* fix(hide-secrets): stop redacting benign identifiers and make redaction deterministic
The OpenAI key detector matched `sk-` anywhere inside a word, so `<task-notification>`
became `<ta[REDACTED]>`, and the Base64 entropy limit of 3.0 flagged ordinary quoted
identifiers such as `"application/json"` and model ids. Redaction also iterated a
hash-seeded set, so the same request produced different bytes on different workers and
broke prompt caching.
- require a standalone `sk-`/`sk_` token with a digit (still catches sk-proj-/sk-ant-)
- raise Base64HighEntropyString limit from 3.0 to the detect-secrets default 4.5
- redact overlapping matches longest-first in a stable order
Resolves LIT-7049
* fix(hide-secrets): treat separators as key boundaries and defer sk_live_ to the stripe detector
The standalone-token boundary also rejected keys glued to a preceding `_`, `-`
or percent-encoded delimiter (`openai_sk-…`, `key-sk-…`, `Bearer%20sk-…`), which
the old pattern redacted, and `sk_live_…` was counted by both the OpenAI and the
Stripe detector.
* fix(hide-secrets): keep the openai key scan linear on repeated sk separators
The digit requirement was a lookahead, so every `sk` inside a long
`[a-zA-Z0-9_-]` run re-scanned the rest of that run looking for a digit.
100 KB of `-sk-` took over 5s in the worker's event loop and the proxy
closed the connection without a response. The check now runs once per
match in `analyze_string` instead.
* chore(hide-secrets): remove redundant performance test comment
* fix(hide-secrets): consume complete openai key tokens
* chore(hide-secrets): remove redundant fixture comment
* chore(hide-secrets): remove redundant test docstrings
* fix(hide-secrets): redact whole stripe live keys
* style(hide-secrets): wrap secret sorting key
* fix(batches): register ownership for every batch create path
Since the team isolation change, the managed files hook decided whether a
response came from a create by looking for the managed input file id on it,
which only the unified input path sets. Batches created from a model-encoded
input file id, a model param, or a raw provider id with ?provider= never got
an ownership row, so they vanished from GET /v1/batches for the key that
created them.
The create endpoint now stamps a create marker on the response before the
hooks run, and the hook keys ownership registration and the batch-created
metric on that marker instead of on the input id format.
* test(batches): assert ownership registration through the managed files hook
The endpoint tests asserted the private create marker, which is wiring, not
behaviour. They now run the create through the real managed files hook and
assert the ownership row is written for the creating key on every create
path, with the unified path driven by a genuine encoded input file id
instead of patched decoders.
Batch creation snapshotted the team's organization with a direct
litellm_teamtable query on every create. Go through get_team_object
instead, which serves the team auth already cached and only falls back
to the database when the team was never cached.
The search= param on /key/list, /audit, and /spend/logs/ui, plus key_hash= on /key/list, now compare the pasted value verbatim. Only a copied key ID (the hash) matches, so a raw virtual key never needs to travel in a GET query string
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q5sbiogJzPcCRmYSbaHxZf
GET /key/list?search= matches the key hash (a raw sk- key is hashed
first) or a case-insensitive alias substring, and key_hash= now hashes a
raw sk- value too. GET /v1/memory?search= matches a key prefix or an
exact memory_id. GET /audit?search= matches id, object_id, changed_by,
or changed_by_api_key. GET /spend/logs/ui?search= matches request_id
across all time and api_key, team_id, user, end_user, session_id, or
model_id inside the date window; session grouping is skipped while a
search is active.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Q5sbiogJzPcCRmYSbaHxZf
Batch cost attribution and the legacy queue endpoint already store the
VerificationToken hash in user_api_key, but omitted user_api_key_hash.
Since v1.99 the spend-log writer re-hashes any key without that provenance
flag, so DailyUserSpend.api_key no longer joins VerificationToken and Usage
shows key-hash-... rows with null api_key_alias / user_email.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
* Fix hide-secrets guardrail: playground redaction, UI dropdown entry, spend-log telemetry
The hide-secrets guardrail never implemented apply_guardrail, so the UI test
playground echoed secrets verbatim; it was missing from the Add Guardrail
dropdown; and it recorded no guardrail_information, so Spend Logs could not
distinguish a redacted request from a clean one.
- implement apply_guardrail (unified interface) with use_native_lifecycle_hooks
so proxied traffic stays on async_pre_call_hook (per-key opt-out and
data["prompt"] handling live only there)
- record standard_logging_guardrail_information (allow/mask + masked_entity_count)
via _process_response/_process_error; opted-out keys and legacy nameless
callback instances record nothing
- advertise hide-secrets in /guardrails/ui/add_guardrail_settings (pre_call only)
and /guardrails/ui/provider_specific_params with a config model
Resolves LIT-3548
* Fix hide-secrets passthrough telemetry and JSON config input
* fix(guardrails): validate hide-secrets object config before submit
- apply_guardrail treats empty-string-only texts as no input, so no
false allow is recorded
- the UI object field keeps raw text while editing and blocks submission
until it parses to a JSON object, instead of posting a string to an
object-only API
- supported_modes_by_provider keeps its dict[str, list[str]] value type
* fix(guardrails): record no hide-secrets telemetry when nothing was inspected
walk_user_text and the prompt redaction now report how many non-empty
strings they visited; when neither inspected anything (image-only
content, empty strings), the run records no guardrail entry instead of
an 'allow' row that counts a check which never saw any text.
Adds a configurable password-strength policy (default: min 12 chars,
upper/lower/number/special, all individually toggleable, floored at 8
so a misconfigured minimum cannot disable the length check, and
unicode-aware so an accented letter cannot satisfy the special-
character requirement) enforced on every path that sets a local
user's password: /user/update, /user/bulk_update, and the invitation
onboarding claim flow.
Adds general_settings.disable_password_login_when_sso_enabled, which
rejects username/password login on /login, /v2/login and /v3/login
(including the UI_USERNAME/UI_PASSWORD admin fallback) once ANY
configured SSO provider is FULLY ready: every companion secret/
endpoint an OAuth provider needs, checked independently per provider
so a stray leftover client id for an unused provider can't mask a
different, fully configured one; and for SAML, the optional
python3-saml runtime being importable, checked without letting a
fully-missing package's ModuleNotFoundError take down password login
itself. SSO becomes the enforced boundary for interactive UI access
without an incomplete, mixed, or half-installed SSO setup locking
every admin out or breaking login outright. Master-key API access is
untouched, and unsetting the setting plus a restart restores password
login as the documented recovery path.
Second pass over the highest-Any-density modules that the first pass left
untouched: guardrail hooks, the gemini and anthropic transformation layers,
the proxy spend-tracking and pass-through endpoints, and the caching clients.
Untyped `response.json()` bodies and `dict[str, Any]` request payloads are
described once at their boundary with a TypedDict or Protocol, so the fields
read downstream resolve to real types instead of Any. No cast, no type: ignore,
no noqa, and no new Any annotations.
The managed batch listing fetched one page of rows, derived has_more from
that raw fetch, then dropped every row whose stored blob would not parse.
last_id came from the survivors, so a page of corrupt or legacy rows came
back as data [], last_id null, has_more true, and a client following
last_id could not advance. The OpenAI SDK's auto-paginator, which cursors
off the last item in data, stopped silently and returned a truncated list.
Read chunks until page_size + 1 batches survive parsing and file-id
resolution or the caller's rows run out, the way the managed file listing
already does, so a page carries data and a usable cursor while parseable
rows remain and has_more only says true when another one exists. The first
chunk keeps the old page_size + 1 size so a healthy page still costs one
query; a scan that has to continue widens to the file listing's
continuation chunk and stops resolving rows once the page is full.
