The helper that carries the credential snapshot into litellm_params lived private
in files/main.py, and the batch retrieve needed it too. It now sits beside
get_litellm_params, which is what it augments, so neither caller reaches into the
other's private surface. Typed as Mapping/MutableMapping of object rather than
Any, which the strict import rules ban.
The file-content route builds the snapshot through the same helper as the batch
route instead of assembling a conditional mapping inline, which drops two mutable
constructions and leaves one way to attach it. Its name loses the batch suffix now
that both routes use it.
A third path reads a completed batch's output file, and it could not resolve the
bucket either. When cost is accounted from the retrieve itself rather than from
the poller, the batch success handler calls _handle_completed_batch, which fetches
the output file through _extract_file_access_credentials. That helper forwarded a
whitelist covering Azure and Vertex, gcs_bucket_name included, but nothing for
Bedrock, and retrieve_batch built its litellm_params through get_litellm_params,
whose fixed signature drops the trusted credential snapshot. So the snapshot never
reached the file read and it failed with "S3 bucket_name is required" for a bucket
the deployment had configured, leaving the batch's cost unrecorded.
Adding s3_bucket_name to that whitelist would not have worked. The Bedrock file
config deliberately resolves the bucket only from the immutable server-side
snapshot or the environment, never from a request param, because the bucket is
what managed file ids are validated against. The snapshot is therefore what has to
flow, exactly as it already does for the model-routed and cost-poller paths.
retrieve_batch now re-adds the snapshot after get_litellm_params, the same way the
file operations already do, the whitelist forwards it, and the proxy attaches it
for router-routed managed batches from the deployment behind the unified id.
Verified against a live proxy reading a real completed Bedrock batch: the cost row
appears within seconds of the retrieve carrying the batch's real spend and usage,
where before the read raised and no row was written.
Resolving those credentials is best effort. A batch whose deployment no longer
resolves, which happens when a model group is removed while batches are in
flight, still serves its status instead of failing the request on the lookup.
This matters for the OSS and polling-disabled configurations, where the retrieve
path is the only thing that accounts for a batch at all.
The mock merged every call into one shared dict, so a second routed retrieval would
overwrite the first and the assertions would still pass. Keep one frozen snapshot per
call and assert exactly one call, which also makes an unintended second retrieval a
failure rather than something the merge hides
get_configured_s3_bucket_name accepts the output bucket only from the immutable
_litellm_internal_model_credentials snapshot or AWS_S3_BUCKET_NAME. That refusal to read
litellm_params is deliberate: the bucket is what validate_managed_cloud_file_id checks a
file id against, so trusting a request-supplied value would let a caller redirect reads
to a bucket of their choosing
Two live entry points reach the Bedrock file-content transformation without ever building
that snapshot. The managed-files pre-call hook sets data["model"] for any id carrying
llm_output_file_id, which is every batch output, so get_file_content always takes the
model-routed branch; that branch called llm_router.afile_content directly, and
managed_files_obj.afile_content, the only caller that built the snapshot, is therefore
unreachable for batch output. CheckBatchCost spread the deployment credentials as plain
kwargs, and get_litellm_params does not carry s3_bucket_name across (gcs_bucket_name is
listed for exactly this reason, its S3 counterpart is not), so the poller lost the bucket
the same way
The result was that every completed Bedrock managed batch failed files.content with
"S3 bucket_name is required" and never had its cost tracked, leaving the row to be
re-polled every cycle. Both paths now resolve the deployment credentials and pass the
same MappingProxyType snapshot the managed-files hook already builds
request_id is the primary key of LiteLLM_SpendLogs and the flush inserts with
skip_duplicates, so a spend log whose id already exists is dropped with no error
raised and a "processed 1 spend log" line still logged. Batch cost accounting
produced exactly such an id twice over, and on a proxy with message redaction
enabled no batch cost row could be written at all.
get_spend_logs_id derived the id by md5-hashing the response for two call types,
aretrieve_batch and acreate_file. Redaction makes that hash a constant:
perform_redaction returns the fixed {"text": "redacted-by-litellm"} placeholder
for any shape it cannot redact, which is what a batch object and a file body both
become, so every such row hashed to md5('{"text": "redacted-by-litellm"}') =
00fcbef15a3b0097e14b0ca016ed30a0 regardless of provider, user, or amount. The
first row to claim that id owned it and every later row was discarded. Verified
against a live proxy: four payloads spanning two providers and three distinct
spend values all computed that id, and the table held one acreate_file row dating
to 2025-05-25, the row that had claimed it.
Keying off the batch's own identity instead is necessary but not sufficient,
because creating a batch already writes an acreate_batch row under exactly that
id, so the cost row becomes a duplicate of the batch's own creation row. Also
verified live: after the hash was removed the poller computed and flushed a
batch's cost, and the only row carrying that id was the acreate_batch row from
when the batch was submitted.
The id now comes from the response's own id, then the standard logging payload's
id, then litellm_call_id, and a batch cost row is namespaced with a _batch_cost
suffix so it cannot collide with the creation row. The middle term is what keeps
this correct under redaction: that payload is built from the unredacted response,
so it still carries the batch id after redaction has flattened the body. Keying
the cost row to the batch rather than to the call also keeps accounting the same
batch twice collapsing to one row instead of billing it twice. Every other call
type still derives its key exactly as before.
Cost and usage themselves are unaffected by redaction: the token columns fall back
to the standard logging payload and spend comes from its response_cost, neither of
which redaction touches. generate_hash_from_response had no other caller and is
removed with it.
* fix(proxy): track spend for OpenAI passthrough /v1/embeddings
OpenAI passthrough embeddings returned 200 but wrote no spend because the
route was unsupported and Cohere's /v1/embed prefix stole the match.
* fix(proxy): clear embeddings lint and Greptile comment nits
Inline embeddings cost tracking to avoid new LIT001/002 hits, trim
redundant doc comments, and cover the Cohere /v1/embeddings collision.
* fix(proxy): drop unreachable embeddings TypeError guard
convert_to_model_response_object with response_type=embedding already
returns EmbeddingResponse; the isinstance check was dead patch coverage.
A managed batch whose request lines all failed can reach a terminal provider
status (completed) with output_file_id=None and only an error_file_id. Such a
row matched neither the completed-with-output billing branch nor the
failed/expired/cancelled branch, so batch_processed stayed False and the poller
re-selected it on every cycle for the lifetime of the deployment; output/error
file deletion is also gated on batch_processed, so those files could never be
deleted.
Broaden the terminal handling so a completed/complete/expired batch with an
output file is billed, and any terminal batch with nothing to bill
(failed/cancelled, or completed/expired with no output) is marked terminal
exactly once. Non-terminal statuses (validating/in_progress) are still left for
the next poll, and an expired batch that did produce output is now billed.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
A deployment with PTU flat-cost attribution also billed every request per
token, so a team paid for reserved capacity and again for the traffic that
capacity serves. Nothing set the per-token price and an unset price falls
back to the public cost map, which made the double charge the default.
/model/new and /model/{id}/update now store zero for every pricing field the
cost map could otherwise fill, refuse a price the caller supplies alongside
PTU config with a 400 naming the field, zero a price already on the row
rather than rejecting later edits of unrelated fields, and drop the zeros
again when the PTU config goes.
A PTU deployment is no longer read as a free model by the budget checks,
which would have waived every budget for it.
* fix(mcp): expose client HTTP headers to logging callbacks and hooks
MCP protocol tool calls built a synthetic Request with only content-type, so metadata.headers reaching logging callbacks and guardrails was empty while /mcp-rest/tools/call exposed the full set. Rebuild the synthetic request from the connection's raw headers (shared with the sampling path), and pass sanitized headers to the pre-call hook, the MCP to LLM guardrail bridge and the Responses API MCP bridge. Credential headers stay masked and proxy key headers stripped.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(mcp): strip custom proxy key and upstream MCP credential headers from logging copies
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(mcp): make client side auth header name accessor public
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(mcp): strip custom proxy key and client redaction opt-out from mcp headers
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(mcp): drop custom proxy key header in the synthetic request builder
Strips general_settings.litellm_key_header_name in build_synthetic_mcp_request so every caller, including sampling, is covered, and reverts passing general_settings into add_litellm_data_to_request on the tool call path since that also switches on enforced_params.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: shivam <shivam@berri.ai>
tests/proxy_unit_tests/ runs twice on every pull request. The nine
alphabetical shards in test-unit-proxy-legacy.yml cover the same
directory as the twelve semantic shards in test-unit-proxy-db.yml,
and all nine are required checks, so each PR pays for the directory
twice before it can merge.
The semantic shards are a strict superset. Expanding both matrices
against the working tree, the legacy globs collect 58 files while the
semantic shards name all 59: test_model_response_typing is a directory
and matches none of the test_[a-z]*.py patterns, so the legacy lane has
silently skipped it. The semantic workflow also carries its own
assert-shard-coverage guard, which fails if a file under that directory
is not assigned to a shard, so a new file cannot drop out of CI once the
alphabetical fallback is gone.
Verified with .github/scripts/assert_ci_coverage.py: 2380 test files
have a runner both before and after the deletion. Removing
test-unit-proxy-db.yml as well takes the same guard red with 58
orphaned files, which confirms the guard is live and that the semantic
shards, not the legacy ones, are what hold the coverage.
The nine bare contexts this workflow published (auth-and-jwt,
key-generation, proxy-config, proxy-server, proxy-server-extras,
proxy-token-counter, proxy-response-and-misc, proxy-user-auth-and-spend,
proxy-utils) still need pruning from the guard-internal-staging ruleset,
which needs admin rights and is not part of this change
The prisma P2034 transaction conflict can surface only as the message
"Transaction failed due to a write conflict or a deadlock" without the
code being reachable on the raised object, so the message fallback in
is_deadlock_error now matches that canonical wording in addition to
40P01 / deadlock detected. Fixes the proxy-infra unit test that asserts
this exact prisma message is treated as a retryable deadlock.
Spend-update transactions increment non-idempotent counters
(spend = spend + x) inside prisma interactive transactions. Every retry
loop only caught DB_RETRY_SAFE_ERROR_TYPES (httpx.ConnectError); a
Postgres deadlock (SQLSTATE 40P01, surfaced by prisma as transaction
conflict code P2034) fell through to a bare except that re-raised
immediately, so on multi-pod / high-concurrency deployments any pod that
lost a deadlock silently dropped its increment.
A deadlock is replay-safe even though the increment is non-idempotent:
Postgres aborts and fully rolls back the victim transaction, so no
partial spend is committed. Add PrismaDBExceptionHandler.is_deadlock_error
and route every spend path (user, end-user/key, team, team_member, org,
tag/agent via _update_entity_spend_in_db, and the daily-spend upsert)
through a shared _handle_spend_update_failure that retries connection
errors and deadlocks with randomized jitter backoff and re-raises
everything else or on exhaustion.
The Admin UI's Authorize & Fetch Token flow stored its pending server in a
module-level dict, so /register, /authorize and /token only succeeded when
every leg happened to land on the process that served /session. On a proxy
with NUM_WORKERS greater than 1, or more than one replica, each click was an
independent draw and failed with a bare 404, which reads as intermittent.
Persist the pending server as a short-lived draft row instead, so any worker
resolves it. The in-memory cache is kept as the fallback for proxies with no
database configured, which keeps single-process deployments working as before.
A session runs under a caller-supplied id only when that id names a server
that really exists, which is the edit form re-authorizing a saved server.
Anything else gets a fresh id, so two concurrent sessions can never share one
draft and silently adopt each other's URL or client credentials. Drafts past
their lifetime are swept on each write so abandoned sessions do not
accumulate, and a lost create race adopts the winner rather than failing a
caller whose session is ready.
Drafts are excluded from listings and never enter the runtime registry. The
exclusion keeps rows whose approval status is NULL, which both short spellings
of the filter drop, silently hiding every server predating the approval
workflow.
Measured on a two-worker proxy against the live GitHub MCP server, 120
concurrent authorize calls per leg: staging 56/120 failures, this branch
0/120, staging again 65/120 as a positive control.
* fix(team): sweep dangling team references and cache on team delete
delete_team drove all of its cleanup off the team's members_with_roles roster, so any
user row referencing the team by another route kept a dangling team id forever and the
deleted team stayed visible on /user/info. Nothing swept LiteLLM_UserTable.teams or
LiteLLM_TeamMembership by team id, schema.prisma declares no relation between the
membership table and the team table so there is no cascade to fall back on, and the
cached team object was never invalidated on delete.
Adds a sweep that runs before the team rows are dropped: it strips the deleted ids from
every user row that still lists them and removes every membership row for those teams.
Adds _delete_cache_team_object in auth_checks and calls it per deleted team so the
team_id:{team_id} entry cannot outlive the team.
The sweep is targeted, not indiscriminate: only the deleted ids are removed and the
other teams on a user record are left intact.
* fix(team): fail member_add when the team is deleted under the row lock
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs(team): correct the post-delete sweep note for the member_add lock path
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(ui): stop a deselected MCP server keeping its grant on a virtual key
The key editor sent `mcp_tool_permissions` unfiltered, and the MCP resolver
counts a server named only under `mcp_tool_permissions` as entitled, unioning
`tool_perm_servers` into `all_servers` at four sites in
`user_api_key_auth_mcp.py`. Deselecting a server, or removing the access group
that supplied it, therefore left a stale entry that kept the key reaching that
server with its old tool allowlist attached.
Reuse `extractMcpEntitlement`, which already landed for the internal-user
surface, so the key surface drops an entry only once the server is known and no
longer granted, and keeps it whenever a retained access group or toolset could
still supply it. The helper moves to a shared module so the key template does
not import a users page component.
Setting the map unconditionally is part of the same fix: the old
`Object.keys(...).length > 0` guard let the previous map ride through the
`object_permission` spread, which filtering to an empty map would otherwise hit
in exactly the case the fix is for.
* fix(ui): resolve retained MCP groups and toolsets per server when pruning tool permissions
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* test(ui): mock the MCP toolsets hook in the key update suite
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
/ui/chat never rendered a metrics bar. The Responses helper already parses
usage off the response.completed event, but the chat page passed positional
undefined where onTimingData, onUsageData and onTotalLatency sit, ChatMessage
had nowhere to hold them, and ChatMessages never rendered ResponseMetrics.
Thread the three callbacks through, persist the values on the assistant
message, and reuse the playground's ResponseMetrics to show latency, TTFT,
input/output/total tokens and cost. Also map the cost the proxy reports on the
streamed usage object, which only the chat-completions helper did before.
Two behaviour differences the port introduced, both found in browser QA
The antd Select matched a prebuilt pattern on its display_name and its
internal name; a Base UI Combobox only searches itemToStringLabel, so
queries like "amex" and "sg" stopped matching. Restore the second field
with a filter predicate on the Root, covered by a regression test that
searches on a token the visible label does not contain
Base UI portals a popup into a positioner whose "isolate z-50" is fixed
in the primitive, so inside an antd Modal at z-index 1000 the options
were visible but not clickable. antd hid this because its own dropdowns
and tooltips already sat above its Modal. The positioner is not reachable
from the call site, so this needs one app-wide rule keyed on an antd
modal being present, and it becomes deletable when the last one goes
* feat(azure_ai): add Fireworks FW model pricing on Azure AI Foundry
* fix(azure_ai): drop incorrect FW-Kimi-K2.6-Code alias
* test(azure-ai): assert FW max token metadata
* feat(azure_ai): add Inkling and Nemotron 3 Ultra pricing
* fix(cli): hide codex and opencode from the lite command listings
They stay registered and invokable, so existing `lite codex` users keep
working; they just no longer show up in `lite --help` or the interactive
shell's command list.
* feat(cli): make the hidden lite command list configurable
codex and opencode are supported, so hardcoding them as hidden was wrong. Let deployments curate their own listing with `lite config set hidden_commands codex,opencode` instead; nothing is hidden by default and hidden commands stay invokable.
Co-Authored-By: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Devin AI <158243242+devin-ai-integration[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
os.exec* has no process-replacement semantics on Windows, so `lite claude`
printed its routing line and returned to the prompt while Claude Code was left
detached without a usable console. Windows now spawns the agent, waits for it,
and exits with the child's status. Batch shims such as the npm-installed
claude.cmd go through cmd.exe because CreateProcess cannot run them directly,
and that command line is emitted verbatim with every token quoted so a spaced
path or an argument holding a shell metacharacter cannot be re-parsed by the
command processor. POSIX keeps using os.execvpe unchanged.
/team/member_delete dropped the roster entry by matching user_email against
members_with_roles, then built its user-row lookup from that same raw email
instead of from the user_id the roster entry already carries. An email the user
row does not literally hold matched nothing, so the team id stayed in the user's
teams array and the team-membership row was left orphaned while the call still
returned 200.
/team/member_add resolves an email to a user case-insensitively but stores the
caller's casing on the roster, so inviting "Alice@Example.com" for a row holding
"alice@example.com" and removing by that same string is enough to reach it.
_cleanup_members_with_roles now returns the roster entries it removed, and both
the user-row update and the membership delete run against their user ids.
When get_team_object fails, the centralized auth gate rebuilds the team
from the token's own fields. A token whose team row was missing when the
key was read carries team_models=[] and team_blocked=False, and the
model-access check reads an empty model list as every model, so the
rebuilt team grants more than the real team ever did.
get_team_object reported a deleted team and a database that would not
answer as the same 404, so the fallback could not tell a definitive
answer from a degraded read. Raise a TeamNotFoundError subclass, still a
404 with the same detail so every other caller is unaffected, only when
the database answers and the row is absent.
A team that is provably gone now refuses, and no setting overrides that.
Otherwise the grant is merely unknown: a token carrying one may vouch,
since replaying a recorded grant cannot widen it, and a token carrying
none may not. allow_requests_on_db_unavailable still opts back out there,
and is only consulted once the failure is known to be a degraded read.
