* [Fix] Team UI: handle legacy dict shape for metadata.guardrails
A team can have metadata.guardrails stored as {"modify_guardrails": bool}
(the permission-flag shape introduced in PR #4810) rather than the
expected string[]. The opt-out logic added in PR #25575 calls .filter()
on this field, which throws TypeError on a dict and crashes the team
detail page.
Add a safeGuardrailsList helper that returns [] when the field is not
an array, and route the three read sites through it.
* [Fix] Team UI: inline Array.isArray guards for guardrails metadata
Replace the safeGuardrailsList helper with inline Array.isArray checks
at each call site, and apply the same guard to opted_out_global_guardrails
for consistency. No known legacy dict rows for opted_out_global_guardrails,
but the unguarded `|| []` pattern is the same shape risk.
Six call sites now defended directly: three for metadata.guardrails
and three for metadata.opted_out_global_guardrails.
The invite-signup form was writing the new user's token via raw
`document.cookie` at `path=/`, while the rest of the auth surface uses
`storeLoginToken` (which writes at `path=/ui` and mirrors to
sessionStorage). After signup the inviter's `path=/ui` cookie kept
winning path-specificity matching, and sessionStorage still held the
inviter's token, so the dashboard rendered as the inviter rather than
the newly created user.
Treat invite signup as a principal-change boundary — clear prior
session cookies first, then store the new token via the canonical
helper.
- Narrow /root/.cache COPY in Dockerfile to /root/.cache/prisma{,-python}
only — drops ~660MB of uv build cache including a setuptools wheel
that surfaced as CVE-2024-6345 / CVE-2025-47273 even though it was
never on the runtime sys.path.
- DiskCache: switch to dc.JSONDisk to neutralize the pickle code path
(CVE-2025-69872, no upstream fix). Values must be JSON-serializable;
cleanup get_cache to skip the now-dead json.loads(dict) branch by
guarding on isinstance(str).
- pyproject.toml: drop diskcache pin from [caching] extra (no fixed
version exists). Stub kept so `pip install litellm[caching]` doesn't
warn; users who want disk caching install diskcache themselves.
- Bump black 24.10.0 → 26.3.1 (CVE-2026-32274) + apply 296-file mechanical
reformat. Black is dev-only (not in the runtime image), but bumping
clears the manifest-scan finding.
- Refresh ui/litellm-dashboard/package-lock.json to pick up next 16.2.4
(was 16.1.7, GHSA-q4gf-8mx6-v5v3), uuid 14.0.0, postcss 8.5.13.
- Refresh litellm-js/spend-logs/package-lock.json to pick up
hono 4.12.16 (GHSA-458j-xx4x-4375).
- uv lock: gitpython 3.1.46 → 3.1.49 (clears two High GHSAs),
langchain-text-splitters 1.1.1 → 1.1.2.
- Add tests/test_litellm/caching/test_disk_cache.py covering JSONDisk
enforcement, dict/string round-trip, TTL, increment, delete/flush.
Net delta on combined trivy + grype scans: 17 findings → 4 (all
remaining 4 are Wolfi system python-3.13 CVEs marked WONTFIX upstream
in CPython 3.14; CVE-2026-3298 is Windows-unreachable on Linux).
Existing on-disk caches written by the previous pickle-format Disk
will silently miss after upgrade — diskcache is intended to be
ephemeral so impact is recreate-on-next-write.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SCIM DELETE /Users/{id} previously called litellm_usertable.delete without
clearing rows that FK back to the user, so Postgres rejected the delete with
LiteLLM_InvitationLink_user_id_fkey and the SCIM caller saw a 500. Add a
helper to drop invitation_link, organization_membership, and team_membership
rows before the user delete (mirrors /user/delete in internal_user_endpoints).
Also add a Status column to the Virtual Keys and Internal Users tables so
admins can see at a glance which keys are blocked and which users SCIM has
deactivated. SCIM-blocked keys carry a tooltip explaining the origin.
Pin the dashboard's Node version to 20 via .nvmrc to match CI.
Many MCP integrations (Zapier, etc.) embed an upstream API key
directly in the server URL, e.g.
``https://actions.zapier.com/mcp/<api-key>/sse``. The list and
single-server endpoints were returning the full URL to any
authenticated user — `_redact_mcp_credentials` only stripped the
explicit ``credentials`` field, and `_sanitize_mcp_server_for_virtual_key`
only ran for restricted virtual keys. Non-admin internal users could
read the dashboard, click the unmask toggle, and exfiltrate the raw
token.
Add `_sanitize_mcp_server_for_non_admin` that runs on top of the
existing credential redaction and clears the credential-bearing
fields:
- ``url`` (the primary leak vector)
- ``spec_path`` (OpenAPI spec URLs that may carry tokens)
- ``static_headers`` / ``extra_headers`` (Authorization)
- ``env`` (arbitrary secrets)
- ``authorization_url`` / ``token_url`` / ``registration_url``
Identity fields (``server_id``, ``alias``, ``mcp_info``, etc.) are
preserved so the UI can still list servers a non-admin's team has
access to.
Apply the new sanitizer in `fetch_all_mcp_servers` and the per-server
fetch path right after the existing virtual-key branch. Update the
existing `test_list_mcp_servers_non_admin_user_filtered` assertions
that previously checked URL visibility.
Frontend defense-in-depth: hide the URL unmask toggle on
`mcp_server_view.tsx` unless the viewer is a proxy admin.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(projects): fire useProjects hook for all authenticated users, not just admins
* fix(routes): add /project/list and /project/info to internal_user_routes allowlist
* fix(projects): use members_with_roles + LiteLLM_UserTable.teams for membership checks
* feat(ui): add "Your Usage" view for admin users on usage page
Admins were forced to use the global usage view with no way to scope it
to their own activity without manually searching for themselves in the
user filter dropdown.
Adds a new "Your Usage" option (admin-only) to the usage view selector.
When selected, it locks the data to the admin's own user_id and hides
the "Filter by user" dropdown.
* feat(ui): wire my-usage view to admin's own user_id in UsagePageView
When usageView is "my-usage", effectiveUserId resolves to the logged-in
admin's own userID. The "Filter by user" dropdown is hidden in this
view (only shown for "global").
* add: screenshots for usage page Your Usage admin fix
* fix(ui): gate useProjects on admin roles to fix failing unit test
* feat(proxy): add /project/list and /project/info to internal user routes
* fix(enterprise): use members_with_roles and litellm_usertable.teams for project access checks
* remove .github screenshots and workflow file from PR
The default-allow-GET fix in route_checks unblocked the route layer, but a
second class of bug remained: handlers that gate on `user_role !=
PROXY_ADMIN` (or a private `_require_proxy_admin` helper) reject admin
viewer at the handler before the route's HTTP method even matters.
Backend: relax handler role checks on read endpoints to allow
PROXY_ADMIN_VIEW_ONLY (same `_user_has_admin_view` helper used elsewhere).
- /v1/access_group GET (list) + /v1/access_group/{id} GET — split
`_require_proxy_admin` into a parallel `_require_admin_view` for the
two read handlers; writes (POST / PUT / DELETE) keep the strict gate.
- /cloudzero/settings GET, /vantage/settings GET — read-only views.
- /config_overrides/hashicorp_vault GET — read-only config view.
- /team/permissions_list GET — let admin viewer see permissions like
a Proxy Admin would.
- /jwt/key/mapping/list, /jwt/key/mapping/info — JWT mapping reads.
- /v1/mcp/discover, /v1/mcp/openapi-registry — MCP picker views.
- /schedule/anthropic_beta_headers_reload/status — read-only status.
- /adaptive_router/state — read-only live snapshot.
UI: hide write buttons that admin viewer should not see (button click
would fail the backend write gate, but the UX expectation is no button).
- Internal Users: hide "Invite User" button.
- Access Groups: hide "Create Access Group" + Delete row action.
- Budgets: hide "+ Create Budget" + Edit/Delete row actions.
- Prompts: hide "+ Add New Prompt" / "Upload .prompt File"; gate the
prompt-table Edit/Delete actions on `isProxyAdminRole` (was
`isAdminRole` which incorrectly included admin viewer).
- Router Settings → Fallbacks: hide AddFallbacks panel + per-row Test
+ Delete actions.
- AI Hub: hide "Select Models / Agents / MCP Servers / Skills to Make
Public" + "Useful Links Management" (writes).
These pages remain VISIBLE for admin viewer (read parity); only the
write entry points are hidden.
Root cause: admin_viewer_routes was an explicit allowlist, so every newly-added
GET endpoint anywhere in the codebase silently 403'd for admin viewer until
someone remembered to add it. We had whacked /spend/logs/ui, /customer/list,
/guardrails/list, /policies/attachments/list, /invitation/info, and several
others in serial — but the next round still surfaced /in_product_nudges,
/health/latest, /credentials, /v1/mcp/network/client-ip, /claude-code/plugins,
/policy/templates. This pattern keeps repeating because the model is wrong.
Structural fix in `_check_proxy_admin_viewer_access`:
- Default-allow safe HTTP methods (GET / HEAD / OPTIONS) on any
non-inference route. Admin Viewer's principle is read parity with
Proxy Admin; HTTP semantics already mark GET as side-effect-free, so
using the method as the allow signal is the correct primitive.
- Unsafe methods (POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE) still go through the existing
explicit allowlists + the hard-blocked write set
(/user/new, /team/new, /key/generate, …).
- LLM/inference routes still 403 (cost-incurring).
The existing admin_viewer_routes list is retained as a backstop for the
small set of routes implemented as POST but semantically read (e.g.
/spend/calculate). Adding new GET endpoints no longer requires touching
this list.
Models page tab/panel off-by-one (UI bug for Admin Viewer):
Tremor's TabList filters falsy children but TabPanels does not, so
conditionally hiding "Add Model" with `{!shouldHideAddModelTab && ...}`
left a phantom panel slot — clicking "LLM Credentials" showed nothing,
and clicking "Pass-Through Endpoints" showed the credentials panel.
Refactor to a single source-of-truth `visibleTabs` array; tab and
panel indices now can never desync.
Tests:
- 12 parametrized tests covering the 6 user-reported endpoints + 4
hypothetical-future endpoints + 2 already-fixed ones, all asserting
Admin Viewer GET succeeds via the default-allow path (no allowlist
entry needed).
- 5 parametrized tests for POST writes still 403'ing
(random-future-write, /user/new, /team/new, /key/generate, /model/new).
- All 207 existing route_checks tests still pass — backward-compatible.
User reported six more 403s and "still restricts access to keys + models" after
the first round. Root causes:
1. Six read endpoints were missing from admin_viewer_routes:
- /guardrails/list, /v2/guardrails/list (Guardrails page)
- /guardrails/submissions, /guardrails/submissions/{guardrail_id}
- /guardrails/usage/overview (Guardrails Monitor page)
- /policies/attachments/list (Policies page)
- /get/mcp_semantic_filter_settings (Settings page)
2. /guardrails/submissions handler treated admin viewer as non-admin, filtering
them to only their team submissions. Switch to _user_has_admin_view() so
admin viewer sees all submissions (read parity with Proxy Admin).
3. UI Keys page (user_dashboard.tsx) and Models page (ModelsAndEndpointsView.tsx)
each had a hard "Access Denied" block specifically for "Admin Viewer" — a
leftover from the pre-parity era. Remove the blocks; gate the "Create Key"
button on the Keys page so admin viewer can read keys but not mint them.
Also drop the post-login redirect that forced admin viewers to /usage on
sign-in (page.tsx).
Tests:
- Extend ADMIN_VIEWER_SETTINGS_ROUTES parametrize list to cover all 7 new
routes (route-checks layer is now the layer production traffic actually
hits, vs. the dependency-override-bypass that was masking the gap).
npm's `min-release-age` config has type `[null, Number]`. The value `3d`
parses to NaN, which propagates into `before = new Date(NaN)` (Invalid
Date). Pacote then calls `.toISOString()` on it and throws
`RangeError: Invalid time value`, breaking every local `npm install`.
Drop the `d` suffix in all six `.npmrc` files. The `<days>` in npm's
type hint is a label, not part of the value.
This is a no-op for CI (`npm ci` ignores this setting per the comment
in the file) but unblocks local `npm install`.
Admin Viewer (proxy_admin_viewer) was being blocked from endpoints it should
be able to read. Most visibly the UI Logs page rendered empty because every
filter and detail call (/spend/logs/ui, /spend/logs/ui/{id},
/spend/logs/session/ui, /customer/list) was rejected at the route_checks
layer even though the underlying handlers permit admin-viewer.
Backend:
- Extend admin_viewer_routes to include spend_tracking_routes,
/customer/{list,info}, /spend/logs/* detail routes, callback / config /
budget / alerting reads, and model cost map status/source.
- Replace bare `user_role != PROXY_ADMIN` checks in read-only handlers
(/budget/list, /budget/settings, /alerting/settings, /invitation/info,
/config/field/info, /config/list, /schedule/model_cost_map_reload/status,
/model/cost_map/source) with `_user_has_admin_view()`.
UI:
- Add `rolesAllowedToViewWriteScopedPages` (rolesWithWriteAccess + Admin
Viewer) and use it for the "Models + Endpoints" and "Agents" sidebar
items so admin viewers see them read-only. Playground stays gated by
rolesWithWriteAccess (cost-incurring).
- Hide Add / Edit / Delete buttons in the LLM Credentials panel for
non-proxy-admin viewers.
Tests:
- 31 parametrized route_checks cases for the Logs + settings endpoints,
with internal-user negative coverage to ensure the gate isn't widened.
- 9 handler-level integration tests (FastAPI TestClient) verifying
admin viewer is no longer blocked at the handler layer.
- New leftnav cases asserting Playground hidden / Models + Agents / Logs
visible to Admin Viewer.
- New roles + credentials test cases for the UI write-gate.
* feat(schema): add workflow run tracking tables (LiteLLM_WorkflowRun, LiteLLM_WorkflowEvent, LiteLLM_WorkflowMessage)
* feat(proxy): add /v1/workflows/runs endpoints for durable agent workflow tracking
* feat(proxy): register workflow management router in proxy_server
* docs(workflows): add README for workflow run tracking API
* test(workflows): add unit tests for /v1/workflows/runs endpoints
* fix(workflows): atomic event+status update via tx(), run_id 404 guard, sequence retry on collision
* test(workflows): add tx mock, 404 on unknown run_id, retry-on-collision tests
* fix(workflows): constrain status to Literal enum, rename total→count in list responses
* add tenant isolation and bounded limits to workflow endpoints
* add created_by column and index to LiteLLM_WorkflowRun
* add ownership and bounded-limit tests for workflow endpoints
* Fix workflow run ownership for null owners
* guard prisma import in workflow_management_endpoints
* sync schema.prisma copies with workflow run models
* black: format workflow_management_endpoints.py
---------
Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
- Remove unused search_provider parameter from
SearchAPIRouter._resolve_search_provider_credentials. The function
only reads tool_litellm_params; the docstring already omitted
search_provider, confirming it was unintentional dead code.
- Drop redundant hasAgents/hasSearchTools conditions from the outer
object_permission guard in OldTeams.tsx. Both agent and search-tool
handling already run independently below this block with their own
object_permission initialization, so including them in the outer
guard caused an empty object_permission to be created prematurely
and never populated within that block.
Co-authored-by: Mateo Wang <mateo-berri@users.noreply.github.com>
Store search tool allowlists only on object permissions, wire auth/management/UI flows to object_permission.search_tools, and remove legacy team-metadata search credential code and tests.
Made-with: Cursor
Treat search tools like models by adding team/key allowed_search_tools controls, enforcing search tool authorization checks, and moving credential ownership to search tool config only to avoid exposing secrets in team metadata.
Made-with: Cursor
Allow search requests to resolve provider credentials from request metadata, team metadata, and default team settings with clear precedence, and expose this flow in proxy docs/UI with regression tests.
Made-with: Cursor
vi.clearAllMocks does not reset mockImplementation, so the error-notification
test was inadvertently relying on a deleteField stub set up in earlier tests
and would time out when run in isolation.
Previously, useStoreRequestInSpendLogs and useDeleteProxyConfigField
did not refresh the proxyConfig cache on success, so the Logging
Settings form continued to render the pre-save values until React
Query refetched on its own. Wire both hooks to invalidate
proxyConfigKeys on success so any active observer (currently the
Logging Settings page) repulls fresh data.
Export proxyConfigKeys for cross-hook reuse.
Switch the spend-logs save flow from mutateAsync + try/catch to
mutate + callbacks. Errors now surface through a single onError path
(no more double toast on failure), and the delete-then-update sequencing
runs through onSettled instead of awaited promises. handleFormSubmit is
no longer async.
Tighten the corresponding test to assert exactly one error toast fires.
