* feat(schema): add workflow run tracking tables (LiteLLM_WorkflowRun, LiteLLM_WorkflowEvent, LiteLLM_WorkflowMessage)
* feat(proxy): add /v1/workflows/runs endpoints for durable agent workflow tracking
* feat(proxy): register workflow management router in proxy_server
* docs(workflows): add README for workflow run tracking API
* test(workflows): add unit tests for /v1/workflows/runs endpoints
* fix(workflows): atomic event+status update via tx(), run_id 404 guard, sequence retry on collision
* test(workflows): add tx mock, 404 on unknown run_id, retry-on-collision tests
* fix(workflows): constrain status to Literal enum, rename total→count in list responses
* add tenant isolation and bounded limits to workflow endpoints
* add created_by column and index to LiteLLM_WorkflowRun
* add ownership and bounded-limit tests for workflow endpoints
* Fix workflow run ownership for null owners
* guard prisma import in workflow_management_endpoints
* sync schema.prisma copies with workflow run models
* black: format workflow_management_endpoints.py
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Greptile flagged the unused ``from unittest.mock import patch``
left over from before the ``configure_proxy`` fixture refactor (the
fixture uses ``monkeypatch``, no ``patch`` calls remain). Also pruned
the now-stale "premium gate" paragraph from the module docstring
since that gate was removed in fbcfd59b1a.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Read user_id and team_id from the request's litellm_params metadata when
fabricating the UserAPIKeyAuth handed to the managed_files hook, so
batches created via passthrough are attributed to the real requester
instead of a hardcoded fallback. Adds parametrized regression coverage
for both the populated-metadata and empty-kwargs cases.
When a litellm_settings row already holds mixed-case names (e.g.
["Langfuse"]) — written by another code path or by hand — the
union-on-update path was running set([...]) over the raw existing list
plus the lowercase-normalized incoming list, so "Langfuse" and
"langfuse" survived as duplicates. delete_callback uses a lowercase
lookup, leaving the mixed-case entry unreachable.
Normalize the existing list with normalize_callback_names before the
union so the merged list converges to lowercase. Adds a regression test
covering the case where the DB starts with ["Langfuse", "SQS"] and the
caller submits ["langfuse"].
The previous commit removed the only top-level use of
``CommonProxyErrors`` (the enterprise-gate ``raise ValueError``).
Ruff F401 flagged the import as unused; the function-local import at
line 2601 in a separate handler is the only remaining caller.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pass-through endpoints configured in
``general_settings.pass_through_endpoints`` defaulted to ``auth: false``
and the safe ``auth: true`` setting was rejected at startup unless the
operator had a LiteLLM Enterprise license. Net result: OSS deployments
had **no safe configuration** — every pass-through admins added without
remembering ``auth: true`` shipped an unauthenticated forwarder, and
remembering ``auth: true`` raised a hard "enterprise-only" error.
Three changes:
* ``litellm/proxy/_types.py`` — flip
``PassThroughGenericEndpoint.auth`` default to ``True``. Operators
who add a pass-through with no explicit ``auth`` value now get a
safe, authenticated forwarder by default. Setting ``auth: false``
remains supported for genuine public-forwarder use cases (e.g.
webhook receivers).
* ``litellm/proxy/pass_through_endpoints/pass_through_endpoints.py``
— drop the ``premium_user`` gate around ``auth: true``. An
unauthenticated forwarder is a deployment choice operators should
be allowed to make explicitly, but the safe option must always be
free. The product-tier decision (which features sit behind the
enterprise license) is separate from "OSS users must always have a
safe option."
* ``litellm/proxy/auth/user_api_key_auth.py`` — the runtime dispatch
pulls pass-through endpoints from ``general_settings`` as raw
dicts, so the Pydantic default doesn't apply. Switched
``endpoint.get("auth")`` to ``endpoint.get("auth", True)`` so a
config dict without an explicit ``auth`` key still requires
authentication at request time.
Tests:
- ``test_passthrough_auth_defaults_to_true`` — Pydantic default is
now safe.
- ``test_passthrough_auth_can_still_be_explicitly_disabled``
— opt-in to ``auth=False`` still works for legitimate
public-forwarder use cases.
- ``test_register_passthrough_with_auth_true_works_for_oss``
— ``premium_user=False`` no longer rejects ``auth=true``.
- ``test_runtime_check_treats_missing_auth_key_as_authenticated``
— raw dict without an ``auth`` key now requires auth (the
previously-unauthenticated forwarder).
- ``test_runtime_check_explicit_auth_false_still_skips_validation``
— explicit opt-in still works.
Closes GHSA-7h34-mmrh-6g58.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
``Response`` is already imported from the top-level ``fastapi``
package via the multi-line ``from fastapi import (...)`` block at the
top of the file (along with ``Depends``, ``HTTPException``, etc.) —
``fastapi.Response`` is the same class that ``fastapi.responses``
re-exports. The earlier ``from fastapi.responses import Response``
addition triggered ruff F811 for redefinition.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Greptile flagged the ``premium_user is not True`` check as a hard
backwards-incompatible break for OSS users currently running
``enable_oauth2_proxy_auth=True``. They were right: unlike the
api_base case (where the docs already required admin opt-in), this
path was documented as available to OSS users. Adding the gate would
have closed a documented feature, not fixed a vuln.
Reframed the change:
* The **identity-only allowlist** (``ALLOWED_OAUTH2_PROXY_FIELDS`` =
``{user_id, user_email, team_id, team_alias, org_id, models}``) is
the actual security fix — it closes the privesc by rejecting any
mapping to a non-identity field at request time. This is unchanged.
* The **premium gate** was parity-with-siblings (a product decision,
not a security one). Removed. BerriAI can re-add it on their own
schedule with a proper deprecation cycle if they want enterprise-
only gating.
Tests: removed ``test_rejects_when_not_premium``; everything else
(allowlist enforcement, identity passthrough, attack-shape
regression) still passes — 14 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
``LiteLLM_OrganizationTableUpdate.organization_id`` is typed
``Optional[str]`` to allow update payloads that don't change the id.
``_verify_org_access`` expects ``str``. Add an explicit None check
that raises 400 before the access guard fires — previously this would
have crashed at runtime on a malformed update payload.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Variant analysis on the team-callback IDOR (GHSA-xxv2-fprq-9x93)
surfaced the same shape on organization-scoped endpoints. Each takes
``organization_id`` from the request body, looks up the org, and
performs reads or writes — without checking whether the caller can
manage that org.
Affected endpoints:
* ``PATCH /organization/update`` — any authenticated key holder could
rewrite any org's metadata, budgets, and object permissions.
* ``POST /organization/member_add`` — docstring promises "Only
proxy_admin or org_admin allowed" but the code never enforced it;
any caller could add members to any org.
* ``POST /organization/member_update`` — only the
``modify-PROXY_ADMIN-target-only`` defense was in place; non-admin
members in any org could be re-roled by any caller.
* ``POST /organization/member_delete`` — no access check at all; any
caller could remove any user from any org.
Each handler now runs the existing ``_verify_org_access`` helper
(proxy-admin / org-admin hierarchy already used by ``GET
/organization/info`` and ``POST /organization/info``) before the read
or write.
Tests:
- ``test_organization_member_add_rejects_unauthorized_caller`` —
internal user not on the org gets 403; DB write never happens.
- ``test_organization_member_update_rejects_unauthorized_caller`` —
same.
- ``test_organization_member_delete_rejects_unauthorized_caller`` —
same.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Variant analysis on the unauthenticated /get_image SSRF surfaced one
related sink in an admin-only endpoint:
``test_hashicorp_vault_connection`` in
``config_override_endpoints.py:402`` calls
``async_client.get(f"{vault_addr}/v1/auth/token/lookup-self")`` with
no SSRF guard. ``vault_addr`` is admin-set, so the threat model is
"admin misconfig (or attacker with admin creds) pivots Vault calls
to cloud metadata or another internal IP."
Same fix shape as the unauthenticated endpoints: wrap in
``async_safe_get`` so each redirect hop is re-validated and private
networks are rejected. Admins running against a legitimate internal
Vault should add the host to ``litellm.user_url_allowed_hosts`` —
the existing escape hatch already used elsewhere in the codebase.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Greptile flagged that the denylist was incomplete: ``user_max_budget``,
``user_tpm_limit``, ``user_rpm_limit``, and ``user_spend`` were not on
it. Inspection of the auth model showed dozens more privileged fields
across the ``LiteLLM_VerificationTokenView`` hierarchy (team / org /
end-user / region budget / spend / limit fields, plus
``allowed_model_region``, ``rpm_limit_per_model``, etc.) — a denylist
of "privileged fields" is unmaintainable here.
Inverted the model. ``ALLOWED_OAUTH2_PROXY_FIELDS`` is now an
identity-only allowlist: ``user_id``, ``user_email``, ``team_id``,
``team_alias``, ``org_id``, ``models``. Any mapping to a non-identity
field is rejected at request time. Default-secure: a future field
added to ``UserAPIKeyAuth`` is automatically blocked from
header-trust.
Use case for OAuth2-proxy auth is identity assertion from a trusted
upstream. Anything beyond that (privileges, budgets, rate limits) is
policy and should be authenticated with a signature, not a header —
operators who need this should switch to JWT auth.
Tests:
- ``test_refuses_to_map_non_identity_fields`` parametrized over 22
fields including all four ``user_*`` Greptile flagged, plus
team/org/end-user budget/limit fields, plus a fabricated field name
to confirm "anything not on the allowlist" is the rule.
- ``test_allowlist_is_identity_only`` locks in the allowlist's intent
so future additions of budget / role / permission entries are caught
in review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two cleanups from the /simplify review pass:
* The header-mapping loop had a special-case ``if key == "max_budget":
auth_data[key] = float(value)`` branch. Since ``max_budget`` is now
in ``PRIVILEGED_OAUTH2_PROXY_FIELDS``, the denylist check rejects
the configuration before the loop runs — the float-conversion
branch is unreachable. Removed.
* Four tests independently called
``monkeypatch.setattr(proxy_server, "premium_user", ...)`` and
``monkeypatch.setattr(proxy_server, "general_settings", ...)`` with
almost-identical bodies. Replaced with a ``configure_proxy`` fixture
that yields a single callable —
``configure_proxy(premium=False)`` /
``configure_proxy(mappings={...})`` — so each test's setup is one
line. The previously-unused ``premium_proxy_settings`` fixture is
removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
``handle_oauth2_proxy_request`` reads HTTP request headers per the
admin-set ``oauth2_config_mappings`` and constructs a
``UserAPIKeyAuth`` from the values. Two failure modes:
1. **Premium parity.** Sibling auth paths
(``enable_oauth2_auth``, ``enable_jwt_auth``) require
``premium_user``; this path did not, so any open-source deployment
could turn the feature on without realising it requires a hardened
reverse-proxy topology. Added the ``premium_user`` gate.
2. **Privileged-field denylist.** Without a denylist, an admin who
maps the wrong header to ``user_role`` (or whose reverse proxy
leaks the header from upstream user input) lets any caller send
``X-User-Role: proxy_admin`` and gain full admin access — Pydantic
coerces the string into the ``LitellmUserRoles.PROXY_ADMIN`` enum.
Mapping any field in ``PRIVILEGED_OAUTH2_PROXY_FIELDS``
(``user_role``, ``api_key``, ``token``, ``permissions``,
``allowed_routes``, budget/limit fields, ``metadata``) raises at
request time so the misconfiguration surfaces loudly rather than
as a silent privesc.
Operators who genuinely need a trusted upstream to assert one of
these privileged fields should switch to JWT auth (signature-validated)
rather than header-trust.
Tests:
- ``test_returns_auth_for_simple_user_id_mapping``: legitimate
identity-only mapping still works.
- ``test_rejects_when_not_premium``: open-source deployments get a
clear enterprise-feature error.
- ``test_refuses_to_map_privileged_fields``: parametrized over every
entry in the denylist — each is rejected at request time.
- ``test_user_role_header_forgery_attack_is_blocked``: end-to-end
shape of the GHSA-5c3m-qffq-4r9m attack; rejected before auth
object construction.
- ``test_safe_fields_still_pass_through``: documented usage
(``user_id``, ``user_email``, ``team_id``, ``models``) is
unaffected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Drop prompt_variables and client_messages from the re-raised error so
callers cannot leak secrets, tokens, or PII embedded in those payloads
through HTTP error responses. Both sync and async variants.
Remove parameters that may contain credentials from the messages built
inside broad except handlers. These messages can surface in HTTP error
responses, so caller-supplied secrets and integration tokens shouldn't
be interpolated into them.
Two cleanups from the /simplify review pass:
* ``Response`` was imported inside the ``except OSError`` branch in
``/get_image`` and at the top of ``/get_favicon``. Per the project's
no-inline-imports rule (CLAUDE.md), hoisted to the existing
``from fastapi.responses import (...)`` block at the top of
``proxy_server.py``.
* The test class's ``_patches()`` helper returned a 2-element list of
patch context managers and tests indexed into them via
``self._patches(...)[0], self._patches()[1]`` — two distinct calls
with confusing aliasing semantics. Restructured to:
- module-level ``_patch_async_safe_get(...)`` that returns a single
patch context manager
- autouse fixture that patches ``get_async_httpx_client`` for every
test in the file (it's the same patch in every case)
- small ``_image_response(...)`` factory to deduplicate Mock setup
Tests now read as ``with _patch_async_safe_get(return_value=...):``
with no list-indexing or duplicate Mock construction.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three review items addressed:
* **Veria (Medium): SSRF via redirect.** ``fetch_validated_image_bytes``
was calling ``validate_url(url)`` once and then fetching with the
default httpx client, so a 3xx to an internal IP would have been
followed unvalidated. Switched to ``async_safe_get`` (the existing
SSRF primitive used elsewhere in the codebase) which walks each
redirect hop, re-validates, and rejects redirects to blocked
networks. Default ``litellm.user_url_validation`` is True so
protection is on out of the box.
* **Greptile (P2): SVG can embed JS.** Removed ``image/svg+xml`` from
the allowed-Content-Type set. The hardcoded response media type
(``image/jpeg`` / ``image/x-icon``) means a real SVG body wouldn't
render as SVG anyway in modern browsers — the allowlist entry was
giving up XSS surface for no actual SVG-rendering benefit. If real
SVG support is wanted later, that's a deliberate feature PR with CSP
/ nosniff bundled.
* **Greptile (P2): cache-write OSError drops validated bytes.** When
the upstream fetch succeeded but ``open(cache_path, "wb")`` raised
(read-only assets dir), the bytes were discarded and the default
logo was served — a silent regression for that deployment. Now
serve the validated bytes inline via ``Response(...)`` as a fallback
before falling back to default.
Tests:
- Replaced low-level mocks of ``validate_url`` with mocks of
``async_safe_get`` directly, exercising the helper's contract
rather than the SSRF primitive's internals.
- New ``test_rejects_svg_content_type`` confirms SVG is blocked.
- ``test_get_image_cache_logic`` fixture now sets
``mock_response.is_redirect = False`` so ``async_safe_get`` doesn't
treat the Mock's truthy attribute as a redirect.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Use key-in-dict membership instead of truthy value lookup so explicitly
supplied empty/falsy payloads still trigger the permission check.
Adds parametrized regression coverage across all gated keys.
Greptile flagged that ``disable_team_logging`` and ``get_team_callbacks``
re-wrap any ``HTTPException`` (including the 403 from the access guard)
through a catch-all that logs at ``.error()`` before re-raising — so
every legitimate access-denied response would pollute alerting
dashboards as a "server error".
Add explicit ``except HTTPException: raise`` and
``except ProxyException: raise`` branches before the catch-all (matching
the pattern already used in ``add_team_callbacks``). 4xx now propagates
quietly; only genuinely unexpected exceptions still hit the
error-level log.
Tests assert ``HTTPException`` is now the surfaced shape (instead of
the previous ``ProxyException`` re-wrap).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three CI failures from the previous push, all addressed:
* ``lint`` (mypy): ``async_client.get(url, **request_kwargs)`` confused
mypy because ``AsyncHTTPHandler.get``'s second positional arg is typed
``bool | None``. Switched to an explicit branch:
``await async_client.get(rewritten_url, headers={"host": host_header})``
for the HTTP-rewritten case, plain ``get(rewritten_url)`` otherwise.
* ``proxy-infra`` /
``test_get_image_custom_local_logo_bypasses_cache``: the existing
test set ``UI_LOGO_PATH=/app/custom_logo.jpg`` with no
``LITELLM_ASSETS_PATH``, asserting the path was served verbatim. That
was the LFI behaviour the new path-containment guard closes. Updated
the test to set ``LITELLM_ASSETS_PATH=/app`` so the path is inside an
allowed root, and patched the helper's ``realpath`` / ``isfile`` to
go along with the mocked filesystem. Test intent (bypass cache when
``UI_LOGO_PATH`` is local) is preserved.
* ``auth-and-jwt`` / ``test_get_image_cache_logic``: existing test
built a ``Mock`` response without ``headers``, so the new
Content-Type check tripped on ``Mock().split(";")[0]``. Two fixes:
1. Set ``mock_response.headers = {"content-type": "image/jpeg"}``
on the test (matches the real upstream contract — a logo CDN
always sets a Content-Type).
2. Make ``fetch_validated_image_bytes`` defensive: if the
Content-Type header is missing or non-string, treat as non-image
and fall back to default. Closes a subtle hole — pre-fix, an
upstream that omits Content-Type entirely would have served
arbitrary bytes under the ``image/jpeg`` wrapper.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three endpoints in ``team_callback_endpoints.py`` accept a ``team_id``
from the URL but never check whether the authenticated caller can
manage that team:
* ``POST /team/{team_id}/callback`` — write Langfuse / Langsmith / GCS
credentials to any team
* ``POST /team/{team_id}/disable_logging`` — silence audit logging
for any team
* ``GET /team/{team_id}/callback`` — read back another team's stored
third-party API credentials
Each handler now runs the existing ``_verify_team_access`` helper
(proxy-admin / org-admin / team-admin hierarchy already used by sibling
endpoints in ``team_endpoints.py``) on the resolved team row before
the read or write.
Tests:
- ``test_add_team_callbacks_rejects_unauthorized_caller`` — internal
user not on the team gets 403; DB write never happens.
- ``test_disable_team_logging_rejects_unauthorized_caller`` — same.
- ``test_get_team_callbacks_rejects_unauthorized_caller`` — same on the
read path; victim team's callback data stays inaccessible.
- ``test_proxy_admin_can_add_team_callbacks`` — proxy admin still
passes through to the DB write (sanity that the guard didn't
over-rotate).
- ``test_team_admin_of_target_team_can_add_callbacks`` — team admin of
the target team still passes through.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves merge conflict in tests/test_litellm/llms/bedrock/chat/test_converse_transformation.py
by keeping both the new bedrock tool-result file/document tests and the
transform_response body-leak regression test.
Also addresses Greptile P2 comment: when BedrockImageProcessor returns a
block with neither 'image' nor 'document' keys on the tool-result path
(image_url and file content types), log a warning instead of silently
dropping the block.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Align ``/get_favicon``'s allowed-root list with ``/get_image``'s. Both
endpoints now accept paths under any of:
* ``LITELLM_ASSETS_PATH`` (or its default — ``/var/lib/litellm/assets``
for non-root, the package dir otherwise)
* the package's bundled-asset dir (``proxy/_experimental/out`` for the
default favicon, ``proxy/`` for the default logo)
* the proxy package dir (``current_dir``) as a final fallback
Without this, an admin who put a custom favicon under
``LITELLM_ASSETS_PATH`` (e.g. mounted into the container at
``/var/lib/litellm/assets/favicon.ico``) would have the favicon
endpoint silently fall back to the default after the previous commit's
path-containment guard. The logo endpoint already accepted this root.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The unauthenticated ``/get_logo_url`` endpoint returned the
``UI_LOGO_PATH`` env var verbatim. For HTTP(S) URLs this is intended —
the dashboard loads the logo directly from a public/internal CDN. For
local filesystem paths it was an information disclosure: any caller
could fetch ``/get_logo_url`` and read admin-only filesystem details
like ``UI_LOGO_PATH=/etc/litellm/secret-config.json``.
Now the endpoint returns the URL only when it begins with
``http://`` or ``https://``. For local paths (or unset) it returns an
empty string — the dashboard falls back to ``/get_image`` which
serves the file via the path-containment guard added in the previous
commit.
Tests parametrize the disclosure-blocked cases (``/etc/...``,
``/proc/self/environ``, relative paths) and confirm HTTP / HTTPS URLs
still pass through unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The unauthenticated ``/get_image`` and ``/get_favicon`` endpoints accept
the admin-set env vars ``UI_LOGO_PATH`` and ``LITELLM_FAVICON_URL`` and
return whatever bytes they resolve to, with a hard-coded ``image/jpeg``
or ``image/x-icon`` content-type. Two attack shapes:
* ``UI_LOGO_PATH=/etc/passwd`` (or any other readable file path) — any
unauthenticated caller exfiltrates the file via ``GET /get_image``.
The previous gate was ``os.path.exists(logo_path)`` which fires on
every readable file. Same shape for the favicon endpoint.
* ``UI_LOGO_PATH=http://169.254.169.254/iam`` (or any internal HTTP
service the admin pointed at) — the proxy fetches it server-side
and streams the response body to the unauthenticated caller. No
URL validation, no Content-Type validation; ``application/json``
AWS metadata gets tunneled out under the ``image/jpeg`` wrapper.
New helper module ``litellm/proxy/common_utils/static_asset_utils.py``:
* ``resolve_local_asset_path(candidate, allowed_roots)`` — returns the
resolved absolute path only if it lives within one of the allowed
asset roots. Uses ``realpath`` so symlinks pointing outside the roots
are caught.
* ``fetch_validated_image_bytes(url)`` — runs the URL through
``validate_url`` (rejecting private / cloud-metadata / loopback
targets) and only returns the response body if the upstream
Content-Type is in a small allowlist of image MIME types.
Both ``/get_image`` and ``/get_favicon`` are wired through the helpers.
The SSRF gate is enforced unconditionally — these endpoints are
unauthenticated, so the admin-facing ``litellm.user_url_validation``
toggle does not apply (an admin who opted out of URL validation for
LLM provider paths shouldn't also expose ``/get_image`` to SSRF).
Tests:
- ``TestResolveLocalAssetPath``: 10 cases covering legitimate paths,
``/etc/passwd``, ``/proc/self/environ``, symlink-out, ``..``
traversal, directories, missing files, and root list edge cases.
- ``TestFetchValidatedImageBytes``: 7 cases covering SSRF block, non-
image content-type rejection, valid image passthrough, non-200
response, fetch exception, empty URL, and parametrized coverage of
every allowed image MIME type.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Remove unused search_provider parameter from
SearchAPIRouter._resolve_search_provider_credentials. The function
only reads tool_litellm_params; the docstring already omitted
search_provider, confirming it was unintentional dead code.
- Drop redundant hasAgents/hasSearchTools conditions from the outer
object_permission guard in OldTeams.tsx. Both agent and search-tool
handling already run independently below this block with their own
object_permission initialization, so including them in the outer
guard caused an empty object_permission to be created prematurely
and never populated within that block.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
- Proxy decoded `model` from the encoded batch_id but never passed it
to `litellm.aretrieve_batch`.
- Without `model` in kwargs, litellm cannot load `BedrockBatchesConfig`
and falls into the legacy provider switch, which 400s for bedrock.
- Fix: set `data["model"] = model_from_id` before the litellm call in
the SCENARIO 1 (encoded batch_id) branch.
- Also corrects the error string in
`_handle_retrieve_batch_providers_without_provider_config` (said
`'create_batch'` despite being raised from the retrieve path).
- Adds tests covering retrieve + file_content round-trip for bedrock-
encoded IDs.
AWS Bedrock pricing publishes a separate 1-hour prompt-cache write rate for
Claude 4.5 / 4.6 / 4.7 (1.6x the 5-minute rate). Without
`cache_creation_input_token_cost_above_1hr`, cost tracking for 1-hour-TTL
prompt caching on Bedrock falls back to the 5-minute rate and undercounts
spend by ~60%.
Adds the field to the spot-checked Global and US-region entries:
- anthropic.claude-opus-4-7 (Global $10.00 / MTok)
- anthropic.claude-opus-4-6-v1 (Global $10.00 / MTok)
- anthropic.claude-opus-4-5-... (Global $10.00 / MTok)
- anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-6 (Global $6.00 / MTok)
- anthropic.claude-sonnet-4-5-... (Global $6.00 / MTok regular,
$12.00 / MTok long-context >200K)
- anthropic.claude-haiku-4-5-... (Global $2.00 / MTok)
- global.anthropic.* mirrors of the above
- us.anthropic.* mirrors at the US +10% premium
Also updates the long-context (>200K) variants of Sonnet 4.5 with
`cache_creation_input_token_cost_above_1hr_above_200k_tokens`.
The mirrored entries in `litellm/model_prices_and_context_window_backup.json`
are updated in lockstep.
EU / AU / APAC / JP / us-gov regional variants are out of scope for this
change pending separate verification against AWS Bedrock pricing for those
regions.
Adds tests/test_litellm/test_bedrock_anthropic_1hr_cache_pricing.py to lock
in the expected values and the 1.6x ratio invariant.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Two issues from the previous push's review:
1. **Greptile P1**: ``get_vector_store_info`` had the same catch-all
``except Exception`` pattern as ``update_vector_store``, so the
HTTPException(403/404) raised by both the in-memory access check and
the new ``_fetch_and_authorize_vector_store`` helper was rewritten as
500. Mirror the ``except HTTPException: raise`` guard from
``update_vector_store``.
2. **code-quality CI** (``tests/code_coverage_tests/recursive_detector.py``)
flagged ``_redact_sensitive_litellm_params`` as an unallowlisted
recursive function. Match the convention of other allowlisted
helpers ("max depth set"): bound recursion at depth 10 (well above
any plausible nesting level for real ``litellm_params`` payloads),
return the redaction sentinel on overflow, and add the function
name to ``IGNORE_FUNCTIONS``.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three issues surfaced in review of the previous commit:
1. **Veria — Medium**: ``litellm_params`` carries a nested
``litellm_embedding_config`` dict (auto-resolved from the model
registry on create / update) which itself holds ``api_key`` /
``aws_*`` / ``vertex_credentials``. The previous redactor only
inspected top-level keys, so the nested values passed through
unredacted. Recurse into nested dicts.
2. **Greptile — P2**: when ``litellm_params`` is a JSON-serialized
string (the in-memory registry occasionally stores it that way), the
previous redactor silently no-op'd via the ``isinstance(..., dict)``
guard and echoed the raw payload back. Now: parse, redact, re-serialize.
If the string is not valid JSON, replace it with the redaction
sentinel rather than echo it.
3. **mypy** flagged ``_redact_sensitive_litellm_params``'s
``Optional[Dict[str, Any]]`` signature as incompatible with the
``object``-typed call site. Widened to ``Any -> Any`` to reflect the
actual contract (the function now handles dict / str / None / other).
Also fixes a related test regression in
``test_remove_sensitive_info_from_deployment_with_excluded_keys``: the
``"credentials"`` plural addition to ``SensitiveDataMasker`` defaults
caused the first call (without ``excluded_keys``) to mutate the input
dict's ``litellm_credentials_name`` to a masked value. The second call
(with ``excluded_keys``) then saw the already-masked value rather than
the original. Construct fresh input for each call.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
/simplify pass:
- ``update_vector_store`` (newly added) and ``get_vector_store_info``'s
DB-fallback path duplicated the same shape: ``find_unique`` →
``model_dump`` → ``LiteLLM_ManagedVectorStore(**)`` →
``_check_vector_store_access`` → raise 404/403. Extract into
``_fetch_and_authorize_vector_store`` so the pattern lives in one
place; future endpoints that need the same gate get it via one call.
- The ``except HTTPException: raise`` guard added in the prior commit is
retained — the helper raises HTTPException(403/404) and the catch-all
``except Exception`` would otherwise rewrite them as 500.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two architectural extensions to the credential-redaction in the previous
commit:
1. ``/vector_store/update`` had two gaps:
- No per-store access control. Any authenticated principal that
passed the premium-feature gate could mutate *any* vector store,
including stores belonging to other teams.
- The response returned the full DB row including ``litellm_params``,
so the caller could read another team's persisted provider
credentials by submitting a no-op metadata change.
Mirror the access-control check ``/vector_store/info`` already
performs (``_check_vector_store_access`` against the existing row),
redact ``litellm_params`` in the response, and add an
``except HTTPException: raise`` guard so the 403/404 responses don't
get rewritten as 500 by the catch-all.
2. ``SensitiveDataMasker``'s default ``sensitive_patterns`` set used
segment-exact matching, so ``credential`` matched ``vertex_credential``
but not ``vertex_credentials`` (the actual Vertex field name). The
previous commit worked around this with a per-call extension; this
commit puts the plural in the upstream defaults so every caller
(Redis config dump, MCP debug headers, cache routes, ...) gets the
correct behavior. The local override in
``vector_store_endpoints/management_endpoints.py`` is removed.
Also updates ``test_excluded_keys_exact_match`` which relied on
``credentials`` *not* being a sensitive pattern to demonstrate
case-sensitive ``excluded_keys`` matching. The intent of the test
(case-sensitive match) is preserved; the assertion now reflects that
when ``excluded_keys`` fails to apply (wrong case), the field falls
through to standard pattern-based masking instead of being passed
through unchanged.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
