* fix(proxy): keep the personal budget on a proxy-admin user object
A token carrying the proxy_admin role (JWT admin scope, SSO) replaced the fetched LiteLLM_UserTable row with a bare admin object, so max_budget never reached common_checks and admins spent past their personal budget on /chat/completions. Keep the row and force only user_role.
Co-authored-by: L4XB <lukas.buck@e-mail.de>
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(e2e): budget denial for a proxy-admin JWT is the 422 ExceededBudget response
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): carry only the personal budget onto a forced proxy-admin user object
Keeping the whole DB row also carried its models list, so a proxy admin
whose row had no-default-models or a restricted list got 403 on personal
requests. Build the admin object as before and copy max_budget and
user_email across. The built-in admin identity (the master key and the UI
username/password login) keeps ignoring its row's budget.
* test(proxy): pin the contrast case in the admin model-list and admin-name budget tests
Each test now also shows the same cached row refusing a non-exempt token, so the
pass case cannot go green on a row the gate never read.
* test(e2e): drive the personal-budget case with a proxy_admin user row and a plain JWT
The Buildkite stack keeps the default admin_allowed_routes, so an admin-scope JWT
gets 403 on /chat/completions before any budget check and the case could never
pass there. A plain token whose sub resolves to a proxy_admin row goes through the
same forced-admin rebuild. Drop the stage-mirror admin_allowed_routes edit, which
the deployed stack never read.
* ci: rerun e2e after an unrelated Gemini streaming spend-row timeout
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: L4XB <lukas.buck@e-mail.de>
Co-authored-by: yucheng-berri <293926326+yucheng-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy/auth): expand all-team-models sentinel for project model access checks
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(e2e): use CI-served models and tighten project all-team-models denial check
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(e2e): declare coverage registry cells for project all-team-models tests
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* ci: retrigger e2e after ephemeral stack deploy timeout
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(e2e): wait for team allowlist propagation before project denial check
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(e2e): annotate written_at as Final per LIT010
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: jesus <jesus@berri.ai>
* test(e2e): jwt auto_register map-existing-key repro
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(jwt): auto_register_map_existing_key maps JWT to the user's existing virtual key
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(jwt): exclude blocked keys from auto_register_map_existing_key reuse
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(jwt): route existing-key lookup through VerificationTokenRepository
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(e2e): stop requiring LITELLM_SALT_KEY for the owned JWT gateway
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(e2e): gate the owned JWT gateway tests behind E2E_OWNED_GATEWAY
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(jwt): only reuse keys that can call LLM routes in auto_register_map_existing_key
Skip Admin UI session keys and keys whose allowed_routes restrict them to
anything other than llm_api_routes (management, read_only, password-reset
sessions). Mapping a JWT to one of those left the user with 401s or 403s on
every LLM call, since the mapping persists.
* fix(jwt): scope auto_register_map_existing_key reuse to the JWT-resolved team
Only reuse a key whose team_id matches the team auth_builder resolved for
the JWT (no team matches no team), so a personal key can no longer bypass
the resolved team's model and budget limits.
With the flag on, the first JWT request now falls through to the same
virtual-key checks later mapped requests get, instead of returning early,
so a reused key's own limits apply from request one rather than 200 then
403. Flag off keeps the early return unchanged.
* fix(jwt): keep the early return when no master key is set
Without a master key the generic virtual-key path returns a bare
INTERNAL_USER object, so falling through on the first auto-registered
request dropped the key's team, models and budgets. Only fall through when
a master key is configured.
Tests now assert the reused key per team rather than the query shape, and
cover the flag-off early return and the no-master-key case.
* test(jwt): assert on race-loser's returned key, not only mocks (TQ002)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(jwt): close the auto_register_map_existing_key race, shared-claim and expiry holes
A key auto_register just minted is never adopted by a concurrent request, so the race loser's cleanup can no longer delete a key another request mapped and cascade its mapping away (503, user left with no key)
Reuse only happens when the claim value is the JWT-resolved user_id. A shared claim such as azp or client_id falls back to minting, so one user can no longer land on another user's personal key and budget
Only keys that never expire are reused, so an expiring key can no longer pin the claim to a permanent 401
Integration tests on a real proxy and Postgres cover all three. The race test holds the first mapping insert in a Postgres relay, so the interleaving is forced rather than timed. The where-clause shape unit tests are replaced by these, since only a real database proves the filter
* test(e2e): create the reused key in the team the JWT resolves to
The flag only reuses a key in the JWT-resolved team, and this identity's groups claim resolves to its team, so a teamless key was never eligible and the test could not pass
* test(integration): match the held statement across TCP reads
The relay looked for the trigger inside one read, so an insert split across two reads was never held and the race test would fail waiting for it. It now matches one exact trigger over a window that keeps the end of the previous read
* fix(jwt): gate key reuse on the claim field, not on the claim value
Requiring the claim value to equal the resolved user_id skipped reuse for users matched through the sso_user_id or case-insensitive email fallback, whose stored user_id differs from the JWT sub. That is the lookup LIT-5378 asks for. Reuse is now allowed when the virtual key claim is the user_id or user_email JWT field, globally or for the token's issuer, which still keeps shared claims such as azp or client_id on the mint path
* fix(jwt): let an issuer's own user field replace the global one when gating key reuse
An issuer that identifies users by uid no longer treats the global sub field as a user identity claim, so a shared sub under that issuer mints instead of reusing a personal key
* test(jwt): make the flag-off test fail when the flag no longer gates key reuse
The flag-off test used a config where sub was not a user identity claim, so deleting the flag check still passed. Configure user_id_jwt_field=sub so only the flag keeps the lookup off, and drop test docstrings
* chore(lint): drop mutable-ok suppressions that LIT013 flags as no-ops
---------
Co-authored-by: yuneng <yuneng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: mrinal <mrinal@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Mrinal Chanshetty <mchanshetty@Mrinals-MacBook-Pro.local>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(auth): bind UI/CLI session tokens to their own AES-GCM context
UI and CLI session tokens are now always encrypted with AES-256-GCM and a
fixed session associated-data value, and the session-token check only accepts
AES-GCM values carrying that same value. Stored secrets keep their current
encryption and decrypt unchanged, so nothing needs migrating.
encrypt_value_helper and decrypt_value_helper take an optional aad. XSalsa20
cannot bind associated data, so an AAD-bound value is always written as
AES-256-GCM, and an AAD-bound decrypt refuses the legacy format.
Session tokens issued before the upgrade stop validating, so UI and CLI users
sign in once more after upgrading.
* test(e2e): cover real SSO login through the dashboard and the lite CLI
Adds two specs under tests/e2e/ui/oidc, run by playwright.oidc.config.ts
against a live Keycloak stack. The dashboard spec checks that the SSO
session authorizes the Virtual Keys and Models data requests. The CLI
spec runs a real lite login in an isolated HOME with the keyring
disabled, then lists models and sends one chat completion with the
stored session. The main Playwright config now ignores oidc/.
* fix(auth): encode UI/CLI session tokens as unpadded base64url
Session tokens carried the v2:gcm: storage prefix and base64 padding. Basic-auth parsers split on the first colon and browsers reject ':' and '=' in WebSocket subprotocols, so Langfuse pass-through and the realtime playground could not use them
Tokens are now plain unpadded base64url, the same header-safe shape as any bearer token
* fix(auth): prefix UI/CLI session tokens with litellm_login_
A prefix-less token starts with sk- about once in 262,144 logins and is then routed as a virtual key, so that login gets a 401. The prefix also makes session tokens easy to spot in logs
The prefix doubles as the token's AES-GCM associated data, so the visible kind and the encrypted kind cannot disagree
---------
Co-authored-by: ryan-crabbe-berri <ryan@berri.ai>
* fix(proxy): list key and team model aliases in GET /v1/models
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): keep alias listing helpers within the type discipline budget
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): cover alias rows on GET /v1/models and /v1/models/{id}
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): apply team then key aliases like chat completions and keep the alias as the retrieved id
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): apply key aliases twice like chat completions and skip only malformed alias entries
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): apply the global model_alias_map between the key alias passes like chat completions
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): list only the caller's own aliases and never rewrite a listed model id on retrieval
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* style(proxy): ruff format model_info alias lookup
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): hide undiscoverable names from model retrieval so an alias named like one resolves to its target
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): keep undiscoverable models retrievable by id while excluding them from the alias guard
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(proxy): pass an immutable name sequence into the model_info alias guard
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): type the model list alias test helpers
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): annotate the new alias listing test fixtures and helpers
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(e2e): add a HashiCorp Vault secret manager lane
key_management_system had no end-to-end coverage: the Rust crates and the
Python unit tests all run against mocked managers. This adds a secret_manager
suite that drives a proxy configured with hashicorp_vault against a real Vault.
The tests seed a fresh secret name per test with the runner's OPENAI_API_KEY and
register a deployment pointing at os.environ/<name>. The proxy's env never holds
that name, so get_secret's os.environ fallback cannot mask a broken manager, and
a bogus value in Vault must come back as the provider's 401. Virtual keys are
checked written to and removed from Vault under prefix_for_stored_virtual_keys.
The setting is global to the proxy, so the lane has its own config and the
secret_manager_vault opt-in marker, and stays out of the per-PR selector.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(e2e): make the secret manager suite backend-agnostic
One marker and opt-in (secret_manager / E2E_SECRET_MANAGER=<system>) pick the
backend from secret_backends.BACKENDS. The tests reach the manager through a
SecretStore protocol, and each backend contributes a secret_store_<system>.py
module, a registry entry, and gateway/secret_manager_<system>_ci_config.yml.
requires_capability deselects tests a backend cannot support (CyberArk does
not delete), and test_secret_backends.py checks every lane config against its
backend without a live stack.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(e2e): add a CyberArk Conjur secret manager lane
Adds cyberark as the second secret_manager backend: a Conjur store over its
REST API (policy-declared variables, raw-text values, policy-patch teardown),
its lane config, and a registry entry without deletes_stored_keys, since the
proxy's CyberArk delete answers not_supported and Conjur keeps the key.
secret_manager/backend.sh up|down <system> boots any backend in Docker and
writes proxy.env and tests.env, so every lane runs the same way; the registry
test checks the script boots exactly the registered backends. e2e_http gains
send_text_external for APIs that speak raw text rather than JSON.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(e2e): give the secret manager suite a client with .proxy and address review
The shared resources fixture reads client.proxy, so a bare ProxyClient errored every
live test at setup. backend.sh now writes its env under a per-user directory with
umask 077, the markerless unit tests are gone per tests/e2e/AGENTS.md, and routine
comments are trimmed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(jwt): accept a team alias in x-litellm-team-id
The header only matched canonical team ids, so a JWT caller selecting one of their teams by its alias got a 403 even though they belonged to it. The header value is now resolved through the existing alias lookup before the JWT allowed-team check and the DB membership fallback, while a value that is already a team id never costs an alias lookup and denials keep naming the value the caller sent
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(jwt): only alias a header team id the database provably lacks
Under fallback_to_db_teams a header value whose team row read fails for any reason other than TeamNotFoundError now keeps the membership denial instead of falling through to the alias lookup, so a degraded read cannot select a different team that carries the value as an alias. Drops the HeaderTeam docstring that only restated its fields
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: ryan <ryan@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
The suite used to mint its own RS256 tokens from a stand-in issuer, which
could only ever prove the proxy agreed with the tests: the claims were
whatever the tests chose to sign. Every JWT bug worth catching lives in the
shape of what an identity provider really emits, so the suite now runs
against Keycloak (realm in idp_realm.json), provisions a group and a user per
test through its admin API, and signs in through the direct-access grant.
That changes what the tokens look like: sub is Keycloak's opaque user uuid
rather than a friendly name, groups arrives from a protocol mapper, aud is
the IdP's own audience, and the JWKS carries an encryption key beside the
signing key so the proxy has to select on kid. The expiry case now takes a
one-second token from a second client in the realm and waits for it to lapse
instead of forging a stale exp.
The proxy config the suite needs is unchanged. CI runs it against a Keycloak
deployed beside the ephemeral stack, which lives in the releaser repo.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01EX13mWex6RaBo9PYnkAtFW
Add tests/e2e/jwt_issuer.py, a test-only RS256 issuer that serves a JWKS
document and signs arbitrary claims over an open loopback-only /token
endpoint, so e2e tests can mint tokens without ever holding a signing key.
One key per process keeps the proxy's cached JWKS valid for the whole run.
Add the first five live JWT auth tests in tests/e2e/other: a valid token for
an existing team is accepted and its spend row carries the claimed team and
user, a tampered signature and an expired token are refused with 401, a
token naming a team that does not exist is refused with 403, and a plain
sk- virtual key keeps working with enable_jwt_auth on. Harness unit tests
cover the issuer itself. Team and user create/delete land on the shared
ProxyClient (warn-only teardown, /user/delete typed as the int it returns)
instead of a fourth per-suite copy.
Document the issuer command, the E2E_JWT_ISSUER_PORT convention (default
4190), JWT_PUBLIC_KEY_URL and the litellm_jwtauth config block in
tests/e2e/CONTRIBUTING.md, and register the new cells in other.yaml.
* fix(auth): resolve bare model names against wildcard deployments in model access groups
* test(e2e): cover model access group permission checks on keys and teams
* test(e2e): cover vendor strategy gaps for chat contract, image edits, auth, team activity
Resolves the first slice of LIT-4778 (vendor API testing strategy): image edits happy path, chat multi-turn + validation + sanitization, LLM-route auth header matrix, and /team/daily/activity structure
* test(e2e): expand vendor API strategy coverage across endpoints
Adds validation cases on existing endpoint suites, plus vector stores, search,
bedrock native, realtime HTTP secrets/calls, responses retrieve, files/batches
contract, and chat stream SSE. Registers coverage cells for LIT-4778
* test(e2e): finish vendor strategy open items
Audio transcription negatives, vector-store file attach/poll/search,
OpenAI moderation category matrix across chat/messages/responses, and
smoke model matrix for chat (LIT-4778)
* test(e2e): harden vendor strategy suite against live env edges
Fix stream [DONE] tracking, XSS no-crash contract, realtime model routing,
vector store list/search models, responses validation, and provider-denied
Bedrock paths so the suite is stable against a live proxy
* test(e2e): rename suites, drop vendor_contract, fix greptile gaps
Move shared status helpers into e2e_http, rename chat auth headers and
chat security suites, remove vendor_contract and dev_config files_settings,
and tighten transcription validation plus vector-store search assertions
* test(e2e): route bedrock stream disconnects through e2e_http
Catch mid-stream RequestException in the shared harness so bedrock native
tests do not import requests directly
This reverts commit dcb4e5033c.
The suites landed without the proof-of-fix and QA runbook the PR body
itself flagged as outstanding, so the coverage they claim is unverified
against a live proxy
* test(e2e): cover vendor strategy gaps for chat contract, image edits, auth, team activity
Resolves the first slice of LIT-4778 (vendor API testing strategy): image edits happy path, chat multi-turn + validation + sanitization, LLM-route auth header matrix, and /team/daily/activity structure
* test(e2e): expand vendor API strategy coverage across endpoints
Adds validation cases on existing endpoint suites, plus vector stores, search,
bedrock native, realtime HTTP secrets/calls, responses retrieve, files/batches
contract, and chat stream SSE. Registers coverage cells for LIT-4778
* test(e2e): finish vendor strategy open items
Audio transcription negatives, vector-store file attach/poll/search,
OpenAI moderation category matrix across chat/messages/responses, and
smoke model matrix for chat (LIT-4778)
* test(e2e): harden vendor strategy suite against live env edges
Fix stream [DONE] tracking, XSS no-crash contract, realtime model routing,
vector store list/search models, responses validation, and provider-denied
Bedrock paths so the suite is stable against a live proxy
* test(e2e): rename suites, drop vendor_contract, fix greptile gaps
Move shared status helpers into e2e_http, rename chat auth headers and
chat security suites, remove vendor_contract and dev_config files_settings,
and tighten transcription validation plus vector-store search assertions
* test(e2e): route bedrock stream disconnects through e2e_http
Catch mid-stream RequestException in the shared harness so bedrock native
tests do not import requests directly
* fix(e2e): address greptile and veria review on vendor strategy suite
Store search tool keys as os.environ refs and resolve them in SearchAPIRouter.
Tighten validation helpers and assertions so 5xx/empty/unrelated failures no longer pass coverage cells
* fix(e2e): drop search_api_router os.environ expansion from vendor suite
Keep the PR test-only. Search tools register without an api_key so the
proxy falls back to its own PERPLEXITY/TAVILY env, same pattern as a2a.
* test(e2e): drop search e2e suite from vendor strategy PR
Remove the /v1/search coverage file and its registry rows so this PR
no longer carries search endpoint testing.
* test(e2e): cover passthrough headers, batch assume-role, gemini, vllm, bedrock guardrails, batch rate-limit mapping
Add parent-package e2e suites for the six feature gaps: pass-through header forwarding via /config/pass_through_endpoint, Bedrock batch STS assume-role, Gemini chat + files, hosted_vllm batch/files, Bedrock guardrail pre_call blocks (plus restored content-filter team opt-out), and OpenAI batch RPM 429 body mapping. Registry cells and LiteLLMParamsBody/TeamMetadata fields updated so markers collect cleanly.
* test(e2e): cover LIT-4587 gaps for redis, responses, tpm cache, apply_guardrail, langfuse
Adds customer-shaped live e2e for apply_guardrail, responses store+metadata TTL,
TPM excluding cached tokens, redis-backed RPM, redis circuit-breaker path,
Langfuse spend, Cohere chat, virtual-key auth, file content download, hosted_vllm
chat, and Nova Sonic realtime. Registry cells updated for the new markers.
* test(e2e): drive LIT-4587 gap suites on Anthropic to avoid Gemini quota flakes
Redis RPM, circuit-breaker path, virtual-key auth, responses metadata, and
Langfuse driver models now use Anthropic haiku so local runs stay green when
Gemini daily quota is exhausted.
* test(e2e): drop Langfuse spend suite; feature is being deprecated
Remove test_langfuse_e2e.py, logging.langfuse registry cells, and the
langfuse-only conftest driver/credentials fixtures.
* test(e2e): fold provider/batch feature tests into their endpoint suites
Keep the e2e layout endpoint- and suite-scoped instead of one file per
provider or feature
Move the virtual-key auth case into access_control/test_access_control_e2e.py
as TestVirtualKeyAuth (replacing an incomplete stub) and drop the standalone
test_virtual_key_auth_e2e.py
Fold the five per-file batch suites (file content, RPM 429 mapping, Bedrock
assume-role, Gemini files, hosted_vllm batch) into batches/test_batches_e2e.py.
The hosted_vllm batch case is skipped for now since it needs a live vLLM server
(HOSTED_VLLM_API_BASE) the e2e environment does not provision; it and the
gemini-files and RPM-mapping cases reference LIT-3382 / LIT-3266 where relevant
Merge the cohere, gemini and hosted_vllm chat cases into
llm_translation/test_chat_completions_regression_e2e.py so /chat/completions
coverage lives in one endpoint file, and repoint the coverage_registry source
fields to the new homes
Move the shared CacheControl / TextBlock / RichMessage request blocks into the
root models.py (re-exported from endpoints_client) so quota_management can use
them without a cross-suite import, which also clears the basedpyright errors in
test_tpm_excludes_cached_tokens_e2e.py; type the httpbin echo body in
test_passthrough_headers_e2e.py with a pydantic model to drop the Any-typed
json.loads path
* test(e2e): address review feedback and re-home virtual-key coverage
Replace the tautological Bedrock assume-role batch id assertion (`startswith(...)
or batch.id`, always true) with a managed-id shape check, since the unified
target_model_names path re-encodes the id rather than returning a raw ARN
Raise the batch RPM-mapping test's rpm_limit above one so the file upload can no
longer consume the key's sole request unit before batch create runs; the batch
create then clears the generic per-request limiter and the batch limiter is what
returns the "Batch rate limit exceeded" body the assertions check
Set exercised_on to [] on the pass-through header test; it drives a pass-through
endpoint, not /chat/completions
Move the virtual-key valid_allows / invalid_denied cells from other.yaml to
mgmt.yaml as mgmt.virtual_key.* so TestVirtualKeyAuth rolls up under Management,
and point its covers marker at the new ids
Introduce the e2e coverage denominator: 282 behavior cells across the six
tracking modules (LLMs, MCPs, Management/UI, Reliability & Performance,
Logging & Guardrails, Other), one validated YAML row each, plus a collector
that diffs the registry against @pytest.mark.covers markers and reports
coverage per module.
The registry rows validate against a pydantic discriminated union so a row
cannot carry a field from another module. The collector is static: a
collect-only pass reads the markers, so it runs no test and needs no live
proxy. Register the covers marker suite-wide so that pass works under
--strict-markers.
This is a draft for review. Tiers are proposed rather than signed off, and a
few cells still need a support check or a prune.
