachable for any
non-proxy-admin caller, since Depends(user_api_key_auth) pulls in a
route-RBAC gate that 403s any route not on an explicit allowlist. That
made the feature unusable for actual end users, who authenticate as
internal_user. Add both routes to internal_user_routes; the handlers
already do their own fine-grained check (metadata.cli_refresh) same as
/key/block does today.
Also: `lite auth print-token` required an explicit --base-url/
LITELLM_PROXY_URL matching the stored token's origin, defaulting to
localhost:4000 otherwise. But apiKeyHelper is configured bare (no
flags), so this always mismatched a real deployment. Track whether
--base-url was explicitly passed (via click's ParameterSource) and, if
not, resolve the server from token.json directly instead of the CLI
default.
* test: mock refresh-token minting in test_cli_poll_key_tolerates_missing_user_row
Landed on litellm_internal_staging after this branch's refresh-key minting
change; needs the same mock as the other cli_poll_key tests since minting
now runs unconditionally whenever a JWT is generated.
* fix(ci): update test_cli_auth.py for refresh_token contract, regenerate schema.d.ts
_poll_for_authentication now always includes "refresh_token" in its
returned dict, and _handle_team_selection_during_polling returns a dict
instead of a bare JWT string -- test_cli_auth.py predates this branch's
refresh-token work and still asserted the old shapes.
schema.d.ts regenerated via `npm run gen:api` to pick up the new
/sso/cli/refresh and /sso/cli/logout routes (plus unrelated drift from
other PRs merged since it was last generated).
* fix(ci): apply CI's own schema.d.ts diff (enterprise routes I can't generate locally)
Local `npm run gen:api` only sees OSS routes -- this machine's
litellm_enterprise editable install points at a now-deleted temp
directory, so it silently drops enterprise-only routes from the spec.
Applied the exact diff CI's own generation produced instead of
re-running the generator locally.
* fix: close refresh-token race, fail closed on DB down, fix logout base_url
Addresses Greptile review findings on the CLI refresh-token PR:
- cli_refresh_token minted a new JWT + refresh token BEFORE blocking the
presented one. Two concurrent requests bearing the same refresh token
could both pass auth and both mint fresh pairs, yielding four live
credentials from one consumed token. Now the presented token is
consumed atomically first via update_many (only succeeding if it flips
blocked from False/None to True); the loser gets count=0 and is
rejected before anything is minted.
- When prisma_client is None, refresh silently returned a new JWT
without ever being able to mark the presented token consumed, leaving
it valid indefinitely. Now fails closed with a 500 instead.
- `lite logout` sent its revocation POST to ctx.obj["base_url"], which
defaults to localhost:4000 when --base-url isn't passed -- the same
bug print_token had before the base_url_explicit fix, just missed
here. Now resolves the same way: trust the stored token's origin
unless the caller explicitly overrode --base-url.
* fix(ci): satisfy ruff format and narrow token_data type in logout
* fix(security): never trust refresh-token metadata for authorization
Addresses a real privilege-escalation path Veria flagged: cli_refresh_token
read team_id, team_alias, and max_budget straight off the presented
token's own metadata and used them to authorize the new JWT. Since any
authenticated user can self-mint a virtual key with arbitrary metadata
via the ordinary /key/generate endpoint, a self-forged key with
{"cli_refresh": true, "team_id": "<any-team>", "max_budget": 999999999}
would sail through _require_cli_refresh_token's only check
(metadata.cli_refresh == True) and get a JWT scoped to a team the
caller never belonged to, with a budget it never had -- full
cross-team / budget bypass, and a removed team member could keep
refreshing team-scoped sessions indefinitely.
Metadata's team_id is now treated as an untrusted UX hint only: honored
solely if the CALLER (identified by the authenticated key's own
user_id, not client input) is a current member per a fresh
get_user_object lookup. team_alias and max_budget are never read back
from metadata at all -- team_alias comes from a live get_team_object
lookup and max_budget is recomputed with the exact same capping logic
the initial SSO login poll uses. _mint_cli_refresh_token no longer
accepts or stores team_alias/max_budget, only the team_id hint.
Added regression tests proving: a forged/stale team_id is dropped
(falls back to no team, not silently honored), and a forged max_budget
in metadata never reaches the issued JWT.
* fix(ci): catch HTTPException specifically instead of bare Exception (BLE001)
* fix: un-consume refresh token if minting the replacement fails
Greptile flagged a real reliability gap: cli_refresh_token blocks the
presented token atomically, then does several more DB calls before
returning a replacement (user lookup, team lookup, JWT mint, new
refresh-key mint). Since this endpoint exists specifically for fully
unattended apiKeyHelper operation, a single transient failure in that
window (DB hiccup, etc.) permanently stranded the user: their old
token was already dead and no new one was issued, with no recovery
path short of a full interactive browser re-login.
Wrap that window in try/except; on any failure, best-effort revert the
consumed token back to usable (blocked=False) before re-raising, so a
retry can succeed. Standard compensating-action pattern since
generate_key_helper_fn doesn't take an injectable transaction, so
wrapping the whole thing in a real DB transaction isn't practical here.
* fix(security): refresh key had unrestricted model access, not none
Critical bug: _mint_cli_refresh_token used models=[] intending "no LLM
access", but that's backwards in this codebase. Per
_check_model_access_helper: `len(filtered_models) == 0 and len(models)
== 0` -> all_model_access = True. An empty models list on a key with no
team_id means UNRESTRICTED access to every model, not zero access. The
CLI refresh token -- meant to be usable for nothing but silently
exchanging itself for a new JWT -- was actually a fully unrestricted
API key for its entire 90-day lifetime, completely undermining the
whole point of keeping it separate from the short-lived call
credential.
Fixed with two independent layers: allowed_routes hard-restricts the
key to exactly /sso/cli/refresh and /sso/cli/logout (the real enforced
boundary, checked in the shared user_api_key_auth dependency for every
route); models is set to an unmatchable sentinel string as
defense-in-depth in case any code path only consults the models field.
Added an end-to-end regression test that exercises the actual
model-access-control function against a key shaped like the minted
refresh token, rather than only asserting on what arguments were passed
to the key-generation call -- the latter kind of test is exactly what
let the original bug ship, since asserting `models == []` is equally
consistent with "no access" and "unrestricted access" without checking
what the access-control code actually does with that shape.
Also: the compensating-rollback added for reliability un-blocked a
consumed refresh token even when the underlying user no longer exists.
That's a permanent, intentional rejection, not a transient failure --
un-blocking it would let a stale refresh token become valid again for a
different account if the user_id is ever reused/re-registered. Moved
the user-existence check outside the rollback-on-failure block so it
stays permanently blocked.
* refactor: rotate CLI refresh tokens via regenerate_key_fn instead of hand-rolled consume/rollback
The refresh token is already a plain litellm virtual key, so rotation can
delegate to the same atomic DB update /key/regenerate uses instead of a
bespoke update_many + compensating-rollback dance. This makes silent CLI
refresh an Enterprise feature, same as regular key regeneration.
* refactor: replace CLI stateless JWT + refresh-key pair with one self-rotating virtual key
The CLI previously minted two credentials on login: a stateless self-signed
JWT for LLM calls, and a separate DB-backed refresh-only key (scoped away
from ever calling an LLM) just to authorize minting a new JWT. Collapse
this into a single real virtual key, used directly as the LLM bearer token
and re-presented to /sso/cli/refresh to rotate its own secret in place.
This also means the CLI session key now shows up in the Admin UI's Keys
page and can be revoked/regenerated like any other key, rather than being
an invisible, unmanageable stateless token.
* refactor: drop silent CLI refresh, key just expires and requires re-login
/sso/cli/refresh only ever benefited Enterprise deployments (regenerate_key_fn's
gate), while everyone else already fell through to "re-run lite login" on
failure. Cut the endpoint, the rotation logic, and the client-side refresh
path entirely; print-token now just prints the cached key until it hits its
LITELLM_CLI_JWT_EXPIRATION_HOURS duration, then fails fast telling the user
to log in again. Session key itself is unaffected: still a real, revocable
virtual key visible in the Keys UI, `lite logout` still revokes it directly.
* fix(ci): regenerate schema.d.ts after removing /sso/cli/refresh route
* revert: go back to stateless JWT, keep only lite auth print-token
The virtual-key redesign (revocable, Keys-UI-visible credential) wasn't
needed just to support print-token, and cost real server-side surface
(a mint path, a logout-revoke endpoint, migrated tests/docs) for a property
this repo doesn't need yet. Reverting cli_poll_key/_types.py/schema.d.ts
back to the original stateless-JWT design; the only durable addition from
this whole effort is `lite auth print-token` (reads the cached credential,
prints it while fresh, fails with a clear message once it's past
LITELLM_CLI_JWT_EXPIRATION_HOURS) plus the base_url_explicit plumbing it
needs. `lite logout` goes back to clearing the local file only, since a
stateless JWT can't be revoked server-side.
* refactor: move CLI token freshness check to cli_token_utils, drop unnecessary renames
Addresses review: the freshness check is a pure token-shape/timestamp
util, not command logic, so it belongs alongside the other SDK-level
CLI token helpers (load_cli_token, get_litellm_gateway_api_key) rather
than in commands/auth.py. Also reverted a few incidental jwt_token/
session_key variable and string renames that weren't load-bearing.
A trailing slash on --base-url (or LITELLM_PROXY_URL) produced
double-slash URLs like https://host//sso/cli/start, which 404s. Normalize
once in the CLI's top-level group callback so every subcommand benefits.
* fix(proxy/client): redact api key from key/info client error messages
The keys management client builds GET /key/info?key=<key> and lets the
requests HTTPError propagate. str(HTTPError) renders the failing request URL
verbatim ("... for url: .../key/info?key=sk-..."), so any caller that logs the
exception leaks the full key; the 401 branch leaked the same way through
UnauthorizedError(str(orig_exception))
Redact both branches with the existing redact_secrets helper so the
secret-bearing query param is scrubbed to ?REDACTED while the status code,
reason, and response object are preserved. Server-side responses already mask
the key, so this closes the remaining client-side surface
* fix: preserve key info unauthorized response
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
* feat(cli): add `litellm-proxy run -- <agent>` to wrap coding agents through the proxy
Wraps Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and any other coding agent so all of its
LLM traffic routes through a LiteLLM proxy, with the agent-vault style of "just
works" DX: one `run -- <agent>` command, auto SSO login when interactive,
env-key "agent mode" for containers/CI, and a fail-fast key check against the
proxy so bad credentials error immediately instead of deep inside the agent.
The wrapped binary is detected by name to pick the right variables. Claude Code
gets ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL (the bare proxy root, so it appends /v1/messages) and
ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN, with any stray ANTHROPIC_API_KEY cleared so the proxy
token wins. Codex and OpenCode get OPENAI_BASE_URL (proxy + /v1) and
OPENAI_API_KEY. Unrecognized commands get both sets so they work either way.
`litellm-proxy claude-code` remains as a shortcut for `run -- claude`.
The core logic is split into dependency-injected helpers (agent_profile,
build_agent_env, verify_proxy_key, run_agent) so env wiring, the preflight, and
the launch handoff are unit-tested without monkeypatching, alongside CliRunner
tests for auth resolution, agent mode, and auto-login. Mutation-tested the env
profiles, preflight, and agent-mode branch to confirm the tests fail when the
behavior is broken.
https://claude.ai/code/session_0154VpLXW7mMvk5wfbgPRJa6
* Make each coding agent its own litellm-proxy command
Replace the `run -- <agent>` interface and the `claude-code` shortcut with
top-level commands generated per known agent, so launching is just
`litellm-proxy claude`, `litellm-proxy codex`, or `litellm-proxy opencode`,
with everything after the agent name forwarded straight to it. This drops the
ceremony of `run --` and cuts typing.
The `--model`/`--small-fast-model` wrapper flags are gone; pass the agent's
own model flag instead, or export the model env vars (the wrapper preserves
what you already have set), which keeps the surface minimal and avoids
intercepting flags the agent owns. Rename the module to agents.py to match.
* fix(cli): route `litellm-proxy codex` through the proxy via a custom provider
Codex ignores OPENAI_BASE_URL (it always dials api.openai.com over the
Responses WebSocket transport), so the OpenAI env profile alone left
`litellm-proxy codex` talking to OpenAI directly instead of the proxy. Point
Codex at the proxy with a custom provider passed as `-c` config overrides, and
force the HTTP/SSE Responses transport with supports_websockets=false since the
proxy does not speak the Responses WebSocket protocol. The provider reads its
key from OPENAI_API_KEY, which the agent env already exports.
The overrides are injected ahead of the user's args so they precede Codex's
subcommand. Claude Code and OpenCode are unaffected; they honor the exported
env vars. Adds regression tests for the per-agent launch args and the
injection ordering.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
* Rename litellm-proxy CLI command to lite
The proxy management CLI was invoked as litellm-proxy, which is a lot to
type for an everyday command. Rename the console script entry point to
lite and update the in-CLI usage examples, help text, error messages and
docs to match.
* fix(sso): stop CLI auth success page from hanging on "Closing..."
The CLI opens the SSO success page with webbrowser.open, so the tab is
not script-opened and the browser refuses window.close(). The countdown
would end on "Closing..." and the tab would sit there forever.
Drop the countdown and just show "You can now close this window and
return to your terminal." from the start, while still attempting
window.close() once so the tab auto-closes in the rare case the browser
allows it. Add a regression test asserting the manual-close instruction
is always present and the misleading countdown/"Closing..." text is gone.
* fix(cli): reattach controlling terminal after SSO login, keep litellm-proxy alias
When the first `lite claude` has to log in via browser SSO, completing the login could
leave stdin detached from the terminal, so a TUI agent like Claude Code would start in
non-interactive mode and exit with "Input must be provided". The wrapper now reopens the
controlling terminal onto stdin just before handoff when the session started interactively;
piped or redirected input is detected up front and left alone, so agent-mode and
non-interactive use are unchanged.
Also keep the `litellm-proxy` console script as an alias for `lite` so existing scripts and
CI that invoke `litellm-proxy` keep working; both names map to the same CLI.
* feat(install): make the curl installer need only curl, not a pre-existing Python
The installer now lets uv provision a managed Python 3.13 when no suitable
interpreter is found, instead of aborting. The minimum is also bumped from
3.9 to 3.10 to match the package's requires-python (>=3.10), so a system
Python 3.9 is no longer selected only for uv tool install to reject it.
* feat(cli): add thin litellm[cli] install path (install-cli.sh + brew) for the lite CLI
On a developer laptop the `lite` CLI only needs `lite login` and running coding
agents through a proxy, but the sole install path was `litellm[proxy]`, which
drags in the whole server tree (fastapi, uvicorn, boto3, polars, cryptography,
litellm-enterprise). The CLI's heavy imports are all guarded, so it runs on the
base SDK plus just rich, pyyaml and requests.
Add a `cli` extra carrying exactly those three, a `scripts/install-cli.sh` curl
one-liner that installs `litellm[cli]`, and a `BerriAI/homebrew-litellm` tap
formula with a release runbook under `packaging/homebrew/`. The installer passes
no `--python`, so uv honours litellm's requires-python and provisions a managed
interpreter, skipping a too-old (3.9) or too-new (3.14+) system Python instead
of failing to resolve.
A pyproject thin-contract test asserts the `cli` extra keeps the deps the CLI
imports and never leaks a server-only dependency from `proxy`, so the laptop
install cannot silently re-bloat
* fix(install): let uv pick the Python via --python-preference system
Both installers detected a system Python with a floor-only check and forced it
with `uv tool install --python <interp>`. On a host whose only Python is outside
litellm's requires-python (a too-old 3.9 or, increasingly, a too-new 3.14) that
forced an incompatible interpreter and the resolve failed. Drop the detection and
pass `--python-preference system`: uv reuses a compatible system Python when
present and downloads a managed one otherwise, always honouring requires-python
* test(router): filter aiohttp unclosed-session gc noise in test_async_fallbacks
test_async_fallbacks asserts the last three captured log records are the
router's fallback messages. Under the litellm_router_testing job (pytest -k
router -n 4) many router tests share the module-level in_memory_llm_clients_cache
(max 200, ttl 3600s). Older cached OpenAI/Azure clients get evicted while their
aiohttp ClientSession is still open, and when the gc reclaims them aiohttp emits
"Unclosed client session"/"Unclosed connector" through the asyncio logger.
Those records land in caplog mid-test and push the expected router logs out of
the last-three window, so the assertion flips to failing non-deterministically.
These warnings are async cleanup noise, not router debug logs, so filter them
out exactly like the existing leaked-task warnings before asserting order. The
assertion on the three router fallback messages is unchanged.
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: add expected_base_url origin check to get_litellm_gateway_api_key
* fix: scope get_stored_api_key and save base_url on login
* fix: pass base_url to get_stored_api_key in CLI entrypoint
* fix: scope ProxyClient stored key to base_url
* test: add expected_base_url coverage for get_stored_api_key
* fix: initialize self.http with resolved api_key not raw param
* fix: black formatting in client.py and test_auth_commands.py
