Code outside the router now reaches it only through the entry points
(registry, settings, health, select, apply, observe, register_plugin, retire)
or the endpoint methods; the outside-member allowlist shrinks from 139 to 45.
litellm/router.py no longer imports litellm.proxy: it asks the installed
RouterHost (litellm/router_host.py) for vertex pass-through credentials,
member auto-router authorization and auto-router prompt compression, and the
proxy installs its host on import. Call sites where a model name can be
missing keep the old answer instead of reaching an entry point with None.
* feat(proxy): per-provider and per-model rpm/tpm requirements for enforce_project_model_quota
* test(proxy): cover per-provider and per-model enforce_project_model_quota policies
* fix(proxy): keep enforce_project_model_quota reads typed
* fix(proxy): apply the quota policy to model add, follow router wildcard rules, keep old setting values
* fix(proxy): keep team model names off quota model entries, read the provider behind api_base, match patterns like the router
A team admin picks a team model's public name, so a name matching an exempt model entry no longer skips its provider's limits. A mapping with no policy key keeps requiring both limits as before, the project create permission check runs before the setting is read, and an unprefixed model behind a known OpenAI-compatible api_base resolves to that provider
* fix(proxy): re-check team projects on team model writes and validate quota provider ids
* fix(proxy): check added limits on model updates and match team models by the model they call
* fix(proxy): re-check team projects by every name a team model serves and check renamed names
* fix(proxy): follow the router's order for tied team patterns and annotate quota tests
* fix(proxy): match a team model's called model through JSON provider prefixes too
* fix(proxy): keep model updates that keep their route as on main
A PATCH or POST model update now checks only the limits its new route adds over the stored one, so removing or zeroing a limit on an unchanged route answers 200 again, under true and under a policy
* refactor(typing): narrow Any sources across providers, proxy and guardrails (wave 1)
* refactor(typing): narrow Any sources across hubs, providers and proxy (wave 2)
* refactor(typing): validate RunwayML task JSON and let dotprompt loaders accept exported prompts
* fix: restore pass-through behavior on paths the typing pass tightened
MCP client IP extraction trusts X-Forwarded-For only when use_x_forwarded_for is True, dotprompt skips a malformed JSON prompt entry instead of raising, RunwayML task payloads pass through unvalidated, and a malformed provider body raises the same AttributeError as before at the CompactifAI, Gemini, and mock transport parse sites
* fix(runwayml): keep a malformed 2xx task body on the 500 path
* fix(edenai,cli): keep a non-object body in the error and fail on a malformed migration report
EdenAI's embedding and image generation parse dropped a non-object body from the error
they raised, so the message no longer named what the provider sent. A helper now raises
with the body in the message, and both paths have a regression test.
`lite encryption migrate` exited 0 with no message when the proxy's report was not an
object or its residual_legacy was not a number, where base crashed. It now fails with a
message naming the value.
The CompactifAI and Gemini image-edit non-object body tests accept TypeError or
AttributeError, which both base and this branch raise, so they guard against a
ValidationError instead of pinning one class. RunwayML's async parse gets the same
non-object body test as the sync one.
* fix: keep base's error classes, duck-typed checks and fail-closed guardrails the typing pass changed
* test: annotate the new regression tests' locals with Final
* test: annotate the remaining new test locals with Final
* fix(key mgmt): a project may only be attached to keys of its own team
A project is created under exactly one team, and its budget and models are
validated against that team's. Nothing checked that a key's team matched, so
`POST /key/generate` with `team_id: team-a` and a `project_id` owned by
`team-b` answered 200 and stored exactly that — a key belonging to team-a,
recorded under team-b's project and validated against its models and budget.
The same held with no team at all.
It needs no proxy-admin rights: an admin of team-a who is a member of no other
team can issue keys under another tenant's project with nothing but the project
id, and that tenant sees the spend without having granted anything.
`_check_project_key_limits` now takes the key's team and refuses a project
owned by a different one, before the model and budget checks so the refusal
reads as what it is. A project with no owning team is left alone — nobody owns
it, so there is no boundary to cross. `/key/update` passes the key's stored
team when the request does not carry one, and now runs the check whenever the
project itself is set or changed, which a request that moves only the project
previously skipped.
Two existing cells needed the project's team passed explicitly: they measure
the model allowlist, not tenancy, and would otherwise have been asserting model
behaviour on a request the new gate refuses. A third builds an unowned project
for the same reason.
Fixes#41089
* fix(key mgmt): check project ownership on every key mutation path
/key/update ran the project check only when project_id, models or
max_budget were supplied, so a request that changed team_id alone left a
foreign project attached. /key/regenerate never ran it at all. Both now
go through one helper that validates the key as the mutation leaves it.
On /key/generate the check moves after default_key_generate_params is
applied, because that can supply team_id; it was rejecting a valid key
whose team came from the defaults.
Tests move into the mapped test file per CLAUDE.md.
* test(key mgmt): read the project from the cache instead of patching the lookup
The test-quality gate rejected the new cells: 12 TQ008 for patching
`get_project_object`, an SDK internal, and 4 TQ001 for accept controls that
could only fail by raising.
The cells now seed `UserApiKeyCache` with the project, which is the idiom
the neighbouring project cells already use and removes the patching. The
accept controls are parametrised together with the rejecting ones, so each
test function carries a real assertion. The three regenerate seams that stay
stubbed each carry a reason.
* fix(proxy): prevent cross-team project keys
Co-authored-by: L4XB <lukas.buck@e-mail.de>
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): validate bulk key team changes
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): use behavioral assertions in project ownership tests
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): read project owner from the database for key ownership checks
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): read project ownership from the primary database under the lookup deadline
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): check project moves against the primary database team
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): run ownership checks after existing validation without the lookup deadline
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): type ownership writer reads
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): make ownership tests independent of runner salt and clock
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): check key project ownership after existing validation
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): run key project ownership right before the key row write
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): reject key project ownership before permission and budget writes
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): keep project object permission validation on the stored payload
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* style(proxy): format key regeneration update payload
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): invalidate the written permission id on bulk update and regenerate
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(proxy): audit project team ownership across endpoints, bulk paths and chaos
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(proxy): drop budget and permission rows written for a rejected cross-team key
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(keys): require project-team membership when regenerate binds a key to a team-owned project
/key/{key}/regenerate and /key/regenerate accepted a team_id + project_id
pair without checking that the caller belongs to the destination team, so a
user with no team could regenerate their own key into another team and its
project. Regenerate now requires a proxy admin or a member/admin of the
project's team whenever the change lands the key on a team-owned project.
Also adapts tests to main's premium_user_check rename, drops a duplicate
import left by the merge, and replaces the created object-permission id cast
with an isinstance check.
* fix(keys): 404 a missing project before any key write, and match the project move refusal to its siblings
A missing project_id on /key/service-account/generate and on both regenerate
routes fell through to a foreign-key 500; regenerate had already written a
deleted-token history row, and service-account generate left its budget and
object-permission rows behind. The ownership check now answers 404 with the
same message /key/generate uses, before any write, and the generate rollback
covers it. The /project/update move refusal now uses ProxyException
(bad_request, param team_id) like the delete-with-keys refusal.
Tests: integration coverage for a team admin regenerating a team key into
another team's project (403), the missing-project 404s with no history rows,
and the unit test that never reached the ownership check is removed.
* test(keys): keep the existing-permission case in the regeneration cache eviction test
Parametrize the test over a key that already has an object_permission_id and one that mints a new row, so eviction under the key's existing permission id stays covered.
---------
Co-authored-by: L4XB <lukas.buck@e-mail.de>
Co-authored-by: yucheng <yucheng@berri.ai>
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ui): show Projects nav to team and org admins
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ui): satisfy frontend lint budget
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* style(ui): format leftnav regression tests
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(projects): let org admins see projects of every team in their orgs
/project/list and /project/info only knew proxy admins and team members, so an
org admin saw projects only for teams they had personally joined. Both now use
the same team access check as /team/info.
* fix(ui): one shared Projects access rule for nav, data and actions
The Projects query skipped global org_admin users, the page-visibility picker
could never offer Projects, and New/Edit showed to users the backend would
reject. Nav and queries now share one rule, Projects is selectable in the
allowlist, New/Edit follow team_admin_editable_team_fields, and the project
modal only lists teams the user administers.
* fix(projects): record IN-list bounds for project visibility filters
Both filters are bounded by one caller's team memberships and admin orgs. Also
cover a project whose team was deleted.
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: ryan-crabbe-berri <ryan@berri.ai>
access already means access groups in this codebase; authz names what the
module decides (who may act on a team). Pure rename: every importer now uses
authz, and access.py stays as a re-export because the published
litellm-enterprise 0.1.73 wheel imports is_team_admin from it.
* refactor(proxy): route every team-admin decision through auth/team_access.py
Move the six team-admin helpers out of common_utils, team_endpoints and
key_management_endpoints into litellm/proxy/auth/team_access.py under public
names, and point every management route and helper at them. The key routes
keep checking team admin before org admin, so a team admin whose user row is
gone still passes as before. Status codes and bodies are unchanged, which the
223-case team-admin matrix confirms at the merge base and at the tip
common_utils keeps `_is_user_team_admin` as an alias because the published
litellm-enterprise 0.1.71 wheel still imports it from there
* refactor(proxy): answer every team access check with TeamAccess.allows
Replace the six helpers in auth/team_access.py with one resolver in
litellm/proxy/management/teams/access.py. Each route passes the roles it
accepts (TEAM_OR_ORG_ADMIN or TEAM_ADMIN_ONLY), and /team/update and
/team/info rank roles through strongest_role so org admin still outranks
team admin there
The org lookup moves behind an OrgRoles protocol, implemented by
PrismaOrgRoles in management/users/service.py, and get_team_access in
management/teams/dependencies.py is the only place that reads proxy_server
globals. _check_key_admin_access keeps its name and body from main
Routes that checked org admin first now read the roster first, so a team
admin whose org lookup errors now passes on /team/delete, /team/block,
/team/unblock, member reset_spend and reset_budget, and the team callback
routes. No allowed caller is denied
Adds a projects entry to the team_admin_editable_team_fields setting. When set, team admins (legacy admins list or members_with_roles role admin) can call /project/new and /project/update for the teams they administer. The two routes join self_managed_routes so the endpoint check runs instead of the route gate's blanket 401. /project/delete stays proxy admin only
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds a configurable password-strength policy (default: min 12 chars,
upper/lower/number/special, all individually toggleable, floored at 8
so a misconfigured minimum cannot disable the length check, and
unicode-aware so an accented letter cannot satisfy the special-
character requirement) enforced on every path that sets a local
user's password: /user/update, /user/bulk_update, and the invitation
onboarding claim flow.
Adds general_settings.disable_password_login_when_sso_enabled, which
rejects username/password login on /login, /v2/login and /v3/login
(including the UI_USERNAME/UI_PASSWORD admin fallback) once ANY
configured SSO provider is FULLY ready: every companion secret/
endpoint an OAuth provider needs, checked independently per provider
so a stray leftover client id for an unused provider can't mask a
different, fully configured one; and for SAML, the optional
python3-saml runtime being importable, checked without letting a
fully-missing package's ModuleNotFoundError take down password login
itself. SSO becomes the enforced boundary for interactive UI access
without an incomplete, mixed, or half-installed SSO setup locking
every admin out or breaking login outright. Master-key API access is
untouched, and unsetting the setting plus a restart restores password
login as the documented recovery path.
Project auth expands all-proxy-models, * patterns, and access-group names
to many concrete models, but the rate limiter looks quotas up by the exact
requested model name, so a quota keyed on one of those entries is never
applied. Fail loudly with a 400 instead of storing an unenforceable quota
Types provider request and response bodies at their boundaries with
TypedDicts and Protocols instead of dict[str, Any], so the untyped-to-typed
crossing is paid once per boundary rather than once per field read.
Removes 1,700 reportAny/reportExplicitAny errors and 1,953 basedpyright
errors overall, plus 310 ruff strict-rule and 106 LIT-rule violations.
No cast, type: ignore, noqa, or new Any annotations anywhere in the diff.
Ratchets the basedpyright, ruff-strict, and type-discipline budgets to the
new counts so the cleared headroom cannot silently grow back.
Replace Any-typed seams with real types in files carrying the highest
remaining reportAny/reportExplicitAny density after #34745: the proxy
server and its utils, the router, the streaming handler and chunk builder,
litellm_logging, the redis cache, the MCP db/tool-registry/spend-writer
layer, the anthropic pass-through adapters and guardrail translation, the
lasso and presidio guardrail hooks, the azure_ai agents handler, the
management endpoints (keys, users, ui_sso, model access groups, config
override, MCP, projects), the responses MCP handlers, response polling
background streaming, and the containers and vector stores mains
No casts, no type: ignore, no noqa, no new suppressions, and no Any
annotations that were not already at base. Whole-tree basedpyright:
reportAny 14,610 -> 14,009, reportExplicitAny 5,100 -> 4,780, total
144,743 -> 143,471, with no rule increasing repo-wide or in any file.
Budgets ratcheted: basedpyright -1,272 across 48 rules, ruff-strict -85,
type-discipline -37
* fix(proxy): invalidate cached project object on /project/update and /project/delete
The auth path reads projects cache-first via get_project_object with a 60s
TTL and no freshness check, but no project write endpoint ever evicted the
project_id:{id} cache entry. A project cached before /project/update added a
model allowlist kept an empty models list in cache, so _run_project_checks
skipped can_project_access_model and project-bound keys could call team
models outside the project allowlist until the TTL expired. The same
staleness applied to blocked status and budget fields, and /project/delete
left the deleted project enforceable from cache.
Evict the cache entry after the DB write in update_project and
delete_project via a shared delete_cached_project_object helper, with the
cache key derivation shared with get_project_object.
* fix(proxy): broadcast project cache invalidation to all workers and make eviction best-effort
Single-worker eviction leaves every other worker serving its in-memory copy
of the mutated project until the 60s TTL expires, so a project allowlist
change was still bypassable on multi-worker deployments. Add a coordination
Redis pub/sub channel (litellm_proxy.auth_cache_invalidation): project
eviction publishes the cache key and a per-worker subscriber deletes the
local in-memory entry, with the next auth read refetching from the DB.
Subscriber starts on any deployment with a coordination Redis and falls back
to the TTL when none is configured.
Also wrap the eviction in a best-effort catch: the DB write has already
committed when eviction runs, so a cache backend error must not turn a
successful update into a 500 or abort the remaining ids in /project/delete.
* fix(lint): sort auth cache invalidation import and suppress best-effort shutdown catch
The strict-budget gate flagged the new import block as un-sorted (I001) and
the broad except in stop_auth_cache_invalidation_subscriber (BLE001); the
catch is intentional since a failing stop must not break proxy shutdown, so
it carries a named suppression instead of counting against the budget.
* fix(proxy): give proxy_admin_viewer read parity with proxy_admin
Route-level checks already default-allow management GETs for the viewer
role, but ~15 handlers compared user_role to PROXY_ADMIN only, dropping
viewers into regular-user scoping (/key/list, /user/info, /model/info,
guardrails, prompts, agents, memory, workflows, MCP catalog, coordination
redis settings, credential migration check, enterprise projects). Swap
those read paths to user_api_key_has_admin_view; write gates unchanged.
The dashboard now presents the viewer session as Admin for all gating
(effectiveSessionRole) so every page fetches with admin visibility, with
userRoleLabel/isViewOnly preserving the account-menu label and the
playground cost guard. The server remains the write authority.
* refactor(agents): remove side-effectful health_check param from GET /v1/agents
Addresses a security review finding on the admin viewer read parity change:
listing agents with health_check=true made the proxy issue a server-side GET
to every agent URL, so a read-scoped caller could trigger request fan-out
beyond their object permissions. The list endpoint is now a pure read for
every role.
Removes the query param, the URL probing helper and its timeouts, the
AgentHealthCheck httpx provider tag, and the dashboard's Health Check
toggle. Requests still passing health_check=true get the full list back
with the param ignored.
* fix(proxy): keep credential encryption check proxy_admin only
The residual scan behind GET /credentials/migrate-encryption/check loads
every model, credential, MCP, team, and verification-token row and runs a
decryption attempt on each stored value. Extending it to proxy_admin_viewer
let a read-only account repeatedly trigger deployment-wide scans, so the
route keeps its original full-admin gate.
* fix(agents): restore health_check, keep list fast path proxy_admin only
Restores the agent health_check feature exactly as before this PR: the
query param, the URL probing helper, the httpx provider tag, and the
dashboard toggle all return, so existing callers keep the filtering
contract. The viewer expansion is instead reverted at its source: the
GET /v1/agents admin fast path stays PROXY_ADMIN only, so a
proxy_admin_viewer goes through the object-permission scoped branch as
before and cannot fan out health checks beyond their allowlist. The
viewer read of a single agent stays viewer-inclusive since it has no
side effects.
Replace Any-typed seams with real types in the files carrying the highest
reportAny/reportExplicitAny density: typed Prisma read helpers in the MCP
db layer and verification token repository, TypedDicts for OAuth credential
payloads and aggregated spend rows, a DailySpendRecord protocol for the
daily activity endpoints, and concrete request/response types in the
volcengine, openai evals, azure batches, azure_ai count_tokens, and ocr
transformation modules. Modernize touched annotations to PEP 604/585 forms.
No casts, no type: ignore, no noqa, no new Any annotations, no behavior
changes. Whole-tree basedpyright: reportAny 27,005 -> 24,427,
reportExplicitAny 7,439 -> 7,280, no rule increased anywhere. Budgets
ratcheted: basedpyright -2,869, ruff-strict -1,505, type-discipline -167.
* fix(proxy): count only active users toward license seat limit
SCIM-deactivated users (metadata.scim_active == false) are kept in LiteLLM_UserTable for audit and reactivation, but they were still counted toward the per-user license limit, so deactivating a user never freed a seat. Okta never sends a SCIM DELETE and Entra only hard-deletes well after deactivation, so deactivation has to be what frees the seat
Add UserRepository.count_billable_users(), which counts every row except those where metadata.scim_active is false (absent, null, and true all count), and route the user-create license gate, the free-SSO 5-user cap, and the enterprise /user/available_users display through it. A separate litellm_active_users Prometheus gauge reports the billable count while litellm_total_users keeps its original meaning so existing dashboards are unaffected
* fix(proxy): floor billable user count at zero
count_billable_users() runs two separate count queries (total, then deactivated). Under a burst of deactivations between them, the deactivated count can momentarily exceed the earlier total and produce a negative result, which would flow into is_over_limit as a negative and show a negative seat count in the display and gauge. Clamp the result to zero so a transient race can never yield a nonsensical negative; the value self-corrects on the next call
Addresses Greptile P1 on the PR
* refactor(proxy): count teams via TeamRepository in available_users
* style: ruff format changed files at line-length 120
Drops PLR0915 from ruff's extend-select along with its per-file-ignores,
and strips the now-unused `# noqa: PLR0915` directives across the codebase
(RUF100 would otherwise flag them as unused). The C901 suppression that
shared a directive with PLR0915 in streaming_handler.py is preserved.
Two related authorization gaps in management endpoints:
1. `/project/update` evaluated permission against the team_id supplied in
the request body. By passing `data.team_id` pointing at a team they
admin, a caller could hijack any project — `_check_user_permission_for_project`
was given the attacker's team_object and happily checked admin
membership against that. Drop the team_object kwarg so the helper
re-fetches the existing project's team. Also require admin rights on
the destination team when reassigning a project across teams, so a
team admin cannot shed projects into another team's namespace.
2. `/key/update` accepted any `organization_id` and only checked that
the org existed before applying limits. A caller could thereby point
their key at an arbitrary org. Add `_validate_caller_can_assign_key_org`
which enforces the same membership rule already applied on the
`/key/list` filter path (`validate_key_list_check`); proxy admins and
no-change updates skip the check.
Tests cover both helpers in isolation: existing-team-admin allow,
unrelated-team admin deny, proxy-admin shortcut, org-member allow,
non-member deny, missing user_id deny, no-memberships deny.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(projects): fire useProjects hook for all authenticated users, not just admins
* fix(routes): add /project/list and /project/info to internal_user_routes allowlist
* fix(projects): use members_with_roles + LiteLLM_UserTable.teams for membership checks
* feat(ui): add "Your Usage" view for admin users on usage page
Admins were forced to use the global usage view with no way to scope it
to their own activity without manually searching for themselves in the
user filter dropdown.
Adds a new "Your Usage" option (admin-only) to the usage view selector.
When selected, it locks the data to the admin's own user_id and hides
the "Filter by user" dropdown.
* feat(ui): wire my-usage view to admin's own user_id in UsagePageView
When usageView is "my-usage", effectiveUserId resolves to the logged-in
admin's own userID. The "Filter by user" dropdown is hidden in this
view (only shown for "global").
* add: screenshots for usage page Your Usage admin fix
* fix(ui): gate useProjects on admin roles to fix failing unit test
* feat(proxy): add /project/list and /project/info to internal user routes
* fix(enterprise): use members_with_roles and litellm_usertable.teams for project access checks
* remove .github screenshots and workflow file from PR
Remove the /project/* management endpoints and the enable_projects_ui
admin-settings flag from the OSS litellm package. Project endpoints now
live under litellm_enterprise and are wired through the existing
enterprise router; OSS builds return 404 for every /project/* route.
The enable_projects_ui UI flag is registered back onto UISettings via a
small extension registry when the enterprise package is imported, so the
admin toggle and downstream key/sidebar gating continue to work in
enterprise builds. On OSS, explicit PATCH attempts with the flag return
403 with a clear enterprise-only message instead of being silently
dropped.
Pydantic request/response types (NewProjectRequest, UpdateProjectRequest,
DeleteProjectRequest, NewProjectResponse) stay in litellm/proxy/_types.py
because management_endpoints/common_utils.py and pydantic-shape tests
import them. LiteLLM_ProjectTable and all FK columns in schema.prisma
are unchanged.
* fix(support-model-specific-tpm/rpm-limits): Allows setting rate limits by tpm/rpm for models by team
* fix(key_management_endpoints.py): enforce guaranteed throughput with key-level model tpm/rpm limits, when team-level tpm/rpm limits are set
* test: add unit testing
* feat(schema.prisma): add metadata to litellm budget table
* feat(proxy/utils.py): add org limits to user api key auth
allows org level tpm/rpm limiting to work
* feat: add org level tpm/rpm limits + inherit org id in key from team
enables org level tpm/rpm limits
* feat: validated working org tpm/rpm limits
* feat: support updating org level, model specific tpm/rpm limits
* fix: working key validation for org level tpm/rpm limits
* fix: working validation for orgs when giving tpm/rpm to teams
* fix(key_management_endpoints.py): fix tpm/rpm limits on orgs
* fix(key_management_endpoints.py): support limits
* refactor: remove duplicate var
* fix: refactor to avoid ruff errors
* fix: fix typign
* fix: fix linting error
* fix: fix testing
* fix(key_management_endpoints.py): document params
* fix: cli auth with SSO okta
* fix: add LITTELM_CLI_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_NAME
* fix: get_litellm_cli_user_api_key_auth
* use existing_key CLI
* fix: use existing key
* test auth commands
* test_cli_sso_callback_regenerate_vs_create_flow
* feat: add CLI Token Utilities
* fix: get_stored_api_key
* move file
* fix: get_valid_models
* fix config.yaml
* TestCLITokenUtils
* TestGetValidModelsWithCLI
* fix: tie user id to keys created through CLI
* fix: add teams interface to CLI
* add /keys/update to the list client commands
* fix /sso/cli/poll to return the user_id
* fix: working TeamsManagementClient
* fix CLI Login command
* fixes for auth
* Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 3400: Clear-text logging of sensitive information
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* ruff fix
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <62310815+github-advanced-security[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(team_endpoints.py): support setting default key expiry
allows admin to set key expiry on all team member keys
makes it easier to setup default team for experimentation
* feat(key_management_endpoints.py): allows admin to set duration for keys created by team members
* feat(team_endpoints.py): support team_member_key_duration on `/team/update`
allows setting max time team member keys are valid for
* fix(team_info.tsx): ui component to update team member key duration
* fix(team_info.tsx): support updating team member key duration, if set
* feat(teams.tsx): add team member key duration param ui component
allow admin to set this on UI
* feat(ui_sso.py): support restricting ui access by sso group
allows controlling who can/can't access the UI
* feat(ssomodals.tsx): add initial commit adding sso group access to admin ui
* feat(proxy_server.py): support reading + writing ui_access_mode from db
allows admin to configure allowed sso groups from UI
* feat(ui_sso.py): support enforcing all teams on sso jwt handler
if ui access mode set via ui, support reading the value and enforcing it
* feat(ui/): ui component for controlling sso access group
allow admin to only allow users within specific sso group to log into UI
* fix(uiaccesscontrolform.tsx): fix field names
* feat(ui_sso.py): return received sso response in the clientside error message - enables easier debugging
* test: add unit tests
* fix: minor fixes
* feat(enterprise/): fix remaining users check on license
* fix(usage_indicator.tsx): if no max user set, don't render remaining user info card
only for users with user limits on their license
* fix(leftnav.tsx): only show remaining users to admin
* feat(columns.tsx): don't allow sorting on model access groups
it's a list[str]
* feat(model_dashboard.tsx): add model access group filters
* docs(deploy.md): move docker recommendation to `main-stable`
* feat(enterprise/internal_user_endpoints.py): expose endpoint for checking available premium users
* feat(usage_indictor.tsx): add new element to help track remaining premium users
* feat(usage_indicator.tsx): show premium user remaining usage
allows users with user caps to know how much is left
* fix(vertex_and_google_ai_studio_gemini.py): bubble up stream is not finished, even if stop reason is given
prevents early completion of stream
Closes https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/11549
* fix(streaming_handler.py): respect is_finished = False in hidden params
internal logic for preventing ending stream early
* fix(litellm_license.py): add function to check if user is over limit
* fix(internal_user_endpoints.py): add function to check if user is over limit
* refactor: move test
* docs(customer_endpoints.py): document new param
